Catherine Patterson, V. Donald Patterson

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: January 30, 2023
• Docket: 82925-4
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Marriage of DIVISION ONE CATHERINE A. PATTERSON, No. 82925-4-I Respondent, UNPUBLISHED OPINION and

DONALD E. PATTERSON,

Appellant.

DWYER, J. — In this marital dissolution action, Donald Patterson contends

that the trial court erred in concluding that it had personal jurisdiction over him

and by entering a dissolution decree. Finding no error, we affirm.

I

Catherine and Donald Patterson married in April 2016 and separated in

January 2020. In August 2020, Catherine1 commenced this action in King

County Superior Court and had a sheriff serve Donald with copies of an

amended petition for divorce and other items, which did not include a summons.

In September 2020, Donald filed a response to the petition and claimed

that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. He asked the trial court

to enter a dissolution degree, divide the property and debts fairly and equitably,

1 We refer to the parties by their first names to avoid confusion. No. 82925-4-I/2

and for attorney fees but only “[i]f and when [the court] acquires jurisdiction” over

him. At some point thereafter, the parties agreed to participate in an informal

family law trial proceeding. The case then proceeded to trial in June 2021, where

both parties represented themselves. On July 6, 2021, the trial court entered a

dissolution decree and findings of fact and conclusions of law.2

Donald appeals and continues to represent himself.

II

Donald contends that the dissolution decree is void because the trial court

lacked personal jurisdiction over him. We disagree.

Our review of a challenge to a trial court’s personal jurisdiction is de novo.

In re Marriage of Murphy, 90 Wn. App. 488, 493, 952 P.2d 624 (1998). “Proper

service of the summons and complaint is essential to invoke personal jurisdiction

over a party.” In re Marriage of Markowski, 50 Wn. App. 633, 635-36, 749 P.2d

754 (1988). However, a party may waive a claim of lack of personal jurisdiction

by “consent[ing], expressly or impliedly, to the court’s exercising jurisdiction.” In

re Marriage of Steele, 90 Wn. App. 992, 997-98, 957 P.2d 247 (1998). Consent

may be established by proceeding and arguing the case on its merits. See

Markowski, 50 Wn. App. at 637; In re Estate of Little, 127 Wn. App. 915, 922,

113 P.3d 505 (2005) (court acquires personal jurisdiction when a party

participates in the proceedings).

The record does not indicate that Catherine served Donald with a

summons in this matter. Her petition also alleged that the trial court did not have

2 We do not detail the trial court’s findings and conclusions because none of them are at

issue in this appeal, except for the personal jurisdiction determination.

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personal jurisdiction over Donald. Donald filed a response agreeing that the

court lacked jurisdiction over him. Both parties later agreed to resolve their

dispute in an informal trial. During the June 2021 trial, Donald testified and

sought affirmative relief in the form of “an equitable interest in the property” at

issue. Thus, by his own actions, Donald waived any challenge to personal

jurisdiction and obtained the benefits of a trial on the merits. The trial court’s

entry of the dissolution decree was proper.

Donald’s reliance on Walker v. Orkin, LLC, 10 Wn. App. 2d 565, 448 P.3d

815 (2019), is misplaced. In Walker, after being served with an unsigned

summons in a personal injury action, the respondent filed a CR 12(b) motion to

dismiss the lawsuit for insufficient service of process within the statute of

limitations. The trial court denied respondent’s motion. Walker, 10 Wn. App. 2d

at 568. On appeal, we noted that the plaintiff failed to timely correct its defective

service, which necessitated a reversal of the trial court’s denial of the motion to

dismiss. Walker, 10 Wn. App. 2d at 572-73.

Unlike in Walker, Donald never moved to dismiss the petition for

dissolution on jurisdictional grounds or for insufficient service of process. “In

order to preserve the jurisdictional question the defendant must, however,

proceed without equivocation, precisely and with dispatch.” Sanders v. Sanders,

63 Wn.2d 709, 714, 388 P.2d 942 (1964). Instead, and also unlike the

respondent in Walker, Donald invoked the trial court’s jurisdiction by agreeing to

proceed to and actively participating at trial. The trial court did not err by

exercising its jurisdiction.

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Affirmed.3

WE CONCUR:

3 Donald’s request for an award of attorney fees and costs is denied.

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