NONPRECEDENTIALȱDISPOSITION Toȱbeȱcitedȱonlyȱinȱaccordanceȱwithȱ Fed.ȱR.ȱApp.ȱP.ȱ32.1
United States Court of Appeals ForȱtheȱSeventhȱCircuit Chicago,ȱIllinoisȱ60604
SubmittedȱJuneȱ23,ȱ2010* DecidedȱJulyȱ27,ȱ2010
Before
JOHNȱL.ȱCOFFEY,ȱCircuitȱJudgeȱ
JOELȱM.ȱFLAUM,ȱCircuitȱJudge
DANIELȱA.ȱMANION,ȱCircuitȱJudge
No.ȱ09Ȭ1035
CEDRICȱDUPREE, AppealȱfromȱtheȱUnitedȱStatesȱDistrict PlaintiffȬAppellant, CourtȱforȱtheȱSouthernȱDistrictȱofȱIllinois.
v. 02ȬcvȬ1059ȬDRH
EARLYȱLASTER,ȱetȱal., DavidȱR.ȱHerndon, DefendantsȬAppellees. ChiefȱJudge.
OȱRȱDȱEȱR
CedricȱDupree,ȱanȱIllinoisȱinmate,ȱsuedȱemployeesȱofȱtheȱIllinoisȱDepartmentȱof Correctionsȱunderȱ42ȱU.S.C.ȱ§ȱ1983,ȱclaimingȱthatȱtheyȱhadȱinterferedȱwithȱhisȱrightȱto practiceȱhisȱreligionȱinȱviolationȱofȱtheȱFirstȱAmendmentȱandȱtheȱReligiousȱLandȱUseȱand InstitutionalizedȱPersonsȱActȱ(“RLUIPA”),ȱ42ȱU.S.C.ȱ§§ȱ2000cc—ccȬ5.ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱcourt initiallyȱdismissedȱtheȱcomplaintȱatȱscreening,ȱandȱweȱremanded,ȱconcludingȱthatȱDupree’s complaintȱsufficientlyȱstatedȱclaimsȱunderȱtheȱFirstȱAmendmentȱandȱRLUIPA.ȱȱDupreeȱv.
* Afterȱexaminingȱtheȱbriefsȱandȱtheȱrecord,ȱweȱhaveȱconcludedȱthatȱoralȱargumentȱis unnecessary.ȱȱThus,ȱtheȱappealȱisȱsubmittedȱonȱtheȱbriefsȱandȱtheȱrecord.ȱȱSeeȱFED.ȱR.ȱAPP.ȱP. 34(a)(2)(C). No.ȱ09Ȭ1035 Pageȱ2
Laster,ȱ106ȱF.ȱApp’xȱ503ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ2004).ȱȱOnȱremandȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱrecruitedȱcounselȱto representȱDupreeȱand,ȱafterȱaȱthreeȬdayȱjuryȱtrial,ȱenteredȱjudgmentȱinȱfavorȱofȱthe defendants.ȱȱDupreeȱappeals,ȱbutȱbecauseȱheȱhasȱfailedȱtoȱprovideȱusȱwithȱaȱtrialȱtranscript, weȱareȱunableȱtoȱconsiderȱmanyȱofȱhisȱarguments.ȱȱSeeȱFED.ȱR.ȱAPP.ȱP.ȱ10(b)(2).ȱȱOfȱthoseȱthat weȱareȱableȱtoȱreview,ȱnoneȱhasȱmerit,ȱandȱweȱaffirmȱtheȱjudgmentȱofȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt.
