Caterpillar Financial Services Corporation v. Hi-Lo Farms, Inc.

District Court, S.D. Mississippi·Decided April 28, 2020·No. 1:19-cv-00295·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI SOUTHERN DIVISION

CATERPILLAR FINANCIAL SERVICES CORPORATION PLAINTIFF

V. CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:19-cv-295-HSO-JCG

HI-LO FARMS, INC., MARTHA COLE, COAST CONSTRUCTION, LLC AND RUSSELL RYALS DEFENDANTS

ORDER AND OPINION GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION [24]

BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiff Caterpillar Financial Services Corporation’s (“Cat Financial”) Priority Motion for Entry of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction [24] (the “Motion”). The Court previously granted, by separate order, Cat Financial’s request therein that the Motion be given expedited/priority consideration, making any response due no later than April 16, 2020. No Defendant responded by April 16, 2020, or otherwise. Defendant Martha Cole notified the Court via e-mail that she was “not contesting the TRO motion.” Further, while not required, Plaintiff filed a proof of service showing it personally served Defendant Russell Ryals with the Motion. While the Motion arguably could be granted as unopposed, the Court finds it also should be granted on its merits, as explained herein. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Background On January 9, 2015, Hi-Lo Farms, Inc. (“Hi-Lo”) entered into a contract with Puckett Machinery Company (“Puckett”) for the Track Loader, and Cole personally guaranteed the contract. [1-1, 1-2]. The contracts provided a first security interest in the Track Loader. [1-1] at ¶ 7. Thereafter, Puckett assigned its interests to Cat Financial, and Cat Financial perfected those interests with a UCC filing. [1-3, 1-4]. Cat Financial sued Hi-Lo and Cole in a prior case, but that case was stayed because Hi-Lo filed for bankruptcy protection. See Caterpillar Fin. Serv. Corp. v. Hi-Lo Farms, Inc., Civ. Action No. 1:17-cv-222-HSO-JCG (S.D. Miss. 2017). In bankruptcy court, Hi-Lo sought permission to lease the Track Loader to Coast Construction, LLC (“Coast Construction”) (the “Lease”). The bankruptcy court granted Hi-Lo’s request; Coast Construction

received physical possession and use of the Track Loader in exchange for monthly rent payments of $5,000 directly to Cat Financial.1 The undisputed record evidence is that Cat Financial has not received payment on the Tract Loader for well over a year. Nevertheless, some combination of Ryals personally and Coast Construction have continued to maintain possession of the Track Loader for their benefit.2 Cat Financial has repeatedly requested the return of the Track Loader. B. Procedural History Cat Financial filed its Complaint [1] on May 24, 2019 against Ms. Cole, Hi-Lo, Coast Construction, and Mr. Ryals, premising jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship. After some initial delay (which Cat Financial attributed to settlement discussions), Cat Financial served all

Defendants, but only Ms. Cole answered [6]. The Clerk entered default as to Hi-Lo, Coast Construction, and Mr. Ryals. [13, 16]. Cat Financial moved for default judgment against all Defendants other than Ms. Cole [17, 18, 19], but this Court denied those motions without prejudice “because Plaintiff seeks to impose liability against all Defendants based on the same injury and similar conduct”, and Ms. Cole could not be defaulted because she had answered. [20].

1 The total $5,000 monthly payment was for the use of other equipment as well, not just the use of the Track Loader.

2 In the e-mail notifying the Court that Ms. Cole does not oppose the Motion, her counsel stated that she does not have possession of the Track Loader. Nevertheless, this Order applies equally to all Defendants. II. DISCUSSION A. Legal Standard Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. Sanders v. Itawamba Cty., 2018 WL 1770487, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 12,

2018). In order to obtain either remedy, Cat Financial must have established four elements: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not issued; (3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs any harm that may result from the injunction to the non-movant; and (4) the injunction will not disserve the public interest. Id. at *2. The Court finds that Cat Financial has satisfied these requirements. B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits Cat Financial brings separate claims against the various Defendants. Its claims against Hi-Lo, Ms. Cole, and Coast Construction are primarily for breach of contract. To succeed on these claims, Cat Financial “must prove only . . . that there was (1) an existing and binding contract and (2) that the defendant breached the contract.” Garth v. Curlee,

2018 WL 4571870, at *9 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 24, 2018). It is undisputed that Hi-Lo, Cole, and Coast Construction each have contracts with (or for the benefit of) Cat Financial, which they have breached by failing to either remit payment to, or to return the Track Loader to, Cat Financial.3 Accordingly, it is likely that Cat Financial will succeed on the merits against these Defendants. Cat Financial’s claims against Ryals are based on quantum meruit, conversion, and replevin. The Court determines that any of these theories provide an independent basis for finding likelihood of success on the merits. “The doctrine of quantum meruit applies to situations where

3 Cat Financial is a third-party beneficiary of the Lease. See Rein v. Benchmark Constr. Co., 865 So. 2d 1134, 1136 (Miss. 2004) (“[U]nder Mississippi law, a third party may maintain an action as a third-party beneficiary to enforce a promise made for their benefit.”) (citation omitted). there is no legal contract but where the person sought to be charged is in possession of money or property which in good conscience and justice he should not retain but should deliver to another . . . .” In re Estate of Fitzner, 881 So. 2d 164, 174 (Miss. 2003) (internal quotes and marks omitted). Second, a claim of “[c]onversion requires an intent to exercise dominion or control over goods

which is inconsistent with the true owner’s right.” Terrell v. Tschirn, 656 So. 2d 1150, 1153 (Miss. 1995) (citation omitted). Both legal theories are fully applicable and satisfied here. Ryals has the Track Loader, is using it for his own benefit, and has not made timely payments. Further, as the signatory for Coast Construction on the Lease and through communications with Cat Financial, Ryals is aware of Cat Financial’s entitlement to the Track Loader’s immediate return. Moreover, Cat Financial has complied with Mississippi’s replevin statute through the verified Complaint, which described the Track Loader, stated its value, and set forth that Cat Financial is entitled to its immediate repossession from Ryals. [1]; see also Miss. Code Ann. § 11- 37-101. Cat Financial has met each statutory condition, and it is undisputed that Ryals is wrongfully possessing and exercising dominion and control over the Track Loader.

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Caterpillar Financial Services Corporation v. Hi-Lo Farms, Inc., (S.D. Miss. 2020).

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