Cedillo Murillo v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: March 11, 2026
• Docket: 23-8069
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

23-8069 Cedillo Murillo v. Bondi BIA Norkin, IJ A220 856 513/514

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 11th day of March, two thousand twenty-six.

PRESENT: GERARD E. LYNCH, ALISON J. NATHAN, SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

JONNATHAN EDUARDO CEDILLO MURILLO, B.V.C.G., Petitioners,

v. 23-8069 NAC PAMELA BONDI, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent.*

* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption to conform to the caption above. _____________________________________

FOR PETITIONERS: Perham Makabi, Kew Gardens, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Paul Fiorino, Senior Litigation Counsel; Virginia Lum, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

Petitioners Jonnathan Eduardo Cedillo Murillo and his minor daughter,

natives and citizens of Ecuador, seek review of a November 21, 2023, decision of

the BIA affirming a February 6, 2023, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)

denying Cedillo Murillo’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and

relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Cedillo-Murillo, et al.,

Nos. A 220 856 513/514 (B.I.A. Nov. 21, 2023), aff’g No. A 220 856 513/514 (Immig.

Ct. N.Y. City Feb. 6, 2023). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying

facts and procedural history.

Cedillo Murillo challenges only the denial of CAT relief. “Where, as here,

‘the BIA adopt[s] and affirm[s] the IJ’s decision, we review the two decisions in 2 tandem.’” Ojo v. Garland, 25 F.4th 152, 159 (2d Cir. 2022) (alterations in original),

quoting Ruqiang Yu v. Holder, 693 F.3d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 2012). “[W]e apply the

substantial evidence standard to questions of fact . . . and de novo review to all

questions of law.” Quintanilla-Mejia v. Garland, 3 F.4th 569, 583 (2d Cir. 2021).

“[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(4)(B).

A CAT applicant has the burden to establish that he or she will “more likely

than not . . . be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.16(c)(2). “Torture” is “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether

physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as . . .

punishing him or her for an act he or she or a third person has committed or is

suspected of having committed, intimidating or coercing him or her or a third

person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or

suffering is inflicted by, or at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence

of, a public official acting in an official capacity or other person acting in an official

capacity.” Id. § 1208.18(a)(1); see also Garcia-Aranda v. Garland, 53 F.4th 752, 758–

59 (2d Cir. 2022) (describing the CAT analysis as a “two-step inquiry” requiring

3 that it be more likely than not that the petitioner will be subjected to the requisite

level of harm and “sufficient state action”).

Cedillo Murillo testified that he was robbed four times by money lenders to

whom he owed money and that he reported at least the second robbery to the local

prosecutor, who responded that the value of the stolen property was insufficient

to prosecute. Moreover, he testified to having told police officers that he was

being threatened by the lenders and that the officers responded that they needed

more evidence to initiate an investigation. That testimony allows the inference

that if Cedillo Murillo had provided concrete evidence that the lenders were

escalating beyond threats, the police would have acted. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.18(a)(7) (“Acquiescence of a public official requires that the public official,

prior to the activity constituting torture, have awareness of such activity and

thereafter breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such

activity.”). Additionally, the evidence in the record of non-violent corruption—

e.g., facilitation of drug and gold trafficking, embezzlement, or bribery over

awards of government contracts—does not itself create a likelihood that

Ecuadorian officials would acquiesce in Cedillo Murillo’s torture by money

lenders. See Matter of M-S-I-, 29 I. & N. Dec. 61, 64 (B.I.A. 2025) (“[T]he potential

4 for private actor violence coupled with a speculation that police cannot or will not

help is insufficient to prove acquiescence.”). On the contrary, there is evidence

that Ecuador has made efforts to crack down on loan sharks. Thus, the record

does not compel a conclusion that Ecuadorian officials are likely to acquiesce to

Cedillo Murillo’s torture. See Quintanilla-Mejia, 3 F.4th at 593–94 (“[S]ubstantial

evidence review does not contemplate any judicial reweighing of evidence.

Rather, it requires us to ask only whether record evidence compelled an

acquiescence finding different from that reached by the agency.”).

As the acquiescence finding is dispositive of CAT relief, we do not reach

Cedillo Murillo’s arguments regarding the likelihood of future harm rising to the

level of torture. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule

courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of

which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”). Nor did the BIA err in declining

to specifically address each of Cedillo Murillo’s arguments on appeal. The BIA is

not obligated to “expressly parse or refute on the record each individual argument

or piece of evidence offered by the petitioner.” Zhi Yun Gao v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d

86, 87 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We have considered Cedillo Murillo’s remaining arguments and find them

5 to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and stays

VACATED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court