DupreeȱtriedȱhisȱFirstȱAmendmentȱandȱRLUIPAȱclaimsȱbeforeȱaȱjuryȱandȱfocusedȱon threeȱincidents.ȱȱHeȱclaimedȱthatȱtheȱdefendantsȱviolatedȱhisȱrightȱtoȱreligiousȱexerciseȱwhen theyȱsuspendedȱhimȱfromȱattendingȱgroupȱchurchȱservicesȱwhileȱinȱsegregation,ȱandȱwhen theyȱdisciplinedȱhimȱforȱhavingȱaȱBibleȱinȱtheȱ“chowȱhall”ȱandȱforȱgatheringȱinmatesȱfor prayerȱinȱtheȱdietaryȱunit.ȱȱAfterȱtheȱjuryȱreturnedȱaȱverdictȱforȱtheȱdefendants,ȱDupreeȱfiled proȱseȱaȱmotionȱforȱaȱnewȱtrialȱorȱtoȱsetȱasideȱtheȱjuryȱverdictȱandȱthreeȱsupplemental motionsȱforȱaȱnewȱtrial.ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱcourtȱtreatedȱtheȱfirstȱthreeȱofȱhisȱfilingsȱasȱmotionsȱfor aȱnewȱtrialȱunderȱRuleȱ59(a)ȱandȱhisȱlastȱfilingȱasȱaȱRuleȱ60(b)ȱmotionȱforȱreliefȱfrom judgment;ȱtheȱcourtȱdeniedȱeach.ȱȱSeeȱFED.ȱR.ȱCIV.ȱP.ȱ59(a);ȱFED.ȱR.ȱCIV.ȱP.ȱ60(b).ȱȱDupree’s attorneyȱmovedȱtoȱwithdraw,ȱcitingȱDupree’sȱclaimȱthatȱheȱhadȱreceivedȱineffective assistanceȱofȱcounselȱduringȱtheȱtrial.ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱcourtȱgrantedȱcounsel’sȱrequestȱandȱlater deniedȱDupree’sȱmotionȱforȱreappointmentȱofȱcounsel.ȱȱ
OnȱappealȱDupreeȱchallengesȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱdenialȱofȱhisȱpostȬtrialȱmotions.ȱȱHis mostȱsubstantiveȱargumentsȱforȱaȱnewȱtrialȱareȱthatȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱerredȱinȱallowingȱthe defendantsȱtoȱintroduceȱevidenceȱofȱhisȱpriorȱconvictionsȱandȱprisonȱdiscipline, misinstructingȱtheȱjuryȱasȱtoȱtheȱburdensȱofȱproofȱforȱestablishingȱaȱviolationȱunder RLUIPA,ȱandȱnotȱoverturningȱtheȱjury’sȱverdictȱdenyingȱhisȱclaimȱthatȱtheȱdefendants prohibitedȱhimȱfromȱattendingȱgroupȱworship.ȱȱDupreeȱalsoȱassertsȱthatȱtheȱcourtȱignored hisȱcomplaintsȱthatȱheȱwasȱnotȱallowedȱtoȱbringȱhisȱlegalȱdocumentsȱtoȱcourt,ȱthatȱonȱone occasionȱtheȱjuryȱsawȱhimȱinȱshacklesȱasȱheȱexitedȱtheȱcourtroom,ȱandȱthatȱheȱwasȱnot allowedȱtoȱpresentȱevidenceȱthatȱduringȱtheȱtrialȱprisonȱemployeesȱbeatȱhimȱinȱretaliation forȱhisȱlawsuit.ȱȱEachȱofȱtheseȱpurportedȱerrors,ȱDupreeȱcontends,ȱprejudicedȱhisȱcaseȱand warrantsȱaȱnewȱtrial.
