Catfish Farmers of Am. v. United States

2024 CIT 23
United States Court of International Trade·Decided February 26, 2024·No. 20-00105·Published

Opinion

Slip Op. 24-23

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Court No. 20-00105

CATFISH FARMERS OF AMERICA, et al., Plaintiffs, v.

UNITED STATES, Defendant, and NTSF SEAFOODS JOINT STOCK COMPANY, Defendant-Intervenor.

Before: M. Miller Baker, Judge

OPINION

[The court partially sustains Commerce’s redetermination and remands for further proceedings.]

Dated: February 26, 2024

Nazak Nikakhtar, Maureen E. Thorson, and Stephanie M. Bell, Wiley Rein LLP of Washington, DC, on the comments for Plaintiffs.

Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Patricia M. McCarthy, Director; and Kara M. Westercamp, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of

Justice of Washington, DC, on the comments for Defendant . Of counsel on the comments was Hendricks Valenzuela, Office of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement & Compliance, U.S. Department of Commerce of Washington, DC.

Robert G. Gosselink and Jonathan M. Freed, Trade Pacific PLLC of Washington, DC, on the comments for Defendant-Intervenor.

Baker, Judge: This case returns after the court directed the Department of Commerce to reconsider (1) whether Indonesia is economically comparable to Vietnam; (2) the finding that Indian data are superior to Indonesia’s; (3) certain evidence submitted by Plaintiffs Catfish Farmers of America and its individual members, and in light of that evidence, whether Defendant -Intervenor NTSF Seafoods Joint Stock Company accurately reported production information; (4) NTSF’s byproduct offset; and (5) evidence relating to moisture content. ECF 68, at 1–2. 1

On remand, Commerce largely stood its ground. Appx017420–017421. Catfish Farmers challenge those results. ECF 86, at 8. The government responded , see ECF 84, and NTSF joined in those comments , see ECF 83. The court requested supplemental briefing, ECF 96, which the parties submitted, ECF 99

1 The court presumes the reader’s familiarity with its pre-

vious opinion, NTSF Seafoods Joint Stock Co. v. United States, Ct. Nos. 20-00104 and 20-00105, Slip Op. 22-38, 2022 WL 1375140 (CIT Apr. 25, 2022).

(plaintiffs), ECF 100 (government). The court again remands .

I

Catfish Farmers brought this suit under 19 U.S.C. §§ 1516a(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) and (a)(2)(B)(iii) to contest Commerce ’s final determination in the 15th administrative review of the applicable antidumping order. Subjectmatter jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c).

In actions brought under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2), “[t]he court shall hold unlawful any determination, finding, or conclusion found . . . to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). The question is not whether the court would have reached the same decision on the same record—rather, it is whether the administrative record as a whole permits Commerce’s conclusion.

Substantial evidence has been defined as more than a mere scintilla, as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. To determine if substantial evidence exists, we review the record as a whole, including evidence that supports as well as evidence that fairly detracts from the substantiality of the evidence.

Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (cleaned up).

II

Broadly speaking, the issues presented fall into two buckets: the selection of a primary surrogate country and how NTSF reported factors of production. The court addresses them in turn.

A

1

In determining costs of production in antidumping cases involving goods imported from a nonmarket- economy country, Commerce must use, “to the extent possible,” one or more market-economy countries (surrogates ) that are “at a level of economic development comparable to that of the nonmarket economy country .” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4) (emphasis added). The court accordingly instructed the agency to “explain whether Indonesia is economically comparable to Vietnam using the same World Bank gross national income data used to identify India and the five other countries on the Department’s list of six countries at levels of comparable economic development.” ECF 68, at 1 (remand order).

Notwithstanding the court’s instruction, Commerce found Indonesia presumptively ineligible because it was not at the “same” level of economic development as Vietnam:

[D]espite the petitioners’ arguments that Indonesia represents a country at a comparable level of economic development as Vietnam, it was not at the same level of economic development and, thus, did not present a scenario where Commerce must afford that country the same consideration as others on the list of countries at the same level of economic development.

Appx017428 (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

The statute, however, does not require a surrogate to be at the “same” level of economic development as the nonmarket-economy country where imports are produced. Instead, it only dictates that a surrogate have a “comparable” level of development, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4), a somewhat broader standard, as it includes the merely similar as well as the identical.

Indeed, the remand results themselves show that Commerce views “the same” as narrower and more selective than “comparable”:

Surrogate [candidates] that are not at the same level of economic development as the [nonmarket -economy] country, but still at a level of economic development comparable to the [nonmarket -economy] country, are selected only to the extent that data considerations outweigh levelof -economic development differences or significant producer considerations.

Appx017423 (emphasis added).

Commerce thus presumptively disqualifies countries that are only “comparable” in favor of its own stricter criterion. But the statute requires the use of “one or more market economy countries that are . . . at a level of economic development comparable to that of the nonmarket economy country.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c)(4)(A) (emphasis added). A more demanding rule that excludes “comparable” countries is therefore not in accordance with law. The court remands again for the Department to apply the statutory standard— under protest, if necessary.

2
a

The court concluded that Commerce impermissibly used circular reasoning to find that “the Indian data were superior in part because ‘the Indonesian information is not from the primary surrogate country which we have selected in this case, India.’୻” Slip Op. 22-38, at 41, 2022 WL 1375140, at *14. On remand, the Department objects that “[t]his passage was not intended to suggest any inherent superiority of the Indian data; rather, it reflects the standard application of Commerce’s sequential surrogate country selection process.” Appx017430.

The problem—as explained above—is that the Department went off the rails in its sequential selection process when it excluded Indonesia from consideration as a surrogate because that country was only at a comparable (rather than the same) level of economic development . On remand, insofar as Commerce includes Indonesia on its candidate list because it is at a comparable level, the Department must evaluate the Indian data on its relative merits vis-à-vis Indonesian data. See Import Administration Policy Bulletin 04.1, Non- Market Economy Surrogate Country Selection Process

(Mar. 1, 2004), at 4 (“[I]f more than one country has survived the selection process to this point, the country with the best factors data is selected as the primary surrogate country.”), ECF 73-2.

b
i

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