AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed August 1, 2013.
S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-12-01164-CR
ROLANDO MARIO CASTRO, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 366th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 366-82255-2011
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices FitzGerald, Francis, and Lewis Opinion by Justice Lewis A jury found appellant Rolando Mario Castro guilty of harassment of a public servant.
The trial court assessed his punishment at two years’ confinement, suspended in favor of five
years’ community supervision, and a $2500 fine. In a single issue on appeal, Castro challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding of guilt. Because the issues in this
appeal involve the application of well-settled principles of law, we issue this memorandum
opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Police encountered Castro when responding to a disturbance call the evening of July 4,
2011. Castro had become intoxicated and belligerent at a holiday party, and the homeowner had
called police to assist him and his other guests in persuading Castro to leave. The police initially
waited with Castro for the cab called by the homeowner. But Castro’s belligerence escalated,
and the cab that arrived was an ordinary rental car rather than a cab equipped with security measures for its elderly female driver. For safety reasons, the police decided to arrest Castro for
public intoxication and disorderly conduct. He was handcuffed and placed in the back of Officer
Angela Reed’s patrol car. Reed was accompanied that day by a volunteer from Citizens on
Patrol, Eddie Mullins. Because of holiday traffic, the ride to the police station was slow. During
the entire ride, Castro spewed vulgar sexual and racial invective at Reed and Mullins. He
screamed and threatened; he called names and shouted insults. Castro’s verbal behavior was
documented by the police car’s recorder from the time Reed’s car arrived at the scene of the
party until Castro was finally delivered to the police station. The recording lasts for
approximately one hour and twenty minutes, and Castro’s verbal abuse continued nearly non-
stop throughout that period of time. Shortly before the three arrived at the station, when the car
was stopped at a traffic light, Castro spat from the back seat, through the grill divider, into the
front seat. Reed and Mullins both reported that Castro’s saliva landed upon them.
Castro was charged with harassment of a public servant. The trial court instructed the
jury:
Our law provides that a person commits the offense of Harassment of a Public Servant if, with the intent to assault, harass, or alarm the person, [he] causes a person the actor knows to be a public servant to contact the saliva of the actor, while the public servant is lawfully discharging an official duty or on account of an exercise of the public servant’s official power or performance of an official duty.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.11(a)(2) (West 2011). The jury found Castro guilty. In his
single appellate issue, Castro contends the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s finding of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, Castro contends the evidence is insufficient to
establish the element of intent, both in terms of Castro’s intent to cause his saliva to contact Reed
and in terms of his intent to assault, harass, or alarm Reed.
We determine whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction by asking
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational –2– trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Johnson v. State, 364 S.W.3d 292, 293–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). We defer to the jury, as trier
of fact, to resolve any conflicts in testimony and to weigh the evidence and draw reasonable
inferences from it. Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “[I]t is not
necessary that every fact point directly and independently to the defendant’s guilt; it is enough if
the conclusion is warranted by the combined and cumulative force of all the incriminating
circumstances.” Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Indeed, intent
is most often proven through the circumstantial evidence surrounding the crime. Sholars v.
State, 312 S.W.3d 694, 703 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d).
Again, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Reed
testified that Castro spat twice. The first time, the saliva hit Mullins in the back of the head and
Reed on her arm; the second time, it made contact in “[j]ust about the same spot.” Mullins
testified that he felt Castro’s saliva on his ear and neck, and then on his shirt collar. He
characterized the volume of saliva as “a lot of spit,” and he confirmed the statement he made
immediately after the incident, which reported that Castro’s saliva hit both Reed and him.