Ordinarilyȱourȱreviewȱofȱaȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱdenialȱofȱaȱmotionȱforȱaȱnewȱtrialȱisȱforȱan abuseȱofȱdiscretion.ȱȱMooreȱexȱrel.ȱEstateȱofȱGradyȱv.ȱTuleja,ȱ546ȱF.3dȱ423,ȱ427ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ2008).ȱȱA newȱtrialȱmayȱbeȱgrantedȱonlyȱifȱtheȱjury’sȱverdictȱisȱagainstȱtheȱmanifestȱweightȱofȱthe evidence,ȱmeaningȱ“noȱrationalȱjury”ȱcouldȱhaveȱrenderedȱtheȱverdict.ȱȱId.ȱ(quotingȱKingȱv. Harrington,ȱ447ȱF.3dȱ531,ȱ534ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ2006)).ȱȱAtȱtheȱoutset,ȱweȱnoteȱthatȱDupreeȱhasȱnot specifiedȱwhatȱhisȱpriorȱconvictionsȱorȱprisonȱdisciplineȱwereȱfor,ȱandȱthusȱweȱcannot evaluateȱhisȱclaimȱthatȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱshouldȱhaveȱexcludedȱthemȱatȱtrial.ȱȱMoreover,ȱwe areȱunableȱtoȱdetermineȱwhetherȱtheȱverdictȱisȱagainstȱtheȱmanifestȱweightȱofȱtheȱevidence orȱwhetherȱtheȱpurportedȱerrorsȱprejudicedȱDupreeȱbecauseȱheȱhasȱnotȱincludedȱaȱtrial No.ȱ09Ȭ1035 Pageȱ3
transcriptȱinȱtheȱrecord.ȱȱWithoutȱtheȱtranscript,ȱweȱareȱunableȱtoȱverifyȱhisȱclaimsȱor conductȱanyȱmeaningfulȱappellateȱreviewȱofȱhisȱargumentsȱforȱaȱnewȱtrial.ȱȱSeeȱLearning CurveȱToys,ȱInc.ȱv.ȱPlayWoodȱToys,ȱInc.,ȱ342ȱF.3dȱ714,ȱ731ȱn.10ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ2003);ȱLaFolletteȱv. Savage,ȱ63ȱF.3dȱ540,ȱ544ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ1995).ȱȱFederalȱRuleȱofȱAppellateȱProcedureȱ10(b)(2) providesȱthatȱ“[i]fȱtheȱappellantȱintendsȱtoȱurgeȱonȱappealȱthatȱaȱfindingȱorȱconclusionȱis unsupportedȱbyȱtheȱevidenceȱorȱisȱcontraryȱtoȱtheȱevidence,ȱtheȱappellantȱmustȱincludeȱin theȱrecordȱaȱtranscriptȱofȱallȱevidenceȱrelevantȱtoȱthatȱfindingȱorȱconclusion.”ȱȱFED.ȱR.ȱAPP.ȱP. 10(b)(2);ȱseeȱLearningȱCurveȱToys,ȱInc.,ȱ342ȱF.3dȱatȱ731ȱn.10.ȱȱBecauseȱDupree’sȱarguments requireȱusȱtoȱevaluateȱtheȱtrialȱevidenceȱasȱwellȱasȱstepsȱtakenȱbyȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱto minimizeȱanyȱprejudice,ȱhisȱfailureȱtoȱprovideȱtheȱtranscriptȱrendersȱtheȱarguments forfeited.ȱȱSeeȱLearningȱCurveȱToys,ȱInc.,ȱ342ȱF.3dȱatȱ731ȱn.10.ȱȱDupree’sȱproȱseȱstatusȱdoesȱnot prohibitȱthisȱresult.ȱȱSeeȱWoodsȱv.ȱThieret,ȱ5ȱF.3dȱ244,ȱ245ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ1993)ȱ(dismissingȱinȱpart theȱappealȱofȱproȱseȱplaintiffȱforȱfailureȱtoȱprovideȱtranscript).ȱȱ
WeȱcouldȱorderȱDupreeȱtoȱsupplementȱtheȱrecordȱasȱauthorizedȱunderȱFederalȱRule ofȱAppellateȱProcedureȱ10(e),ȱseeȱLaFollette,ȱ63ȱF.3dȱatȱ545,ȱbutȱweȱdeclineȱtoȱdoȱsoȱhere.ȱȱIn theirȱresponseȱbrief,ȱtheȱappelleesȱgaveȱDupreeȱnoticeȱofȱhisȱobligationȱtoȱhaveȱtheȱtranscript preparedȱandȱtheȱconsequencesȱofȱhisȱfailureȱtoȱdoȱso.ȱȱDespiteȱthisȱnotice,ȱDupreeȱhasȱmade noȱattemptȱtoȱsecureȱaȱtranscript.ȱȱSeeȱLearningȱCurveȱToys,ȱInc.,ȱ342ȱF.3dȱatȱ731ȱn.10; LaFollette,ȱ63ȱF.3dȱatȱ545Ȭ46.
