IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE SEBASTIAN CASTAÑEDA-VERA, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) C.A. No. N25C-09-256 SPL ALEX KAPLAN, CHRISTIAN ) GRAVIER, ANTHONY ) JAROSZEWSKI, BRENDAN QUINN, ) SIGMA ALPHA EPSILON ) FRATERNITY, and DELAWARE ) ALPHA CHAPTER OF SIGMA ) ALPHA EPSILON FRATERNITY ) ) Defendants. ) Submitted: March 30, 2026 Decided: June 30, 2026 Upon Defendant Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity’s Motion to Dismiss, DENIED. Upon Defendant Anthony Jaroszewski’s Motion to Dismiss, Joined by Defendants Christian Gravier, Alex Kaplan, and Brendan Quinn,1 DENIED. ORDER
1 Kaplan joined Jaroszewski’s motion. D.I. 26. Quinn filed a motion to dismiss in which he joined Jaroszewski’s motion (D.I. 32) and, during oral argument, withdrew his challenges to Castañeda-Vera’s failure to amend his complaint. Gravier moved for judgment on the pleadings and joined Jaroszewski’s motion. D.I. 35. Because all “individual defendants” assert the same basis for dismissal, the Court’s assessment of Jaroszewski’s motion applies with equal force to all motions filed by the individual defendants. This 30th day of June 2026, upon consideration of Defendants’ Motions to
dismiss, Sebastian Castañeda-Vera’s responses, Defendants’ replies, the parties’
oral arguments, and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that:
BACKGROUND
1. On September 30, 2023, the Delaware Alpha Chapter (“Delaware
Alpha”) of the Sigma Alpha Epsilon (“ΣAE”) national fraternity hosted a house party
in Newark, Delaware.2 Delaware Alpha chapter president, Kaan Erturk,3 and fellow
fraternity members Joseph Lombardo,4 Alex Kaplan, Christian Gravier, Anthony
Jaroszewski, Brendan Quinn, and Kyle Ontra attended the party.5
2. Ontra invited Castañeda-Vera and Seth Nis to join him at the party.6
Ontra met Castañeda-Vera and Nis outside the party and escorted them inside the
house.7 Castañeda-Vera and Nis proceeded to the basement.8
2 D.I. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 17. 3 Castañeda-Vera brought a separate complaint against Lombardo and Erturk. N24C-01-246. 4 Id. 5 See Compl. ¶¶ 17, 20, 22, 25. 6 Compl. ¶¶ 1, 19. 7 Compl. ¶ 19. 8 Compl. ¶ 19. 1 3. Lombardo approached Castañeda-Vera and demanded to know who he
was and who had invited him.9 Castañeda-Vera informed Lombardo that Ontra had
invited him to the party.10 Lombardo claimed to not know Ontra.11
4. Castañeda-Vera and Nis went upstairs to find Ontra.12 As they ascended
the steps, Lombardo pushed Castañeda-Vera multiple times.13 As they reached the
main floor, and after Lombardo’s third push, Castañeda-Vera pushed Lombardo
back.14 A melee ensued.15
5. Lombardo punched Castañeda-Vera in the face, and about ten to fifteen
other ΣAE fraternity members joined the fracas, several of whom continued to punch
Castañeda-Vera in his face and body.16 The fraternity members threw Castañeda-
Vera from the house where he landed face down on the ground.17
9 Compl. ¶ 20. 10 Compl. ¶ 20. 11 Compl. ¶ 20. 12 Compl. ¶¶ 20-21. 13 Compl. ¶ 21. 14 Compl. ¶ 21. 15 Compl. ¶ 21. 16 Compl. ¶¶ 21-22. 17 Compl. ¶ 23. 2 6. Fraternity members exited the house and continued to beat Castañeda-
Vera.18 Nis and Ontra attempted to stop the physical altercation.19
7. After the assault, Castañeda-Vera, Nis, and Ontra went to an urgent care
facility on Main Street in Newark, Delaware.20 At the urgent care facility,
Castañeda-Vera called the Newark Police Department, and officers arrived to take
statements from the three men and transport Castañeda-Vera to the Christiana
Hospital for treatment.21
8. Castañeda-Vera suffered injuries to his nose, jaw, and left knee; he
required surgery on his nose.22 In addition to his physical injuries, Castañeda-Vera
suffered psychological and emotional trauma.23
9. On October 20, 2023, ΣAE informed Delaware Alpha that it was
imposing sanctions for violating Section 61(C) of “Fraternity Law” as a result of the
physical altercation that occurred between Delaware Alpha members and Castañeda-
Vera.24 Under Section 61(C) of Fraternity Law, Delaware Alpha members offended
18 Compl. ¶ 24. 19 Compl. ¶ 24. 20 Compl. ¶ 28. 21 Compl. ¶¶ 29-30. 22 Compl. ¶¶ 32, 36. 23 Compl. ¶ 36. 24 Compl. ¶ 33. 3 “institutional rules of the collegiate host institution of the Chapter Collegiate on
