Cecilia Rotelli v. Department of the Navy

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided July 15, 2022·No. SF-315H-17-0113-I-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

CECILIA ROTELLI, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-315H-17-0113-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, DATE: July 15, 2022 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Cecilia Rotelli, Auburn, Washington, pro se.

Leonard R. Rippey and Sandra J. Morris, Esquire, North Charleston, South Carolina, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her termination appeal as settled. For the reasons set forth below, the appellant’s petition for review is DISMISSED as untimely filed with out good

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

cause shown. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e), (g). We FORWARD the appellant’s claim that the agency breached the settlement agreement to the Western Regional Office for docketing of a petition for enforcement. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).

BACKGROUND ¶2 On November 27, 2016, the appellant filed an initial appeal challenging her November 2016 termination from an Administrative Specialist position with the Space and Naval Warfare Center. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1. On February 14, 2017, the appellant and the agency submitted an amended settlement agreement to the Board. IAF, Tabs 25, 28. Among other things, the settlement called for the agency to rescind its termination of the appellant and replace the existing Standard Form 50 in her Official Personnel File with one denoting that she voluntarily resigned. IAF, Tab 28 at 1. The administrative judge determined that the agreement was lawful on its face and voluntarily entered into and understood by the parties. IAF, Tab 30, Initial Decision (ID) at 2-3. He issued an initial decision entering the agreement into the record for enforcement purposes, consistent with its terms, and dismissing the appeal as settled. Id.; IAF, Tab 25 at 7. The initial decision informed the parties that it would become the final decision of the Board on March 24, 2017, unless a petition for review was filed by that date. ID at 4. ¶3 On October 31, 2017, over 7 months after the deadline to file, the appellant filed a petition for review asking the Board “to review the settlement agreement and the case itself, and the decision to approve.” Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 2 at 4. The Clerk of the Board informed the appellant that her submission was untimely and that the Board would consider the merits of her petition only upon establishment of good cause. PFR File, Tab 2 at 3, Tab 3. The appellant submitted a motion to waive the time limit, along with other supporting documentation, asserting that she did not realize that she could file a petition for review or that she had any other recourse and that she had fired her attorney just 4 3

days before the deadline to file. PFR File, Tab 4. She further asserts that, at the time of the settlement, she was in shock and dealing with the fallout of her loss of employment, which included scrambling to move from one state to another, financial hardship, and searching for new employment. Id. at 4-7. She also indicates that she suffered from medical conditions but denie s that they affected her ability to timely file her petition for review. Id. at 6. The appellant asserts that, from the time of the settlement until her filing of the petition for review, she has “completed over 150 job applications to no avail.” PFR File, Tab 2 at 4, Tab 4 at 6. The appellant additionally asserts that she did not learn the full effect of the settlement on her retirement benefits until August 2017 and appears to allege that either the agency or the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) have provided her with confusing or incorrect information as to her retirement and benefits due to the agency’s alleged failure to comply with the provisions of the settlement agreement that required it to substitute a resignation for its termination action. PFR File, Tab 2 at 3-4, Tab 4 at 5-6, 18. ¶4 Alongside her attempt to show good cause for waiving the filing deadline, the appellant additionally challenges the validity of the settlement itself as well as the underlying probationary termination that prompted the settlement. PFR File, Tab 2 at 4-5, Tab 4 at 4-5. Among these arguments are that she was coerced into the settlement by her attorney and that the settlement resulted from the agency’s misinformation and thus it was involuntary or fraudulent, her termination was the result of retaliation for whistleblowing, and her termination was contrary to her understanding that her position was permanent. Id.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW ¶5 It is undisputed that the appellant’s petition for review is untimely. The Board will waive the time limit to file a petition for review only upon a showing of good cause for the delay in filing. 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.12, 1201.114(g). To establish good cause for waiving an untimely filing of an appeal, a party must 4

show that she exercised due diligence or ordinary prudence under the particular circumstances of the case. Smith v. Office of Personnel Management, 93 M.S.P.R. 394, ¶ 4 (2003). To determine whether an individual has shown good cause for an untimely filing, the Board will consider the length of the delay, the reasonableness of the excuse and her showing of due diligence, whether she is proceeding pro se, and whether she has presented evidence of the existence of circumstances beyond her control that affected her ability to comply with the time limits or of unavoidable casualty or misfortune that similarly shows a causal relationship to her inability to timely file her petition. Moorman v. Department of the Army, 68 M.S.P.R. 60, 62-63 (1995), aff’d, 79 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Table). ¶6 Notwithstanding the appellant’s pro se status, her more than 7-month delay in filing is significant. See Mauldin v. U.S. Postal Service, 115 M.S.P.R. 513, ¶ 13 (2011) (finding a delay of more than 7 months significant); Crook v. U.S. Postal Service, 108 M.S.P.R. 553, ¶ 6 (finding a 1-month delay in filing significant, despite the appellant’s pro se status), aff’d, 301 F. App’x 982 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Regardless of the situation between the appellant and her attorney, it is well established that the right of appeal is personal to the app ellant, whether or not she is represented, and she remains responsible for the prosecution and development of her appeal. Smith, 93 M.S.P.R. 394, ¶ 5. When an initial decision clearly informs an appellant of her ability to file a petition for review, her failure to read or understand the document does not show the due diligence necessary to constitute good cause for a waiver of the filing deadline. See Njoku v. Department of Homeland Security, 111 M.S.P.R.

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Cecilia Rotelli v. Department of the Navy, (Miss. 2022).

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