Weȱcan,ȱhowever,ȱaddressȱaȱfewȱofȱDupree’sȱargumentsȱonȱtheirȱface.ȱȱDupreeȱ complainsȱthatȱhisȱrecruitedȱcounselȱwasȱineffectiveȱinȱfailingȱtoȱserveȱoneȱofȱtheȱdefendants who,ȱDupreeȱcontends,ȱcouldȱhaveȱtestifiedȱtoȱsupportȱhisȱclaims.ȱȱButȱasȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt correctlyȱexplainedȱwhenȱitȱdeniedȱhisȱRuleȱ59(a)ȱmotion,ȱthereȱisȱnoȱSixthȬAmendment rightȱtoȱeffectiveȱassistanceȱofȱcounselȱinȱaȱcivilȱcase,ȱsoȱhisȱdissatisfactionȱwithȱcounsel’s performanceȱdoesȱnotȱwarrantȱaȱnewȱtrial.ȱȱSeeȱStancielȱv.ȱGramley,ȱ267ȱF.3dȱ575,ȱ581ȱ(7thȱCir. 2001).ȱ
Dupreeȱalsoȱcontendsȱthatȱafterȱthisȱcourt’sȱremand,ȱtheȱcaseȱshouldȱhaveȱbeen reassignedȱtoȱaȱnewȱdistrictȱjudge.ȱȱInȱhisȱthirdȱsupplementalȱmotionȱforȱaȱnewȱtrial,ȱhe reliedȱuponȱSupremeȱCourtȱRuleȱ36ȱinȱarguingȱthatȱheȱwasȱentitledȱuponȱremandȱtoȱa changeȱofȱvenueȱandȱhenceȱaȱnewȱjudge.ȱȱSupremeȱCourtȱRuleȱ36,ȱhowever,ȱgovernsȱthe custodyȱofȱprisonersȱinȱhabeasȱcorpusȱproceedings,ȱandȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱcorrectlyȱnoted thatȱtheȱruleȱdoesȱnotȱapplyȱtoȱDupree’sȱcase.ȱȱTheȱcourtȱthusȱdeniedȱDupree’sȱmotion, whichȱitȱconstruedȱasȱaȱRuleȱ60(b)ȱmotionȱforȱreliefȱfromȱjudgmentȱbecauseȱitȱwasȱfiledȱmore thanȱtenȱdaysȱafterȱtheȱentryȱofȱjudgment.ȱȱSeeȱFED.ȱR.ȱCIV.ȱP.ȱ59(b)ȱ(2008)ȱ(amendedȱDec.ȱ1, 2009);ȱFED.ȱR.ȱCIV.ȱP.ȱ60(b);ȱTalanoȱv.ȱNw.ȱMed.ȱFacultyȱFound.,ȱInc.,ȱ273ȱF.3dȱ757,ȱ762ȱ(7thȱCir. 2001).ȱȱPerhapsȱDupreeȱintendedȱtoȱrelyȱonȱourȱCircuitȱRuleȱ36,ȱwhichȱprovidesȱthat “[w]heneverȱaȱcaseȱtriedȱinȱaȱdistrictȱcourtȱisȱremandedȱbyȱthisȱcourtȱforȱaȱnewȱtrial,ȱitȱshall No.ȱ09Ȭ1035 Pageȱ4
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NONPRECEDENTIALȱDISPOSITION Toȱbeȱcitedȱonlyȱinȱaccordanceȱwithȱ Fed.ȱR.ȱApp.ȱP.ȱ32.1
United States Court of Appeals ForȱtheȱSeventhȱCircuit Chicago,ȱIllinoisȱ60604
SubmittedȱJuneȱ23,ȱ2010* DecidedȱJulyȱ27,ȱ2010
Before
JOHNȱL.ȱCOFFEY,ȱCircuitȱJudgeȱ
JOELȱM.ȱFLAUM,ȱCircuitȱJudge
DANIELȱA.ȱMANION,ȱCircuitȱJudge
No.ȱ09Ȭ1035
CEDRICȱDUPREE, AppealȱfromȱtheȱUnitedȱStatesȱDistrict PlaintiffȬAppellant, CourtȱforȱtheȱSouthernȱDistrictȱofȱIllinois.
v. 02ȬcvȬ1059ȬDRH
EARLYȱLASTER,ȱetȱal., DavidȱR.ȱHerndon, DefendantsȬAppellees. ChiefȱJudge.
OȱRȱDȱEȱR
CedricȱDupree,ȱanȱIllinoisȱinmate,ȱsuedȱemployeesȱofȱtheȱIllinoisȱDepartmentȱof Correctionsȱunderȱ42ȱU.S.C.ȱ§ȱ1983,ȱclaimingȱthatȱtheyȱhadȱinterferedȱwithȱhisȱrightȱto practiceȱhisȱreligionȱinȱviolationȱofȱtheȱFirstȱAmendmentȱandȱtheȱReligiousȱLandȱUseȱand InstitutionalizedȱPersonsȱActȱ(“RLUIPA”),ȱ42ȱU.S.C.ȱ§§ȱ2000cc—ccȬ5.ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱcourt initiallyȱdismissedȱtheȱcomplaintȱatȱscreening,ȱandȱweȱremanded,ȱconcludingȱthatȱDupree’s complaintȱsufficientlyȱstatedȱclaimsȱunderȱtheȱFirstȱAmendmentȱandȱRLUIPA.ȱȱDupreeȱv.