matters of behavior.”25
10. On September 30, 2025, Castañeda-Vera filed a complaint in the
Superior Court asserting assault and battery claims against Kaplan, Gravier,
Jaroszewski, and Quinn and vicarious and custodial liability claims against ΣAE and
Delaware Alpha.26
11. ΣAE moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing the Court lacks personal
jurisdiction over it and that Castañeda-Vera failed to assert facts supporting his
claims of vicarious and custodial liability.27 Jaroszewski, joined by Kaplan, Gravier,
and Quinn (“ Individual Defendants”), moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging
Castañeda-Vera failed to adequately state his claims of assault and battery.28
Castañeda-Vera, of course, opposes Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
25 Compl. ¶ 33. 26 Compl. 27 D.I. 17 (“ΣAE MTD”). 28 D.I. 25 (“Defs. MTD”). Kaplan joined the Motion to Dismiss. D.I. 26. Quinn joined the Motion to Dismiss. D.I. 32. Gravier joined the Motion to Dismiss. D.I. 35. 4 LEGAL STANDARDS
12. Upon a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under
Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(2), the plaintiff has the burden of showing a basis
for this Court’s jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.29 If, as here, there has
been no evidentiary hearing or meaningful discovery, the Court evaluates whether
the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction based on the
record as a whole, including the complaint, affidavits, and the parties’ briefs.30 “The
Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true, unless
contradicted by affidavit, construes the record in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving
party.”31
13. Delaware Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(6) governs a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.32 When
assessing a motion to dismiss under this rule, this Court must:
29 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(2); AeroGlobal Cap. Mgmt., LLC v. Cirrus Indus., Inc., 871 A.2d 428, 437 (Del. 2005) (citing Jacobson v. Ronsdorf, 2005 WL 29881, at *3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2005)). 30 Green Am. Recycling, LLC v. Clean Earth, Inc., 2021 WL 2211696, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. June 1, 2021) (citations omitted). 31 Degregorio v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 2018 WL 3096627, at *5 (Del. Super. Ct. June 20, 2018) (citing Wiggins v. Physiologic Assessment Servs., LLC, 138 A.3d 1160, 1165 (Del. Super. Ct. 2016)). 32 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6). 5 (1) accept all well pleaded factual allegations as true, (2) accept even vague allegations as “well pleaded” if they give the opposing party notice of the claim, (3) draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and (4) do not affirm a dismissal unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances.33
14. Delaware’s pleading standards at the motion to dismiss stage are
minimal.34 If, based on the circumstances presented, the plaintiff may recover, then
the motion to dismiss must be denied.35 Conversely, a motion to dismiss will be
granted if “under no reasonable interpretation of the facts alleged could the
complaint state a claim for which relief might be granted.”36 The Court need not
“accept conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts nor [] draw
unreasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.”37
33 Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital Holdings LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 535 (Del. 2011) (citing Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 896-97 (Del. 2002)). 34 Id. at 536 (citing Savor, Inc., 812 A.2d at 896). 35 Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967, 968 (Del. 1978). 36 Unbound Partners Ltd. P’ship v. Invoy Holdings Inc., 251 A.3d 1016, 1023 (Del. Super. Ct. 2021) (quoting inVentiv Health Clinical, LLC v. Odonate Therapeutics, Inc., 2021 WL 252823, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 2021)). 37 Clinton v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., 977 A.2d 892, 895 (Del. 2009) (citing Feldman v. Cutaia, 951 A.2d 727, 731 (Del. 2008) (internal quotations omitted)). 6 ANALYSIS
