02/18/2025
DA 24-0303 Case Number: DA 24-0303
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2025 MT 36
CB1, d/b/a CBB COLLECTIONS,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
KATELYN N. HOVE and IRA HOVE,
Defendants and Appellants,
HEALTH CARE SERVICE CORPORATION d/b/a BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF MONTANA,
Third-Party Defendant and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DV-21-556 Honorable Ashley Harada, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
D. Michael Eakin, Attorney at Law, Billings, Montana
For Appellee CB1, Inc.:
Martin S. Smith, Ryan A. Stewart, Felt Martin, PC, Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: November 13, 2024 Decided: February 18, 2025
Filed:
q.,-.6.--,f __________________________________________ Clerk Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Katelyn and Ira Hove (collectively the Hoves) appeal the March 1, 2024 Order
Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and April 15, 2024 Order Denying
Defendants’ Rule 59 Motion to Alter or Amend issued by the Thirteenth Judicial District
Court, Yellowstone County. We reverse for action consistent with this Opinion.
¶2 We restate the issues on appeal as follows:
1. Whether a Declaration under § 1-6-105, MCA, is the equivalent of an affidavit.
2. Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of CB1.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 In 2018, Katelyn Hove (Hove) was hospitalized in the Billings Clinic (the clinic)
for pregnancy complications. The clinic billed Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) of Montana
for Hove’s services. BCBS of Montana sent the clinic an explanation of benefits (EOB)
explaining that BCBS of Texas was Hove’s insurance provider. According to Hove, BCBS
of Texas sent her an EOB indicating it had paid $35,304.12 on Hove’s hospital bill and
indicated she may owe $770.48 to the provider. The Texas EOB also showed that
$32,427.10 was not covered by the plan. Hove did not pay the remaining balance.
¶4 The clinic assigned the debt that was not paid to CB1, a debt-collection agency. On
May 13, 2021, CB1 filed suit on the debt against the Hoves.1 The complaint alleged breach
of contract, breach of obligation, and unjust enrichment. The Hoves named BCBS of
Montana as a third-party defendant. In 2023, CB1 moved for summary judgment based on
1 Katelyn and Ira are married, and Katelyn is covered by Ira’s insurance.
2 affidavits from the clinic detailing the various services Hove received and the balances due.
Hove responded with a written declaration (the declaration) that disputed portions of the
account. Attached to the declaration were an EOB sent to Hove by BCBS of Texas, and
an email from the Montana Commissioner of Securities and Insurance. In her response,
Hove claimed the clinic billed for three charges for time spent in the intensive care unit
(ICU). However, Hove asserted she never spent time in the ICU.
¶5 The District Court granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of CB1 on
March 1, 2024. The District Court reasoned the attached EOB was unverified, and the
declaration was not in proper form. The court noted a party opposing a motion for
summary judgment has the affirmative duty to respond by affidavits or sworn testimony.
The District Court entered a final monetary judgment against the Hoves on March 29, 2024,
of $61,810.20, which included outstanding principal, pre-judgment interest, pre-judgment
costs, and interest that accrues on the judgment at a rate of 11.5% until fully paid.
¶6 The Hoves filed a motion to amend the judgment on March 29, 2024. In conjunction
with their motion to amend, the Hoves attached a sworn affidavit relaying essentially the
same information as the declaration. The Hoves asserted in their motion that the court
should reconsider the judgment now that their affidavit was in the “correct form.” The
District Court denied the motion, reasoning the Hoves did not satisfy any of the four criteria
under Nelson v. Driscoll, 285 Mont. 355, 948 P.2d 256 (1997) that would allow the court
to alter or amend the judgment in their favor. Additionally, the District Court explained it
had not entered judgment in favor of CB1 because of the form of their declaration but
because the declaration and its attachments were inadmissible hearsay because they were
3 unverified and created by other people. The court also found the declaration was not dated
by Hove, so it did not meet the criteria under § 1-6-105, MCA.