“[O]ne’s acts are generally reliable circumstantial evidence of one’s intent.” Laster v. State, 275
S.W.3d 512, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 646 S.W.2d 524, 527
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no pet.); see also Smith v. State, No. 09-09-00084-CR,
2010 WL 1236410, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 31, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication). Both Reed and Mullins testified they were certain Castro intended
to spit at them, based upon Castro’s verbal abusiveness, the fact that he spat twice, and his
apparent unhappiness with his circumstances at that point in time. Indeed, Castro’s conduct and
demeanor support an inference that Castro intended the saliva to contact both persons in the front
seat. See Smith, 2010 WL 1236410, at *3 (jury could rationally believe officer truthfully stated
–3– defendant spit in officer’s face and could rationally infer from defendant’s belligerence that he
intended his saliva to come into contact with officer).
A jury may also infer intent from the words of a defendant. Guevara v. State, 152
S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). In this case, the jury could have inferred Castro’s
hostility toward Reed in particular after listening to the recording of the vulgar, insulting remarks
he directed toward her throughout the time they were in contact. Castro repeatedly used words
intended to wound, including demeaning sexual terms. Given the hostility Castro’s words
conveyed specifically to Reed, the jury could have inferred that the reason he spat was to harass,
alarm, or assault her.
Castro concedes that the State may well have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he
was “the most annoying intoxicated person” in Reed’s and Mullins’s experience. He
acknowledges the record establishes he was “a drunken fool.” However, Castro uses these
concessions as the basis for an argument that proof of his intoxication “necessarily impeded [the
State’s] ability to prove the specific intent” required by the offense of harassment of a public
servant. We disagree.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed August 1, 2013.
S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-12-01164-CR
ROLANDO MARIO CASTRO, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 366th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 366-82255-2011
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices FitzGerald, Francis, and Lewis Opinion by Justice Lewis A jury found appellant Rolando Mario Castro guilty of harassment of a public servant.
The trial court assessed his punishment at two years’ confinement, suspended in favor of five
years’ community supervision, and a $2500 fine. In a single issue on appeal, Castro challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding of guilt. Because the issues in this
appeal involve the application of well-settled principles of law, we issue this memorandum
opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Police encountered Castro when responding to a disturbance call the evening of July 4,
2011. Castro had become intoxicated and belligerent at a holiday party, and the homeowner had
called police to assist him and his other guests in persuading Castro to leave. The police initially
waited with Castro for the cab called by the homeowner. But Castro’s belligerence escalated,
and the cab that arrived was an ordinary rental car rather than a cab equipped with security measures for its elderly female driver. For safety reasons, the police decided to arrest Castro for
public intoxication and disorderly conduct. He was handcuffed and placed in the back of Officer
Angela Reed’s patrol car. Reed was accompanied that day by a volunteer from Citizens on
Patrol, Eddie Mullins. Because of holiday traffic, the ride to the police station was slow. During
the entire ride, Castro spewed vulgar sexual and racial invective at Reed and Mullins. He
screamed and threatened; he called names and shouted insults. Castro’s verbal behavior was
documented by the police car’s recorder from the time Reed’s car arrived at the scene of the
party until Castro was finally delivered to the police station. The recording lasts for
approximately one hour and twenty minutes, and Castro’s verbal abuse continued nearly non-
stop throughout that period of time. Shortly before the three arrived at the station, when the car
was stopped at a traffic light, Castro spat from the back seat, through the grill divider, into the
front seat. Reed and Mullins both reported that Castro’s saliva landed upon them.
Castro was charged with harassment of a public servant. The trial court instructed the
jury:
Our law provides that a person commits the offense of Harassment of a Public Servant if, with the intent to assault, harass, or alarm the person, [he] causes a person the actor knows to be a public servant to contact the saliva of the actor, while the public servant is lawfully discharging an official duty or on account of an exercise of the public servant’s official power or performance of an official duty.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.11(a)(2) (West 2011). The jury found Castro guilty. In his
single appellate issue, Castro contends the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s finding of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, Castro contends the evidence is insufficient to
establish the element of intent, both in terms of Castro’s intent to cause his saliva to contact Reed
and in terms of his intent to assault, harass, or alarm Reed.