* Afterȱexaminingȱtheȱbriefsȱandȱtheȱrecord,ȱweȱhaveȱconcludedȱthatȱoralȱargumentȱis unnecessary.ȱȱThus,ȱtheȱappealȱisȱsubmittedȱonȱtheȱbriefsȱandȱtheȱrecord.ȱȱSeeȱFED.ȱR.ȱAPP.ȱP. 34(a)(2)(C). No.ȱ09Ȭ1035 Pageȱ2
Laster,ȱ106ȱF.ȱApp’xȱ503ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ2004).ȱȱOnȱremandȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱrecruitedȱcounselȱto representȱDupreeȱand,ȱafterȱaȱthreeȬdayȱjuryȱtrial,ȱenteredȱjudgmentȱinȱfavorȱofȱthe defendants.ȱȱDupreeȱappeals,ȱbutȱbecauseȱheȱhasȱfailedȱtoȱprovideȱusȱwithȱaȱtrialȱtranscript, weȱareȱunableȱtoȱconsiderȱmanyȱofȱhisȱarguments.ȱȱSeeȱFED.ȱR.ȱAPP.ȱP.ȱ10(b)(2).ȱȱOfȱthoseȱthat weȱareȱableȱtoȱreview,ȱnoneȱhasȱmerit,ȱandȱweȱaffirmȱtheȱjudgmentȱofȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt.
DupreeȱtriedȱhisȱFirstȱAmendmentȱandȱRLUIPAȱclaimsȱbeforeȱaȱjuryȱandȱfocusedȱon threeȱincidents.ȱȱHeȱclaimedȱthatȱtheȱdefendantsȱviolatedȱhisȱrightȱtoȱreligiousȱexerciseȱwhen theyȱsuspendedȱhimȱfromȱattendingȱgroupȱchurchȱservicesȱwhileȱinȱsegregation,ȱandȱwhen theyȱdisciplinedȱhimȱforȱhavingȱaȱBibleȱinȱtheȱ“chowȱhall”ȱandȱforȱgatheringȱinmatesȱfor prayerȱinȱtheȱdietaryȱunit.ȱȱAfterȱtheȱjuryȱreturnedȱaȱverdictȱforȱtheȱdefendants,ȱDupreeȱfiled proȱseȱaȱmotionȱforȱaȱnewȱtrialȱorȱtoȱsetȱasideȱtheȱjuryȱverdictȱandȱthreeȱsupplemental motionsȱforȱaȱnewȱtrial.ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱcourtȱtreatedȱtheȱfirstȱthreeȱofȱhisȱfilingsȱasȱmotionsȱfor aȱnewȱtrialȱunderȱRuleȱ59(a)ȱandȱhisȱlastȱfilingȱasȱaȱRuleȱ60(b)ȱmotionȱforȱreliefȱfrom judgment;ȱtheȱcourtȱdeniedȱeach.ȱȱSeeȱFED.ȱR.ȱCIV.ȱP.ȱ59(a);ȱFED.ȱR.ȱCIV.ȱP.ȱ60(b).ȱȱDupree’s attorneyȱmovedȱtoȱwithdraw,ȱcitingȱDupree’sȱclaimȱthatȱheȱhadȱreceivedȱineffective assistanceȱofȱcounselȱduringȱtheȱtrial.ȱȱTheȱdistrictȱcourtȱgrantedȱcounsel’sȱrequestȱandȱlater deniedȱDupree’sȱmotionȱforȱreappointmentȱofȱcounsel.ȱȱ
OnȱappealȱDupreeȱchallengesȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱdenialȱofȱhisȱpostȬtrialȱmotions.ȱȱHis mostȱsubstantiveȱargumentsȱforȱaȱnewȱtrialȱareȱthatȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱerredȱinȱallowingȱthe defendantsȱtoȱintroduceȱevidenceȱofȱhisȱpriorȱconvictionsȱandȱprisonȱdiscipline, misinstructingȱtheȱjuryȱasȱtoȱtheȱburdensȱofȱproofȱforȱestablishingȱaȱviolationȱunder RLUIPA,ȱandȱnotȱoverturningȱtheȱjury’sȱverdictȱdenyingȱhisȱclaimȱthatȱtheȱdefendants prohibitedȱhimȱfromȱattendingȱgroupȱworship.ȱȱDupreeȱalsoȱassertsȱthatȱtheȱcourtȱignored hisȱcomplaintsȱthatȱheȱwasȱnotȱallowedȱtoȱbringȱhisȱlegalȱdocumentsȱtoȱcourt,ȱthatȱonȱone occasionȱtheȱjuryȱsawȱhimȱinȱshacklesȱasȱheȱexitedȱtheȱcourtroom,ȱandȱthatȱheȱwasȱnot allowedȱtoȱpresentȱevidenceȱthatȱduringȱtheȱtrialȱprisonȱemployeesȱbeatȱhimȱinȱretaliation forȱhisȱlawsuit.ȱȱEachȱofȱtheseȱpurportedȱerrors,ȱDupreeȱcontends,ȱprejudicedȱhisȱcaseȱand warrantsȱaȱnewȱtrial.
