UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
ANTHONY L. CAVALLERO,
Plaintiff, Case No. 1:20-cv-00196-DCN
vs. INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendant.
The Complaint of Plaintiff Anthony Cavallero was conditionally filed by the Clerk of Court due to his status as a prisoner and pauper. Dkts. 3, 1. A “conditional filing” means that Plaintiff must obtain authorization from the Court to proceed. After reviewing the Complaint, the Court has determined that Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. REVIEW OF COMPLAINT 1. Factual Allegations Plaintiff alleges that, on October 7, 2019, Correctional Officer Lough arrested him in the Unit 16 backyard for smoking, even though he was not smoking. He further alleges that Lough took his moon-pie, even though it was his birthday. He asserts that these acts constitute cruel and unusual punishment. He says that he suffered the following injuries— “a bad birthday and all around a bad day”—for which he seeks $1 million in damages. 2. Standard of Law for Screening Complaints Under modern pleading standards, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In addition, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)1 requires the Court to screen all pro se prisoner and pauper complaints to determine whether they have stated a claim upon which relief can be granted before such complaints are served on the defendants. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 & 1915A. The Court must
dismiss any claims that are frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court liberally construes a plaintiff’s pleadings to determine whether the case should be dismissed for lack of a cognizable legal theory or failure to plead sufficient facts
to support a cognizable legal theory under the Iqbal/Twombly standard. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989). Rule 12(b)(6) authority to dismiss claims as explained in Jackson was expanded by the PLRA, giving courts power to dismiss deficient claims sua sponte, either before or after opportunity to amend as explained in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
1 Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, et seq. 3. Eighth Amendment Theory A. Standard of Law
The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). The Eighth Amendment “embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). While conditions of confinement may be harsh and restrictive without being a violation of the Eighth Amendment, they cross the line of acceptability when they (1) involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain,” (2) are “grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment,” (3) result “in unquestioned and serious deprivation of basic human needs, or (4) deny an inmate
“the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Where conditions of confinement are challenged, a plaintiff must make two showings. First, the plaintiff must make an “objective” showing that the deprivation was “sufficiently serious” to form the basis for an Eighth Amendment violation. Johnson v.
Lewis, 217 F.3d at 731. Second, the plaintiff must make a “subjective” showing that the prison official acted “with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. To establish an official’s deliberate indifference, an inmate must show that (1) the officer was aware of the risk to the prisoner's health or safety, and (2) the officer deliberately disregarded that risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. To rebut the subjective inquiry, prison officials may present evidence that they reasonably responded to the risk. Id. at 844–45. Mere negligence is not sufficient to
establish deliberate indifference; rather, the official’s conduct must have been wanton or reckless See id. at 835. B. Discussion Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim is subject to dismissal, because he has not
shown that being wrongly arrested for smoking in prison even though he was not smoking and being deprived of a dessert—when he is already serving a term of punishment for a state crime—had any objective consequence that rises to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. These deprivations did not involve the unnecessary infliction of pain, were not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime of which Plaintiff stands convicted—
assault and battery on certain personnel;1 did not amount to a serious deprivation of basic human needs; and did not deny him the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. 4. Due Process Theory
A. Standard of Law To state an actionable Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing “(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; [and] (3) lack of process.” Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
1 See https://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/prisons/offender_search/detail/87463. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466–68 (1983), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482-86 (1995). Liberty interests created by state law or
prison regulations that entitle an inmate to due process are “generally limited to freedom from restraint.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484 (internal citations omitted). Typically, segregation “in and of itself does not implicate a protected liberty interest.” Serrano v.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
ANTHONY L. CAVALLERO,
Plaintiff, Case No. 1:20-cv-00196-DCN
vs. INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendant.
The Complaint of Plaintiff Anthony Cavallero was conditionally filed by the Clerk of Court due to his status as a prisoner and pauper. Dkts. 3, 1. A “conditional filing” means that Plaintiff must obtain authorization from the Court to proceed. After reviewing the Complaint, the Court has determined that Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. REVIEW OF COMPLAINT 1. Factual Allegations Plaintiff alleges that, on October 7, 2019, Correctional Officer Lough arrested him in the Unit 16 backyard for smoking, even though he was not smoking. He further alleges that Lough took his moon-pie, even though it was his birthday. He asserts that these acts constitute cruel and unusual punishment. He says that he suffered the following injuries— “a bad birthday and all around a bad day”—for which he seeks $1 million in damages. 2. Standard of Law for Screening Complaints Under modern pleading standards, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In addition, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)1 requires the Court to screen all pro se prisoner and pauper complaints to determine whether they have stated a claim upon which relief can be granted before such complaints are served on the defendants. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 & 1915A. The Court must
dismiss any claims that are frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court liberally construes a plaintiff’s pleadings to determine whether the case should be dismissed for lack of a cognizable legal theory or failure to plead sufficient facts
to support a cognizable legal theory under the Iqbal/Twombly standard. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989). Rule 12(b)(6) authority to dismiss claims as explained in Jackson was expanded by the PLRA, giving courts power to dismiss deficient claims sua sponte, either before or after opportunity to amend as explained in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
1 Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, et seq. 3. Eighth Amendment Theory A. Standard of Law
The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). The Eighth Amendment “embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). While conditions of confinement may be harsh and restrictive without being a violation of the Eighth Amendment, they cross the line of acceptability when they (1) involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain,” (2) are “grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment,” (3) result “in unquestioned and serious deprivation of basic human needs, or (4) deny an inmate
“the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Where conditions of confinement are challenged, a plaintiff must make two showings. First, the plaintiff must make an “objective” showing that the deprivation was “sufficiently serious” to form the basis for an Eighth Amendment violation. Johnson v.
