Cattanach v. Maricopa County Community College District

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: March 30, 2023
• Docket: 4:22-cv-00572
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Donna Lynn Cattanach, No. CV-22-00572-TUC-RCC

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Maricopa County Community College District, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Defendant Maricopa County Community College 16 District's ("MCCCD" or "the District")1 Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of 17 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 5.) Plaintiff Donna Lynn Cattanach, appearing pro se, 18 was advised of her rights and responsibilities on a motion to dismiss as required by 19 Stratton v. Buck, 697 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2012). (Doc. 6.) Plaintiff filed her Response on 20 March 3, 2023. (Doc. 11) Defendant filed its Reply on March 9, 2023. (Doc. 12.) 21 On March 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed a "Response to Defendant's Reply." (Doc. 13.) 22 The Court interprets this filing as a sur-reply. "[N]either the Federal Rules of Civil 23 Procedure nor the District's Local Rules entitle a party to a sur-reply as a matter of right." 24 Burgess v. Shinn, No. CV-21-01164-PHX-DJH, 2022 WL 2341218, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 25 29, 2022) (citing LRCiv 7.2). In general, "sur-replies are highly disfavored and permitted 26 only in extraordinary circumstances." Id. (quoting Finley v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff's 27 1 Although the caption in this matter indicates multiple Defendants, the Third Amended 28 Complaint served upon Defendant MCCCD was edited to include only Defendant MCCCD. (Doc. 1-3 at 63.) 1 Office, No. CV-14-02609-PHX-DLR, 2016 WL 777700, at *1 n.1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 29, 2 2016)). The Court may, in its discretion, permit a party to file a sur-reply, considering 3 "whether the movant's reply in fact raises arguments or issues for the first time, whether 4 the nonmovant's proposed sur[-]reply would be helpful to the resolution of the pending 5 motion, and whether the movant would be unduly prejudiced were leave to be granted." 6 Liberty Corp. Cap. Ltd. v. Steigleman, No. CV-19-05698-PHX-GMS, 2020 WL 2097776, 7 at *1 n.2 (D. Ariz. May 1, 2020) (quoting Sebert v. Ariz. Dep't of Corr., No. CV-16- 8 00354-PHX-ROS-ESW, 2016 WL 3456909, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 17, 2016)). The Court 9 understands that this was likely done because Plaintiff is pro se, however, the Court will 10 strike Plaintiff's sur-reply. Defendant did raise any new arguments to which Plaintiff must 11 respond, neither would the sur-reply as written be helpful to resolution of Defendant's 12 Motion to Dismiss. 13 For the following reasons, the Court will grant Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 14 I. Brief Factual Background 15 In 2016, Plaintiff, 73, began working for Defendant as a Writing Tutor. (Doc. 5-1 16 at 2.)2 She resigned on or about November 24, 2021 after, she alleges, she experienced 17 "egregious harassment based upon age" for over a year. (Doc. 1-3 at 51.) On February 15, 18 2022, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination based on age with the U.S. Equal 19 Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against her former employer. (Doc. 5-1.) 20 Plaintiff alleged: 21 On or about February 14, 2021, I was harassed by Samantha 22 Crandall, Instructional Services Manager with accusations of 23 flouting work policies and breaking the rules of not assisting students with quizzes and test [sic]. On or about July 13, 24 2021, I asked Sara Olk, Administrative Assistant, why haven't 25 I been assigned students to tutor, and she stated that we'll do our best to distribute more of them to you when we can. On 26

27 2 Notably, Plaintiff does not provide any information about her age in her Second Amended Complaint. (See Doc. 1-3 at 50–56.) This fact was only available in the copy of 28 the EEOC Charge that Defendant provided as an attachment to its Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 5-1.) 1 or about November 5, 2021, I started having symptoms of sickness due to the hostile work environment, I know of 2 others not in my protected class that are treated better than 3 me. On or about November 17, 2021, I constructively discharged when I submitted my resignation letter to 4 Samantha Crandall . . . . I believe I was discriminated against 5 because of my age, 71, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended. 6