A. Castañeda-Vera’s complaint makes a prima facie showing of jurisdiction over ΣAE.
15. ΣAE claims this Court lacks personal jurisdiction because “ΣAE does
not have continuous and systemic contacts with Delaware required for general
personal jurisdiction”38 and it “does not have sufficient minimum contacts with
Delaware necessary for specific personal jurisdiction.”39 Castañeda-Vera responds
that ΣAE’s “chartering” of Delaware Alpha is enough to establish personal
jurisdiction.40
16. To determine whether a Court has personal jurisdiction over a party,
Delaware Courts apply a two-part test.41 First, the Court considers “whether
Delaware’s Long Arm Statute is applicable.”42 Second, the Court evaluates
“whether subjecting the nonresident to jurisdiction in Delaware violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (the so-called ‘minimum contacts’
requirement).”43 In construing the Long-Arm statute, the Court must interpret it
38 ΣAE MTD at 8. 39 Id. at 9. 40 D.I. 36 at 20. 41 AeroGlobal Cap. Mgmt., LLC, 871 A.2d at 437-438 (citing LaNuova D & B, S.p.A. v. Bowe, Inc., 513 A.2d 764, 769 (Del 1986)). 42 Id. at 438 (citing Waters v. Deutz Corp., 479 A.2d 273 (Del. 1984)). 43 Id. 7 “broadly to the maximum extent permissible under the Due Process Clause.”44 “In
other words, the [Delaware] Supreme Court has instructed that trial courts should
permit service under § 3104 if the statutory language plausibly permits service, and
rely upon a Due Process analysis to screen out uses of the statute that sweep too
broadly.”45
17. Delaware’s Long Arm Statute provides in pertinent part:
a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident, or a personal representative, who in person or through an agent: (1) transacts any business or performs any character of work or service in the State; (2) contracts to supply services or things in this State; (3) causes tortious injury in the State by an act or omission in this State; (4) causes tortious injury in the State or outside of the State by an act or omission outside the State if the person regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct in the State or derives substantial revenue from services, or things used or consumed in the State.46
18. Under Delaware’s long arm statute, “personal jurisdiction is either
general or specific.”47 General jurisdiction requires “that the defendant have greater
contacts with the forum state,”48 but “grants authority to a state’s courts to ‘assert []
44 Tell v. Roman Catholic Bishops of Diocese of Allentown, 2010 WL 1691199, at *8 (Del. Super Ct. Apr. 26, 2010) (citing LaNuova D & B, S.p.A., 513 A.2d at 768). 45 Sample v. Morgan, 935 A.2d 1046, 1056 (Del. Ch. 2007) (citations omitted). 46 10 Del. C. § 3104(c)(1) – (4) (cleaned up). 47 Rotblut v. Terrapinn, Inc., 2016 WL 5539884, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2016). 48 Id. 8 jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant on the basis of wholly unrelated contacts
with the forum.’”49 Specific jurisdiction “requires a link between the cause of action
and the defendant’s conduct.”50
19. Castañeda-Vera’s complaint alleges sufficient facts to support a finding
of specific jurisdiction here. To find a plaintiff has established specific jurisdiction,
“there must be an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy,
principally, an activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is
therefore subject to the state’s regulation.”51
20. This Court in Furek v. University of Delaware, addressed a similar
challenge to its jurisdiction over claims brought against a national fraternity for
“local” conduct.52 There, the plaintiff sued a national fraternity for injuries sustained
at the Delaware local chapter fraternity house.53 The only contact the national
49 Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 129 (Del. 2016) (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 426 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 50 Rotblut, 2016 WL 5539884, at *4. 51 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017) (cleaned up). 52 Furek v. Univ. of Del., 1986 WL 2837 at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 9, 1986) aff’d 594 A.2d 506, 526 (Del. 1991) (affirmed in part, reversed in part on issues unrelated to jurisdiction). 53 Furek, 1986 WL 2837 at *1. 9 chapter, incorporated in Virginia,54 had “with Delaware is that it chartered a local
chapter, a contact from which it has benefitted and continued to benefit.”55 The
Court noted that “since International Shoe, minimum contacts have been found
where a defendant maintained a single isolated contact with a state.”56 This Court
found “a sufficient nexus between this single contact and the conduct of the local
chapter so that the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over [the national chapter]
will not offend the ‘traditional notices of fair play and substantial justice.”57
21. So, too, here. ΣAE chartered Delaware Alpha and receives “fraternity
dues, health-and-safety fees, province fees, local dues and/or housing/association
fees” from that local chapter.58 ΣAE has benefitted and continues to benefit from its
affiliation with Delaware Alpha.59 The complaint alleges sufficient facts to establish
this Court’s specific personal jurisdiction over ΣAE.
