Cecel L. Morton v. Karin Arnold

W.D. Washington

Cecel L. Morton v. Karin Arnold

DecidedNovember 7, 2025

Docket3:25-cv-05818

StatusUnknown

This text of Cecel L. Morton v. Karin Arnold (Cecel L. Morton v. Karin Arnold) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 CECEL L. MORTON, CASE NO. C25-5818 BHS 8 Petitioner, ORDER 9 v. 10 KARIN ARNOLD, 11 Respondent. 12

13 THIS MATTER is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Theresa Fricke’s Report 14 and Recommendation (R&R), recommending the Court dismiss pro se petitioner Cecil 15 Morton’s § 2241 habeas petition as second or successive, decline to issue a certificate of 16 appealability, and dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Dkt. 5. 17 The R&R correctly concludes that Morton has filed numerous habeas petitions 18 arising from his 1994 convictions. It also correctly concludes that Morton’s most recent 19 iteration is properly construed as a § 2254 petition. The only available mechanism for 20 Petitioner to challenge in federal court his current state confinement is 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 21 not § 2241. See Dominguez v. Kernan, 906 F.3d 1127, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 2018) 22 (“[Section 2254] ‘is the exclusive vehicle for a habeas petition by a state prisoner in 1 custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the petitioner is not challenging 2 his underlying state court conviction.’”) (quoting White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 3 1009–10 (9th Cir. 2004)).

4 A district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s 5 disposition to which a party has properly objected. The district judge may accept, reject, 6 or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to 7 the magistrate judge with instructions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). A proper objection 8 requires specific written objections to the findings and recommendations in the R&R.

9 United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 10 Morton’s objects to the R&R’s conclusions and recommendations, but he has not 11 addressed the facts or analysis in it. He claims that he can raise subject matter jurisdiction 12 at any time, and that the Court erred in construing his petition under § 2254. These 13 objections are without merit, and they are OVERRULED. The R&R is ADOPTED,

14 Morton’s habeas petition is DENIED, the Court will NOT issue a § 2253(c) Certificate 15 of Appealability, and the matter is DISMISSED. All other pending motions are denied as 16 moot. 17 The Clerk shall enter a JUDGMENT and close the case. 18 Dated this 7th day of November, 2025. A 19 20 BENJAMIN H. SETTLE 21 United S tates District Judge 22

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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 CECEL L. MORTON, CASE NO. C25-5818 BHS 8 Petitioner, ORDER 9 v. 10 KARIN ARNOLD, 11 Respondent. 12

13 THIS MATTER is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Theresa Fricke’s Report 14 and Recommendation (R&R), recommending the Court dismiss pro se petitioner Cecil 15 Morton’s § 2241 habeas petition as second or successive, decline to issue a certificate of 16 appealability, and dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Dkt. 5. 17 The R&R correctly concludes that Morton has filed numerous habeas petitions 18 arising from his 1994 convictions. It also correctly concludes that Morton’s most recent 19 iteration is properly construed as a § 2254 petition. The only available mechanism for 20 Petitioner to challenge in federal court his current state confinement is 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 21 not § 2241. See Dominguez v. Kernan, 906 F.3d 1127, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 2018) 22 (“[Section 2254] ‘is the exclusive vehicle for a habeas petition by a state prisoner in 1 custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the petitioner is not challenging 2 his underlying state court conviction.’”) (quoting White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 3 1009–10 (9th Cir. 2004)).

4 A district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s 5 disposition to which a party has properly objected. The district judge may accept, reject, 6 or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to 7 the magistrate judge with instructions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). A proper objection 8 requires specific written objections to the findings and recommendations in the R&R.

9 United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 10 Morton’s objects to the R&R’s conclusions and recommendations, but he has not 11 addressed the facts or analysis in it. He claims that he can raise subject matter jurisdiction 12 at any time, and that the Court erred in construing his petition under § 2254. These 13 objections are without merit, and they are OVERRULED. The R&R is ADOPTED,

14 Morton’s habeas petition is DENIED, the Court will NOT issue a § 2253(c) Certificate 15 of Appealability, and the matter is DISMISSED. All other pending motions are denied as 16 moot. 17 The Clerk shall enter a JUDGMENT and close the case. 18 Dated this 7th day of November, 2025. A 19 20 BENJAMIN H. SETTLE 21 United S tates District Judge 22

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