5RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Castellano-Chacon v. INS No. 02-3273 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2003 FED App. 0293P (6th Cir.) File Name: 03a0293p.06 _________________ COUNSEL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ARGUED: Richard R. Renner, TATE & RENNER, Dover, FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Ohio, for Petitioner. Linda S. Wernery, UNITED STATES _________________ DEPARTM E N T OF J U S T I C E , OFFI CE OF IMMIGRATION LITIGATION, Washington, D.C., for ROLANDO AUGUSTINE X Respondent. ON BRIEF: Richard R. Renner, TATE & CASTELLANO-CHACON, - RENNER, Dover, Ohio, for Petitioner. Edward C. Durant, John C. Cunningham, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT Petitioner, - OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION LITIGATION, - No. 02-3273 - Washington, D.C., for Respondent. v. > , BOGGS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which - GILMAN, J., joined. DOWD, D. J. (p. 32), delivered a IMMIGRATION AND - separate opinion dissenting in part. NATURALIZATION SERVICE, - Respondent. - _________________ - N OPINION On Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals. _________________ No. A78 390 991. BOGGS, Circuit Judge. Rolando Augustine Castellano- Argued: June 19, 2003 Chacon (referred to as “Castellano” in Petitioner’s Brief) petitions for review of a decision rendered by the Board of Decided and Filed: August 18, 2003 Immigration Appeals (BIA) ordering his deportation after denying his application for asylum, application for Before: BOGGS and GILMAN, Circuit Judges; and withholding of removal under the Immigration and DOWD, District Judge.* Nationality Act (INA), and request for withholding of removal pursuant to the legislation implementing Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture.1 Castellano contends that the BIA did not properly consider his claim, which is founded
1 United Nations Convention Against T orture and O ther Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading T reatment or P unishm ent, open ed for signa ture * Feb. 4, 1985, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. The Ho norable D avid D . Dowd, Jr., United States District Judge for Doc. A/RES/39/708 (1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), modified the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation. in 24 I.L.M. 535 (19 85).
1 No. 02-3273 Castellano-Chacon v. INS 3 4 Castellano-Chacon v. INS No. 02-3273
on a fear of persecution should he return to Honduras, as a we drink, dance, and find girls. On my left shoulder, I result of his former membership in a street gang. Castellano have a cross. On my left arm, I have “XIII”, Roman additionally appeals the BIA’s decision on two procedural numerals for 13. On my back, I have a tattoo that says grounds. First, Castellano claims that he was effectively “sureno”, to means [sic] that I come from the South. On denied a fair hearing in violation of his due process rights the ring and middle fingers of my right hand, I have because his counsel was not allowed to make an opening and tattoos of “N” and “Y” to show I was from New York. closing statement at his removal hearing. Second, Castellano On the index, middle and ring fingers of my left hand, I claims that the BIA erred in not ruling on his motion to have tattoos of “H”, “L” and “S”. The H means I was correct the transcript of his immigration hearing. For the from Hempstead. The “L” was for “La Vida Loca”, the reasons set forth in this opinion, we deny Castellano’s crazy life. The “S” is for “Salvatrucha,” which Petition for Review and affirm the BIA’s decision. represents the Salvadoran roots of the gang. On the back of my left hand, near the wrist, I have three dots. They I also represent the crazy life. I got the tattoos during one week, a few each day. Background Castellano stated that he did not realize what he was getting Castellano, a native of Honduras, illegally entered the into when he joined the gang and in July 1998, he decided to United States in February 1992, when he was sixteen years leave MS 13, because of the violence of gang life and the fact old. At the age of eighteen, while living in Hempstead, New that so many members were “going to jail for life.” York, Castellano joined the “MS 13" gang, named after 13th Castellano was concerned that the gang would retaliate Street in Los Angeles, and received a number of tattoos as against him and his family for leaving, so he moved to part of his initiation process. In his application for asylum, Baltimore. Castellano described and explained the meaning of these tattoos: After getting into a violent fight with one of his roommates in Baltimore, Castellano moved to North Carolina, where he About two months after I joined MS 13, I got tattooed. purchased false identification papers on the black market in Other MS 13 members did the tattoos. I have a 13 on my order to take a job. After a brief stint in jail in New York in chin. This signifies my membership in MS 13. The 1999, Castellano returned to North Carolina and then moved three dots below the corner of my right eye signify the to Ohio. In April 2001, Castellano got a job with a nursery in crazy life. The tear drop below the corner of my left eye Berlin Heights, Ohio, for which he needed a car so that he signifies the memory of a friend (called “El Mago”) who could get back and forth to work. However, when Castellano was killed by a rival gang. On my chest, I have tattoos applied for the title, using the identification papers that he had for “M”, “S”, “Honduras”, and “13". These mean that I purchased in North Carolina, he was arrested for using false belonged to MS 13, and I am from Honduras. On my identification and sentenced to a 30-day jail term. right arm I have “MS” in Roman letters, and “Mi Vida Loca” which means my crazy life. On my right shoulder, While Castellano was in jail, he was served with a Notice I have tattoos of theater masks with sad and happy faces. to Appear (NTA) on June 12, 2001, charging him with being To me this means that sometimes we are sad, like when removable under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration somebody dies, and sometimes we are happy, like when and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), since No. 02-3273 Castellano-Chacon v. INS 5 6 Castellano-Chacon v. INS No. 02-3273
he was “[a]n alien in the United States [who had not been] Furthermore, when arrested, children frequently face the use admitted or paroled.” At Castellano’s removal proceeding on of excessive force by the State, including extra-judicial August 3, 2001, he conceded removability on the basis of the executions. For example, Casa Alianza2 reported a rapid rise allegations included in the NTA, but sought asylum, based on in extrajudicial murders since 1998, including the killing of a “change of country conditions.” Castellano claimed that more than 820 “gang youth and street children” during the since he had left Honduras, the conditions in his country had period from January 1998 to June 2001. CODEH, the changed to the extent that people with gang tattoos were now Honduran Committee for the Defense of Human Rights, being persecuted. Castellano admitted that he had been in the reported a number of “execution-style” shootings of juvenile United States for at least nine years and had not, until now, delinquents, and Time magazine, along with Casa Alianza, requested asylum because he had only recently learned about reported on the orchestration of, or at least reckless disregard the extrajudicial executions of gang members in Honduras. for, gang on gang violence within the Honduran prison system. The State Department’s 2000 report on human rights On September 28, 2001, a hearing was held on Castellano’s