J-A14034-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
STANLEY J. CATERBONE AND ADVANCED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MEDIA GROUP, PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
LANCASTER CITY POLICE,
Appellee No. 1915 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered September 29, 2015 in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No.: CP-36-MD-0001108-2015
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED MAY 11, 2016
Appellant, Stanley J. Caterbone, appeals pro se from the September
29, 2015, order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
upholding the District Attorney’s disapproval of his private criminal
complaint. The Commonwealth has filed a motion to quash. For the reasons
set forth herein, we grant the Commonwealth’s motion and quash the
appeal.
Although the facts of this case are not readily apparent, it is evident
from the record that Appellant filed a Private Criminal Complaint directly
with the District Attorney against the Chief of the Lancaster City Police
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-A14034-16
Department, the Department, a Detective and four police officers, two
named and two listed as John Doe 1 and John Doe 2. (See Private Criminal
Complaint, 7/27/15, at 1).
Appellant’s brief substantially fails to comply with our rules of
appellate procedure. It is thirteen pages long and consists of a cover page,
an instruction Order from the Superior Court, eleven pages that consist of a
half-page “CONCISE STATEMENT OF MATTERS COMPLAINED,” and a nine
and a half-page section entitled, “BRIEF,” which appears to be an
unsuccessful attempt at an argument section. (Appellant’s Brief, at 3; see
id. at 1-13). He also attaches two orders from the common pleas court,
both with a Superior Court Docket No. 1108 MD 2015; the letter from the
District Attorney’s Office dated August 31, 2015, indicating disapproval of
the private complaint; and finally, the two pages of the complaint itself.
(See id. at attachments).
The complaint states that the acts committed by the accused were:
“Working Theory confirmed by Experts Cheryl Welsh and Derrick Robinson,
both Targeted individuals of U.S. Sponsored Mind Control ‘It is known in the
community by a [sic] some [sic] that ‘they’ will Target and [sic] individual
(Stan J. Caterbone) and Target others in the COMMUNITY (Lancaster) to
HARASS, STALK, Etc.,) in order to drive the ORIGINAL Target to Suicide.”
(Private Criminal Complaint, 7/27/15, at 2). The complaint then goes on to
state that the acts committed violated “Sec. 2901 of Title 18 and Section
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3503 of Title 18.” (See id.). Section 2901 involves the crime of kidnapping,
and Section 3503 prohibits criminal trespass. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2901,
3503.
On August 31, 2015, the District Attorney’s Office of Lancaster County
denied Appellant’s criminal complaint. Appellant appealed to the trial court,
which affirmed the denial on September 29, 2015. Appellant timely
appealed.1
On February 22, 2016, the Appellee, the District Attorney of Lancaster
County, filed a motion to quash this appeal. On March 11, 2016, Appellant
filed an answer. Action on the motion was deferred to the merits panel by
April 1, 2016 per curiam order. The motion to quash was premised on
Appellant’s failure to follow the dictates of Pa.R.A.P. 2111. (See Motion to
Quash, 2/22/16, at 1-2). The answer, while sixty-five pages long, did not
address any of the allegations of the motion. (See Answer to Motion to
Quash, 3/11/16, at 1-65).
As this Court has reiterated on numerous occasions:
While [we are] willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, we note that appellant is not entitled to any particular advantage because [he] lacks legal training. As our [S]upreme [C]ourt has explained, any layperson choosing to represent [himself] in a legal proceeding must, to some ____________________________________________
1 On November 25, 2015, Appellant filed a Rule 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to the court’s order. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The court filed an opinion on December 9, 2015. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
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reasonable extent, assume the risk that [his] lack of expertise and legal training will prove [his] undoing.
O’Neill v. Checker Motors Corp., 567 A.2d 680, 682 (Pa. Super. 1989)
(citations and quotation marks omitted); accord Branch Banking & Trust
v. Gesiorski, 904 A.2d 939, 942 (Pa. Super. 2006); Smathers v.
Smathers, 670 A.2d 1159, 1160 (Pa. Super. 1996). Indeed, “pro se status
does not entitle a party to any particular advantage because of his or her
lack of legal training.” First Union Mortgage Corp. v. Frempong, 744
A.2d 327, 333 (Pa. Super. 1999).
The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure provide, in relevant
part:
Briefs and reproduced records shall conform in all material respects with the requirements of these rules as nearly as the circumstances of the particular case will admit, otherwise they may be suppressed, and, if the defects are in the brief or reproduced record of the appellant and are substantial, the appeal or other matter may be quashed or dismissed.
Pa.R.A.P. 2101.
Because of the substantial defects in Appellant’s brief in a companion
case listed before this same panel, we were unable to conduct a meaningful
review of the appeal’s merits. (See Caterbone v. Residents of the
County of Lancaster Pennsylvania, No. 1561 MDA 2015, J-A14016-16
(Pa. Super. May 10, 2016)). Likewise, we are unable to do so in this case.