Ordinarilyȱourȱreviewȱofȱaȱdistrictȱcourt’sȱdenialȱofȱaȱmotionȱforȱaȱnewȱtrialȱisȱforȱan abuseȱofȱdiscretion.ȱȱMooreȱexȱrel.ȱEstateȱofȱGradyȱv.ȱTuleja,ȱ546ȱF.3dȱ423,ȱ427ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ2008).ȱȱA newȱtrialȱmayȱbeȱgrantedȱonlyȱifȱtheȱjury’sȱverdictȱisȱagainstȱtheȱmanifestȱweightȱofȱthe evidence,ȱmeaningȱ“noȱrationalȱjury”ȱcouldȱhaveȱrenderedȱtheȱverdict.ȱȱId.ȱ(quotingȱKingȱv. Harrington,ȱ447ȱF.3dȱ531,ȱ534ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ2006)).ȱȱAtȱtheȱoutset,ȱweȱnoteȱthatȱDupreeȱhasȱnot specifiedȱwhatȱhisȱpriorȱconvictionsȱorȱprisonȱdisciplineȱwereȱfor,ȱandȱthusȱweȱcannot evaluateȱhisȱclaimȱthatȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱshouldȱhaveȱexcludedȱthemȱatȱtrial.ȱȱMoreover,ȱwe areȱunableȱtoȱdetermineȱwhetherȱtheȱverdictȱisȱagainstȱtheȱmanifestȱweightȱofȱtheȱevidence orȱwhetherȱtheȱpurportedȱerrorsȱprejudicedȱDupreeȱbecauseȱheȱhasȱnotȱincludedȱaȱtrial No.ȱ09Ȭ1035 Pageȱ3
transcriptȱinȱtheȱrecord.ȱȱWithoutȱtheȱtranscript,ȱweȱareȱunableȱtoȱverifyȱhisȱclaimsȱor conductȱanyȱmeaningfulȱappellateȱreviewȱofȱhisȱargumentsȱforȱaȱnewȱtrial.ȱȱSeeȱLearning CurveȱToys,ȱInc.ȱv.ȱPlayWoodȱToys,ȱInc.,ȱ342ȱF.3dȱ714,ȱ731ȱn.10ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ2003);ȱLaFolletteȱv. Savage,ȱ63ȱF.3dȱ540,ȱ544ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ1995).ȱȱFederalȱRuleȱofȱAppellateȱProcedureȱ10(b)(2) providesȱthatȱ“[i]fȱtheȱappellantȱintendsȱtoȱurgeȱonȱappealȱthatȱaȱfindingȱorȱconclusionȱis unsupportedȱbyȱtheȱevidenceȱorȱisȱcontraryȱtoȱtheȱevidence,ȱtheȱappellantȱmustȱincludeȱin theȱrecordȱaȱtranscriptȱofȱallȱevidenceȱrelevantȱtoȱthatȱfindingȱorȱconclusion.”ȱȱFED.ȱR.ȱAPP.ȱP. 10(b)(2);ȱseeȱLearningȱCurveȱToys,ȱInc.,ȱ342ȱF.3dȱatȱ731ȱn.10.ȱȱBecauseȱDupree’sȱarguments requireȱusȱtoȱevaluateȱtheȱtrialȱevidenceȱasȱwellȱasȱstepsȱtakenȱbyȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱto minimizeȱanyȱprejudice,ȱhisȱfailureȱtoȱprovideȱtheȱtranscriptȱrendersȱtheȱarguments forfeited.ȱȱSeeȱLearningȱCurveȱToys,ȱInc.,ȱ342ȱF.3dȱatȱ731ȱn.10.ȱȱDupree’sȱproȱseȱstatusȱdoesȱnot prohibitȱthisȱresult.ȱȱSeeȱWoodsȱv.ȱThieret,ȱ5ȱF.3dȱ244,ȱ245ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ1993)ȱ(dismissingȱinȱpart theȱappealȱofȱproȱseȱplaintiffȱforȱfailureȱtoȱprovideȱtranscript).ȱȱ
WeȱcouldȱorderȱDupreeȱtoȱsupplementȱtheȱrecordȱasȱauthorizedȱunderȱFederalȱRule ofȱAppellateȱProcedureȱ10(e),ȱseeȱLaFollette,ȱ63ȱF.3dȱatȱ545,ȱbutȱweȱdeclineȱtoȱdoȱsoȱhere.ȱȱIn theirȱresponseȱbrief,ȱtheȱappelleesȱgaveȱDupreeȱnoticeȱofȱhisȱobligationȱtoȱhaveȱtheȱtranscript preparedȱandȱtheȱconsequencesȱofȱhisȱfailureȱtoȱdoȱso.ȱȱDespiteȱthisȱnotice,ȱDupreeȱhasȱmade noȱattemptȱtoȱsecureȱaȱtranscript.ȱȱSeeȱLearningȱCurveȱToys,ȱInc.,ȱ342ȱF.3dȱatȱ731ȱn.10; LaFollette,ȱ63ȱF.3dȱatȱ545Ȭ46.
