Cecilia Armenta Mendoza v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 5, 2025
• Docket: 15-73712
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 5 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CECILIA ARMENTA MENDOZA, No. 15-73712

Petitioner, Agency No. A200-201-445

v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted December 3, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: GOULD, BEA, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Cecilia Armenta Mendoza (“Petitioner”) petitions for review of the

decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and an immigration judge

(“IJ”) denying her applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8

U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition.

1. “Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning, we review both

decisions.” Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2023)

(citing Garcia-Martinez v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 2018)). We

review the denial of an application for asylum and withholding of removal for

substantial evidence. Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2021). The

substantial evidence standard is deferential, allowing reversal only when “any

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”

Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 703 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Zehatye

v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added)).

2. “To be eligible for asylum, a petitioner has the burden to demonstrate a

likelihood of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”

Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1059 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Substantial

evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Petitioner did not establish that she

suffered “past persecution” based on one incident of violence in Mexico in 1988 and

threats from her ex-husband. Nor did the agency err in limiting its analysis of harm

1 Petitioner does not challenge the IJ’s and BIA’s denial of relief under CAT on this appeal.

2 15-73712 for “past persecution” to only the harm Petitioner experienced in Mexico, as opposed

to harm she experienced in the United States. See Gonzalez-Medina v. Holder, 641

F.3d 333, 337–38 (9th Cir. 2011) (“It is reasonable to link the past persecution

provision to the proposed country of removal.”).

3. Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s conclusion that

Petitioner did not meet the burden to establish a well-founded fear of future

persecution. “Absent evidence of past persecution, [an applicant] must establish a

well-founded fear of future persecution by showing both a subjective fear of future

persecution, as well as an objectively ‘reasonable possibility’ of persecution upon

return to the country in question.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1029

(9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Recinos de Leon v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1185, 1190 (9th Cir.

2005)). Petitioner testified that she has not interacted with, heard from, or seen her

ex-husband since they separated in 1991, despite multiple visits back to Mexico

where Petitioner learned her ex-husband returned after their separation in 1991. The

record supports the agency’s conclusion that there is no evidence that Petitioner’s

ex-husband has any current interest in hurting Petitioner or in harming her in the

future.

PETITION DENIED.2

2 The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues. The motion for stay of removal is otherwise denied. See Dkt. No. 1.

3 15-73712