practices in Honduras, released by the Bureau of Democracy, application for asylum. Castellano first presented a statement Human Rights, and Labor, also reported that Honduran by expert witness Professor Jeff Stewart, which was admitted government officials have been involved in targeting children into evidence by the Immigration Judge (IJ). Professor suspected of being in gangs. Finally, the Special Rapporteur Stewart’s statement essentially described the deteriorating of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Asma conditions in Honduras since “Hurricane Mitch” devastated Jahangir, reported after visiting Honduras in the summer of the country in 1998. The professor explained that the 2001 that the Honduran media had contributed to the problem economic consequences of this natural disaster led to a by targeting “tattooed youth,” linking them directly to gangs general rise in the level of violence in Honduras, and and crime. Jahangir found the government to be involved in subsequently a steep increase in the number of extra-judicial at least “some” of the known extra-judicial killings of murders committed by Honduran security forces and/or children. In sum, there is evidence of the Honduran paramilitary groups, specifically targeting young men with government directly or indirectly persecuting children3 tattoos, who were assumed to be gang members involved in suspected of being in gangs. criminal activities. The professor testified that the targeting of gang members is seen by those in power in Honduras as a In response to the government’s contention that “form of acceptable ‘social cleansing.’” Professor Stewart Castellano’s application for asylum was untimely, Castellano concluded that Castellano “faces the grave probability of testified to the fact that he had not become aware of the death at the hands of government forces due to his previous gang affiliation and numerous tattoos.” 2 Casa Alianza is a non-profit organization “dedicated to the A number of sources were cited by Professor Stewart in rehabilitation and defense of street children” in Guatemala, Honduras, support of his statements regarding the targeting of gang Mexico, and N icaragua. See About Casa Alianza at http://www.casa- members. The general theme of these reports was that alianza .org/E N/abou t/. children who are assumed to be in gangs, because of tattoos 3 or for other reasons, are at grave risk of being killed or Professor Stewart adm itted on cross-exam ination that the Casa tortured in Honduras, either by state security forces or Alianz a reports he cited, which focused on “gang youth,” were referring to people twenty-three-years old or you nger, wherea s Castellano is vigilante groups that appear to act with impunity. twenty-seven-years old, and no longer a “youth.” No. 02-3273 Castellano-Chacon v. INS 7 8 Castellano-Chacon v. INS No. 02-3273
developing violence in Honduras, specifically targeted at 478, 481 (1992) (stating that a refugee is defined by the INA gang members, until May 2001 when he saw news reports on as an alien who is unable or unwilling to return to his home television while he was in jail. The jail in which Castellano country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of was housed had cable television, and so Castellano was able persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, to view several Spanish news programs not available to him membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” earlier. In support of Castellano’s testimony, Professor (quoting 8 U.S.C § 1101(a)(42)(A))). The IJ additionally did Stewart testified at the hearing and explained that it was not “not find a claim to be made out” with respect to Castellano’s surprising that Castellano would have been unaware of the application for withholding of removal. Finally, the IJ, in changed conditions in Honduras, since “Central American denying Castellano’s application for relief pursuant to the refugees” have virtually no access to these sorts of news Convention Against Torture, found that although Castellano reports “particularly concerning . . . gang violence.” had provided evidence of “general violence,” he had not Nevertheless, on cross-examination, Castellano admitted that provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that he would, he had been afraid of deportation and subsequent prosecution “more likely than not,” be at risk of being tortured if he as early as 1998 when he avoided the police after getting into returned to Honduras. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16-18 (2001). a fight with his roommate in Baltimore. In relevant part, the following exchange took place between the government On February 22, 2002, the Board of Immigration Appeals lawyer and Castellano: (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision. Specifically, the BIA noted with respect to Castellano’s application for asylum, that he Q: On page 4 of your supplemental application, Item 11, had not “provide[d] an adequate basis to excuse his failure to as you talk about getting into a fight with a man where file the application [on time],” and explicitly agreed with the you hit his door with a knife and then you say I was IJ’s conclusion that Castellano had “failed to establish a afraid that if I went to the police to explain, they would nexus between any mistreatment he may suffer and one of the deport me. protected grounds under the Act,” thereby independently A: It’s true. I was afraid, yes. disposing of both his application for asylum and his Q: Were you afraid of gangs then too? application for withholding of removal. Finally, the BIA A: Yes, because I didn’t want to go back there because agreed with the IJ’s denial of Castellano’s claim under the they would kill me. Convention Against Torture, since “general conditions of Q: So you were afraid of gangs in ‘98 then? violence and gross human rights violations are not sufficient A: I think about that. I just fought with that guy, but I ground[s] for determining that a particular person would be was afraid that they were going to deport me, yes. subjected to torture.” Castellano was subsequently removed to Honduras in April 2002. On October 10, 2001, the IJ denied Castellano’s application for asylum, his application for withholding of removal, and II his application for relief pursuant to the Convention Against Torture. The IJ found that Castellano’s application for Application for Asylum asylum was time barred and that in any case Castellano had not demonstrated the requisite criteria for being a refugee as Section 208(a)(2)(B) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), defined in Section 101(a)(42)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. requires aliens to apply for asylum within one year of their § 1101(a)(42)(A), and reiterated in INS v. Zacarias, 502 U.S. arrival in the United States, but allows an untimely No. 02-3273 Castellano-Chacon v. INS 9 10 Castellano-Chacon v. INS No. 02-3273