7 (Id. at 2.) 8 On August 13, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Pima County Superior Court 9 citing Title VII, Title VI, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 10 Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Civil Service Reform Act ("CSRA"), and 11 the elements of a claim of negligence. (Doc. 1-3 at 24–25.) Plaintiff filed Amended 12 Complaints on August 17 ("First Amended Complaint") and August 20 ("Second 13 Amended Complaint"). (Doc. 1-3 at 31–37, 50–56.) Plaintiff then amended her complaint 14 again on November 3 ("Third Amended Complaint"). (Doc. 1-3 at 63–69.) It does not appear that Plaintiff filed this final version with the Pima County Superior Court Clerk, 15 but Defendant asserts it was only ever served with the Third Amended Complaint. (Doc. 16 5 at 2.) Apart from adding some detail to her alleged physical and psychological injures, 17 Plaintiff only changed the Defendants she named between the Second and Third 18 Amended Complaints.3 The Court will cite to the allegations in Plaintiff's Second 19 Amended Complaint as it was the last document filed with the Court Clerk, and because 20 the substantive allegations it contains against Defendant are identical to the Third 21 Amended Complaint that was served upon Defendant. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 22 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992); A.R. Intern. Anti-Fraud Sys., Inc. v. Pretoria Nat. Cent. 23 Bureau of Interpol, 634 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (finding that an 24 amended complaint supersedes the original complaint). 25 Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint—indeed every version of her Complaint— 26 is sparse and lacks specific factual allegations or explanation of her claims. Plaintiff 27 3 In her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff named “District (MCCCD); Dr. Deric 28 Hall, Director EEO; Melinda Caraballo, Acting Director EEO.” (Doc. 1-3 at 50). In her Third Amended Complaint, the only remaining party was the District. (Doc. 1-3 at 63.) 1 states that she was "Discriminated against based upon Age and Egregiously Harassed due 2 to a Hostile Work Environment from Jan 9, 2021, until Nov 24, /2021 [sic] at MCCCD- 3 Phoenix College." (Doc. 1-3 at 51.) She further alleges "Disparate Treatment" stating 4 "[o]ut of just about 40 Tutors in Phoenix College I was treated very differently from other 5 Tutors. 35 tutors out of 40 were substantially under the age of 40. Most tutors were in 6 their 20s, early 30s." (Id. at 52.) She notes, "October-November 2021, I learned another 7 employee in my age range was also harassed & resigned" but offers no additional detail. 8 (Id.) Finally, she makes reference to "Constructive Discharge due to Hostile Work 9 Environment." (Id.) She asserts that she suffered anxiety and several physical ailments 10 (i.e., osteoarthritis, migraines, and diarrhea) as a result of her experience. (Id. at 52–55.) 11 Attached to Defendant's Notice of Removal were copies of Plaintiff's Complaint(s) 12 along with various additional documents (i.e., a letter from Plaintiff regarding EEOC 13 Charge, and copies of messages and emails between Plaintiff and other District 14 employees). (See Docs. 1-3, 1-4, 1-5.) On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court is generally limited to considering 15 the complaint itself. Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 16 Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1274 (9th Cir. 1993)). However, the Court 17 may consider "material which is properly submitted as part of the complaint" and whose 18 legitimacy is not contested. Id. (quoting Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 19 1994)). Alternatively, "under [Federal Rule of Evidence] 201, a court may take judicial 20 notice of 'matters of public record.'" Id. (quoting Mack v. South Bay Distrib., 798 F.2d 21 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986)). An EEOC charge is a matter of public record. See Spina v. 22 Maricopa Cnty. Dept. of Transp., No. 05–CIV–0712–PHX–SMM, 2007 WL 4168438, at 23 *2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 20, 2007). 24 It is not clear to the Court which of the additional documents included with the 25 Notice of Removal, if any, were attached to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. 26 Accordingly, the Court will consider only the face of the Second Amended Complaint 27 and the copy of the EEOC Charge attached to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 28 1 II. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 2 Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's lawsuit in its entirety because she failed to 3 sufficiently allege a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 5.) Defendant asserts 4 that Plaintiff has not pled any facts that plausibly establish a claim for age discrimination 5 under the ADEA. (Id. at 3–9.) Defendant further argues that Plaintiff's Title VII and ADA 6 claims lack factual support and are otherwise barred because Plaintiff failed to exhaust 7 her administrative remedies. (Id. at 9–13.) Defendant also contends that Plaintiff's Title 8 VI claim lacks factual support. (Id. at 15.) Finally, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has not 9 pled a viable claim for a suit under negligence by merely listing the elements of 10 negligence in the applicable law section of her Second Amended Complaint. (Id. at 13.) 11 III. Motion to Dismiss Standard 12 A complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that 13 the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While Rule 8 does not require 14 detailed factual allegations, "it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant 15 unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Instead, 16 "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to 17 relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 18 544, 570 (2007)). 