¶7 The Hoves appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶8 We review a district court’s evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion. In re T.W.,
2006 MT 153, ¶ 8, 332 Mont. 454, 139 P.3d 810. The district court has broad discretion
in determining the admissibility of evidence. Howard v. St. James Community Hospital,
2006 MT 23, ¶ 17, 331 Mont. 60, 129 P.3d 126. A district court’s preclusion of hearsay
evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Martinez, 2023 MT 251, ¶ 18,
414 Mont. 340, 545 P.3d 652.
¶9 We review summary judgment rulings de novo applying the standards of M. R. Civ.
P. 56. Perl v. Grant, 2024 MT 13, ¶ 10, 415 Mont. 61, 542 P.3d 396. Summary judgment
is only proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
DISCUSSION
¶10 1. Whether a Declaration under § 1-6-105, MCA, is the equivalent of an affidavit.
¶11 Section 1-6-105, MCA, states that when:
any matter is required or permitted to be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by a person’s sworn written declaration, verification, certificate, oath, or affidavit, the matter may with like force and effect be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by an unsworn written declaration, certificate, verification, or statement that is subscribed by the person as true under penalty of perjury.
Additionally, a declaration must abide by the proper formatting including a date, place,
signature, and statement of “I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true 4 and correct.” Section 1-6-105, MCA. Section 1-1-203, MCA, defines affidavit as “a sworn
written declaration made before an officer authorized to administer oaths or an unsworn
written declaration made under penalty of perjury as provided in 1-6-105.” This section
expressly encompasses unsworn declarations made under penalty of perjury within the
meaning of affidavit.
¶12 Further, a deliberate falsification of an unsworn declaration constitutes perjury, and
§ 1-6-105, MCA, provides the same punishment for falsifying a declaration as § 45-7-202,
MCA, provides for falsifying an affidavit or other sworn oath. Consequently, even though
a declaration is unsworn before a notary or court, its substance carries the same weight and
penalties as an affidavit. Thus, an unsworn declaration made under penalty of perjury as
provided in § 1-6-105, MCA, is the equivalent of an affidavit.
¶13 Here, the District Court pointed out the declaration was not dated properly and
therefore did not meet the statutory criteria under § 1-6-105, MCA. We note the declaration
is dated March 2023, and although it is missing a day, it is signed by Hove who clearly
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02/18/2025
DA 24-0303 Case Number: DA 24-0303
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2025 MT 36
CB1, d/b/a CBB COLLECTIONS,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
KATELYN N. HOVE and IRA HOVE,
Defendants and Appellants,
HEALTH CARE SERVICE CORPORATION d/b/a BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF MONTANA,
Third-Party Defendant and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DV-21-556 Honorable Ashley Harada, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
D. Michael Eakin, Attorney at Law, Billings, Montana
For Appellee CB1, Inc.:
Martin S. Smith, Ryan A. Stewart, Felt Martin, PC, Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: November 13, 2024 Decided: February 18, 2025
Filed:
q.,-.6.--,f __________________________________________ Clerk Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Katelyn and Ira Hove (collectively the Hoves) appeal the March 1, 2024 Order
Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and April 15, 2024 Order Denying
Defendants’ Rule 59 Motion to Alter or Amend issued by the Thirteenth Judicial District
Court, Yellowstone County. We reverse for action consistent with this Opinion.
¶2 We restate the issues on appeal as follows:
1. Whether a Declaration under § 1-6-105, MCA, is the equivalent of an affidavit.
2. Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of CB1.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 In 2018, Katelyn Hove (Hove) was hospitalized in the Billings Clinic (the clinic)
for pregnancy complications. The clinic billed Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) of Montana
for Hove’s services. BCBS of Montana sent the clinic an explanation of benefits (EOB)
explaining that BCBS of Texas was Hove’s insurance provider. According to Hove, BCBS
of Texas sent her an EOB indicating it had paid $35,304.12 on Hove’s hospital bill and
indicated she may owe $770.48 to the provider. The Texas EOB also showed that
$32,427.10 was not covered by the plan. Hove did not pay the remaining balance.