application to be considered if there are changed (D) Changed circumstances circumstances materially affecting the applicant’s eligibility An application for asylum of an alien may be for asylum or extraordinary circumstances that would justify considered . . . if the alien demonstrates to the the delay.4 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). satisfaction of the Attorney General either the existence of changed circumstances which Castellano contends that the BIA erred in finding his materially affect the applicant’s eligibility for application to be untimely, since he filed his application asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to within one year of learning about the possibility of the delay in filing an application within the period persecution in Honduras. Before turning to the merits of his specified in subparagraph (B). claim, however, we must address the threshold question of (3) Limitation on judicial review whether we have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final No court shall have jurisdiction to review any decision that Castellano’s application is untimely. The INA determination of the Attorney General under states in relevant part: paragraph (2). § 1158 Asylum 8 U.S.C. § 1158. (a) Authority to apply for asylum (1) In general Although the Supreme Court has articulated a presumption Any alien who is physically present in the United favoring judicial review of administrative action, that States or who arrives in the United States, . . . presumption may be overcome by specific statutory language irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply for precluding review, such as the language of 8 U.S.C. asylum in accordance with this section or, where § 1158(a)(3), or “specific legislative history that is a reliable applicable, section 1225(b) of this title. indicator of congressional intent.” Block v. Cmty. Nutrition (2) Exceptions Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 349 (1984). The government contends ... that this court does not have jurisdiction to review (B) Time Limit Castellano’s claim since paragraph (3) explicitly states that a Subject to subparagraph (D), paragraph (1) shall decision taken under paragraph (2) is not reviewable by any not apply to an alien unless the alien demonstrates court, thereby overcoming the presumption in favor of by clear and convincing evidence that the judicial review. application has been filed within 1 year after the date of the alien’s arrival in the United States. Castellano argues in response that 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) is ... “imprecise” and trumped by two other provisions of the INA, included in section 242 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1252, which specifically provide for judicial review of decisions made 4 In fact, the one-year filing period com mences eithe r on the alien’s under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), thereby producing an ambiguity day of arrival in the U nited S tates or on April 1, 1997, whichever is later. and creating doubt as to whether Congress did in fact intend 8 C.F.R. § 204.4(a)(2)(ii). Since Castellano entered the U nited S tates in 1992, the one-year filing period commenced for him on April 1, 1997. However, since Castellano did not apply for asylum until 2001, he was well outside of the o ne-year filing period established by the INA, and therefore his application is not timely. These facts are undisputed. No. 02-3273 Castellano-Chacon v. INS 11 12 Castellano-Chacon v. INS No. 02-3273
to bar judicial review under these circumstances.5 8 U.S.C. any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of § 1252(a)(2)(B) states in relevant part that: the alien.” (citing INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966), Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120, 128 (1964), and Fong Haw Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948))). shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any other decision or action of the Attorney General the authority for which is Despite the various presumptions working in Castellano’s specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of favor, these presumptions are not controlling where there is the Attorney General, other than the granting of relief no ambiguity, and there is no ambiguity if, as in this case, the under section 1158(a) of this title. “congressional intent to preclude judicial review is ‘fairly discernable [from] the statutory scheme.’” Block, 467 U.S. at (emphasis added). In addition, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D) 351 (quoting Data Processing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, states that “the Attorney General’s discretionary judgment 157 (1970)). It is not necessary to interpret 8 U.S.C. § 1252 whether to grant relief under section 1158(a) of this title shall as providing an affirmative grant of jurisdiction in conflict be conclusive unless manifestly contrary to the law and an with 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3), as it can be understood to extend abuse of discretion.” Castellano argues that these provisions only to decisions made pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). In can be seen as permitting review of all decisions made under other words, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) and 8 U.S.C. 1158(a), including those relating to the timeliness of an § 1252(b)(4)(D) are referring to 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) generally, application, and that the standard of review to be applied is which deals with the granting of asylum, whereas 8 U.S.C. whether the BIA’s decision was “manifestly contrary to the § 1158(a)(3) specifically addresses 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2). law and an abuse of discretion.” Castellano, having outlined Moreover, such an interpretation is fully consistent with the these two conflicting interpretations, labels the conflict an statutory scheme, which generally prohibits judicial review of “ambiguity” in the statute and argues that in addition to the discretionary decisions taken by the Attorney General under presumption of judicial review of administrative actions, there the INA. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Were we to is a presumption favoring the alien when interpreting any accept Castellano’s argument, other specific prohibitions on ambiguities in the language of the INA, which requires this judicial review relating to discretionary decisions made by the court to resolve the question of reviewability in Castellano’s Attorney General in other parts of the INA outside of 8 favor. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 U.S.C. § 1158(a), but nevertheless within this subchapter, (1987) (restating the “longstanding principle of construing would be redundant, since 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) precludes review of “any other decision or action of the Attorney General the authority for which is specified under this 5 Castellano also argues that the plain language of 8 U.S.C. subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General.” §1158 (a)(3), only co vers ac tions of the “Attorney General” and not See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(D) (limiting judicial review decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals or other subo rdinate of the Attorney General’s determinations regarding the officials. However, the Board of Appeals acts here for the Attorney General as his delegate, and it is to bo th the Attorney G enera l and his inadmissibility of aliens implicated in terrorist activity). delegates that Congress has assigned the task of making these difficult decisions pursuant to the INA . See INS v. C ardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. Although this is a question of first impression before the 421, 444 -45 (1 987 ). Congress did no t expect the Attorney G enera l to Sixth Circuit, other circuits have addressed this issue and exercise his discretion in suspension of deportation cases personally, and, have unanimously concluded that the federal courts lack under the rule-m aking authority, he can d elegate his authority. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 , 351 (1956 ). jurisdiction to review BIA determinations on the timeliness of No. 02-3273 Castellano-Chacon v. INS 13 14 Castellano-Chacon v. INS No. 02-3273