19 A claim is only plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 20 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 21 alleged." Id. The law requires the complaint to contain more than "a statement of facts 22 that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action." Twombly, 550 23 U.S. at 555. This means that "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 24 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. 25 The task of determining if a plaintiff has stated a plausible claim to survive a 26 motion to dismiss is "context-specific" and "requires the reviewing court to draw on its 27 judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, although a 28 plaintiff's specific factual allegations might be relevant to a constitutional claim, a court 1 must nevertheless consider whether there are other "more likely explanations" for a 2 defendant's conduct. See id. at 681. 3 While pro se litigants are generally held to the same rules as parties who are 4 represented by an attorney, the court will "construe pro se filings liberally." Hebbe v. 5 Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A "complaint [filed by a pro se litigant] 'must 6 be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Id. (quoting 7 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). If the district court determines that a 8 pleading might be cured by the allegation of other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an 9 opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 10 F.3d 1122, 1127–29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 11 IV. Discussion 12 The Court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to meet the pleading requirements to 13 plausibly state any claim upon which relief can be granted in her Second Amended 14 Complaint. 15 A. ADEA 16 The ADEA prohibits an employer from acting to "discriminate against any 17 individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 18 employment, because of such individual's age[,]" or "to limit, segregate, or classify his 19 employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 20 employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, 21 because of such individual's age[.]" 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1)–(2). 22 A plaintiff seeking to state a claim for age discrimination under a theory of 23 disparate treatment must allege facts that, if true, establish (1) Plaintiff is at least forty; 24 (2) Plaintiff was performing satisfactorily; (3) Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment 25 action; and (4) Plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected age class. See 26 Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co. LLC, 413 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2005); see also 27 Sheppard v. David Evans & Assoc., 694 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2012). Although "a 28 wide array of disadvantageous changes in the workplace" might constitute an adverse 1 employment action, Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000), "not every 2 employment decision amounts to an adverse employment action," Brooks v. City of San 3 Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 928 (9th Cir. 2000). "An adverse employment action is shown 4 where the employer's decision imposed a 'material change in the terms and conditions of 5 a person's employment.'" DeVega v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 2006 WL 2168566, at *3 (D. 6 Ariz. July 28, 2006) (quoting Chuang v. Univ. of Cal., 225 F.3d 1115, 1126 (9th Cir. 7 2000)). Furthermore, "[t]o establish a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must 8 show: (1) [s]he is a member of the class protected by the ADEA; (2) [s]he was subjected 9 to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on age; (4) the harassment was 10 sufficiently pervasive or severe so as to alter the conditions of the plaintiff's employment 11 and create an abusive work environment; (5) the objectionable behavior was both 12 subjectively and objectively offensive, such that a reasonable person would find it hostile 13 or abusive; (6) and the plaintiff found it hostile or abusive." Caracofe v. Drake Kryterion, 14 Inc., No. CV-18-02595-PHX-SPL, 2020 WL 122873, at *6 (D. Ariz. Jan. 10, 2020). 15 "[C]ourts consider all the circumstances, including the frequency of the allegedly 16 discriminatory conduct, its severity, and whether it unreasonably interferes with an 17 employee's work performance." Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1109 (9th 18 Cir. 2008). That said, "[s]imply causing an employee offense based on an isolated 19 comment is not sufficient . . . ." McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1113 (9th 20 Cir. 2004); see also, Kortan v. Calif. Youth Authority, 217 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000) 21 (plaintiff who alleged supervisor mailed postcards to her home, stated females are 22 "castrating bitches," and called the plaintiff "Medea," did not raise a hostile work 23 environment claim); Manatt v. Bank of Am., 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 2003) (plaintiff 24 who alleged coworkers made racist remarks, called him "China man," and "pulled their 25 eyes back with their fingers in an attempt to imitate or mock the appearance of Asians" 26 did not create a hostile work environment); but see Fuller v. Idaho Dep't of Corr., 865 27 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2017) (employer who sided with plaintiff's alleged rapist raised 28 sufficient hostility to withstand summary judgment). 