¶4 The clinic assigned the debt that was not paid to CB1, a debt-collection agency. On
May 13, 2021, CB1 filed suit on the debt against the Hoves.1 The complaint alleged breach
of contract, breach of obligation, and unjust enrichment. The Hoves named BCBS of
Montana as a third-party defendant. In 2023, CB1 moved for summary judgment based on
1 Katelyn and Ira are married, and Katelyn is covered by Ira’s insurance.
2 affidavits from the clinic detailing the various services Hove received and the balances due.
Hove responded with a written declaration (the declaration) that disputed portions of the
account. Attached to the declaration were an EOB sent to Hove by BCBS of Texas, and
an email from the Montana Commissioner of Securities and Insurance. In her response,
Hove claimed the clinic billed for three charges for time spent in the intensive care unit
(ICU). However, Hove asserted she never spent time in the ICU.
¶5 The District Court granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of CB1 on
March 1, 2024. The District Court reasoned the attached EOB was unverified, and the
declaration was not in proper form. The court noted a party opposing a motion for
summary judgment has the affirmative duty to respond by affidavits or sworn testimony.
The District Court entered a final monetary judgment against the Hoves on March 29, 2024,
of $61,810.20, which included outstanding principal, pre-judgment interest, pre-judgment
costs, and interest that accrues on the judgment at a rate of 11.5% until fully paid.
¶6 The Hoves filed a motion to amend the judgment on March 29, 2024. In conjunction
with their motion to amend, the Hoves attached a sworn affidavit relaying essentially the
same information as the declaration. The Hoves asserted in their motion that the court
should reconsider the judgment now that their affidavit was in the “correct form.” The
District Court denied the motion, reasoning the Hoves did not satisfy any of the four criteria
under Nelson v. Driscoll, 285 Mont. 355, 948 P.2d 256 (1997) that would allow the court
to alter or amend the judgment in their favor. Additionally, the District Court explained it
had not entered judgment in favor of CB1 because of the form of their declaration but
because the declaration and its attachments were inadmissible hearsay because they were
3 unverified and created by other people. The court also found the declaration was not dated
by Hove, so it did not meet the criteria under § 1-6-105, MCA.
¶7 The Hoves appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶8 We review a district court’s evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion. In re T.W.,
2006 MT 153, ¶ 8, 332 Mont. 454, 139 P.3d 810. The district court has broad discretion
in determining the admissibility of evidence. Howard v. St. James Community Hospital,
2006 MT 23, ¶ 17, 331 Mont. 60, 129 P.3d 126. A district court’s preclusion of hearsay
evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Martinez, 2023 MT 251, ¶ 18,
414 Mont. 340, 545 P.3d 652.
¶9 We review summary judgment rulings de novo applying the standards of M. R. Civ.
P. 56. Perl v. Grant, 2024 MT 13, ¶ 10, 415 Mont. 61, 542 P.3d 396. Summary judgment
is only proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
DISCUSSION
¶10 1. Whether a Declaration under § 1-6-105, MCA, is the equivalent of an affidavit.
¶11 Section 1-6-105, MCA, states that when:
any matter is required or permitted to be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by a person’s sworn written declaration, verification, certificate, oath, or affidavit, the matter may with like force and effect be supported, evidenced, established, or proved by an unsworn written declaration, certificate, verification, or statement that is subscribed by the person as true under penalty of perjury.
Additionally, a declaration must abide by the proper formatting including a date, place,
signature, and statement of “I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true 4 and correct.” Section 1-6-105, MCA. Section 1-1-203, MCA, defines affidavit as “a sworn
written declaration made before an officer authorized to administer oaths or an unsworn
written declaration made under penalty of perjury as provided in 1-6-105.” This section
expressly encompasses unsworn declarations made under penalty of perjury within the
meaning of affidavit.
¶12 Further, a deliberate falsification of an unsworn declaration constitutes perjury, and
§ 1-6-105, MCA, provides the same punishment for falsifying a declaration as § 45-7-202,
MCA, provides for falsifying an affidavit or other sworn oath. Consequently, even though
a declaration is unsworn before a notary or court, its substance carries the same weight and
penalties as an affidavit. Thus, an unsworn declaration made under penalty of perjury as
provided in § 1-6-105, MCA, is the equivalent of an affidavit.