an asylum application. See Hailu v. I.N.S., No. 02-1645, 2003 therefore is not judicially enforceable law in the United WL 1821468 at *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 8, 2003); Tsevegmid v. States. See Bannerman v. Snyder, 325 F.3d 722, 724 (6th Cir. Ashcroft, 318 F.3d 1226, 1229-30 (10th Cir. 2003); Fahim v. 2003) (citing Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 372 (6th Cir. U.S. Att’y Gen., 278 F.3d 1216, 1217-18 (11th Cir. 2002); 2001), for the proposition that the International Covenant on Ismailov v. Reno, 263 F.3d 851, 854-55 (8th Cir. 2001); Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the U.N. General Hakeem v. INS, 273 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2001). The Assembly on Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 and ratified by general consensus among the circuits is that “[t]he meaning the United States on April 2, 1992, is not judicially of § 1158(a)(3) is clear: Congress intended to bar judicial enforceable law since it is not self executing, and “non-self- review of decisions made under § 1158(a)(2).” Ismailov, 263 executing agreements will not be given effect as law in the F.3d at 855. We join our sister circuits on this point and hold absence of necessary authority.” (quoting the Restatement that we are barred from reviewing the BIA’s decision denying (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 111 (1987))). Second, the Castellano’s application on the basis that it was untimely and United States’ treaty obligations on this score are must therefore affirm the BIA’s decision on this point. implemented in section 241(b)(3) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1231, which deals with applications for withholding of As a last-ditch effort, Castellano argues in his Reply Brief removal and does not provide a time limit. that the government’s interpretation of the INA dealing with the reviewability of the timeliness of an application for III asylum would result in a breach by the United States of its obligations under the 1951 United Nations Convention Application for Withholding of Removal Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Refugee Convention).6 First, the United States is not a party to the Refugee Withholding of removal pursuant to section 241(b)(3) of Convention. However, by acceding to the Refugee Protocol the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), corresponds to the non- in 1968,7 the United States undertook obligations under the refoulement obligation in Article 33 of the Refugee Refugee Convention, since the Protocol incorporates the Convention, prohibiting the deportation or removal of anyone substantive provisions of Articles 2 through 34 of the Refugee whose life or freedom would be threatened in his or her home Convention. Nevertheless, Castellano cannot circumvent the country on account of one of the same five grounds necessary INA and make a claim under the Refugee Protocol, since it is for asylum (race, religion, nationality, membership in a not self-executing, INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 428 n.22 particular social group, or political opinion). Unlike an (1984) (noting that the Protocol was not intended to be self- application for asylum, however, a grant of an alien’s executing, and serves only as a useful guide in determining application for withholding is not a basis for adjustment to congressional intent in enacting the Refugee Act), and legal permanent resident status, family members are not granted derivative status, and it only prohibits removal of the petitioner to the country of risk, but does not prohibit removal to a non-risk country. Furthermore, a greater quantum of 6 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, proof is required as to the likelihood of persecution in the opened for signature July 28, 1951 , G.A. Res. 429[V], 189 U.N.T.S. 137. country of risk in order to establish eligibility for 7 withholding. In other words, the courts consider the same United Nations Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, opened factors to determine eligibility for both asylum and for signature Jan. 31, 1967, G.A. Res. 2198 [XXI], 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S., 267. No. 02-3273 Castellano-Chacon v. INS 15 16 Castellano-Chacon v. INS No. 02-3273
withholding, but in the case of withholding, a higher viable claim nor any evidence at all that the claim relates probability of persecution is required. to the respondent’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political The standard of review requires us to uphold the BIA’s opinion. determination against withholding the removal of an alien, unless it is “manifestly contrary to the law.” Ali v. Reno, 237 This determination, explicitly referring to Castellano’s F.3d 591, 596 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing 8 U.S.C. application for asylum, applies a fortiori to Castellano’s § 1252(b)(4)(B)and (C)). Furthermore, any administrative eligibility for withholding of removal. Castellano argues on findings of fact are “conclusive unless any reasonable appeal that the IJ and the BIA, having made no adverse adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” finding regarding Castellano’s credibility, erred in denying Ibid. his claim for withholding of removal. Castellano contends that he has presented sufficient evidence to establish that if he In order to qualify for withholding, Castellano must returns to Honduras, he will be persecuted as a result of his demonstrate that there is a clear probability that he would be former membership in a gang, and that his former subject to persecution if he were to return to Honduras, membership in MS 13 constitutes membership in a “particular “because of [his] race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group” pursuant to the INA. particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); Mikhailevitch v. INS, 146 F.3d 384, 391 (6th A. Membership in a particular social group Cir. 1998) (holding that in order to qualify for withholding of deportation, the petitioner “must demonstrate that there is a Although membership in a particular social group has clear probability that he would be subject to persecution” increasingly been invoked as a basis for asylum and were he to return to his native country). We must determine, withholding claims, defining what constitutes such a group therefore, 1) whether Castellano is in fact a member of a for purposes of the INA remains elusive and inconsistent. “particular social group” for purposes of the statute; and The circuits that have taken a position on this issue have 2) whether Castellano has presented sufficient evidence to adopted overlapping definitions that resemble variations on a compel a finding that he would, more likely than not, be common theme. The First, Third, and Seventh Circuits have persecuted on the basis of that membership. See Stevic, 467 explicitly adopted the BIA’s approach, which defined the U.S. at 424 (reaffirming that the “clear-probability standard” term “particular social group” as composed of individuals is equivalent to asking “whether it is more likely than not that who share a “common, immutable characteristic.” Lwin v. the alien would be subject to persecution.”). INS, 144 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1998); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1239 (3d Cir. 1993); Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, The IJ found that Castellano was not a member of a 7 (1st Cir. 1990). The Ninth Circuit initially adopted a particular social group. The BIA incorporated the IJ’s “voluntary associational relationship” definition of a social findings and affirmed the decision, but focused instead on the group, under which the term implies “a collection of people lack of a nexus between Castellano’s status and the potential closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated by some for persecution, stating in relevant part: common impulse or interest.” Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986) (looking to various sources Overall, [Castellano] has not borne his burden to of international law for guidance). In a more recent decision, establish eligibility for asylum because there is not a the Ninth Circuit rearticulated its approach in an effort to No. 02-3273 Castellano-Chacon v. INS 17 18 Castellano-Chacon v. INS No. 02-3273