54 Id. 55 Id. at *2. 56 Id. (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 57 Id. (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316). 58 D.I. 36 at 10. 59 See Furek, 1986 WL 2837 at *2. 10 B. Castañeda-Vera has alleged reasonably conceivable facts susceptible to proving ΣAE’s vicarious and custodial liability.
i. Vicarious Liability
22. ΣAE argues that Castañeda-Vera failed to demonstrate ΣAE’s agency
or control over the local chapter members and therefore, cannot be held liable for
the actions of Delaware Alpha members.60 Castañeda-Vera responds that ΣAE’s
membership documents establish its agency and control over Delaware Alpha
members, making them vicariously liable.61
23. A defendant may be vicariously liable when:
(1) the acting (or non-acting) party’s negligence actually and proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries; (2) the act (or omission) of the acting (or non-acting) party is within the scope of an agency relationship with the defendant,; (3) the acting (or non–acting) party is in its day-to-day activities subject to a right of control of the defendant; and (4) there are no affirmative defenses precluding the defendant’s liability.62
24. “To establish an agency relationship, one party must consent to have
another act on its behalf, with the principal controlling and directing the acts of the
60 ΣAE MTD at 11-14. 61 D.I. 36 at 9-10. Marshall v. Univ. of Del, 1986 WL 11566 at *1 (Del. Super. Oct. 8, 1986) (citations 62
omitted). 11 agent.”63 When it comes to determining if the principal controlled the agents day-
to-day activities the question is “whether the given agency relationship is one in
which the principal, either by contract or custom, may interfere with or direct the
actions of the agent.”64
25. This Court, in Marshall v. University of Delaware, assessed whether the
Sigma Nu National Fraternity could be vicariously liable for injuries caused by
fraternity members.65 There, Sigma Nu fraternity members “attempted to force their
way into a party,” causing a fight which resulted in the plaintiff being struck in the
eye by a bottle and injured.66 The Court found that the fraternity members “duty to
take reasonable precautions extended to anyone who would have foreseeably been
within the scope of the risk created by the [members] conduct” 67 and that “[o]ne
could reasonably conclude that the plaintiff, as an invited guest at the party, was
within foreseeable scope of the risk.”68 In assessing the scope of an agency
relationship between the National Fraternity and its Delaware Chapter, the Court
63 Pinnacle IV, L.P. v. CyberLabs AI Holdings Ltd., 2024 WL 3252672 at *4 (Del. Cuper. Ct. July 1, 2024) (citing Baccellieri v. HDM Furniture Indus., Inc., 2013 WL 1088338, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 28, 2013)). 64 Marshall, 1986 WL 11566 at *3. 65 Id. *2-3. 66 Id. at 1, 3. 67 Id. at *3. 68 Id. 12 found that “one of the purposes of a fraternal association is to develop ties of
friendship and fellowship among its members”69 and “the constitution and ‘laws’ of
[the National Fraternity], confers upon local chapters the right to enforce certain
standards of conduct against the [National Fraternity] membership.”70 The Court
found that the National Fraternity had the “power to control the individual members
of the local chapter as well as the chapter as an entity.”71 A jury could reasonably
conclude that the fraternity members attendance at the party was within the scope of
the fraternity’s purpose72 and that the National Fraternity “had the right to control
the day-to-day activities of its members in relation to their activities at the
University.”73
26. ΣAE directs this Court’s attention to Barenborg v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon
Fraternity, where the California Court of Appeals found that ΣAE’s “Minerva’s
Shield,” a document defining fraternity expectations, “‘has no power to control the
activities or operations of any Chapter Collegiate’ and that subject to certain duties,
local chapters ‘shall be virtually independent of [ΣAE]’ and ‘have complete control
69 Id. 70 Id. 71 Id. at *8. 72 Id. at *3. 73 Id. 13 of [their] own activities.’”74 That Court held that “Fraternity Laws” such as the
Minerva’s Shield were insufficient in establishing the National Chapter’s right to
control the local chapter’s day-to-day activities.75
27. The Court need not resolve any conflict between these cases here. The
parties have presented cases procedurally positioned at summary judgment where
evidence is available to support, or contradict, pled allegations. Here, ΣAE seeks
dismissal before any facts are developed. This Court is incapable of assessing the
adequacy of Castañeda-Vera’s proof at this stage. Rather, the sole question for the
Court is whether he has offered reasonably conceivable set of circumstances under
which he may recover. He has done so.