Weȱcan,ȱhowever,ȱaddressȱaȱfewȱofȱDupree’sȱargumentsȱonȱtheirȱface.ȱȱDupreeȱ complainsȱthatȱhisȱrecruitedȱcounselȱwasȱineffectiveȱinȱfailingȱtoȱserveȱoneȱofȱtheȱdefendants who,ȱDupreeȱcontends,ȱcouldȱhaveȱtestifiedȱtoȱsupportȱhisȱclaims.ȱȱButȱasȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt correctlyȱexplainedȱwhenȱitȱdeniedȱhisȱRuleȱ59(a)ȱmotion,ȱthereȱisȱnoȱSixthȬAmendment rightȱtoȱeffectiveȱassistanceȱofȱcounselȱinȱaȱcivilȱcase,ȱsoȱhisȱdissatisfactionȱwithȱcounsel’s performanceȱdoesȱnotȱwarrantȱaȱnewȱtrial.ȱȱSeeȱStancielȱv.ȱGramley,ȱ267ȱF.3dȱ575,ȱ581ȱ(7thȱCir. 2001).ȱ
Dupreeȱalsoȱcontendsȱthatȱafterȱthisȱcourt’sȱremand,ȱtheȱcaseȱshouldȱhaveȱbeen reassignedȱtoȱaȱnewȱdistrictȱjudge.ȱȱInȱhisȱthirdȱsupplementalȱmotionȱforȱaȱnewȱtrial,ȱhe reliedȱuponȱSupremeȱCourtȱRuleȱ36ȱinȱarguingȱthatȱheȱwasȱentitledȱuponȱremandȱtoȱa changeȱofȱvenueȱandȱhenceȱaȱnewȱjudge.ȱȱSupremeȱCourtȱRuleȱ36,ȱhowever,ȱgovernsȱthe custodyȱofȱprisonersȱinȱhabeasȱcorpusȱproceedings,ȱandȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱcorrectlyȱnoted thatȱtheȱruleȱdoesȱnotȱapplyȱtoȱDupree’sȱcase.ȱȱTheȱcourtȱthusȱdeniedȱDupree’sȱmotion, whichȱitȱconstruedȱasȱaȱRuleȱ60(b)ȱmotionȱforȱreliefȱfromȱjudgmentȱbecauseȱitȱwasȱfiledȱmore thanȱtenȱdaysȱafterȱtheȱentryȱofȱjudgment.ȱȱSeeȱFED.ȱR.ȱCIV.ȱP.ȱ59(b)ȱ(2008)ȱ(amendedȱDec.ȱ1, 2009);ȱFED.ȱR.ȱCIV.ȱP.ȱ60(b);ȱTalanoȱv.ȱNw.ȱMed.ȱFacultyȱFound.,ȱInc.,ȱ273ȱF.3dȱ757,ȱ762ȱ(7thȱCir. 2001).ȱȱPerhapsȱDupreeȱintendedȱtoȱrelyȱonȱourȱCircuitȱRuleȱ36,ȱwhichȱprovidesȱthat “[w]heneverȱaȱcaseȱtriedȱinȱaȱdistrictȱcourtȱisȱremandedȱbyȱthisȱcourtȱforȱaȱnewȱtrial,ȱitȱshall No.ȱ09Ȭ1035 Pageȱ4
beȱreassignedȱbyȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱforȱtrialȱbeforeȱaȱjudgeȱotherȱthanȱtheȱjudgeȱwhoȱheard theȱpriorȱtrialȱ.ȱ.ȱ.ȱ.”ȱȱButȱDupree’sȱcaseȱhadȱbeenȱdismissedȱuponȱscreening,ȱseeȱ28ȱU.S.C. §ȱ1915A(b)(1),ȱandȱremandedȱforȱfurtherȱproceedings.