¶13 Here, the District Court pointed out the declaration was not dated properly and
therefore did not meet the statutory criteria under § 1-6-105, MCA. We note the declaration
is dated March 2023, and although it is missing a day, it is signed by Hove who clearly
averred it in support of her legal claims. While at times a specific day in a month may have
some impact on the interpretation of a declaration, here the specific day of the month has
no significance on the substance within the declaration, and the March 2023 date is
sufficient to meet the statutory criteria.
¶14 2. Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of CB1.
¶15 Motions for summary judgment are decided based on the pleadings, the discovery
and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits. M. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). “[A]t the
summary judgment stage, a court may consider only evidence that would be admissible at
5 trial.” In re Estate of Mead, 2014 MT 264, ¶ 21, 376 Mont. 386, 336 P.3d 362. An affidavit
either supporting or opposing summary judgment “must be made on personal knowledge,
set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is competent
to testify on the matters stated.” M. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(1). Any document referenced in the
affidavit must be a sworn or certified copy, which is attached to or served with the affidavit.
M. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(1). “Exhibits in support of an affidavit may be attached if a foundation
is laid for such exhibits based on any exception to the rule excluding hearsay evidence.”
Capital One, NA v. Guthrie, 2017 MT 75, ¶ 24, 387 Mont. 147, 392 P.3d 158.
¶16 CB1 asserts the Texas EOB was not created by Hove, and she did not attach any
other declaration or affidavit from someone who could verify and attest to its creation and
credibility. CB1 also asserts the declaration itself contains inadmissible hearsay in the form
of conversations Hove had with other people regarding the EOB and email.
¶17 The Hoves assert “[t]he district court should not have discounted her declaration
and affidavit stating that she was never in the ICU simply because the explanation of
benefits was unverified.” The Hoves claim there are still issues of fact whether Hove was
billed for treatment in the ICU. The Hoves claim the logical inference is that the course of
treatment was coded incorrectly for insurance purposes, and as such, summary judgment
was not proper.
¶18 Here, the District Court determined the declaration, EOB, and attached email were
inadmissible hearsay. However, certain statements within the declaration were made based
on Hove’s own personal knowledge and are admissible. For example, Hove stated she
never spent time in the ICU, yet she was billed for three separate ICU charges. Without
6 examining the other statements made in the declaration or the EOB, this statement made
by Hove is on its own sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact and preclude
summary judgment. As such, we need not consider whether the EOB and additional
statements in the declaration are hearsay at this juncture.
¶19 Summary judgement may be granted only when there is no genuine issue of material
fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
“A genuine issue of material fact is a fact materially inconsistent with proof of an essential
element of a claim or defense at issue.” Lawrence v. Pasha, 2023 MT 150, ¶ 8, 413 Mont.
149, 533 P.3d 1029. “The opposing party’s proffered evidence must be material and of a
substantial nature, not fanciful, frivolous, gauzy or merely suspicious.” Pasha, ¶ 9
(quotations omitted).
¶20 Hove declared, based on her own personal knowledge, that she never spent any time
in the ICU, yet she was billed for it three separate times. This conflicts with CB1’s factual
assertion that Hove received necessary healthcare services and treatment from the clinic.
Further, CB1 submitted an affidavit from the clinic’s Director of Payer Relations, Rebecca
Kelly. Kelly stated she reviewed both the Montana and Texas EOBs, and the Texas EOB
was incorrect. Kelly stated both EOBs address the same portions of services relating to the
debts in question, but the Montana EOB identifies $32,427.10 as patient responsibility.
Although Kelly’s affidavit asserts the Montana EOB was attached as an exhibit, it does not
appear that it was attached, nor was the Montana EOB anywhere in the record. Thus, there
remains a genuine material dispute of fact.
7 CONCLUSION
¶21 We find that a declaration executed under § 1-6-105, MCA, is equivalent to an
affidavit and is sufficient supporting evidence at the summary judgment stage. We find
the District Court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of CB1 because Hove’s
declaration established there are genuine issues of material fact. We thus reverse the
March 1, 2024 Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and the April 15,
2024 Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Alter or Amend and remand for trial on the
merits.
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
We Concur:
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA /S/ JIM RICE