RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1842-24
C.B.,1
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
J.P.,
Defendant-Respondent. ________________________
Submitted December 18, 2025 ‒ Decided March 17, 2026
Before Judges Marczyk and Bishop-Thompson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, Docket No. FV-09-1232-25.
Donelson, D'Alessandro & Peterson, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Keith A. Peterson, on the briefs).
Matthew Jeon, attorney for respondent.
PER CURIAM
1 We use initials to protect domestic violence victims. R. 1:38-3(c)(12). Plaintiff C.B. appeals from the denial of her application for a final
restraining order (FRO) under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act
(PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, following a hearing. Having considered the
record and the applicable legal principles, we reverse and remand for a new
hearing before a different judge.
I.
We glean the following undisputed facts elicited from C.B.'s testimony at
the FRO hearing, which was conducted on January 17, 2025. Both parties were
represented by counsel at the hearing. C.B. and J.P. dated for less than two
months during the summer of 2024. C.B. alleged and provided detailed
testimony J.P. sexually assaulted her on two occasions: July 23 and August 17,
2024. According to C.B., J.P. used coercion and force to engage in
nonconsensual sexual acts with her, ignoring her repeated verbal refusals.
Despite the alleged assaults, the parties continued to interact, exchanging
messages with affectionate and sexual content, meeting in person, and engaging
in consensual sexual intercourse at least once following the first incident. The
relationship ultimately ended in late August 2024.
Between August 17 and 26, 2024, after the second alleged assault, C.B.
reported the incidents to the Jersey City Police Department and sought to obtain
A-1842-24 2 a temporary restraining order (TRO). She testified a department detective
instructed her to delay filing for the TRO until the police made contact with J.P.
Following this instruction, C.B. did not pursue the TRO until October 24, 2024,
after being informed the police had contacted J.P.
C.B. ultimately filed the complaint and obtained the TRO, alleging J.P.
committed the predicate acts of assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1; sexual assault,
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1); criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3; and
harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. She further testified although J.P. had not
contacted her since the TRO was granted; she remained fearful and stated the
FRO was necessary to protect her from J.P.
J.P. did not testify or present any witnesses. After reciting the relevant
statutory definitions and case law pertaining to assault, sexual assault, criminal
sexual contact, and harassment, the court summarized C.B.'s testimony
regarding the alleged predicate acts. The court also made credibility
determinations, finding C.B.'s testimony generally credible and noting no
significant inconsistencies or evidence of fabrication. It further acknowledged
C.B.'s demeanor, responsiveness to the questions, and body language appeared
consistent with "a person that [wa]s generally truthful with the [c]ourt."
A-1842-24 3 However, the court found certain aspects of C.B.'s testimony regarding
the version of events were, "at times, . . . not plausible or logical," and therefore
discounted those portions of the testimony. Specifically, in reviewing the text
messages between the parties, the court found there were no references to the
alleged assaults, no apologies by J.P., and no expressions from C.B. regarding
her feelings about the alleged assaults. On that basis, the court further
discounted C.B.'s testimony.
Additionally, the court did not credit C.B.'s explanation for the delay in
contacting the police—namely, her claim she was advised by a detective not to
immediately seek a restraining order—finding this explanation "simply
implausible." The court opined, as a matter of law, no police officer would ever
offer such advice. It also found C.B.'s testimony unsupported because she did
not have the detective testify at the hearing.
The court "disregard[ed] all of [C.B.]'s testimony regarding the predicate
acts" and determined C.B. failed to satisfy the first prong of the analysis under
Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006). On January 17, 2025,
the court denied the FRO, dismissed the domestic violence complaint, and
vacated the TRO. This appeal ensued.
A-1842-24 4 II.
The scope of appellate review following the grant or denial of an FRO is
limited. T.B. v. I.W., 479 N.J. Super. 404, 412 (App. Div. 2024). In reviewing
"a trial court's order entered following trial in a domestic violence matter, we
grant substantial deference to the trial court's findings of fact and the legal
conclusions based upon those findings." J.D. v. A.M.W., 475 N.J. Super. 306,
312-13 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting N.T.B. v. D.D.B., 442 N.J. Super. 205, 215
(App. Div. 2015)). Generally, findings by a trial court "are binding on appeal
when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." T.M.S. v. W.C.P.,
450 N.J. Super. 499, 502 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J.
394, 411-12 (1998)).
"We defer to the credibility determinations made by the trial court because
the trial judge 'hears the case, sees and observes the witnesses, and hears them
testify,' affording it 'a better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the
veracity of witnesses.'" Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting
Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412). We afford "particular deference to the Family Part
because of its 'special jurisdiction and expertise' in family matters." Harte v.
Hand, 433 N.J. Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at
A-1842-24 5 412). We, however, review a trial court's legal conclusions de novo. C.C. v.