Appellant’s brief does not contain a statement of jurisdiction, a
statement of the order in question, a statement of the scope and standard of
review, a statement of the questions involved, or a conclusion “stating the
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precise relief sought.” Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a). Indeed, upon our review of
Appellant’s brief, we are unable to discern why he believes the trial court’s
denial of his petition was incorrect, or the nature of his underlying claims.
The brief contains a long quotation from the Mental Health Procedures Act,
a purported involuntary commitment petition under Section 302 of that Act,
see 50 P.S. § 7302, the Act of July 9, 1976, No. 143, § 302, as amended, a
letter to the editor written by Appellant, and a copy of a complaint he filed in
federal court. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 4-13). It does not contain any
argument. (See id.). “When issues are not properly raised and developed
in briefs, when the briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for
review[,] a Court will not consider the merits thereof.” Commonwealth v.
Maris, 629 A.2d 1014, 1017 (Pa. Super. 1993) (citation omitted).
Therefore, we grant Appellee’s motion to quash this appeal.
Moreover, if we were to consider the validity of the trial court’s ruling,
we would find Appellant is entitled to no relief.
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J-A14034-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
STANLEY J. CATERBONE AND ADVANCED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MEDIA GROUP, PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
LANCASTER CITY POLICE,
Appellee No. 1915 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered September 29, 2015 in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at No.: CP-36-MD-0001108-2015
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED MAY 11, 2016
Appellant, Stanley J. Caterbone, appeals pro se from the September
29, 2015, order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
upholding the District Attorney’s disapproval of his private criminal
complaint. The Commonwealth has filed a motion to quash. For the reasons
set forth herein, we grant the Commonwealth’s motion and quash the
appeal.
Although the facts of this case are not readily apparent, it is evident
from the record that Appellant filed a Private Criminal Complaint directly
with the District Attorney against the Chief of the Lancaster City Police
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. J-A14034-16
Department, the Department, a Detective and four police officers, two
named and two listed as John Doe 1 and John Doe 2. (See Private Criminal
Complaint, 7/27/15, at 1).
Appellant’s brief substantially fails to comply with our rules of
appellate procedure. It is thirteen pages long and consists of a cover page,
an instruction Order from the Superior Court, eleven pages that consist of a
half-page “CONCISE STATEMENT OF MATTERS COMPLAINED,” and a nine
and a half-page section entitled, “BRIEF,” which appears to be an
unsuccessful attempt at an argument section. (Appellant’s Brief, at 3; see
id. at 1-13). He also attaches two orders from the common pleas court,
both with a Superior Court Docket No. 1108 MD 2015; the letter from the
District Attorney’s Office dated August 31, 2015, indicating disapproval of
the private complaint; and finally, the two pages of the complaint itself.
(See id. at attachments).
The complaint states that the acts committed by the accused were:
“Working Theory confirmed by Experts Cheryl Welsh and Derrick Robinson,
both Targeted individuals of U.S. Sponsored Mind Control ‘It is known in the
community by a [sic] some [sic] that ‘they’ will Target and [sic] individual
(Stan J. Caterbone) and Target others in the COMMUNITY (Lancaster) to
HARASS, STALK, Etc.,) in order to drive the ORIGINAL Target to Suicide.”
(Private Criminal Complaint, 7/27/15, at 2). The complaint then goes on to
state that the acts committed violated “Sec. 2901 of Title 18 and Section
-2- J-A14034-16
3503 of Title 18.” (See id.). Section 2901 involves the crime of kidnapping,
and Section 3503 prohibits criminal trespass. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2901,
3503.
On August 31, 2015, the District Attorney’s Office of Lancaster County
denied Appellant’s criminal complaint. Appellant appealed to the trial court,
which affirmed the denial on September 29, 2015. Appellant timely
appealed.1
On February 22, 2016, the Appellee, the District Attorney of Lancaster
County, filed a motion to quash this appeal. On March 11, 2016, Appellant
filed an answer. Action on the motion was deferred to the merits panel by
April 1, 2016 per curiam order. The motion to quash was premised on
Appellant’s failure to follow the dictates of Pa.R.A.P. 2111. (See Motion to
Quash, 2/22/16, at 1-2). The answer, while sixty-five pages long, did not
address any of the allegations of the motion. (See Answer to Motion to
Quash, 3/11/16, at 1-65).
As this Court has reiterated on numerous occasions:
While [we are] willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, we note that appellant is not entitled to any particular advantage because [he] lacks legal training. As our [S]upreme [C]ourt has explained, any layperson choosing to represent [himself] in a legal proceeding must, to some ____________________________________________
1 On November 25, 2015, Appellant filed a Rule 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to the court’s order. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The court filed an opinion on December 9, 2015. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
-3- J-A14034-16
reasonable extent, assume the risk that [his] lack of expertise and legal training will prove [his] undoing.