1 Here, Plaintiff has failed to meet the pleading standard to plausibly state a claim 2 under the ADEA for age discrimination, even if the Court considers the factual 3 allegations in the EEOC Charge in addition to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. 4 The EEOC Charge establishes that Plaintiff is over forty years old. (Doc. 5-1.) But 5 Plaintiff does not allege facts that she was performing her work satisfactorily, that she 6 suffered a cognizable adverse employment action, or that she was replaced by someone 7 younger. Plaintiff alleges that she complained once about not being assigned students to 8 tutor, but she does not elaborate any further about this practice apart from saying that she 9 was told the District would "do our best to distribute more of them to you when we can." 10 (Id.) These minimal factual allegations are not enough for the Court to plausibly infer that 11 Plaintiff suffered any adverse employment action. And while she states that the majority 12 of tutors were younger than her and that she knew "of others not in [her] protected class 13 that are treated better than [her]," Plaintiff does not explain how, why, or attempt to 14 connect these allegations to her alleged mistreatment. Neither has Plaintiff pled sufficient facts for a claim of a hostile work 15 environment. Although she is protected by the ADEA, Plaintiff has not alleged that the 16 harassment she experienced was based on age, nor that it was nearly so pervasive or 17 severe as to alter her work conditions and create an objectively abusive work 18 environment. Taken as true, Plaintiff's sparse allegations that a manager accused her of 19 violating policy and that she was not assigned students to tutor once are not pervasive, 20 severe, or enough to allege that a reasonable person would find that environment hostile 21 or abusive. 22 In her Response, Plaintiff seems to mistake a requirement that she plead sufficient 23 factual allegations with a requirement that she provide all her evidence regarding her 24 alleged mistreatment. (See, e.g., Doc. 11 at 3–4.) She argues that she could not possibly 25 have fit evidence of a year's worth of mistreatment in a brief complaint. (Id.) Plaintiff 26 does not have to provide all her evidence to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 27 She must, however, provide explanation and specific factual allegations so as to avoid the 28 "unadorned, the defendant unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]" prohibited by Iqbal, 556 1 U.S. at 678, and permit this Court to reasonably infer that she has a claim. 2 B. Title VII 3 Plaintiff also appears to allege a claim under Title VII. Title VII makes illegal any 4 action by an employer that discriminates against any individual with respect to her 5 compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of her race, color, 6 religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The first requirement to make 7 out a prima facie case for Title VII discrimination is to allege that the plaintiff is a 8 member of a protected class. See Reynaga v. Roseburg Forest Prods., 847 F.3d 678, 690– 9 91 (9th Cir. 2017). 10 Plaintiff has not made any allegation that she belongs to a class protected under 11 Title VII (race, color, religion, sex, or national origin) or that she experienced 12 discrimination based on her membership in that class. It is unnecessary to analyze 13 Plaintiff's Title VII claim further. 14 C. Title VI 15 Plaintiff also cites to Title VI in her Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 1-3 at 52– 16 53.) Title VI prohibits "any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" 17 from excluding, denying benefits, or discriminating against any individual "on the ground 18 of race, color, or national origin[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. In her Response, Plaintiff 19 addresses why she believes the District received federal financial assistance to fall under 20 Title VI, but she does not make any factual allegations that her alleged mistreatment was 21 on the basis of her race, color, or national origin. (Doc. 11 at 5–6.) Therefore, the Court 22 will dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint to the extent she raises a claim under 23 Title VI. 24 D. ADA 25 Although Plaintiff cited the ADA in her Second Amended Complaint, she clarifies 26 in her Response that this was a typo and she only meant to cite to the ADEA. (Doc. 11 at 27 5.) Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the ADA claim and not address it further. 28 1 E. Negligence 2 In the applicable law section of her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff lists the 3 four elements of a claim of negligence (duty, breach, causation, and damages). (Doc. 1-3 4 at 54.) She provides no other reference to negligence nor any specific factual allegations 5 that would support a claim that the District breached a duty owed to Plaintiff and that 6 such breach caused damages. The Court will therefore dismiss Plaintiff's Second 7 Amended Complaint to the extent she intended to allege a claim of negligence. 