J.A.H., 463 N.J. Super. 419, 429 (App. Div. 2020).
In determining whether to enter an FRO under the PDVA, the court is
required to make certain findings regarding each alleged predicate act pursuant
to a two-step analysis. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125-27. Initially, "the [court]
must determine whether [a] plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the
credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A.
2C:25-19(a) has occurred." Id. at 125 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)). If a
predicate act is proven, the court must next determine whether a restraining
order is necessary to protect a plaintiff from immediate harm or further acts of
abuse. Id. at 127.
The predicate act of assault is committed when a person "[a]ttempts to
cause or purposely, knowingly[,] or recklessly causes bodily injury to
another[.]" N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a)(1). "Bodily injury" is "physical pain, illness or
any impairment of physical condition[.]" N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(a); see also State v.
Stull, 403 N.J. Super.
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RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1842-24
C.B.,1
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
J.P.,
Defendant-Respondent. ________________________
Submitted December 18, 2025 ‒ Decided March 17, 2026
Before Judges Marczyk and Bishop-Thompson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, Docket No. FV-09-1232-25.
Donelson, D'Alessandro & Peterson, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Keith A. Peterson, on the briefs).
Matthew Jeon, attorney for respondent.
PER CURIAM
1 We use initials to protect domestic violence victims. R. 1:38-3(c)(12). Plaintiff C.B. appeals from the denial of her application for a final
restraining order (FRO) under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act
(PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, following a hearing. Having considered the
record and the applicable legal principles, we reverse and remand for a new
hearing before a different judge.
I.
We glean the following undisputed facts elicited from C.B.'s testimony at
the FRO hearing, which was conducted on January 17, 2025. Both parties were
represented by counsel at the hearing. C.B. and J.P. dated for less than two
months during the summer of 2024. C.B. alleged and provided detailed
testimony J.P. sexually assaulted her on two occasions: July 23 and August 17,
2024. According to C.B., J.P. used coercion and force to engage in
nonconsensual sexual acts with her, ignoring her repeated verbal refusals.
Despite the alleged assaults, the parties continued to interact, exchanging
messages with affectionate and sexual content, meeting in person, and engaging
in consensual sexual intercourse at least once following the first incident. The
relationship ultimately ended in late August 2024.
Between August 17 and 26, 2024, after the second alleged assault, C.B.
reported the incidents to the Jersey City Police Department and sought to obtain
A-1842-24 2 a temporary restraining order (TRO). She testified a department detective
instructed her to delay filing for the TRO until the police made contact with J.P.
Following this instruction, C.B. did not pursue the TRO until October 24, 2024,
after being informed the police had contacted J.P.
C.B. ultimately filed the complaint and obtained the TRO, alleging J.P.
committed the predicate acts of assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1; sexual assault,
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1); criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3; and
harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. She further testified although J.P. had not
contacted her since the TRO was granted; she remained fearful and stated the
FRO was necessary to protect her from J.P.
J.P. did not testify or present any witnesses. After reciting the relevant
statutory definitions and case law pertaining to assault, sexual assault, criminal
sexual contact, and harassment, the court summarized C.B.'s testimony
regarding the alleged predicate acts. The court also made credibility
determinations, finding C.B.'s testimony generally credible and noting no
significant inconsistencies or evidence of fabrication. It further acknowledged
C.B.'s demeanor, responsiveness to the questions, and body language appeared
consistent with "a person that [wa]s generally truthful with the [c]ourt."
A-1842-24 3 However, the court found certain aspects of C.B.'s testimony regarding
the version of events were, "at times, . . . not plausible or logical," and therefore
discounted those portions of the testimony. Specifically, in reviewing the text
messages between the parties, the court found there were no references to the
alleged assaults, no apologies by J.P., and no expressions from C.B. regarding
her feelings about the alleged assaults. On that basis, the court further
discounted C.B.'s testimony.
Additionally, the court did not credit C.B.'s explanation for the delay in
contacting the police—namely, her claim she was advised by a detective not to
immediately seek a restraining order—finding this explanation "simply
implausible." The court opined, as a matter of law, no police officer would ever
offer such advice. It also found C.B.'s testimony unsupported because she did
not have the detective testify at the hearing.
The court "disregard[ed] all of [C.B.]'s testimony regarding the predicate
acts" and determined C.B. failed to satisfy the first prong of the analysis under
Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006). On January 17, 2025,
the court denied the FRO, dismissed the domestic violence complaint, and
vacated the TRO. This appeal ensued.
A-1842-24 4 II.
