Catherine Daniels v. David Mathews, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare of the United States

567 F.2d 845, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 5437
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedDecember 29, 1977
Docket77-1341
StatusPublished
Cited by30 cases

This text of 567 F.2d 845 (Catherine Daniels v. David Mathews, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare of the United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Catherine Daniels v. David Mathews, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare of the United States, 567 F.2d 845, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 5437 (8th Cir. 1977).

Opinion

LAY, Circuit Judge.

Catherine Daniels seeks review of the district court’s order sustaining the decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare denying her Social Security disability benefits. The administrative law judge (ALJ) denied her application for supplemental income benefits and the Secretary in turn upheld this ruling. The claimant thereafter sought review before the federal district court. The district judge, on review of a magistrate’s recommendation that substantial evidence supported the administrative decision, entered judgment in favor of the Secretary. We reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Mrs. Daniels was born on March 10, 1932, and has an 11th grade education. Her past work experience includes employment as a dishwasher, babysitter, and manager of a dry cleaning store. In 1955 she completed a 9-month vocational course in practical nursing. Commencing in 1960 she worked for five to six years as a nurse’s aid.

Mrs. Daniels testified at the hearing that she quit working in 1969 due td a nervous condition. The sparse medical record demonstrates that she suffers from anxiety, headaches, dizziness and fatigue. The medical diagnoses reported varied from “depressive neurosis” to “chronic mild depressive reaction” and “acute anxiety neurosis.” The claimant has undergone three surgical procedures since 1969: removal of adhesions around the bowel tract, a hysterectomy, and rectal surgery. She was again hospitalized for ten days in January, 1976. 1

Mrs. Daniels testified that her family physician had told her she could no longer work because of her nervous condition. In October of 1975 one consulting psychiatrist, based upon a single examination, reported that claimant was “partially disabled from gainful employment.” A psychiatric social worker who had given claimant supportive therapy over four months concluded in January of 1976 that Mrs. Daniels had not been able “to tolerate employment in the past year” and that she would be unable to tolerate employment in the coming year. Mrs. Daniels also had been treated by Dr. Tomelleri, a psychiatrist with the St. Louis Comprehensive Neighborhood Health Center. The record contains no report from him.

*847 In denying benefits, the ALJ gave substantial weight to the testimony of Dr. Boyd, an industrial consultant psychologist, that notwithstanding physical and mental impairments the claimant is still able to engage in a number of jobs. According to Dr. Boyd these jobs included cashier, clerical work, real estate and photograph sales.

On appeal claimant asserts that there is no substantial evidence which supports the vocational expert’s evaluation. Claimant further asserts that the hypothetical question asked of Dr. Boyd was improper in that the ALJ failed to factually state the mental and physical impairment the vocational expert was to assume in making his evaluation. The government concedes the hypothetical question was improper but urges that the examiner was otherwise sufficiently informed to provide an answer.

The hypothetical question asked by the administrative law judge was as follows:

I want you to consider the claimant’s general background, training, and education, and experience . . .. And, also I want you to consider, and also assume, that I should find that the claimant has certain physical and njental limitations that would prevent her from working again as a nurse’s assistant or a nurse’s aid. Or as a domestic. Or, as a babysitter for young children. Or as a receptionist. Or as a dishwasher. Do you have an opinion, based upon a reasonable medical, upon a reasonable certainty, as to what alternative employment she could engage in. .

Dr. Boyd answered:

Now, I do think she has very definite marketable skills which she could transfer to jobs other than the jobs she has been doing. Assuming the physical and mental limitations, these jobs would include cashiering, which, you know, it’s really making change. You do greet the public to a certain extent. It doesn’t require much in the way of physical stamina or strength.
I think she can function, you know, in various kinds of clerical occupations. I think that in terms of sorting coupons or sorting photographs, that type of thing. Or pricing photographs. I think she can function as a telephone solicitor. A telephone collector. Telephone sales. She’s had some experience using a telephone, in the real estate business, there.
And, I think she can function, you know, in some of the service occupations. A locker room attendant. A, they determine, they watch persons, rather than watch men. I think she certainly has shown tremendous responsibility and over a long period of time. She’s a throughly [sic] dependable person. These are found in stores, in business institutions and Federal buildings. These are jobs, under the assumption, that I think she could do.

On cross-examination Dr. Boyd gave the following reasons for his conclusion that claimant could perform the jobs mentioned:

[T]he reason I cited the jobs I did, was because, they’re, you know, not much in the way of physical demand. A nurse’s aide, you’re on your feet, where you’re really out chasing. A domestic, you’re on your feet, as I’ve said. A baby-sitter, you got to be alert. A real estate salesperson, that’s not very demanding. A dishwasher, again, it’s demanding, you’re on your feet all the time when you’re washing dishes. I cited jobs I thought she had the skills, but were to be less demanding.

The ALJ found that although claimant was not capable of working as a nurse’s aid she could work as a nurse’s aid instructor. Mrs. Daniels is not even a licensed practical nurse. The last time she worked as a nurse’s aid was over ten years ago and the evidence does not support the assumption that she has the mental or physical capacity at the present time to be engaged in such technical employment. Cf. Johnson v. Richardson, 486 F.2d 1023 (8th Cir. 1973). Beyond this, we find no evidence in the record to support the expert’s opinion that claimant had the capacity to do the other jobs mentioned. It may be that Dr. Boyd’s evaluation is correct, but we deem the record grossly inadequate to credit this testimony. There is no support for the proposition that claimant could ever function as a real es *848 tate sales person or a cashier. She is not trained in real estate and has had no education to support such a finding. The evidence showed that claimant could not do even simple math. 2

The basic weakness of the expert’s evaluation as to claimant’s capacity to do specific jobs results from the vague hypothesis and assumption the vocational expert was asked to make. He was told to assume “certain physical and mental limitations” that would prevent claimant from doing all the jobs she had performed several years before. These “limitations” were undisclosed. Furthermore, the answer of Dr. Boyd assumed that the main impairment suffered is a physical one. Dr.

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Bluebook (online)
567 F.2d 845, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 5437, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/catherine-daniels-v-david-mathews-secretary-of-health-education-and-ca8-1977.