“harmoniz[e] it with [the BIA’s] immutability requirement.” in order to gain a fuller understanding of what it means to say Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1093 n.6 (9th Cir. that the members of a social group must share a “common, 2000). The court recognized that groups sharing immutable immutable characteristic.” characteristics, such as a familial relationship, or one’s sexual orientation and sexual identity, would not necessarily fit In Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985), within the Sanchez definition, with its focus on a “voluntary the BIA held that a Salvadoran Taxi cooperative did not associational relationship” and therefore expanded the constitute a particular social group, even though the members definition, holding that a “‘particular social group’ is one were being persecuted because they refused to participate in united by a voluntary association, including a former work stoppages. The BIA reasoned that the characteristic of association, or by an innate characteristic that is so being a taxi driver was not immutable since the drivers could fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members change jobs and the “concept of a refugee simply does not that members either cannot or should not be required to guarantee an individual a right to work in the job of his change it.” Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093 (emphasis choice.” In so doing, the BIA undertook a careful analysis of in original). See also Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. the term “particular social group” and stated in relevant part: 1994) (adopting the Ninth Circuit’s broad approach, citing Sanchez-Trujillo, 801 F.2d at 1576, as well as Ananeh- [W]e interpret the phrase ‘persecution on account of Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621, 626 (1st Cir. 1985) and membership in a particular social group’ to mean Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233-34 (BIA 1985)). persecution that is directed toward an individual who is The Second Circuit has taken yet another approach. In a member of a group of persons all of whom share a Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991), the Second common, immutable characteristic. The shared Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit’s “voluntary associational characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, relationship” standard, but additionally noted that the or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a members of a social group must be externally distinguishable. shared past experience such as a former military “Like the traits which distinguish the other four enumerated leadership or land ownership. The particular kind of categories – race, religion, nationality and political opinion – group characteristic that will qualify under this the attributes of a particular social group must be recognizable construction remains to be determined on a case-by-case and discrete.” Ibid. See also Saleh v. United States Dep’t of basis. However, whatever the common characteristic Justice, 962 F.2d 234, 240 (2d Cir. 1992). that defines the group, it must be one that the members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required We have not previously stated a specific test in the Sixth to change because it is fundamental to their individual Circuit, and in doing so now we recognize the deference due identities or consciences . . . . By construing the BIA’s interpretation of the INA insofar as it reflects a ‘persecution on account of membership in a particular judgment that is peculiarly within the BIA’s expertise. We social group’ in this manner, we preserve the concept that therefore join the First, Third, and Seventh Circuits in refuge is restricted to individuals who are either unable adopting the BIA’s definition of a “particular social group.” by their own actions, or as a matter of conscience should See generally Fieran v. INS, 268 F.3d 340, 344 (6th Cir. not be required, to avoid persecution. 2001); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). Nevertheless, we return to the Id. at 233-34. original decision of the BIA, which established that standard, No. 02-3273 Castellano-Chacon v. INS 19 20 Castellano-Chacon v. INS No. 02-3273
Using this standard, the BIA has recognized several social our own jurisprudence as well, as exemplified by the groups, such as young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu tribe “external” approach taken by the Second Circuit in Gomez, of northern Togo who did not undergo female genital but not by other circuits in the country thus far. Specifically, mutilation as practiced by that tribe and who opposed the the UNHCR guidelines suggest defining a “particular social practice, In Re Fauziya Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (BIA group” as: 1996); members of the Marehan subclan of Somalia, who share ties of kinship and linguistic commonalities, In Re H–, [A] group of persons who share a common characteristic 21 I. & N. Dec. 337 (BIA 1996); homosexuals in Cuba, other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, I. & N. Dec. 819 (BIA 1990); and perceived as a group by society. The characteristic will former members of the national police of El Salvador, Matter often be one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is of Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658 (BIA 1988). Each of these otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or the groups share an immutable characteristic, or at least a exercise of one’s human rights. fundamental characteristic that “either cannot [be] change[d], or should not be required to [be] change[d] because it is Id. at ¶ 11 (emphasis added). fundamental to [the members’] individual identities or consciences.” The UNHCR takes the Second Circuit’s approach, in that the external perception of the group can be considered as an Since Acosta, The Office of the United Nations High additional factor in the overall calculus of what makes up a Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has published “particular social group.” However, we recognize that the guidelines on the definition of a “particular social group” that UNHCR guidelines are not binding and furthermore the BIA, deal specifically with the question of whether the definition to whom we owe deference, has on occasion explicitly should be based primarily on “internal” factors, such as innate distinguished its own interpretation of the Protocol from the characteristics, or whether it is appropriate to consider the UNHCR. See, e.g., Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 228 (noting “external” perception of the group in determining whether or that “to the extent that the UNHCR’s position in the not such a group exists for purposes of the Refugee Handbook does not require an individual to show he is likely Convention. Guidelines on International Protection: to become a victim of persecution, we find that position to be “Membership of a particular social group” within the context inconsistent with Congress’ intention and with the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 of the protocol.”). Yet, the BIA has, since Acosta, stated that Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Refugee for a “group to be viable for asylum purposes, we believe Agency, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (2002). This question, there must also be some showing of how the characteristic is which has divided courts in various countries,8 is evident in
