Catalanotto v. Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc.

648 So. 2d 970, 94 La.App. 5 Cir. 403, 1994 La. App. LEXIS 3545, 1994 WL 696661
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedDecember 14, 1994
DocketNo. 94-CA-403
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 648 So. 2d 970 (Catalanotto v. Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Catalanotto v. Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc., 648 So. 2d 970, 94 La.App. 5 Cir. 403, 1994 La. App. LEXIS 3545, 1994 WL 696661 (La. Ct. App. 1994).

Opinion

11 JOHN C. BOUTALL, Judge pro tem.

Defendants, Lifemark Hospitals of Louisiana, Inc., d/b/a St. Jude Medical Center and M. Lizaro (hereinafter “St. Jude”), appeal from a denial of its exception of prematurity. We reverse.

The sole issue on this appeal is whether St. Jude’s untimely payment of its renewal surcharge to the Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund resulted in a “gap” in coverage.

The facts for the purposes of this appeal are not in dispute. On January 22, 1993, plaintiff underwent surgery at St. Jude Medical Center for the repair of an inguinal hernia. On or about January 27,1993, while still in the hospital and recuperating from the surgery, plaintiff, who was under the influence of Demerol, attempted to get out of his hospital bed. RHe fell and fractured his left hip. Plaintiff alleges that the negligence of defendants was the direct cause of the fall and the resultant damages.

On June 23, 1993, plaintiffs filed a “Complaint of Medical Malpractice and Request for Medical Review Panel” with the Louisiana Patient’s Compensation Fund (hereinafter “the Fund”). On July 9, 1993, the Fund refused the claim, asserting that there was a gap in coverage occasioned by St. Jude’s untimely payment. Plaintiffs subsequently initiated this action against St. Jude and its nurse. They filed an exception of prematurity, asserting that there was coverage. The trial court denied coverage and this appeal ensued.

In connection with the exception of prematurity, the following was established: St. Jude first became a member of the Fund on January 24, 1989 and is “qualified” as a self-insured health care provider. St. Jude has continuously maintained with the Fund a certificate of deposit in the amount of $124,-000.00 as proof of financial responsibility.

The annual surcharge renewal was due on or before January 24, 1993. The Fund sent out a sixty (60) day notice of payment to St. Jude on October 7, 1992, some 109 days before due date. The evidence does not indicate the Fund sent any follow-up notice and/or notice of cancellation to St. Jude. The Fund received St. Jude’s surcharge renewal on March 18, 1993. St. Jude tendered and the Fund accepted a full twelve month surcharge. Despite this, the Fund issued a Certificate of Enrollment stating the enrollment period is from March 18, 1993 to January 24, 1994. TheJsjFund1 maintains that, because of the untimely payment of the surcharge, there is a “gap” in coverage from January 24, 1993 until March 18, 1993.

In Jones v. Crow, 633 So.2d 247, 250 (La.App. 1 Cir.1993), the court discussed the purpose of the Medical Malpractice Act:

[972]*972The purpose of the Medical Malpractice Act, LSA-R.S. 40:1299.41 et seq., is to limit the liability of health care providers who qualify under the Act by maintaining specified basic malpractice insurance and by contributing a surcharge to the Patient’s Compensation Fund. As long as a health care provider remains qualified under the Act, the health care provider and his insurer are liable for malpractice only to the extent provided in the Act. LSA-R.S. 40:1299.45A; Sewell v. Doctors Hospital, 600 So.2d 577, 578 (La.1992). Moreover, all claims against health care providers covered by the Act are required to be reviewed by a medical review panel. LSA-R.S. 40:1299.47A(1). The burden is on a defendant to prove immunity from suit as a qualified health care provider under the Act. Goins v. Texas State Optical, Inc., 463 So.2d 743, 744 (La.App.4th Cir.1985).

In order to qualify as a health care provider under the Medical Malpractice Act, a health care provider must file proof of financial responsibility as described in La.R.S. 40:1299.42(E) and pay the annual Patient’s Compensation Fund surcharge levied on the health care provider in accordance with La. R.S. 40:1299.44. For self-insureds, like St. Jude, qualification under the Medical Malpractice Act is effective upon the commissioner’s acceptance of the proof of financial responsibility and his receipt of payment of the surcharge; for health care providers other than self-insureds, qualification is effective at the time the malpractice insurer ^accepts payment of the surcharge. Abate v. Healthcare International Inc., 560 So.2d 812, 816-7 (La.1990): Jones v. Crow, supra at p. 250.

In this case, there is no question as to St. Jude’s initial qualification for the Fund. It is not disputed that St. Jude initially “qualified and enrolled” in the Fund on January 24, 1989. Likewise, It is not disputed that St. Jude is currently “qualified.” Finally, it is not disputed that St. Jude has maintained at all times since its enrollment proof of financial responsibility with the Fund as an alternative to underlying medical malpractice insurance. The sole issue presented by this lawsuit is whether St. Jude was a “qualified health care provider” under the Act during the two months when the surcharge was overdue so as to require review by a medical review panel prior to the institution of a lawsuit, or did the untimely payment of a surcharge result in a “gap” in coverage under the Fund.

The requirements for coverage under the Medical Malpractice Act, namely proof of financial responsibility and payment of the annual surcharge, are treated differently within the statutes. Under La.R.S. 40:1299.45(A)(1)2 malpractice coverage is granted only while the underlying insurance coverage remains in force, or, as in the case of self-insureds herein, while the security posted is in effect. However the Medical IsMalpractice Act, and more specifically, La.R.S. 40:1299.44(A)(2)(d) and 40:1299.44(A)(3)(a) suggest that for those health care providers who maintain underlying medical malpractice insurance, the annual surcharge may be paid late without a gap in coverage of the Fund if the insurer providing the underlying coverage allows the premiums of its policy to be paid after the date due.3 We find no provision within the Medical Malpractice Act which regulates the untimely payment of the annual surcharge by a self-insured health care provider.

However, we do find some provisions in the Fund rules. La.R.S. 40:1299.44(D)(3) provides that “The [Patient’s Compensation [973]*973Fund Oversight] board shall have authority, ..., to adopt and promulgate such rules, regulations and standards as it may deem necessary or advisable to implement the authority and discharge the responsibilities conferred and imposed on the board by this [Medical Malpractice Act.] In accordance ■with this provision, the Patient’s Compensation Fund Oversight Board adopted a set of rules, LAC 37:III.Chapters 1-17. Section 107 provides:

|6§ 107. Purpose and Objective of Rules; Construction, Application
These rules are adopted and promulgated to ensure that the Patient’s Compensation Fund is organized, administered and operated on a financially and actuarially sound basis so as to achieve the purpose for which it was established, by providing that qualification for enrollment is based on sound and realistic standards of financial responsibility; that the fund and its surcharge rates are adequate for the risks assumed; that surcharges are timely collected;

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Saucier v. Uchendu
W.D. Louisiana, 2021
Luther v. IOM Co.
109 So. 3d 467 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2013)
Harrelson v. Harrelson
7 So. 3d 1004 (Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, 2008)
Williams v. Louisiana Patients' Compensation Fund Oversight Board
921 So. 2d 1168 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2006)
Griffin v. PATS. COMP. FUND OVERSIGHT BOARD
907 So. 2d 90 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2005)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
648 So. 2d 970, 94 La.App. 5 Cir. 403, 1994 La. App. LEXIS 3545, 1994 WL 696661, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/catalanotto-v-lifemark-hospitals-of-louisiana-inc-lactapp-1994.