28. The social gathering, or party, precipitating Castañeda-Vera attack is
within the scope of ΣAE’s purpose.76 As for ΣAE’s ability to control the day-to-day
operations of Delaware Alpha, Minerva’s Shield offers some guidance. That
document contains ΣAE’s risk management policies, which are binding on every
local chapter and individual member of the fraternity and covers issues such as
violent assaults on fraternity guests at the hands of fraternity members.77 ΣAE also
Barenborg v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity, 244 Cal.Rptr.3d 680, 693 (Cal. Ct. 74
App. 2019). 75 Id. at 694. 76 See Marshall, 1986 WL 11566 at *3. 77 Compl. ¶¶ 12-13. 14 maintains a code of conduct and bylaws that exist to control its members conduct
with respect to risk management policies.78 Castañeda-Vera pleads sufficient facts
to support a finding that ΣAE may be vicariously liable for the local chapter’s, and
chapter members’ conduct.
ii. Custodial Liability
29. ΣAE argues that Castañeda-Vera did not plead any facts showing that
ΣAE owed him a duty, ΣAE breached that duty, or that “ΣAE knew or should have
known that these particular assailants were ‘likely to cause bodily harm’ to Plaintiff
or anyone else.”79 Castañeda-Vera argues that fraternity members are generally
members of a class that most men would agree “need to be controlled,” and for that
reason, ΣAE could reasonably foresee that the fraternity members, when acting in
the scope of the fraternity, and “under color” of the fraternity, would need to be
controlled.80 The lack of control on ΣAE’s part, Castañeda-Vera argues, resulted in
his physical injury.81
30. A defendant may be found liable under a theory of custodial liability:
where a party other than the defendant has acted (or has failed to act) causing an injury to another, the defendant may be held liable (for his own negligence) under a custodial theory of liability if: (1) the
78 Id. ¶ 15. 79 ΣAE MTD at 18. 80 D.I. 36 at 13-14. 81 D.I. 36 at 13-14. 15 defendant had a duty to control the conduct of the acting (or non-acting party); (2) the defendant knew of or had reason to foresee the acting (or non-acting) party’s conduct; (3) the plaintiff was within the sphere of foreseeable risk created by the acting (or non-acting) party’s conduct; (4) the defendant breached his duty to control the acting (or non-acting) party; (5) the defendant’s breach of duty actually and proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries; and (6) there are no affirmative defenses precluding the defendant’s liability.82
31. “A party is liable under a custodial theory of liability not for the conduct
of another, but for [its] own conduct in failing to discharge a duty to control the
conduct of another.”83 “The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that the duty to
control the conduct of another arises only within a ‘special relation’ either between
the party with the duty to control and the party to be controlled or between the party
with the duty to control and the party for whose protection the duty to control is
imposed.”84 “Whether one has a duty to control another is a question for the Court
to decide.”85 “The duty of a fraternity to control the conduct of its members extends
only to that conduct which a member engages in as a member;” in which the question
is whether the member was acting under color of his fraternity status.86
82 Marshall, 1986 WL 11566 at *1 (citations omitted). 83 Id. at *4. 84 Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §315 (1965)). 85 Id. at *5. 86 Id. 16 32. Again, Marshall is instructive. There, the Court reasoned that “[i]n
order to hold Sigma Nu liable under a custodial theory of liability for the plaintiff’s
injuries, it must be shown that Sigma Nu’s duty to control the conduct of its members
was one that Sigma Nu owed to the plaintiff.”87 The Court in Marshall, having
already found that the National Fraternity had a duty to control the conduct of its
members, and had a duty to the plaintiff, proceeded to assess whether the National
Fraternity breached its duty to the plaintiff.88 In Marshall, the Court was presented
with a documented history of the National Fraternity failing to control the conduct
of Sigma Nu members.89 And, the Court held that it was reasonably conceivable that
the National Fraternity owed a duty to the plaintiff and breached that duty when it
failed to control Sigma Nu members who had a known history of misconduct.90 The
Court found that the National Chapter was liable under a theory of custodial
liability.91
33. The Court, in Marshall, had the benefit of facts developed through
fulsome discovery to determine whether the national chapter breached its duty. The
national fraternity’s knowledge of prior incidents assisted in that determination.
87 Id. at *6. 88 Id. 89 Id. 90 Id. 91 Id. 17 Here, there is no evidence of prior misconduct, but plaintiff has pled sufficient facts
warranting further factual development. Whether ΣAE owed a duty to Castañeda-
Vera is a fact-specific determination that cannot be made on the record presently
before the Court. The Court denies ΣAE’s motion to dismiss.