8 S.C.R. 689 , ¶ 78. W hereas the Australian High Court has held that the For example, the Supreme Court of Canada has defined a “particular existence of a “particular social group” “depends, in most, perhaps all social group” to encompass 1) groups defined by an innate or cases on external perceptions of the group. The notion of persecution for unchangeable characteristic; 2) groups whose m emb ers voluntarily reasons of membership of a particular social group implies that the group assoc iate for reasons so fundamental to their human dignity that they must be identifiable as a social unit.” Applicant A v. Minister for should not be forced to forsake that association; and 3) groups associated Immigration and Ethnic A ffairs (1997) 190 CLR 225, 264 (McH ugh J.); by a former voluntary status, unaltera ble due to its historical permanence. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Applicant Z (2001) Ward v. Canad a (M inister of Em ployment & Immigration), [1993] 2 116 FCR 36, ¶ 11. No. 02-3273 Castellano-Chacon v. INS 21 22 Castellano-Chacon v. INS No. 02-3273
understood in the alien’s society, such that we, in turn, may nonpolitical crimes on the other.” Id. at 1132 (citations understand that the potential persecutors in fact see persons omitted). While this may be true, gang membership cannot sharing the characteristic as warranting suppression or the be equated to a criminal activity such as drug trafficking, infliction of harm.” In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, *11 unless that is its only purpose, and thus Bastanipour is not on (BIA 1999) vacated by the Attorney General on January 19, point. Furthermore, “former members of the MS-13 gang” is 2001 in light of a proposed rule published at 65 Fed. Reg. not the social group properly at issue in this case. 76588, which has since been withdrawn. See 2003 Immigr. Bus. News & Comment Daily 42 (March 7, 2003). While it is possible to conceive of the members of MS 13 as a particular social group under the INA, sharing for While we refrain from incorporating into our own example the common immutable characteristic of their past definition of a “particular social group” the UNHCR’s experiences together, their initiation rites, and their status as guidance on this topic, we take note of the BIA’s recent Spanish-speaking immigrants in the United States, when one decision, In re R-A-, and note that this language suggests that examines the evidence in this case, Castellano is not arguing the BIA may be moving in the direction of recognizing that that he will be persecuted on the basis of his membership in the external perception of a group is a relevant factor to MS 13. Instead, the evidence he has presented establishes, at consider in making a determination as to whether a group fits best, that “tattooed youth” are targeted and prosecuted. As a within the INA’s definition of a particular social group. In result, we can only rule in Castellano’s favor if we hold that other words, society’s reaction to a “group” may provide “tattooed youth” constitute a social group, which we decline evidence in a specific case that a particular group exists, as to do. long as the reaction by persecutors to members of a particular social group is not the touchstone defining the group. As the While it is apparent that the definition of a “social group” BIA continues to revise and evaluate its own definition of a is a flexible one, which encompasses a wide variety of groups particular social group, our definition may evolve in the same who do not otherwise fall within the other categories of race, way as the BIA’s, with the caveat that the BIA must continue nationality, religion, or political opinion, it is also apparent to make a reasonable interpretation of the statute, as it has that the term cannot be without some outer limit, outside of thus far. which tattooed youth surely falls. As a category, tattooed youth do not share an innate characteristic, nor a past The IJ in Castellano’s case relied on Bastanipour v. I.N.S., experience, other than having received a tattoo. Furthermore, 980 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1992), in determining that his former the concept of a refugee simply cannot guarantee an membership in the MS 13 gang did not constitute individual the right to have a tattoo. Tattooed youth is membership in a particular social group. In Bastanipour, the overbroad and cannot be seen as constituting a collection of Seventh Circuit held that drug traffickers do not constitute a people closely affiliated with each other, who share a “particular social group” for purposes of the INA. The court “common, immutable characteristic.” The BIA’s reasonably noted that the INA was “surely not intended for the protection of members of the criminal class in this country, merely upon a showing that a foreign country deals with them even more harshly than we do. A contrary conclusion would collapse the fundamental distinction between persecution on the one hand and the prosecution of No. 02-3273 Castellano-Chacon v. INS 23 24 Castellano-Chacon v. INS No. 02-3273
determination on this issue was not manifestly contrary to the already, is considerably higher. Thus, even if Castellano can law.9 prove past persecution, his case is not made. Moreover, Castellano’s evidence of threats does not rise to the level of B. Is there sufficient evidence to compel a finding that past persecution as defined by the INA and interpreted under Castellano would be, more likely than not, persecuted as a our case law. result of his membership in a particular social group? Castellano’s evidence of past persecution consists of a Castellano has not presented evidence to support the threat he received while in prison from another inmate who contention that he would be, more likely than not, persecuted was Honduran and who has since been deported to Honduras. on the basis either of his membership in MS 13, or because of his tattoos, since the evidence he produced at the hearing At the immigration hearing, Castellano testified as follows: focused on the persecution of children who were twenty- three-years-old or younger, and Castellano is now twenty- Q Have you received any specific threats? seven-years-old. In addition, he gave no information A No, I haven’t received any, but - - regarding other similarly situated gang members who have ... been deported and found themselves in danger. Q Did, did anybody - - when you were in jail in Bedford Heights, did anybody tell you that they, Castellano argues that he has proven past persecution, they could participate in that type of action? thereby entitling him to a presumption under 8 C.F.R. A One of the boys that was there, yes, from Honduras § 208.13(b)(1)(ii) of a well-founded fear of suffering future he said that they were going to deport him he saw persecution. If Castellano were applying for asylum, and he the news [sic]. They were destroying, they were had in fact proven past persecution, he would have made his destroying all the gang members. He got, he got case and the burden would shift to the government to prove upset. He said that when he got back he was going that his fear of suffering future persecution was not well- to go and do the army to destroy them. He was in founded. See Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 390. However, the, in the military down there in Honduras and he Castellano’s application for asylum is time-barred and the can get back in there easily. His name was Oscar standard for an application for withholding, as mentioned Masariego. He was detained there too.
