Cecil Reginald Jay v. John B. Boyd, District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service

Ninth Circuit

Cecil Reginald Jay v. John B. Boyd, District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service

222 F.2d 820

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedAugust 4, 1955

Docket14545_1

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 222 F.2d 820 (Cecil Reginald Jay v. John B. Boyd, District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Cecil Reginald Jay v. John B. Boyd, District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 222 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1955).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, a citizen of Great Britain, entered the United States in 1921, where he has since resided. From 1935 to 1940, according to his own testimony in the deportation proceedings herein mentioned, he was a member of the Communist Party of the United States. After passage of the Internal Security Act of September 23, 1950, 64 Stat. 987, he was ordered deported as an alien who had been a voluntary member of the Communist Party. After exhausting his administrative remedies before the Board of Immigration Appeals, appellant has attempted by petition for writ of habeas corpus in the court be-Tow to assert that he cannot be expelled for membership in the Communist Party from 1935 to 1940 since non-membership was not made a condition of his entry. The court below correctly rejected this contention. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911.

Appellant applied for suspension of deportation under § 244(a) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254(a) (5), which provides that the Attorney General may in his discretion suspend deportation in certain cases. Upon hearing held on this application before a special inquiry officer, that officer denied the application reciting that the denial was on the basis of confidential information relating to the appellant, disclosure of which, in the opinion of the officer, would be prejudicial to the public interest.

This ruling of the officer was expressly authorized by C.F.R. Title 8, § 244.3.

Appellant attacks his detention upon the ground that he was denied due process of law in the consideration of his ap *821 plication for suspension of deportation because of the use of this confidential information. This contention is likewise wholly without merit. U. S. ex rel. Matranga v. Mackey, 2 Cir., 210 F.2d 160.

The decision denying appellant’s application for writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

The appellant, a citizen of Great Britain, entered the United States in 1921, where he has since resided. From 1935 to 1940, according to his own testimony in the deportation proceedings herein mentioned, he was a member of the Communist Party of the United States. After passage of the Internal Security Act of September 23, 1950, 64 Stat. 987, he was ordered deported as an alien who had been a voluntary member of the Communist Party. After exhausting his administrative remedies before the Board of Immigration Appeals, appellant has attempted by petition for writ of habeas corpus in the court be-Tow to assert that he cannot be expelled for membership in the Communist Party from 1935 to 1940 since non-membership was not made a condition of his entry. The court below correctly rejected this contention. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911.

Appellant applied for suspension of deportation under § 244(a) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1254(a) (5), which provides that the Attorney General may in his discretion suspend deportation in certain cases. Upon hearing held on this application before a special inquiry officer, that officer denied the application reciting that the denial was on the basis of confidential information relating to the appellant, disclosure of which, in the opinion of the officer, would be prejudicial to the public interest.

This ruling of the officer was expressly authorized by C.F.R. Title 8, § 244.3.

Appellant attacks his detention upon the ground that he was denied due process of law in the consideration of his ap *821 plication for suspension of deportation because of the use of this confidential information. This contention is likewise wholly without merit. U. S. ex rel. Matranga v. Mackey, 2 Cir., 210 F.2d 160.

The decision denying appellant’s application for writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.

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222 F.2d 820, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cecil-reginald-jay-v-john-b-boyd-district-director-immigration-and-ca9-1955.

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