CDL NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES, INC v. FIVE TOWNS HEART IMAGING MEDICAL, PC

District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania·Decided December 14, 2021·No. 2:20-cv-00783·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CDL NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES, INC, ) ) Civil Action No. 20-783 Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Judge Cathy Bissoon ) FIVE TOWNS HEART IMAGING, ) MEDICAL, PC ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

I. MEMORANDUM Pending before the Court is Plaintiff CDL Nuclear Technologies, Inc. (hereinafter, “CDL”)’s Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s Amended Counterclaim (Doc. 35). After consideration of all briefing, CDL’s Motion to Dismiss will be granted. A. BACKGROUND As the Court writes mainly for the parties, it assumes familiarity with the facts in this case. This action was initiated by CDL regarding an “Equipment Lease Agreement” (hereinafter, the “Agreement”) (Doc. 28), where CDL was the Lessor and Defendant Five Towns Heart Imaging Medical, P.C. (hereinafter, “Five Towns”) was the Lessee. Five Towns, in answering, has raised counterclaims against CDL (“Counterclaim,” Doc. 34), as follows: Breach of Contract (related to Medicare Reimbursability) (Count I); Breach of Contract (related to Excessive Demand for Payment) (Count II); and Unjust Enrichment and Assumpsit (Count III). CDL filed a Motion to Dismiss, moving to dismiss Count I in part and Count II in its entirety pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Specifically, with respect to Count I, CDL asserts that the count should be dismissed “to the extent it alleges CDL breached the duty to renegotiate its prices under Section 40 of the Lease Agreement,” and to the extent Five Towns claims that CDL breached the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Doc. 35. With respect to Count II, CDL asserts that it should be dismissed in its entirely because “the claim fails to allege that CDL breached any obligation imposed by the Lease Agreement and improperly relies on parol

evidence,” and to the extent Five Towns claims that CDL breached the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Id. B. ANALYSIS Where disagreement exists on the facts, the Court at this juncture accepts the well-pleaded facts set out in Five Towns’s Counterclaim against CDL as true. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210–11 (3d Cir. 2009). A court should dismiss a complaint—or in this case, the counterclaim—if it fails to set out “enough facts to state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 1. Count I – Breach of Contract (related to Medicare Reimbursability) Five Towns avers that CDL breached the Agreement by refusing to “adjust its charges and/or renegotiate the Lease amounts” pursuant to § 40 of the Agreement. Counterclaim at ¶¶ 105-106. Five Towns alleges that “CDL’s refusal to adjust its charges and/or renegotiate the Lease terms and rates violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in Pennsylvania contracts and Lease terms understood in light of the covenant.” Id. at ¶ 107. Central to all of Five Towns’s allegations is that the actual Medicare reimbursement rate for

Rubidium-82 doses (contemplated as $415.00 in the Agreement, with two doses required per exam) is lower than as provided in the Agreement, and that moreover, industry practice dictates that billings to Medicare should be limited to the “Fair Market Value” of Rubidum-82 doses. Id. at ¶¶ 100-102. CDL responds indicating that it has no obligation to renegotiate fees under § 40 of the Agreement, because even if the fee for Rubidum-82 was zero, no obligation to renegotiate would be triggered, and that therefore the breach of contract claim fails as a matter of law. Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter, “Brief”) (Doc. 36) at 2-5. Nevertheless, CDL

concedes that Five Towns has preserved as a “fact issue” whether CDL breached its duty to adjust its fees under § 40. Id. at 5 n.2. CDL further argues that Count I, to the extent it alleges breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, fails as a matter of law under Pennsylvania contract law. Id. at 5-7. To assert a breach of contract claim, a party must allege: (1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) the breach of a duty imposed by the contract; and (3) resulting damages. Omicron Sys. v. Weiner, 860 A.2d 554, 564 (Pa. Super. 2004). When interpreting a contract under Pennsylvania law, courts must adhere to the following: In interpreting a contract, the ultimate goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties as reasonably manifested by the language of their written agreement. When construing agreements involving clear and unambiguous terms, the Court need only examine the writing itself to give effect to the parties’ understanding. The Court must construe the contract only as written and may not modify the plain meaning under the guise of interpretation.

Southwest Energy Production Co. v. Forest Resources, LLC, 83 A.3d 177, 187 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013). A contract is ambiguous if “it is reasonably susceptible of different constructions and capable of being understood in more than one sense,” and where there is ambiguity, it is construed against the drafter—which in this case is CDL. McWreath v. Range Resources— Appalachia, LLC, 81 F. Supp. 3d 448, 460–61 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (internal citations omitted); see Five Towns’s Response in Opposition to CDL’s Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter, “Response”) (Doc. 38) at 9. Five Towns argues that § 40 should be read to indicate that certain obligations to adjust or negotiate fees would be triggered if Medicare reimbursement for any individual component needed for cardiac PET perfusion imaging (hereinafter, “cardiac PET scan”) (which includes costs for Global Myocardial Perfusion PET, two doses of Rubidium-82, and Global Treadmill) declined by the amounts indicated in the Agreement. Response at 2-8. While not providing

precise numbers for the “actual Medicare reimbursement rate,” which is allegedly lower than the rate in the Agreement, Five Towns avers that CDL breached this portion of the Agreement, by refusing to “adjust its charges and/or renegotiate the Lease terms and rates.” Counterclaim at ¶¶ 100, 106. CDL, on the other hand, argues that § 40 should be read to refer to declines for Medicare reimbursement on the total cost of a cardiac PET scan—in other words, the triggers should be based on the total of the various components, rather than declines for any individual component. Brief at 2-5. The Court finds that, while § 40 could have been more artfully and clearly drafted, it is not ambiguous. The words “combined,” the inclusion of a calculation of the total amount for the cardiac PET scan,1 and “collective” indicate that § 40 contemplated declines triggered vis-à-vis

the total amount for cardiac PET scan, not each of its individual components. Agreement at § 40. The Court agrees with CDL that the only narrow fact issue to be preserved here is if CDL had the duty to adjust its fees per § 40. Brief at 5 n.2. CDL also objects to Count I, to the extent Five Towns is attempting to bring a separate claim for breach of good faith and fair dealing. Brief at 5-7. Claims for breach of good faith and fair dealing are subsumed into any breach of contract claim. Burton v. Teleflex Inc.,

CDL NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES, INC v. FIVE TOWNS HEART IMAGING MEDICAL, PC, (W.D. Pa. 2021).

CDL NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES, INC v. FIVE TOWNS HEART IMAGING MEDICAL, PC (CDL NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES, INC v. FIVE TOWNS HEART IMAGING MEDICAL, PC) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Mary Burton v. Teleflex Inc
707 F.3d 417 (Third Circuit, 2013)
Fowler v. UPMC SHADYSIDE
578 F.3d 203 (Third Circuit, 2009)
Omicron Systems, Inc. v. Weiner
860 A.2d 554 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2004)
Southwestern Energy Production Co. v. Forest Resources, LLC
83 A.3d 177 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2013)
McWreath v. Range Resources-Appalachia, LLC
81 F. Supp. 3d 448 (W.D. Pennsylvania, 2015)