Although Castellano’s Brief refers to this as a threat, it seems 9 The government suggests that Castellano could remove his tattoos that not even Castellano, when testifying to the event at his and we sure ly agree that if possible, this would dispose of the case. hearing, viewed it as a threat. Castellano argues on appeal However neither the IJ, nor the B IA, app ear to base their decision o n this that “vagueness is often used to imply violence,” but there is fact, and there is no evidence in the record regarding C astellano ’s ability no indication that Masariego considered Castellano to be to remove his tattoos. Castellano states in a footnote in his Reply Brief among the “gang members” that he was interested in that “[i]f respo ndent would consent to reopening the record with a new hearing, undersigned counsel pro ffers to prove that after the Immigration “destroying.” Furthermore, we held in Mikhailevitch, 146 Judge’s hearing, respondent itself denied Castellano permission to attempt F.3d at 390, that “persecution” within the meaning of the tattoo removal at Meridia Southwest Hospital in Bedford Heights, Ohio.” INA, “requires more than a few isolated incidents of verbal Although this information suggests tha t the tattoo s are in fact removable, harassment or intimidation, unaccompanied by any physical it is unnecessary to com e to this conc lusion in o rder to affirm the BIA ’s punishment, infliction of harm, or significant deprivation of decision in this case. No. 02-3273 Castellano-Chacon v. INS 25 26 Castellano-Chacon v. INS No. 02-3273
liberty.” Whether or not Masariego’s comment was meant as executing agreements will not be given effect as law in the a threat, it does not rise to the level of “persecution” for absence of necessary authority.” (quoting Restatement (Third) purposes of the INA. In addition, Castellano must of Foreign Relations Law § 111 (1987))). The United States demonstrate more than the existence of a generalized or Senate, in consenting to ratify the Convention Against random possibility of persecution in his native country on Torture, attached a proviso that articles 1-16 are not self- account of the fact that he has tattoos, in order to succeed in executing, see 136 Cong. Rec. S17486-01, S17492 (1990). his application for withholding. See Singh v. INS, 134 F.3d Congress then passed the Foreign Affairs Reform and 962, 967 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that a petitioner “must show Restructuring Act (FARRA), which instructed appropriate that [he] is at particular risk – that [his] predicatment is agencies to implement the obligations of the United States appreciably different from the dangers faced by [his] fellow under Article 3 of the Convention, see Pub. L. No. 105-277, citizens” (quoting Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 852 (9th Cir. § 2242(b), 112 Stat. 2681. The INS and the Executive Office 1994))). for Immigration Review, following the dictates of FARRA, have since promulgated regulations implementing our In sum, even if we view Castellano’s and Stewart’s obligations under the Convention Against Torture, which testimony as wholly credible, the evidence presented does not constitute the appropriate law under which Castellano’s claim compel a finding that Castellano would be subject to can be made. persecution on account of his membership in a particular social group. First, Castellano’s evidence only suggests that 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c) articulates the conditions under which young people with tattoos are targeted, and the group of an alien may be found eligible for the withholding of his or “tattooed youth” is not a social group for purposes of the her removal as a result of the probability of being subjected INA. Second, Castellano has not effectively demonstrated to torture in the removal country. The regulation states in that he is in fact a member of the group being targeted in relevant part that: Honduras, in light of his age. We therefore affirm the BIA’s denial of Castellano’s application for withholding of his (4) In considering an application for withholding of removal. removal under the Convention Against Torture, the immigration judge shall first determine whether the alien IV is more likely than not to be tortured in the country of removal. If the immigration judge determines that the Convention Against Torture alien is more likely than not to be tortured in the country of removal, the alien is entitled to protection under the Castellano appeals the BIA’s denial of his request for Convention Against Torture. Protection under the withholding of removal under Article 3 of the Convention Convention Against Torture will be granted either in the Against Torture. In fact, the Convention Against Torture form of withholding of removal or in the form of deferral does not provide an independent basis for challenging of removal. removal because its provisions are not self-executing, and therefore not judicially enforceable law in the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(4). See Bannerman, 325 F.3d at 724 (citing Buell, 274 F.3d at 372, in which the court stated that a treaty is not judicially Perhaps the most important difference between an enforceable law since it is not self executing, and “non-self- application for withholding of removal pursuant to section No. 02-3273 Castellano-Chacon v. INS 27 28 Castellano-Chacon v. INS No. 02-3273
241(b)(3) of the INA, and making a claim under the than not, be tortured. Presumably, the government would also legislation implementing the Convention Against Torture, is argue that Castellano lacked figures on the number of those that in order to succeed pursuant to the Convention Against deported with similar tattoos who had been tortured, but the Torture, it is not necessary to link the harm faced with any of point is well taken. Castellano attempted to make his case by the five protected grounds enumerated in relation to showing that a person in Honduras with tattoos is, more likely applications for asylum and withholding: race, religion, than not, tortured by the government. If Castellano had nationality, membership in a particular social group, or presented specific evidence in support of the contention that political opinion. Instead, 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(4) focuses on the majority of persons similarly situated in terms of gang the particularized threat of torture, rather than any other form status or tattoos were subject to torture, he might have made of persecution, should the alien return to the country at issue, his case. However, Castellano’s evidence described the although the torture must be inflicted, instigated, consented targeting of young gang members, generally twenty-three- to, or acquiesced in, by state actors. It is therefore possible years-old or younger, who are not similarly situated since for Castellano to succeed in his claim pursuant to the Castellano is now twenty-seven-years-old. Furthermore, Convention Against Torture, even though we have held that Castellano did not present specific evidence as to the he is not part of a particular social group being targeted. likelihood of torture under these circumstances. Castellano did not, therefore, succeed in demonstrating that it was more This court applies the same standard of review when likely than not that he would be tortured upon returning to dealing with claims under 8 C.F.R. § 208(c) pursuant to the Honduras. Convention Against Torture as it does when reviewing claims under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). They are both decisions on V whether an alien’s removal must be withheld and are subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4). We are, therefore, to uphold the Due Process BIA’s determination against withholding the removal of an alien, unless it is “manifestly contrary to the law.” Ali v. According to Castellano, during the immigration hearing Reno, 237 F.3d 591, 596 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing 8 U.S.C. the IJ “announced his desire to complete the hearing § 1252(b)(4)(B)and (C)). And all administrative findings of expeditiously, and accordingly [did] not permit [his] counsel fact are “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would to make opening statements nor closing arguments.” This be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Ibid. information does not appear in the transcript from the hearing, but Castellano alleges that this occurred where the transcript The burden of proof is on Castellano to establish that he reads “off the record.” Castellano claims that by barring his would, more likely than not, be tortured if removed to counsel from presenting an opening statement and a closing Honduras. