Catherine W. v. Robert F.

116 Misc. 2d 377, 455 N.Y.S.2d 519, 1982 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3886
CourtNew York Family Court
DecidedOctober 21, 1982
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 116 Misc. 2d 377 (Catherine W. v. Robert F.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Family Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Catherine W. v. Robert F., 116 Misc. 2d 377, 455 N.Y.S.2d 519, 1982 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3886 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1982).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

Morton I. Willen, J.

The fundamental issue in this case is the determination of a father’s obligation to provide child support when his adolescent children refuse to see him.

There is no doubt that such obligation may be suspended when a former wife-custodian actively deprives the father of his visitation rights. Under section 241 of the Domestic Relations Law which does not apply in the instant matter because of the former wife’s remarriage, alimony may also be terminated. Other remedies exist as well, which will be discussed below.

Where the father’s conduct towards the children clearly is such that his acts render it inimical to their physical or emotional well-being, then the children’s refusal to see him does not excuse his obligation to support them.

There is a grey zone, however, where the children perceive their father with anger and resentment, do not wish to see him, and conflicting allegations are made as to the basis. When this occurs, typically either a petition for contempt or to enforce or vacate support or visitation or to make support and visitation mutually dependent, follows, [378]*378and a hearing held to determine the adequacy of the children’s reaction. If, for example, their refusal to have visitation is fueled by their mother’s hurts, old or new, and she is overtly or covertly undermining visitation, and the alleged conduct of the father is blown up to undeserved proportions, then the misalliance between mother and children rather than the father’s conduct is the root cause for nonvisitation and the courts will afford him relief.

Stated another way, if the acts of the father with the children are of such magnitude as to reasonably excuse their refusal to see him, then his obligation to support them will be enforced. Where on the other hand, resentment, the anticipated fallout of a defunct marriage, results in noncompliance with the duty of the custodial parent to foster and encourage a positive relationship between the children and noncustodial parent, our law quite properly provides a range of remedies, including change of custody, contempt, suspending child support or alimony where applicable, and making child support dependent upon visitation.

The courts must take especial care not to provide children as allies to either side when former spouses elect to continue litigation warfare.

This petition by the father seeks a finding of willful contempt against the mother and an order making support dependent upon visitation. The parties were married in 1960 and divorced in 1979. There are two children, Cathleen, 17, and Robert (Robbie), 16. A nonmerged separation agreement provided custody to the mother, alimony, support for the children, specified visitation (one full weekend and all remaining Sundays of the month), prompt disclosure of serious illness of the children, and mutual access to their medical and school records. Additionally the parties agreed to: “exert every reasonable effort to maintain free access and unhampered contact between the children and each of the parties and to foster a feeling of affection between the children and the other party. Neither party shall do anything which may estrange the children from the other party or injure the children’s opinion as to their mother or father or which may hamper the free and [379]*379natural development of the children’s love and respect for the other party.”

In previous litigation, following the recommendation of the Consultation Services Center, Cathleen was excused from compliance with visitation with her father while Robbie was compelled to continue. The father is currently paying child support of $120 per week ($60 per week per child), as a result of an order of this court on December 10, 1980.

At this time the father has not had visitation with either of the children for over two years, based he says, on the mother having turned his daughter against him, and as to his son, based on the mother’s wrongful removal of the boy to a Pennsylvania boarding school without the father’s consent nor even consultation with him. No serious refutation was made by the mother that her placing the son in the Pennsylvania school was clandestine and effectively deprived the father of agreed upon as well as court-ordered visitation.

The testimony adduced showed continuous efforts by the father to obtain visitation. There were a huge number of telephone calls which resulted in either the phone being hung up, or his being told the children were not home when they actually were there, or his being told to call back at a later time at which time no one was home and eventually total frustration when the mother obtained an unlisted telephone number. He attempted on a large number of occasions to go to the mother’s house and was denied visitation in each instance. In at least one instance he was told his son was not home while he was seen at an upstairs window. Additionally the police were called frequently by the mother upon very little pretext. The father sent many letters as well as birthday and Christmas cards to the children and these were returned to him, unopened, and on one occasion, the boy, Robbie, responded with a vitriolic hate letter.

The main thrust of the mother’s defense was that the decision to forego visitation was made by the children solely, despite her advice to the contrary. The testimony of the mother persuades the court that she is ambivalent [380]*380about fostering an appropriate father-child relationship, paying lip service to its virtue but covertly approving any negative reaction by the children to their father. On cross-examination the mother’s present husband indicated that the mother was partially responsible for the children’s refusal of visitation by her overreaction to her former husband, and the court so finds.

The incidents which the children allege sustain their decision not to see their father consist of Cathleen’s claim that her father demeaned her in front of her friends, that he was a phony, that he badgered her about her mother, that he asked her to live with him, that she resented his present wife and her teenage daughter. She claimed her father called her a “whore”, “bitch”, “stupid” and that she looked like a prostitute. She was criticized by him at age 14 for wearing too much make-up, for low grades in school and for going out with boys.

The father denied all of the name calling except that he admitted telling his daughter, “If that’s the way you feel, you can go to hell.” He stated that his former wife’s reaction to the children’s refusal to see him was illustrated by her statement to him in a telephone conversation, “I am glad you are getting it stuffed up your ass.” Notwithstanding all of Cathleen’s negativism she admitted that during a period of regular visitation with her father they went rollerskating, to the movies and even picnics. The father’s present wife also indicated that at one time there was discussion of Cathleen living with them and sharing a bedroom with her 16-year-old daughter. After hearing all the versions of what was said and done, the court is satisfied that the father was truthful, sincere and is not looking to avoid his support obligations. He emphatically denies calling Cathleen the names she attributes to him and the court believes him. He testified that if he is required to support the children but is unable to see them, that they would continue to regard him as “just money”.

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131 A.D.2d 547 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1987)

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Bluebook (online)
116 Misc. 2d 377, 455 N.Y.S.2d 519, 1982 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3886, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/catherine-w-v-robert-f-nyfamct-1982.