ȱȱ“Ordersȱdirectingȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱto undertakeȱfurtherȱproceedingsȱareȱroutinelyȱheardȱbyȱtheȱdistrictȱjudgeȱwhoȱenteredȱthe orderȱthatȱwasȱtheȱsubjectȱofȱtheȱappeal,”ȱandȱCircuitȱRuleȱ36ȱdoesȱnotȱrequireȱreassignment.ȱ InȱreȱUnitedȱStates,ȱ572ȱF.3dȱ301,ȱ305ȱn.3ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ2009).ȱȱDupreeȱfurtherȱassertsȱthat reassignmentȱwasȱnecessaryȱbecauseȱtheȱjudge’sȱpriorȱdismissalȱofȱtheȱcomplaint demonstratedȱhisȱprejudiceȱagainstȱtheȱcase.ȱȱJudicialȱrulings,ȱhowever,ȱrarelyȱpresentȱa validȱbasisȱtoȱquestionȱaȱjudge’sȱimpartiality,ȱLitekyȱv.ȱUnitedȱStates,ȱ510ȱU.S.ȱ540,ȱ555ȱ(1994), andȱDupreeȱhasȱpresentedȱnoȱreasonȱwhyȱtheȱjudgeȱcouldȱnotȱfairlyȱruleȱinȱhisȱcase followingȱremand,ȱseeȱCollinsȱv.ȱIllinois,ȱ554ȱF.3dȱ693,ȱ697ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ2009);ȱseeȱalsoȱLiteky,ȱ510 U.S.ȱatȱ551ȱ(“Itȱhasȱlongȱbeenȱregardedȱasȱnormalȱandȱproperȱforȱaȱjudgeȱtoȱsitȱinȱtheȱsame caseȱuponȱitsȱremand,ȱandȱtoȱsitȱinȱsuccessiveȱtrialsȱinvolvingȱtheȱsameȱdefendant.”). ȱ Finally,ȱtheȱdistrictȱcourtȱdidȱnotȱabuseȱitsȱdiscretionȱinȱdenyingȱDupree’sȱpostȬtrial requestȱforȱreappointmentȱofȱcounsel.ȱȱTheȱcourtȱappliedȱtheȱcorrectȱlegalȱstandardȱand basedȱitsȱdecisionȱonȱfactsȱsupportedȱbyȱtheȱrecord.ȱȱSeeȱSantiagoȱv.ȱWalls,ȱ599ȱF.3dȱ749,ȱ760Ȭ 61ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ2010);ȱPruittȱv.ȱMote,ȱ503ȱF.3dȱ647,ȱ658ȱ(7thȱCir.ȱ2007)ȱ(enȱbanc).ȱȱTheȱcourt consideredȱDupree’sȱargumentsȱregardingȱtheȱcomplexityȱofȱhisȱclaimsȱandȱhisȱexperience withȱmentalȱillness,ȱbutȱnotedȱthatȱDupreeȱhadȱbeenȱableȱtoȱadequatelyȱfileȱtwoȱproȱseȱpostȬ trialȱmotions.ȱȱTheȱcourtȱaddedȱthatȱDupreeȱhadȱfoundȱfaultȱwithȱeachȱofȱtheȱfourȱlawyers recruitedȱtoȱassistȱhimȱandȱhadȱsimplyȱbeenȱunableȱtoȱmaintainȱanȱattorneyȬclient relationship.ȱȱUnderȱtheseȱcircumstances,ȱweȱconcludeȱthatȱtheȱcourt’sȱdecisionȱtoȱdenyȱthe reappointmentȱofȱcounselȱwasȱreasonable.ȱȱSeeȱPruitt,ȱ503ȱF.3dȱatȱ658Ȭ59.ȱ
Accordingly,ȱweȱAFFIRMȱtheȱjudgmentȱofȱtheȱdistrictȱcourt.