Cavallaro v. United States

153 F. Supp. 2d 52, 88 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6183, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11232, 2001 WL 877063
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedJuly 27, 2001
Docket1:99-cv-12625
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 153 F. Supp. 2d 52 (Cavallaro v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cavallaro v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 2d 52, 88 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6183, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11232, 2001 WL 877063 (D. Mass. 2001).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SARIS, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This action involves an Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) proceeding to determine the correct tax liability of petitioners William and Patricia Cavallaro (“the Cavalla-ros”) for the years 1987 through 1996. The IRS has issued a third-party record-keeper summons to the accounting firm of Ernst & Young seeking documents the accounting firm created or received while working on estate tax and corporate merger issues with petitioners’ attorney at the law firm of Hale and Dorr.

The Cavallaros have filed a motion to quash the IRS summons on the grounds that these documents are protected by the attorney-client privilege. The United States has filed a counterclaim seeking enforcement of the summons, arguing that the accounting firm’s communications are not privileged.

For reasons stated below, the petition to quash is DENIED and the government’s counterclaim to enforce the summons is ALLOWED.

II. BACKGROUND

The following facts are treated as undisputed, except where otherwise noted.

A. The Dawn of Camelot

William and Patricia Cavallaro (“the Ca-vallaros”) founded Knight Tool, Inc. (“Knight”) in 1976 to manufacture tools for companies such as McDonnell Douglas, Polaroid, and Raytheon. In 1988, William Cavallaro and his son Kenneth developed a rudimentary glue-dispensing machine. The business met with little commercial success for several years as a result of difficulties in marketing the machines. In order to give the Cavallaros’ three sons an opportunity to pursue and promote this glue-dispensing machine business, the Ca-vallaros formed Camelot Systems, Inc. (“Camelot”) in 1987. The sons were named as sole shareholders. Thereafter, Knight, owned by Mr. and Mrs. Cavallaro, continued to manufacture the machines. Camelot, owned by the sons, became the sole distributor. Both Knight and Camelot employees received their salaries from Knight.

The three sons worked hard to build Camelot through aggressive product marketing, a complete re-engineering of the original glue-dispensing machine, and the development of five new models, all produced by Knight. As a result, Camelot became financially successful over the next several years. On December 31, 1995, Knight merged into Camelot. On July 1, 1996, Camelot was sold for approximately $97 million.

B. Involvement of Ernst & Young and Hale and Dorr

In 1992, when Camelot was beginning to enjoy increasing commercial success, the Cavallaros, on behalf of Knight, contacted the law firm of Hale and Dorr to discuss engaging the firm. In October of 1994, the Cavallaros again contacted Hale and Dorr to assist with their estate planning, which included potential transfer tax issues arising from the close business relationship between Knight and Camelot. Between December 19, 1994 and December 31, 1995, Hale and Dorr provided legal advice to Knight and the Cavallaros, acting on behalf of Knight, with respect to the merger of Knight into Camelot. During *55 those meetings, Hale and Dorr advised the Cavallaros on drafting certain affidavits purporting to establish the respective values of each company.

Camelot had first begun to meet with Ernst & Young in June of 1994 for tax planning meetings. Ernst & Young sent Camelot a letter of engagement on November 16,1994 documenting this business relationship and the work that would be accomplished. More specifically, the engagement letter states that Ernst & Young had been hired by Camelot to provide tax advice “solely for the benefit of Camelot Systems, Inc. and not for the benefit of anyone other than the corporation and its shareholders.” (IRS Exhibit J.)

On December 15, 1994, Ernst & Young sent William Cavallaro a letter not only recommending the merger of Knight and Camelot in preparation for the future sale of the company, but also offering options to minimize future gift transfer taxes.

Ernst & Young explained that the IRS would closely examine the respective values of Knight and Camelot at the time of the merger to determine the proper allocation of the sales proceeds between the two corporations’ shareholders. The Ernst & Young letter went on to warn petitioners that, because Camelot had no employees and virtually no tangible assets, and because Knight bore most of the expenses and risks of the glue-dispensing business, the IRS would likely value Knight at approximately 85% of the newly merged corporation, and Camelot at 15%. Because such a valuation would defeat the tax saving goal of allocating most of the sale proceeds to the Cavallaro children, Ernst & Young made several recommendations as to how Knight could transfer assets to Camelot after the merger, but before any future sale of the company. In particular, the accounting firm advised the Cavallaro parents that significant savings on tax liability would be possible if, following a merger, they commenced a gifting program to their children in order shift the respective ownership interests in the merged company from the parents to the children.

On December 19, 1994, the Cavallaro parents, their three sons, the Camelot comptroller, accountants from Ernst & Young, and lawyers from Hale and Dorr attended a meeting. Neither Camelot nor the three sons had an attorney. Hale and Dorr was representing only the parents. This meeting is the Rubicon of this litigation because the petitioners claim it triggered the protection of the attorney-client privilege by altering the nature of their relationship with Ernst & Young.

C. Allegation of Fraud

The Cavallaros did not follow the recommendations outlined in the December 15, 1994 Ernst & Young letter. Instead, on May 28, 1995, William Cavallaro and his oldest son, Kenneth, signed affidavits that were directly at odds with the accounting firm’s initial valuation. In these affidavits, William and Kenneth Cavallaro stated that, when Camelot was formed in 1987, Knight had gifted the glue-dispensing machine technology to Camelot. William Ca-vallaro justified this gift transfer on the basis that the technology had not been profitable up to that time and, he believed, was “no more than a promising raw idea.” Ernst & Young’s subsequent December 31, 1995 valuation, at the time of the merger, reflected this alleged (but undocumented) technology transfer.

The result of the undocumented transfer was significant to the valuation of the companies. While the technology purportedly had no value in 1987, by the time of the merger in 1995, Camelot’s value with the technology represented an 85% stake of *56 the newly formed company, making Knight’s value a 15% stake. This valuation, assuming an earlier undocumented technology transfer as described in the affidavits, directly contradicted Ernst & Young’s valuation made just five months earlier which valued Camelot at 15% and Knight at 85% of the newly formed company.

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153 F. Supp. 2d 52, 88 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6183, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11232, 2001 WL 877063, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cavallaro-v-united-states-mad-2001.