8 F. CSRA 9 Plaintiff makes a reference the CSRA. (Doc. 1-3 at 54.) The CSRA applies to 10 federal employees. See Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. 41, 44 (2012) ("The Civil Service 11 Reform Act . . . establishes a framework for evaluating personnel actions taken against 12 federal employees."). Plaintiff has not made any allegations that she was a federal 13 employee when employed by the District. The Court will dismiss Plaintiff's Second 14 Amended Complaint to the extent she intended to allege a claim under the CSRA. 15 V. Conclusion and Leave to Amend 16 For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended 17 Complaint for failure to state a claim. The Court will however dismiss without prejudice 18 to allow Plaintiff to re-file an amended complaint because she may have more 19 information that she thought she could not include in a few sentences. (See Doc. 11 at 4 20 ("I experienced harassment over the entire year of 2021. The form of harassment varies 21 but not the intent. I couldn't include dates, nature of incident, severity, etc. in 1, 2 22 sentences. It's not realistic.").) 23 The Court evaluates whether to permit amendment by weighing "(1) bad faith; (2) 24 undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; (4) futility of amendment; and (5) 25 whether plaintiff has previously amended his complaint." W. Shoshone Nat'l Council v. 26 Molini, 951 F.2d 200, 204 (9th Cir. 1991). "Leave to amend need not be given if a 27 complaint, as amended, is subject to dismissal." Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 28 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). 1 Here, the Court will permit Plaintiff one more opportunity to amend the complaint. 2 Within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order, Plaintiff may file a Fourth Amended 3 Complaint. The Fourth Amended Complaint must be retyped or rewritten in its 4 entirety and may not incorporate any part of the previous complaints by reference. 5 In other words, if Plaintiff files a Fourth Amended Complaint, the Court will 6 consider it as a stand alone document and will only assess the factual allegations it 7 contains. 8 Plaintiff must write short, plain statements telling the Court: (1) law right Plaintiff 9 believes was violated; (2) the name of the Defendant who violated the law; (3) exactly 10 what that Defendant did or failed to do; (4) how the action or inaction of that Defendant 11 is connected to the violation; and (5) what specific injury Plaintiff suffered because of 12 that Defendant's conduct. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371–72, 377 (1976). If 13 Plaintiff fails to affirmatively link the conduct of the named Defendant with the specific 14 injury suffered by Plaintiff, the allegations against Defendant will be dismissed for failure 15 to state a claim. As indicated above, mere conclusory allegations that a Defendant has 16 violated the law are not acceptable and will be dismissed. 17 The Court is aware that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. Plaintiff shall familiarize 18 herself with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rules for the District of 19 Arizona, both of which can be found on the Court's web site at www.azd.uscourts.gov. 20 Plaintiff is also advised that a Handbook for Self-Represented Litigants is available on 21 the Court's website at: http://www.azd.uscourts.gov/handbook-self-represented-litigants. 22 In addition, Step Up to Justice offers a free, advice-only clinic for self-represented civil 23 litigants on Thursdays from 1:30 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. If Plaintiff wishes to schedule a clinic 24 appointment, she should contact the courthouse librarian, Mary Ann O'Neil, at 25 MaryAnn_O'Neil@LB9.uscourts.gov. 26 If Plaintiff fails to prosecute this action or to comply with the rules or any Court 27 order, the Court may dismiss the action with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 28 Procedure 41(b). See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260–61 (holding that the district court did not 1 || abuse its discretion in dismissing a pro se plaintiff's complaint for failing to comply with 2 || acourt order). 3 Accordingly, 4 IT IS ORDERED that 5 (1) Plaintiff's Sur-Reply (Doc. 13) is STRICKEN. 6 (2) Defendant MCCCD's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. (Doc. 5.) 7 (3) This matter is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff may file a 8 Fourth Amended Complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this 9 Order. If Plaintiff fails to file a Fourth Amended Complaint within this 10 deadline, the Clerk of Court must, without further order of the Court, enter a 11 judgment of dismissal of this action with prejudice and deny any pending 12 unrelated motions as moot. 13 Dated this 29th day of March, 2023. 14 15 , 4] 16 fy pL N- M7 Honorable Raner ©. Collins 18 senior United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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