Caston v. Biden

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedFebruary 9, 2023
DocketCivil Action No. 2023-0193
StatusPublished

This text of Caston v. Biden (Caston v. Biden) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Caston v. Biden, (D.D.C. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CHARLES CASTON, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-00193 (UNA) v. ) ) JOSEPH BIDEN, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on its initial review of plaintiff’s pro se submission, ECF

No. 1, which the court will generously construe as a complaint, an application for leave to proceed

in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, and what appears to be a motion for a temporary restraining order

(“TRO”), ECF No. 3. The court will grant the in forma pauperis application, dismiss the case

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), and deny the motion for TRO.

“A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A complaint that lacks “an arguable basis either in

law or in fact” is frivolous, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), and a “complaint plainly

abusive of the judicial process is properly typed malicious,” Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305,

1309 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

Here, plaintiff, who resides in Houston, Texas, sues President Biden, Ashley Biden, and

current United States Attorney General and retired Federal Judge, Merrick Garland. Preliminarily,

the court notes that both the complaint and motion for TRO are procedurally defective. Neither

the complaint nor the motion (1) is captioned for this court, (2) clearly identify the nature of the intended submission, (3) properly identify the parties and their contact information, or (4) follow

the required format. See Fed. Rs. Civ. P. 7(a)–(b), 10(a)–(b); D.C. LCvR 5.1(c)(1), (d), (g).

The allegations themselves fare no better. Plaintiff alleges that defendants have violated

several Constitutional Amendments by their alleged involvement in “domestic violence, and rape,

and sodomy, morale turpitude, identity theft, over observation, false imprisonment, white slavery,

pimping, sex trafficking, money laundering, torture, control of property, human rights, civil rights,

breaking and entering a habitation, vandalism of plaintiff[’s] vehicle, [and] distribution of

steroids.” He demands that the court “compel defendants [] to a jury trial, and to order the six feet

rule[.]” No other information or context is provided.

The court cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a frivolous complaint. Hagans

v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536–37 (1974) (“Over the years, this Court has repeatedly held that the

federal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are

‘so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit.’ ”), quoting Newburyport

Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579 (1904); Tooley v. Napolitano, 586 F.3d 1006, 1010

(D.C. Cir. 2009) (examining cases dismissed “for patent insubstantiality,” including where the

plaintiff allegedly “was subjected to a campaign of surveillance and harassment deriving from

uncertain origins.”). A court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to

the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible,” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992),

or “postulat[e] events and circumstances of a wholly fanciful kind,” Crisafi, 655 F.2d at 1307–08.

The instant complaint satisfies this standard.

Plaintiff’s “attachment for temporary restraining order,” construed as a motion for TRO,

also demands “help,” in the form of “an immediate hearing, to prevent domestic violence,” arguing

that defendants “are guilt[y] of fraud and embezzlement, over observation, official oppression, identity theft, moral turpitude, rape and sodomy, money laundering, and prostitution[.]” The court

finds that the motion is equally as frivolous as the complaint.

Consequently, the complaint, ECF No. 1, is dismissed without prejudice, and the motion

for TRO, ECF No. 3, is denied. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.

Date: February 9, 2023 ___________/s/____________ RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge

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Related

Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport
193 U.S. 561 (Supreme Court, 1904)
Hagans v. Lavine
415 U.S. 528 (Supreme Court, 1974)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Denton v. Hernandez
504 U.S. 25 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Tooley v. Napolitano
556 F.3d 836 (D.C. Circuit, 2009)
Salvatore G. Crisafi v. George E. Holland
655 F.2d 1305 (D.C. Circuit, 1981)

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Bluebook (online)
Caston v. Biden, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/caston-v-biden-dcd-2023.