Lewis, 217 F.3d at 731. Second, the plaintiff must make a “subjective” showing that the prison official acted “with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. To establish an official’s deliberate indifference, an inmate must show that (1) the officer was aware of the risk to the prisoner's health or safety, and (2) the officer deliberately disregarded that risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. To rebut the subjective inquiry, prison officials may present evidence that they reasonably responded to the risk. Id. at 844–45. Mere negligence is not sufficient to
establish deliberate indifference; rather, the official’s conduct must have been wanton or reckless See id. at 835. B. Discussion Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim is subject to dismissal, because he has not
shown that being wrongly arrested for smoking in prison even though he was not smoking and being deprived of a dessert—when he is already serving a term of punishment for a state crime—had any objective consequence that rises to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. These deprivations did not involve the unnecessary infliction of pain, were not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime of which Plaintiff stands convicted—
assault and battery on certain personnel;1 did not amount to a serious deprivation of basic human needs; and did not deny him the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. 4. Due Process Theory
A. Standard of Law To state an actionable Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing “(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a deprivation of the interest by the government; [and] (3) lack of process.” Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
1 See https://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/prisons/offender_search/detail/87463. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause itself or from state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466–68 (1983), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482-86 (1995). Liberty interests created by state law or
prison regulations that entitle an inmate to due process are “generally limited to freedom from restraint.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484 (internal citations omitted). Typically, segregation “in and of itself does not implicate a protected liberty interest.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases). Rather, a liberty interest arises only if the conditions of segregation impose an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. Due process for all types of disciplinary segregation demands only that the prison hearing officer’s decision be supported by “some evidence,” and that the evidence “have some indicia of reliability.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1105 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Toussaint I”), abrogated in part on other
grounds by Sandin v. Conner. The “some evidence” standard is minimally stringent, and the relevant inquiry is whether “there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. An exception allowing a prisoner to pursue a procedural due process claim without showing a liberty interest may apply if prison officials have found a prisoner guilty of a
disciplinary infraction at a hearing where “no shred of evidence of the inmate’s guilt is presented.” Burnsworth v. Gunderson, 179 F.3d 771, 775 (9th Cir. 1999). In that limited circumstance, a prisoner is entitled to pursue a due process claim even if he or she did not demonstrate a cognizable liberty interest, because a disciplinary hearing finding unsupported by evidence violates due process “wholly apart from the conditions of confinement and without regard to the Sandin requirements.” Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 2002).
B. Discussion Plaintiff’s claims that he was arrested for smoking when he was not, in fact, smoking may state a due process claim if he has additional facts showing that he can meet one of the standards set forth above. However, here, Plaintiff has not provided sufficient factual
allegations that he was convicted without any shred of evidence, that he was punished at all, and/or that he suffered an atypical and significant hardship after he was “arrested” for smoking. Plaintiff may amend his Complaint if he can meet one of these standards.
5. Defendant State of Idaho The Eleventh Amendment prohibits a federal court from entertaining a suit brought by a citizen against a state, absent a waiver of sovereign immunity. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1890). The Supreme Court has consistently applied the Eleventh Amendment’s jurisdictional bar to states and state entities “regardless of the nature of the relief sought.” See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984).
Moreover, only a “person” may be sued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a state is not considered a “person” under that statute. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot proceed against the state of Idaho. If he decides to amend, he must name those prison officials who caused the alleged constitutional violations. 6. Standard for Amendment If Plaintiff chooses to amend the Complaint, he must allege a sufficient causal connection between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation of his
constitutional rights. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (1989); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss” or to survive screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
An amended complaint must contain all of Plaintiff’s allegations in a single pleading and cannot rely upon or incorporate by reference prior pleadings. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 15.1. An amended pleading completely replaces the original pleading. A pleading is more understandable if it is organized by claim for relief and defendant, rather than asserting a broad set of facts at the beginning of a pleading that are
unrelated to a list of defendants elsewhere in the pleading. For each claim against each defendant, Plaintiff must state the following (organized by each defendant): (1) the name of the person Plaintiff claims to have caused the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights; (2) the facts showing that the defendant is a state actor (such as state employment or a state contract); (3) the dates on which the conduct of the defendant allegedly took place; (4) the specific conduct or action Plaintiff alleges is unconstitutional; (5) the
particular provision of the constitution Plaintiff alleges has been violated; (6) facts alleging that the elements of the violation are met; (7) the injury or damages Plaintiff personally suffered; and (8) the particular type of relief he is seeking from each defendant. The amended complaint must be legibly written or typed in its entirety, and it should be clearly designated as an “Amended Complaint.” Plaintiff's name and address should be clearly printed at the top left corner of the first page of each document filed with the Court. [f Plaintiff files an amended complaint, he must also file a “Motion to Review the Amended Complaint.” If Plaintiffs amendment does not comply with Rule 8, as explained in the screening standard of law above, this case may be dismissed with prejudice (meaning it cannot be brought again). If Plaintiff fails to file anything further, his Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). ORDER IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff must file an amended complaint within 30 days if he desires to proceed. If he does not, he must file a notice of voluntary dismissal within 30 days.
Le DATED: June 30, 2020 is aS ° ad / a > alld. — — AS David C. Nye | Chief U.S. District Court Judge
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 8