Caufman v. Presbyterian Congregation of Cedar Spring

6 Binn. 59, 1813 Pa. LEXIS 66
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJune 9, 1813
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 6 Binn. 59 (Caufman v. Presbyterian Congregation of Cedar Spring) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Caufman v. Presbyterian Congregation of Cedar Spring, 6 Binn. 59, 1813 Pa. LEXIS 66 (Pa. 1813).

Opinion

Tilghman C. J.

The Presbyterian Congregation of Cedar Spring, were plaintiffs below, and obtained a verdict and judgment. In the course of the trial exceptions were taken to the plaintiffs* evidence, and to the charge of the Court. It will be necessary to state the evidence, in order to understand the points in controversy. So early as the year 1763, the plaintiffs began to build a church on that part of the land now claimed by them, which is not in dispute. The settlement having been broken up by the Indian war, the building of the church was- suspended and not resumed till the year 1767, when it being found that the old logs were rotten they were rejected, and a new church built within about four rods of the site of the old foundation. On the 30th of March 1767, a location was entered in the land office “for 200 acres adjoining Thomas Baxton, Robert “Neilson and John Wilkes, ‘in the names of James Patter- son and James Purdy J in trust for a Presbyterian Meetaing house and .grave yard.” On these locations the quantity of 332 acres 81 perches was surveyed by James Wilson, an assistant of William Maclay, deputy surveyor. When Maclay was informed of the quantity, he said it was more than he could return; and therefore told Isaac Calhount under whom the defendant claims, that if he would enter a location for 100 acres, he might take up part of the land, which Calhoun accordingly did; in consequence of which Maclay cut up the land into two surveys, one of which containing 232 acres 18 perches he returned for the congregation, and the other containing 99 acres 123 perches for Calhoun. The part returned for Calhoun is much, the best in quality, and answers best to the description of the plaintiffs’ location. It does not appear that the congregation were iii-[61]*61formed of the manner in which these surveys were returned; on the contrary they took and always retained possession of" the disputed tract, and about the year 1774 or 1775, built a parsonage house on it, which was first occupied by their minister Mr. Kennedy. About the year 1779, Kennedy was succeeded by the Rev. Hugh Magill, who was placed on the land under a written agreement with the congregation, by virtue of which he was permitted to clear woodland and make improvements, for which he was to receive a compensation in case they exceeded the rent. Magill while thus in possession, purchased Calhoun?s title-' for 40/. a sum far below its value, supposing the title to be good. This was about the year 1786. Before the purchase was made, Magill informed the congregation of Calhoun'1 s■ claim, and told them that if they did not purchase, he would. It does not appear that the congregation took any steps towards purchasing / themselves, but the purchase of Magill produced discontent, in consequence of which the matter was ‘referred to the presbytery in the year 1800, when it was finally agreed that Magill should hold the possession of 'the church land during his life and receive an annuity; but he was no longer to remain pastor of the church. He died in possession in the year 1805, immediately after which his children received notice from the plaintiffs to quit the premises. During their father’s life-, his sons William and Robert obtained a conveyance from James Purdy the surviving trustee of the church, for the sum of 55 dollars; and on the 17th March T807, they obtained a patent from the Commonwealth in trust for all the children of .their father. On the 5th May 1807, all the children joined ifi a deed to the defendant with general warranty, in consideration of the sum of 500/. secured to be paid to them. As soon as the defendant took possession, the plaintiffs brought this ejectment against him. The charge of the president of the Court of Common Pleas was in favour of the plaintiffs; but at the same time he told the jury, that if they were satisfied that Magill purchased from Calhoun for his own use, with the consent of the congregation, in that case the defendant would riot be estopped from controverting the plaintiffs’ title, although he came in under their tenant. He likewise told them that if they were satisfied that the congregation were informed of the defend[62]*62ant’s intention to purchase, and gave no notice o£ their claim, the verdict ought to be in favour of the defendant.

I have been thus particular in stating the evidence, because there is very little difficulty when the matter is fully understood. We must now take for granted that the congregation gave no assent to Magill’s purchase for his own use, and that they were not informed of the defendant’s intention to purchase. The case then stands simply thus. The defendant pm-chased from the children of Magill, who came in under their father, who was the tenant of the plaintiffs. Under such circumstances shall not the defendant be obliged to restore the possession to the plaintiffs? Certainly he shall. Neither the tenant, nor one who claims under him, shall withhold from the landlord that possession, which by the agreement of the parties, was to be given up at the end of the term; and whether the term was for life or for years there is no difference. This principle is so familiar that authorities need hardly be cited. I will refer, however, to the case of Galloway v. Ogle, in this Court, 2 Binn. 468, and Jackson v. Hardie, in the Supreme Court of New York, 4 Johns. 210, 211. It is not proved expressly that the defendant knew whence the persons from whom he purchased derived their possession, but'that is immaterial; it was his business to know it, and the circumstance of his taking a general warranty renders it probable that he did know it, or at least that he knew the title not to be without suspicion. I have hitherto considered the case upon the facts which I have stated. But on the trial of the cause the defendant objected to the admission of some of those facts in evidence. The validity of those objections is now to be examined. In the first place it was contended that parol evidence of what was said by Wilson the assistant of Maclay ought not to have been admitted, because the official return of survey was the best evidence of the survey. But the evidence of Wilson’s words was not let in with a view of contradicting the return of survey; it was only to shew what were the boundaries of the plaintiffs’ claim. It will be recollected that Wilson is dead, otherwise nothing less than his own oath could have been received. Where boundary is the subject, what has been said by a deceased person is received as evidence. It forms an exception to the general nile. It was [63]*63necessary for the plaintiffs to shew their possession of the lands returned for Calhoun; because had they acquiesced in that return, and suffered Calhoun to take possession and keep it for any considerable time, they would have been bound by it. But having never acquiesced, they had a right to contend that William Maclay had done the wrong, even supposing that not more than 220 acres could properly háve been- returned upon a location for 200 acres, He ought not to have deprived them of the most valuable portion of the land, especially as it corresponded best with the plaintiffs location. It was impossible for the plaintiffs to shew the extent of their possession, without shewing the lines run by Wilson.

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Bluebook (online)
6 Binn. 59, 1813 Pa. LEXIS 66, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/caufman-v-presbyterian-congregation-of-cedar-spring-pa-1813.