Casteel v. Kentucky Home Life Insurance

79 S.W.2d 941, 258 Ky. 304, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 140
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976)
DecidedJanuary 29, 1935
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 79 S.W.2d 941 (Casteel v. Kentucky Home Life Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Casteel v. Kentucky Home Life Insurance, 79 S.W.2d 941, 258 Ky. 304, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 140 (Ky. 1935).

Opinion

Opinion oe the Court by

Judge Ratliff

Affirming.

On February 7, 1930, the Inter-Southern Life Insurance Company of Louisville, Ky., for a paid premium of $352.55 and a like sum to be paid each year thereafter during the life of the insured, issued to Abraham Casteel an insurance policy on the ordinary life plan for the principal sum of $5,000. The wife of the insured, appellant herein, was named beneficiary of the policy. The insured paid the • annual premium *306 thereafter due February 7, 1931 and 1932, respectively, but failed to pay the premium February 7, 1933.

In April, 1932, the Inter-Southern became insolvent and was placed in the hands of a receiver. In August, 1932, an agreement was reached between the receiver, the State Insurance Commissioner, and the Kentucky Home Life Insurance Company of Louisville, whereby the Kentucky Home Life took over the business of the Inter-Southern and the latter ceased to do business, and the Kentucky Home Life assumed the policies, contracts, assets and liabilities, etc., of the Inter-Southern as provided in the contract with the State Insurance Commissioner and receivers for the Inter-Southern. This contract was approved by the Franklin circuit court. The insured died January 9, 1934, and soon thereafter the appellant brought this suit in the Wayne circuit court against the Kentucky Home Life to recover of it the face value of the policy. In the original petition she alleged that the Kentucky Home Life succeeded to the assets and liabilities of the Inter-Southern and had reinsured all of the policyholders of the Inter-Southern and assumed all its risks, and, therefore, was liable to her as beneficiary of the policy issued to her deceased husband and that the policy was in full force and effect at the time of his death. Thereafter she filed her amended petition alleging that she had been diily appointed and qualified as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, the insured, and asked that she be permitted to.sue in both capacities' — -in her individual right as beneficiary of the policy, and also as administratrix of the estate of the decedent. The defendant below entered motion for the court to require her to elect as to whether she would prosecute her action in her individual right as beneficiary of the policy, or as administratrix of the estate of her decedent. Upon her failure to elect, the court made the election for her and struck from the pleadings her amended petition in so far as she sought to recover as the beneficiary of the policy. Thereafter appellant filed her second amended petition withdrawing her first amended petition in so far as she sought to recover as administratrix, and alleged therein that the net reserve value of the policy sued on was $363 at the time defendant took over the business and assets of the Inter-Southern, and that the defendant had received and then had said reserve due on the said policy. She further *307 alleged that the provisions of the contract entered into by the defendant Kentucky Home Life and the receiver of the Inter-Southern was not a contract of reinsurance as between her decedent and the defendant, but was a contract of assumed risk, and prayed as in her original petition. In her original petition she prayed to recover the sum of $5,000 (face of the policy) with interest from January 9, 1934 (date of the death of insured), etc.

A special demurrer had theretofore been filed and sustained to her original petition and petition as amended, and the special demurrer was extended to the second amended petition which the court also sustained, and she declined to plead further and her petition was dismissed. From that judgment she brings this appeal.

The various defenses pleaded by the Kentucky Home Life were that the adjudication of insolvency of the Inter-Southern, ipso facto, canceled the policy and precluded any claims of the insured for subsequent occurring losses under the policy; and further that if appellant had any cause of action she should prosecute it as administratrix of the estate of her decedent, and not in her individual capacity as the beneficiary of the policy; and that the policy sued on had lapsed for nonpayment of premiums at the time of the contract between the Kentucky Home Life and the receivers for the Inter-Southern and State Insurance Commissioner, which was approved by the court, and at which time the insured was entitled to only the reserve provided in the policy; and, under the terms of its contract, the Kentucky Home Life assumed the policies and contracts of the Inter-Southern subject to the status of the insured with the Inter-Southern and subject to such defenses as would have been available to the Inter-Southern.

The generally recognized rule is that a decree of dissolution of an insurance company, as a decree pursuant to Kentucky Statutes, sec. 753, or an adjudication of insolvency coupled with the appointment of a receiver, cancels or terminates outstanding insurance policies by operation of law. Moren v. Ohio Valley Fire & Marine Ins. Company’s Receiver, 224 Ky. 643, 6 S. W. (2d) 1091; Couch’s Enc. of Insurance Law, vol. 6, sec. *308 1431, p. 5070. In New Farmers’ & Traders’ Bank v. Crowe, 82 S. W. 287, 288, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 500, the rule is thus stated:

“Where an insurance company has become insolvent, the rule is that the holder of an unmatured policy is a creditor, and is entitled to share with the other creditors in the assets, the amount of his claim being the value of the policy at the date of the dissolution of the company; and where he is indebted to the company a set-off will be allowed him to the extent of his claim.”

In the case of Jas. W. Lovell v. St. Louis Mutual Life Ins. Co., 111 U. S. 264, 4 S. Ct. 390, 28 L. Ed. 423, among other points discussed and decided which are pertinent to the case at bar, it is held that the amount of the insured’s recovery is limited to the reserve in the policy less any indebtedness thereon, and that the insolvency of the original insurer, ipso facto, terminates all contracts of insurance issued by it. To the same effect, see Fuller v. Wright, Insurance Commissioner, 147 Ga. 70, 92 S. E. 873, L. R. A. 1917E, 1139; Couch Enc. of Insurance Law, vol. 8, sec. 2043; Carr v. Hamilton, 129 U. S. 252, 9 S. Ct. 295, 32 L. Ed. 669; Cooley’s Briefs on Insurance, vol. 5, p. 4624; 32 C. J. pp. 1039, 1040; 40 R. C. L. sec. 20, p. 853.

But if the assets of an insolvent company are sold to another which undertakes to assume the contracts and obligations of the insolvent company (as was done in the present case), the rights of the policyholders in the insolvent company must be determined by the contract between the buying company, the receiver or other authorized representative of the insolvent company, and the policyholders.

The Kentucky Home Life mailed to each policyholder in the Inter-Southern, including Abraham Casteel, the insured, copies of its 'contract, wherein it was in part provided:

“2.

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Bluebook (online)
79 S.W.2d 941, 258 Ky. 304, 1935 Ky. LEXIS 140, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/casteel-v-kentucky-home-life-insurance-kyctapphigh-1935.