O’Neill v. Checker Motors Corp., 567 A.2d 680, 682 (Pa. Super. 1989)
(citations and quotation marks omitted); accord Branch Banking & Trust
v. Gesiorski, 904 A.2d 939, 942 (Pa. Super. 2006); Smathers v.
Smathers, 670 A.2d 1159, 1160 (Pa. Super. 1996). Indeed, “pro se status
does not entitle a party to any particular advantage because of his or her
lack of legal training.” First Union Mortgage Corp. v. Frempong, 744
A.2d 327, 333 (Pa. Super. 1999).
The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure provide, in relevant
part:
Briefs and reproduced records shall conform in all material respects with the requirements of these rules as nearly as the circumstances of the particular case will admit, otherwise they may be suppressed, and, if the defects are in the brief or reproduced record of the appellant and are substantial, the appeal or other matter may be quashed or dismissed.
Pa.R.A.P. 2101.
Because of the substantial defects in Appellant’s brief in a companion
case listed before this same panel, we were unable to conduct a meaningful
review of the appeal’s merits. (See Caterbone v. Residents of the
County of Lancaster Pennsylvania, No. 1561 MDA 2015, J-A14016-16
(Pa. Super. May 10, 2016)). Likewise, we are unable to do so in this case.
Appellant’s brief does not contain a statement of jurisdiction, a
statement of the order in question, a statement of the scope and standard of
review, a statement of the questions involved, or a conclusion “stating the
-4- J-A14034-16
precise relief sought.” Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a). Indeed, upon our review of
Appellant’s brief, we are unable to discern why he believes the trial court’s
denial of his petition was incorrect, or the nature of his underlying claims.
The brief contains a long quotation from the Mental Health Procedures Act,
a purported involuntary commitment petition under Section 302 of that Act,
see 50 P.S. § 7302, the Act of July 9, 1976, No. 143, § 302, as amended, a
letter to the editor written by Appellant, and a copy of a complaint he filed in
federal court. (See Appellant’s Brief, at 4-13). It does not contain any
argument. (See id.). “When issues are not properly raised and developed
in briefs, when the briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for
review[,] a Court will not consider the merits thereof.” Commonwealth v.
Maris, 629 A.2d 1014, 1017 (Pa. Super. 1993) (citation omitted).
Therefore, we grant Appellee’s motion to quash this appeal.
Moreover, if we were to consider the validity of the trial court’s ruling,
we would find Appellant is entitled to no relief.
When this Court reviews a Common Pleas Court’s decision concerning private criminal complaints, our review is congruent with the standard that was to be applied by the Common Pleas Court. Thus, where a D.A. denied a complaint on purely legal grounds and where the Common Pleas Court was therefore to undertake de novo review, we review the Common Pleas Court’s decision for an error of law, thereby applying a de novo standard and a plenary scope of review. However, where the D.A. denied the complaint on a policy basis or a hybrid of legal and policy bases, and where the Common Pleas Court was therefore to apply an abuse of discretion standard, we similarly review the court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is not a mere error in judgment. It is a decision based on bias, partiality, prejudice, ill will, manifest unreasonableness,
-5- J-A14034-16
or misapplication of law.
Commonwealth ex rel. Guarrasi v. Carroll, 979 A.2d 383, 385–86 (Pa.
Super. 2009) (citations omitted).
An examination of the private criminal complaint in this case reveals it
fails to contain a “summary of the facts sufficient to advise the defendant of
the nature of the offense charged,” as required by the Pennsylvania Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Pa.R.Crim.P. 504(6)(a). Rather, it merely attaches a
series of unexplained documents and photographs similar to those attached
to Appellant’s brief herein. (See Private Criminal Complaint, 7/25/15, at
Attachments; Appellant’s Brief, at 2-13). As noted by the trial court in its
December 9, 2015 opinion, Appellant’s petition for review of the denial of
the private complaint “was too convoluted to discern any potential grounds
for approv[al],” and the 200-plus page petition contains many inconceivable
allegations and exhibits, such as involvement of the Lancaster County bench
in “U.S. sponsored mind control,” and government invasion of his “thoughts
via remote sensing technologies and introducing poisonous gas into his
home.” (Trial Court Opinion, 12/09/15, at unnumbered pages 2-3).
We agree with the trial court that the petition presented no cognizable
grounds for the filing of a criminal complaint.
Therefore, under either standard of Carroll, it is obvious that the trial
court ruling would have been affirmed. See Carroll, supra at 385-86.
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Commonwealth’s motion granted. Appeal quashed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 5/11/2016
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