Cavanaugh v. Lexington Furniture

CourtNorth Carolina Industrial Commission
DecidedOctober 16, 1998
DocketI.C. NO. 600965
StatusPublished

This text of Cavanaugh v. Lexington Furniture (Cavanaugh v. Lexington Furniture) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Carolina Industrial Commission primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cavanaugh v. Lexington Furniture, (N.C. Super. Ct. 1998).

Opinion

The Full Commission has reviewed the prior Opinion and Award based upon the record of the proceedings before Deputy Commissioner Bain Jones, Jr. The appealing party has not shown good ground to reconsider the evidence; receive further evidence; rehear the parties or their representatives; or amend the Opinion and Award, except with the addition of Finding of Fact Nos. 17 and 18 and minor corrections in the Conclusion of Law and Award.

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The Full Commission finds as fact and concludes as matters of law the following, which were entered into by the parties at the hearing as:

STIPULATIONS
1. All parties are properly before the Commission and the Commission has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter.

2. All parties have been correctly designated, and there is no question as to misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties.

3. Plaintiff was the employee of defendant employer Lexington Furniture on 9 February 1995.

4. Plaintiff's average weekly wage is $310.37, yielding a compensation rate of $206.88, as determined by a Form 22 filed with the Commission.

5. The issues before the Commission are (1) whether plaintiff sustained a compensable injury by occupational disease on or about February 1995, while working for defendant employer; (2) if so, to what amount of past, present and future medical and disability compensation is plaintiff entitled under the Act; and (3) to what extent are defendants responsible for providing compensation to plaintiff?

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The Full Commission adopts the findings of fact found by the Deputy Commissioner and finds as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff is a married female with three children. She was born on 28 January 1959.

2. Plaintiff began her employment with defendant-employer on 26 January 1995. Prior to that time, she was employed for approximately six years as a waitress at various restaurants.

3. For the first few days of her employment with defendant-employer, plaintiff worked on the "kick line." She was thereafter transferred to the "mark line," where she was responsible for grading board lengths of lumber. Plaintiff's job consisted of standing at a roller conveyor belt. As board lengths were slid to her, she would grasp the board, turn it up on its edge, and mark any defects in the wood with a crayon marker. The board was then flipped, and the process repeated on the other side. Each board was between 2" and 3" thick, and from eight to sixteen feet in length. The lumber was primarily either poplar or oak, and each board weighed between eight to twenty-four pounds, depending on wood type and board length. The line would normally handle between 10,000 and 11,000 board feet a day, and plaintiff would be permitted two ten minute breaks and one thirty minute lunch period each day.

4. By the third day on the mark line, plaintiff began to experience pain in her hands and wrists. After a few weeks, she reported the problem to her supervisor who sent her to the company personnel manager. Plaintiff was given a splint for her right wrist to wear while working. Plaintiff wore the brace continually, including during the night.

5. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff required an additional brace for her left wrist.

6. In May, plaintiff was moved to the molding department due to her continued complaints of pain in her arms and hands. Her new job required her to remove strips of molding as they came out of the cutting machine.

7. In December 1995, plaintiff was placed on the putty line, where she was responsible for smaller pieces of wood. Finally, she was moved to the finish inspection line, where she was required to wipe stain and glaze from finished pieces of wood.

8. On 10 January 1996, plaintiff presented to Dr. Mark McGinnis, complaining of pain in her elbows, arms, and wrists. Dr. McGinnis diagnosed plaintiff as having bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, and recommended surgical release.

9. On 21 February 1996, plaintiff presented to Dr. Scott McCloskey, seeking a second opinion regarding the necessity of surgery. Dr. McCloskey concurred with the findings of Dr. McGinnis, and also believed plaintiff suffered from some degree of ulnar nerve entrapment at the elbow on each side, known as tardy ulnar palsy; however, he recognized that the carpal tunnel problem was the more significant. He wrote plaintiff out of work on that date. On 23 February 1996 Dr. McCloskey performed a right carpal ligament release for plaintiff.

10. During the surgery, Dr. McCloskey noted that plaintiff had an extremely thickened carpal ligament. The condition of the nerve made plaintiff's prognosis for recovery uncertain.

11. Following surgery, plaintiff continued to see Dr. McCloskey for follow up visits. By 29 May 1996, plaintiff had recovered from the right wrist surgery sufficiently to schedule the procedure for the left wrist. Surgery on the left wrist was performed on 13 June 1996.

12. In August 1996, plaintiff was informed by defendant-employer that due to her continued absence for a period of six months, her employment was being terminated.

13. On 28 August 1996, Dr. McCloskey determined that plaintiff had sufficiently recovered from her surgery to attempt to return to work in a light duty job. On 17 September 1996, plaintiff began working as a waitress at a Waffle House restaurant.

14. Plaintiff next presented to Dr. McCloskey on 20 November 1996, complaining of having considerable difficulty with both arms, including pain and numbness. Plaintiff tested positive for Tinel's sign over the ulnar nerve at the elbows, and demonstrated a possible recurrence of carpal tunnel. Dr. McCloskey diagnosed plaintiff as having some recurrence of carpal tunnel syndrome, and that the tardy ulnar palsy had worsened. He recommended steroid injections for the left hand, and if successful, a repeat of the process on the right hand. Dr. McCloskey believed at this time that the tardy ulnar palsy was the greater of plaintiff's difficulties, and recommended surgical decompression.

15. Plaintiff has not as yet undergone further surgery, and therefore has not reached maximum medical improvement. Plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome and tardy ulnar palsy are a direct result of the repetitive motion activity plaintiff was required to perform on her job with defendant-employer. Further, plaintiff's jobs with defendant-employer placed her at a greater risk of developing carpal tunnel syndrome and/or tardy ulnar palsy than that of the general public. There is no evidence in the record that plaintiff's current job as a waitress involves any repetitive motion activities of the type which would have caused either carpal tunnel syndrome or tardy ulnar palsy, or would have placed plaintiff at a greater risk than that faced by the general public.

16. The release surgery performed on plaintiff's wrists was reasonably necessary to provide relief or affect a cure for plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome, and the future release surgery on plaintiff's elbows is reasonably necessary to affect a cure or provide relief from plaintiff's tardy ulnar palsy.

17. Carpal tunnel syndrome and tardy ulnar palsy can be caused by repetitive motion activities. Plaintiff's job requirements on the various production lines, and specifically on the mark line, constituted such activity and resulted in her sustaining both carpal tunnel syndrome and tardy ulnar palsy.

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Related

Hansel v. Sherman Textiles
283 S.E.2d 101 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1981)
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357 S.E.2d 674 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1987)
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256 S.E.2d 189 (Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1979)

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Bluebook (online)
Cavanaugh v. Lexington Furniture, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cavanaugh-v-lexington-furniture-ncworkcompcom-1998.