Castleberry v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Texas
DecidedAugust 29, 2025
Docket4:24-cv-00793
StatusUnknown

This text of Castleberry v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Castleberry v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Castleberry v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., (E.D. Tex. 2025).

Opinion

United States District Court EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SHERMAN DIVISION

DOMINIC CASTLEBERRY, § § Plaintiff, § v. § Civil Action No. 4:24-cv-793 § Judge Mazzant JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., § § Defendant. § MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Pending before the Court is Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #15). Having considered the Motion and the relevant pleadings, the Court finds that the Motion should be DENIED. BACKGROUND This case involves the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). On February 21, 2025, Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”) filed its Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #15). Through it, Defendant seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims brought under 15 U.S.C. § 1681b of the FCRA (Dkt. #15). On March 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed his Response (Dkt. #22). On March 28, 2025, Defendant replied (Dkt. #23). Plaintiff promptly filed his Sur-Reply (Dkt. #24). The Court now takes up the Motion. LEGAL STANDARD The purpose of summary judgment is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986). Summary judgment is proper under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A dispute about a material fact is genuine when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Substantive law identifies which facts are material. Id. The trial court “must

resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the party opposing the motion [for summary judgment].” Casey Enters., Inc. v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 655 F.2d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 1981). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of its motion and identifying “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the movant bears the burden of proof on a claim or defense for which it is moving for summary judgment, it must come forward with evidence that establishes “beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or defense.” Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986). Where the nonmovant bears the burden of proof, the movant may discharge the burden by showing that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmovant’s case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; Byers v. Dall. Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2000). Once the movant has carried its burden, the nonmovant

must “respond to the motion for summary judgment by setting forth particular facts indicating there is a genuine issue for trial.” Byers, 209 F.3d at 424 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248–49). A nonmovant must present affirmative evidence to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. Mere denials of material facts, unsworn allegations, or arguments and assertions in briefs or legal memoranda will not suffice to carry this burden. See Solomon v. Hous. Corrugated Box Co., 526 F.2d 389, 396–97 (5th Cir. 1976). Rather, the Court requires “significant probative evidence” from the nonmovant to dismiss a request for summary judgment. In re Mun. Bond Reporting Antitrust Litig., 672 F.2d 436, 440 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Ferguson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 584 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1978)). The Court must consider all of the

evidence but “refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007). ANALYSIS After a careful review of the entire summary judgment record and the Parties’ arguments, the Court is not convinced that Defendant has met its burden to demonstrate that there are no issues of material fact such that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This case is laden

with fact questions, and it is a jury’s province to decide those fact questions. CONCLUSION It is therefore ORDERED that Defendant JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #15) is hereby DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Castleberry v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/castleberry-v-jpmorgan-chase-bank-na-txed-2025.