The scope of appellate review following the grant or denial of an FRO is
limited. T.B. v. I.W., 479 N.J. Super. 404, 412 (App. Div. 2024). In reviewing
"a trial court's order entered following trial in a domestic violence matter, we
grant substantial deference to the trial court's findings of fact and the legal
conclusions based upon those findings." J.D. v. A.M.W., 475 N.J. Super. 306,
312-13 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting N.T.B. v. D.D.B., 442 N.J. Super. 205, 215
(App. Div. 2015)). Generally, findings by a trial court "are binding on appeal
when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." T.M.S. v. W.C.P.,
450 N.J. Super. 499, 502 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J.
394, 411-12 (1998)).
"We defer to the credibility determinations made by the trial court because
the trial judge 'hears the case, sees and observes the witnesses, and hears them
testify,' affording it 'a better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the
veracity of witnesses.'" Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting
Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412). We afford "particular deference to the Family Part
because of its 'special jurisdiction and expertise' in family matters." Harte v.
Hand, 433 N.J. Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at
A-1842-24 5 412). We, however, review a trial court's legal conclusions de novo. C.C. v.
J.A.H., 463 N.J. Super. 419, 429 (App. Div. 2020).
In determining whether to enter an FRO under the PDVA, the court is
required to make certain findings regarding each alleged predicate act pursuant
to a two-step analysis. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 125-27. Initially, "the [court]
must determine whether [a] plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the
credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A.
2C:25-19(a) has occurred." Id. at 125 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)). If a
predicate act is proven, the court must next determine whether a restraining
order is necessary to protect a plaintiff from immediate harm or further acts of
abuse. Id. at 127.
The predicate act of assault is committed when a person "[a]ttempts to
cause or purposely, knowingly[,] or recklessly causes bodily injury to
another[.]" N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a)(1). "Bodily injury" is "physical pain, illness or
any impairment of physical condition[.]" N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(a); see also State v.
Stull, 403 N.J. Super. 501, 505 (App. Div. 2008).
Sexual assault is another predicate act under the PDVA. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-
19(a)(7). A person commits a sexual assault if, during the act of sexual
penetration with another person, "[t]he actor commits the act using coercion or
A-1842-24 6 without the victim's affirmative and freely-given permission, but the victim does
not sustain severe personal injury." N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1).
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b) provides that "[a]n actor is guilty of criminal sexual
contact if he commits an act of sexual contact with the victim under any of the
circumstances set forth in section 2C:14-2(c) (1) through (5)." "Sexual contact"
is defined as "an intentional touching by the . . . actor, either directly or through
clothing, of the victim's . . . intimate parts for the purpose of degrading or
humiliating the victim or sexually arousing or sexually gratifying the act or."
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-1(d).
A person is guilty of the predicate act of harassment, "if, with purpose to
harass another," the person "[e]ngages in any other course of alarming conduct
or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such
other person." N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(c). "'A finding of a purpose to harass may be
inferred from the evidence presented' and from common sense and experience."
H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 175 N.J. 309, 327 (2003) (quoting State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J.
564, 577 (1997)).
Here, the court did not make factual findings J.P. had committed one of
the alleged acts prohibited by the PDVA, nor did it engage in a principled
analysis to determine whether C.B. proved each act by a preponderance of the
A-1842-24 7 evidence. See Big Smoke LLC v. Twp. of W. Milford, 478 N.J. Super. 203,
227-28 (App. Div. 2024). The trial court also did not address the second prong
of Silver—whether an FRO was necessary to protect C.B.—based on her
testimony of ongoing fear and distress.
Instead, the court discounted C.B.'s testimony and determined her
credibility regarding her initial pursuit of a TRO based on judicial notice of a
purported practice by police officers, rather than on an assessment of the
relevant evidence. See N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. A.M.W., 480
N.J. Super. 496, 506 (App. Div. 2024). It likewise discounted C.B.'s testimony
due to the lack of allegations or apologies in the text messages between the
parties, without correlating this evidence to any specific predicate acts.
Therefore, no deference is owed to the court's ruling given the absence of any
legal conclusion. See Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019).
Absent an expressed holding on specific predicate acts, or other findings from
which an implicit determination may be discerned, we conclude reversal and
remand is warranted.
In sum, we reverse, reinstate C.B.'s complaint and TRO, and remand for
a new hearing before a different judge. See Entress v. Entress, 376 N.J. Super.
125, 133 (App. Div. 2005) (determining that "[i]n an abundance of caution," a
A-1842-24 8 remanded matter should be assigned to "a different judge for the plenary hearing
to avoid the appearance of bias or prejudice based on the judge's prior
involvement with the matter and his expressions" of doubt as to a party's
credibility); R. 1:12-1(d); Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 4
on R. 1:12-1 (2026) (stating "the appellate court has the authority to direct that
a different judge consider the matter on remand in order to preserve the
appearance of a fair and unprejudiced hearing"). We take no position with
respect to the outcome of the FRO hearing.
Reversed and remanded for a new hearing consistent with this opinion.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
A-1842-24 9