C. Castañeda-Vera has alleged a reasonably conceivable set of facts that Kaplan, Gravier, Jaroszewski, and Quinn committed assault and battery against him.
34. Kaplan, Gravier, Jaroszewski, and Quinn (“Individual Defendants”)
contend that Castañeda-Vera’s allegation that the “[individual] defendants [were]
involved in the physical altercation with [Plaintiff],” is insufficient to support claims
of assault and battery.92 The Individual Defendants argue that the Court should
dismiss the Complaint because it “(1) fails to state prima facie claims for assault and
battery; (2) fails to aver facts showing that Plaintiff is entitled to relief from [the
individual defendants]; and (3) does not allow the Court to draw inferences lending
to a reasonably conceivable recovery.”93 Castañeda-Vera responds that he “has pled
conceivable claims” against the Individual Defendants for “making intentional,
unpermitted contact with his person” and for “intending to make contact with his
person and instilling fear in [him]” for purposes of battery and assault.94
92 Defs. MTD ¶¶ 3-4. 93 Defs MTD ¶ 5. 94 D.I. 37 ¶¶ 4, 5. 18 35. “A prima facie assault case requires a general showing that a
Defendant’s conduct placed the Plaintiff in apprehension of imminent harmful or
offensive physical contact.”95 For Castañeda-Vera’s assault claims to survive a
motion to dismiss, Castañeda-Vera “must allege that [the Individual Defendants] (1)
acted intentionally, (2) without [Castañeda-Vera’s] consent, and (3) [the Individual
Defendants’] actions placed [Castañeda-Vera] in fear of imminent harmful or
offensive contact.”96
36. And, to establish a prima facie case “for battery, a Plaintiff must
establish the Defendant intentionally caused harmful or offensive contact.”97 “[T]he
tort of battery is the intentional, unpermitted contact upon the person of another
which is harmful or offensive.”98 “The intent necessary for battery is the intent to
make contact with the person, not the intent to cause harm.”99
37. Castañeda-Vera’s complaint alleges that the Individual Defendants
assaulted and battered him. He asserts that Lombardo, Erturk, and ten to fifteen
other Delaware Alpha members assaulted and battered him inside the fraternity
95 Rodriguez v. Cahall, 2024 WL 3161740, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. June 25, 2024) (citing Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1361 (Del. 1995)). 96 Smith v. Access Labor Servs., Inc., 2022 WL 1538029, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. May 16, 2022) (citing Browne v. Saunders, 2001 WL 138497, at *1 (Del. Feb. 14, 2001)). 97 Rodriguez, 2024 WL 3161740, at *3. 98 Brzoska, 668 A.2d at 1360. 99 Id. 19 house and then outside in front of the house.100 Lombardo identified Kaplan,
Gravier, Jaroszewski, and Quinn as being involved in the physical altercation with
Castañeda-Vera.101
38. At oral argument, the Defendants argued that their identification by
Lombardo as being “involved in the physical altercation” is too vague of a statement
to support Castañeda-Vera’s claim. But Delaware’s motion to dismiss standard is
minimal, requiring only a reasonably conceivable set of circumstances to deny a
motion to dismiss.102 Based on the facts alleged, the Court may reasonably infer that
the Defendants, as Delaware Alpha members identified as being involved in the
altercation, intentionally engaged in the assault and battery that occurred. The Court
denies Defendants motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
CONCLUSION
39. Castañeda-Vera’s complaint alleges sufficient facts to meet the minimal
standard to survive a motion to dismiss. ΣAE chartered a Delaware Chapter, and
Castañeda-Vera pled facts that ΣAE had some control over the day-to-day operations
of Delaware Alpha members and that ΣAE owed Castañeda-Vera a standard of care.
Allegations in the complaint support a finding that that standard of care was breached
100 Compl. ¶¶ 21-24. 101 Compl. ¶ 25. 102 Cent. Mortg. Co., 27 A.3d at 536. 20 when fraternity members attacked Castañeda-Vera. ΣAE’s Motion to Dismiss is
DENIED. Castañeda-Vera has alleged that Alex Kaplan, Christian Gravier,
Anthony Jaroszewski, and Brendan Quinn were engaged in the physical attack upon
him. Jaroszewski’s Motion to Dismiss, joined by Kaplan, Gravier, and Quinn,
Quinn’s motion to dismiss, and Gravier’s motion to dismiss are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Sean P. Lugg, Judge