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3). Castellano claims that he argument, the IJ effectively denied him a fair hearing and has succeeded in making this case through his own testimony, violated his due process rights. Presumably Castellano would the reports he offered, and Professor Stewart’s testimony. argue that this violation requires us to vacate the BIA’s The government disagrees, arguing that since Professor decision and remand his case for a new hearing. Stewart did not know how many people were returned to Honduras during 2000-01, nor the number of those people This court reviews de novo an alleged due-process violation who had tattoos similar to the petitioner’s, no evidence was based on the manner in which an IJ conducts a deportation presented to support the argument that he would, more likely hearing, Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 391, for although there is No. 02-3273 Castellano-Chacon v. INS 29 30 Castellano-Chacon v. INS No. 02-3273
no constitutional right to asylum, aliens facing removal are counsel the opportunity to make opening and closing entitled to due process. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, statements, the IJ might have exercised his broad discretion 693-94 (2001). Such due process requires that Castellano be in controlling the duration and scope of those arguments, afforded a full and fair hearing, although the IJ is entitled to thereby serving both the interests of due process and broad discretion in conducting that hearing. Mikhailevitch, expediency. Nevertheless, since Castellano failed to identify 146 F.3d at 391. any specific prejudice resulting from the IJ’s denial, we hold the error to be harmless in this case. Castellano cites a number of cases that discuss the importance of opening and closing arguments in criminal Castellano contends that barring his counsel’s opening and trials. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) closing arguments prejudiced his trial in that neither (holding that a New York statute conferring upon judges in Castellano nor his counsel had “an opportunity to present his nonjury criminal trials the power to deny counsel any case in a concise narrative form,” nor an opportunity “to opportunity to make summation of the evidence before the argue the law,” and “Castellano never had a chance to hear his rendition of judgment, was unconstitutional as applied to chosen advocate plea [sic] for his life, human-to-human.” defendant, since it denied the defendant the constitutional Castellano’s Reply Brief at 15. However, these are general right to assistance of counsel); United States v. Stanfield, 521 statements that fail to identify any specific prejudice resulting F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that the trial court’s from the IJ’s procedure. decision to give an opening statement to the jury instead of permitting each side to make an opening statement, required VI reversal, since it created prejudice by obscuring the correct standard for jury consideration of evidence in a criminal Corrections to the Record case); United States v. Hershenow, 680 F.2d 847 (1st Cir. 1982) (holding that the trial court erred in refusing to allow Castellano argues on appeal that the BIA erred in failing to the defendant in a criminal case to make opening statements correct errors in the record, pointed out by Castellano in a to the jury; however, since there was no prejudice, the error motion to correct the transcript. Despite the fact that the was harmless). corrections were not disputed by the Attorney General, the BIA ruled on the merits of the appeal, without ruling on the There is no question that opening and closing arguments motion to correct the transcript. Castellano cites no law in are critically important in sharpening and clarifying issues for support of his contention that the BIA is in error, and does not resolution in our adversary system. Although they may be of state the legal basis for our jurisdiction to review this greater importance where a jury is involved, they still serve a question. Furthermore, Castellano does not identify any purpose in a bench trial and, given no other excuse than prejudice resulting from these omissions and corrections to general expediency, we agree with Castellano that the IJ in the transcript. this case did in fact err. While we recognize the practical pressures that come to bear on our administrative courts Presumably we have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s ruling dealing with immigration issues, we also wish to encourage on this motion to correct the transcript under 8 U.S.C. the greatest respect for petitioners who appear before them § 1252(b)(9), which deals with the consolidation of questions and to ensure that every opportunity for a full and fair hearing for judicial review, when reviewing a final order of removal. is afforded to them. Instead of entirely denying Castellano’s However, in this case the BIA has not yet ruled on No. 02-3273 Castellano-Chacon v. INS 31 32 Castellano-Chacon v. INS No. 02-3273
Castellano’s motion and there is no indication in the record as _____________ to whether they will in the future, so that the time for review may not yet be ripe. Moreover, even if we have jurisdiction DISSENT and the issue is ripe, given the fact that the corrections are _____________ mostly typographical, and the only substantive correction to be made is the addition of the IJ’s ruling that barred DAVID D. DOWD, JR., District Judge, dissenting in part. Castellano’s counsel from making opening and closing I have no dispute with most of the majority’s opinion. arguments, there does not appear to be any prejudice resulting However, I must, respectfully, dissent from the decision to the from the BIA’s lack of decision on the motion to correct the extent it holds to be harmless the denial of an opportunity to transcript, rendering any error harmless. make a closing argument. Although such error might be harmless with respect to an opening statement, in my view, VII where counsel requests a closing argument, due process, even in the context of INS proceedings, requires that the request be For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the BIA’s ruling, granted and failure to do so is so prejudicial that it should be which denied Castellano’s application for asylum, for considered prejudice per se. I would remand this case for withholding of removal, and his claim pursuant to the review by a different immigration judge. legislation implementing the Convention Against Torture.