Cedric M. Scott, PhD v. General Land Office of the State of Texas

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedNovember 25, 2025
Docket15-25-00217-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Cedric M. Scott, PhD v. General Land Office of the State of Texas (Cedric M. Scott, PhD v. General Land Office of the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cedric M. Scott, PhD v. General Land Office of the State of Texas, (Tex. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

ACCEPTED 15-25-00217-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 11/25/2025 3:53 PM CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE IN THE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS CLERK AT AUSTIN, TEXAS FILED IN 15th COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 11/25/2025 3:53:47 PM CASE NO. 15-25-00217-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk (Transferred from the Third Court of Appeals)

CEDRIC M. SCOTT, PhD Appellant, Pro Se

v.

GENERAL LAND OFFICE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS Appellee

On Appeal from the 250th Judicial District Court of Travis County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-25-000006

APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST GLO FOR FILING A FRIVOLOUS MOTION TO DISMISS

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Cedric M. Scott Cedric M. Scott, PhD 901 Hidden Valley Drive, #9204 Round Rock, Texas 78665 cedricscott41@gmail.com

Appellant, Pro Se TO THE HONORABLE FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS:

Appellant, Cedric M. Scott, PhD1, respectfully moves for sanctions against

the General Land Office (“GLO”) pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 45, Tex. Civ. Prac. &

Rem. Code Chapter 10, and this Court’s inherent authority, and states as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

GLO’s Motion to Dismiss is legally frivolous, factually unsupported, and

procedurally improper. It relies on rulings issued by a disqualified trial judge, seeks

affirmative appellate relief while GLO remains in procedural default, and

misrepresents that Appellant “agreed” to dismissal based on an informal email sent

before Appellant learned of Judge Liu’s conflict of interest. GLO’s Motion to

Dismiss lacks any basis in law or fact, and because it was filed for the improper

purpose of obscuring structural judicial error and avoiding appellate review,

sanctions are warranted.

II. THE MOTION TO DISMISS IS FRIVOLOUS UNDER TRAP 45

An appellate court may award damages and costs when a party files a

frivolous motion or brief. Tex. R. App. P. 45. A motion is frivolous when:

1. It has no reasonable legal basis,

2. It misstates controlling principles, or

1 Plaintiff’s first name is pronounced See-Drick and not Said-Drick. Gender is female, and pronouns are she, her, and hers.

2 3. A reasonable attorney should know it cannot succeed.

GLO’s arguments depend on orders issued by Judge Cory R. Liu, who was

later discovered to be legally disqualified under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(a)(1)(B). A

disqualified judge’s rulings are void ab initio. In re City of Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d

506, 510 (Tex. 2021) and In re Union Pac. Res. Co., 969 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tex.

1998). Void orders cannot support dismissal, the Motion to Dismiss has no legal

foundation.

III. GLO CANNOT SEEK AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF WHILE IN DEFAULT

GLO never answered Appellant’s Second Amended Petition, filed August

12, 2025, which added new allegations—including cronyism, blacklisting,

conflicts of interest, discovery abuse, and contract-management failures. Under

Tex. R. Civ. P. 62–65, new allegations require a new answer. Stoner v. Thompson,

578 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Tex. 1979), a party that fails to answer is in default and may

not seek any affirmative relief, including:

• Motions to dismiss,

• Motions to compel,

• Discovery orders, or

• Appellate relief.

By filing a Motion to Dismiss despite being in procedural default, GLO

invoked a remedy the law prohibits. This alone renders the Motion frivolous. 3 IV. GLO MISREPRESENTS APPELLANT’S “NON-OPPOSITION” EMAIL

Appellant’s email (dated 10/24/2025) sent weeks before Judge Liu’s recusal and

did not waive any rights because it was:

a. Not filed with the Court,

b. Not a Rule 11 agreement,

c. Not an intentional relinquishment of a known right, and

d. Sent before Appellant discovered the relevance of Judge Liu’s

disqualification.

Therefore, structural judicial errors cannot be waived. Buckholts I.S.D. v. Glaser,

632 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tex. 1982) and Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S.

868, 886–87 (2009). GLO’s reliance on this email is misleading and frivolous.

V. SANCTIONS ARE AUTHORIZED UNDER TEXAS LAW

A. TRAP 45 — Frivolous Motions

This Court may award just damages, costs, or “single or double costs”

against a party filing a frivolous appellate motion.

B. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 10.001–10.006

Sanctions are appropriate where filings are:

1. Submitted for an improper purpose,
2. Legally insufficient, or

3. Without evidentiary support. 4 Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 619 (Tex. 2007) (affirming sanctions for misuse of

judicial process). GLO’s Motion to Dismiss fits all categories mentioned in this

section.

C. Inherent Authority

Courts may sanction conduct that abuses judicial process. In re Bennett, 960

S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex. 1997). Filing a motion founded on void orders, procedural

default, and misrepresentation of waiver is such abuse. GLO never rejoined issue

and remains in default, which bars any motion to dismiss. Because appellate

jurisdiction depends on a valid order, and because GLO has none, their dismissal

argument cannot stand.

D. Texas Whistleblower Act requires judgment where statutory causation is met

Tex. Gov’t Code §554.004(a):

• If termination occurs within 90 days of a protected report, causation is

presumed as a matter of law. Appellant reported to HUD-OIG and Texas

Rangers and GLO fired her within 90 days. Thus, causation is established.

GLO produced zero rebuttal evidence (because they defaulted). Thus, under the

Act: (a) Liability is established, and (b) Judgment is appropriate.

E. Internal Audit Report 25-01 corroborates your protected activity

GLO’s internal audit report confirms:

• GLO’s longstanding pattern of violations 5 • The exact deficiencies you reported

• Failures involving federal funds, contract oversight, compliance, and

monitoring

This independent government-generated report suffices as objective corroboration

of your whistleblower complaints. Therefore, no contrary evidence exists.

F. Summary Judgment Relief

The Fifteenth Court of Appeals possesses authority to grant judgment in

Appellant’s favor because this record presents the rare situation where the:

1. Trial court never had lawful authority to act,
2. Appellee remains in procedural default, and
3. Material facts are undisputed.

A judge who is disqualified under Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b “is without authority to

act, and any orders issued are void ab initio.” In re City of Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d

506, 510 (Tex. 2021); In re Union Pac., 969 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tex. 1998).

Thus, every ruling made by Judge Liu—including the denial of Appellant’s

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Related

Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.
556 U.S. 868 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Low v. Henry
221 S.W.3d 609 (Texas Supreme Court, 2007)
In Re Union Pacific Resources Co.
969 S.W.2d 427 (Texas Supreme Court, 1998)
Buckholts Independent School District v. Glaser
632 S.W.2d 146 (Texas Supreme Court, 1982)
Stoner v. Thompson
578 S.W.2d 679 (Texas Supreme Court, 1979)
In Re Bennett
960 S.W.2d 35 (Texas Supreme Court, 1998)

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