We determine whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction by asking
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational –2– trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Johnson v. State, 364 S.W.3d 292, 293–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). We defer to the jury, as trier
of fact, to resolve any conflicts in testimony and to weigh the evidence and draw reasonable
inferences from it. Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “[I]t is not
necessary that every fact point directly and independently to the defendant’s guilt; it is enough if
the conclusion is warranted by the combined and cumulative force of all the incriminating
circumstances.” Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Indeed, intent
is most often proven through the circumstantial evidence surrounding the crime. Sholars v.
State, 312 S.W.3d 694, 703 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d).
Again, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Reed
testified that Castro spat twice. The first time, the saliva hit Mullins in the back of the head and
Reed on her arm; the second time, it made contact in “[j]ust about the same spot.” Mullins
testified that he felt Castro’s saliva on his ear and neck, and then on his shirt collar. He
characterized the volume of saliva as “a lot of spit,” and he confirmed the statement he made
immediately after the incident, which reported that Castro’s saliva hit both Reed and him.
“[O]ne’s acts are generally reliable circumstantial evidence of one’s intent.” Laster v. State, 275
S.W.3d 512, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 646 S.W.2d 524, 527
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no pet.); see also Smith v. State, No. 09-09-00084-CR,
2010 WL 1236410, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 31, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication). Both Reed and Mullins testified they were certain Castro intended
to spit at them, based upon Castro’s verbal abusiveness, the fact that he spat twice, and his
apparent unhappiness with his circumstances at that point in time. Indeed, Castro’s conduct and
demeanor support an inference that Castro intended the saliva to contact both persons in the front
seat. See Smith, 2010 WL 1236410, at *3 (jury could rationally believe officer truthfully stated
–3– defendant spit in officer’s face and could rationally infer from defendant’s belligerence that he
intended his saliva to come into contact with officer).
A jury may also infer intent from the words of a defendant. Guevara v. State, 152
S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). In this case, the jury could have inferred Castro’s
hostility toward Reed in particular after listening to the recording of the vulgar, insulting remarks
he directed toward her throughout the time they were in contact. Castro repeatedly used words
intended to wound, including demeaning sexual terms. Given the hostility Castro’s words
conveyed specifically to Reed, the jury could have inferred that the reason he spat was to harass,
alarm, or assault her.
Castro concedes that the State may well have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he
was “the most annoying intoxicated person” in Reed’s and Mullins’s experience. He
acknowledges the record establishes he was “a drunken fool.” However, Castro uses these
concessions as the basis for an argument that proof of his intoxication “necessarily impeded [the
State’s] ability to prove the specific intent” required by the offense of harassment of a public
servant. We disagree. Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to the commission of crime. TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.04(a). Although Chase tries to distinguish his argument from this rule,
he cannot. Evidence of Chase’s intoxication does not negate the element of intent. See Hawkins
v. State, 605 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
Finally, Chase quotes at length from the legislative history of the offense of harassment
of a public servant, in which opponents of the statute apparently believed the offense ought not
to apply to circumstances such as Chase’s, i.e., to an “agitated drunk.” However, despite these
opponents’ efforts to condemn such an application, the statute was enacted and remains in effect.
We cannot rely on rejected commentary when applying the statute the commentators opposed.
–4– We conclude a rational trier of fact, charged with discerning Castro’s intent from
evidence of the surrounding circumstances, could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Castro intended to cause his saliva to contact Reed and intended—when he did so—to harass,
alarm, or assault her. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilt. See
Johnson, 364 S.W.3d at 293–94. We overrule Castro’s single issue.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/David Lewis/ DAVID LEWIS JUSTICE
Do Not Publish TEX. R. APP. P. 47
121164F.U05
–5– S Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
ROLANDO MARIO CASTRO, Appellant On Appeal from the 366th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas No. 05-12-01164-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. 366-82255-2011. Opinion delivered by Justice Lewis. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices FitzGerald and Francis participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 1st day of August, 2013.
–6–