Cassidy v. Barnhart

464 F. Supp. 2d 864, 2006 WL 3590173
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedSeptember 5, 2006
Docket4:05 CV 980 DDN
StatusPublished

This text of 464 F. Supp. 2d 864 (Cassidy v. Barnhart) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cassidy v. Barnhart, 464 F. Supp. 2d 864, 2006 WL 3590173 (E.D. Mo. 2006).

Opinion

464 F.Supp.2d 864 (2006)

James CASSIDY, Plaintiff,
v.
Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

No. 4:05 CV 980 DDN.

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.

September 5, 2006.

*865 *866 Jeffrey J. Bunten, St. Louis, MO, for Plaintiff.

Jane Rund, Office of U.S. Attorney, St. Louis, MO, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

NOCE, United States Magistrate Judge.

This action is before the court for judicial review of the final decision of the defendant Commissioner of Social Security denying the application of plaintiff James Cassidy for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., and supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. (Doc. 1.) The parties have consented to the authority of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Doc. 7.)

1. Background

On August 29, 2003, plaintiff applied for disability benefits. He alleged he became disabled on November 30, 2002, at age 51, on account of conditions that include generalized pain, bad blood circulation, otosclerosis, degenerative arthritis, and chronic ear infections. (Tr. 64, 68-76.)

Following an evidentiary hearing, on January 11, 2005, an administrative law judge (ALJ) denied benefits. (Tr. 12-20.) Because the Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ's decision, it became the *867 final decision of the Commissioner for review in this action.

2. General Legal Principles

The court's role on review is to determine whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 577 (8th Cir.2006). "Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the Commissioner's conclusion." Id. In determining whether the evidence is substantial, the court considers evidence that detracts from, as well as supports, the Commissioner's decision. See Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir.2000). So long as substantial evidence supports that decision, the court may not reverse it because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome or because the court would have decided the case differently. See Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir.2002).

To be entitled to disability benefits, a claimant must prove he is unable to perform any substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which would either result in death or which has lasted or could be expected to last for at least 12 months. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(D), (d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). A five-step regulatory framework governs the evaluation of disability in general. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-41, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987) (describing the five-step process); Fastner v. Barnhart, 324 F.3d 981, 983-84 (8th Cir.2003). If the Commissioner finds that a claimant is not disabled at any step, a determination or decision is made and the next step is not reached. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).

3. The ALJ's Decision

In his decision denying benefits, the ALJ found that the medical evidence established that plaintiff has bilateral otosclerosis, degenerative joint disease, and peripheral vascular disease, which are considered severe. However, these impairments, either singly or in combination, are not medically equal to one in the Commissioner's Listing of Disabling Impairments. (Tr. 13-14, 19.)

The ALJ determined that plaintiff's subjective complaints were not fully credible, that he had the Residual Functional Capacity to work except for lifting more than 20 pounds occasionally or more than ten pounds frequently; or to climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl more than occasionally; or to be exposed to concentrated noise. (Tr. 19.)

The ALJ found that plaintiff cannot perform his past relevant work as a fast food cook, a maintenance laborer for a fast food restaurant, a building maintenance laborer, a hardware store stocker and sales clerk, or a factory preventative maintenance mechanic. (Id.)

Nevertheless, the ALJ found that plaintiff can perform a wide range of light work, was then 53 years old (approaching advanced age), had a high school education and an Associate Degree in radio and television repair. Given these facts, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not and is not disabled. (Tr. 19-20.)

4. Plaintiff's Grounds for Relief and Discussion

Plaintiff argues that the decision of the ALJ is not supported by substantial evidence. More specifically, he argues that the ALJ erred (1) when determining plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC) because he found that plaintiff retained the ability to perform the full range of light work; (2) in failing to consider properly plaintiff's subjective complaints under Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984); and (3) in not obtaining the testimony *868 of a vocational expert (VE), when the record contained evidence that plaintiff suffered from non-exertional impairments.

a. Ground 1: Plaintiff's Residual Functional Capacity

The RFC is "the most [a claimant] can still do despite" his physical or mental limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). When determining plaintiff's RFC, the ALJ must consider all relevant evidence but ultimately, the determination of the plaintiff's RFC is a medical question. Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir.2001). As such, the determination of plaintiff's ability to function in the workplace must be based on some medical evidence. Id.; see also Nevland v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir.2000).

The ALJ found plaintiff's impairments limited him to

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Related

Bowen v. Yuckert
482 U.S. 137 (Supreme Court, 1987)
Baldeo K. Singh v. Kenneth S. Apfel
222 F.3d 448 (Eighth Circuit, 2000)
Harris v. Shalala
45 F.3d 1190 (Eighth Circuit, 1995)

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Bluebook (online)
464 F. Supp. 2d 864, 2006 WL 3590173, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cassidy-v-barnhart-moed-2006.