Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed October 6, 2021. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D21-1621 Lower Tribunal No. 20-12633 ________________
Cassidy S. Miller, Petitioner,
vs.
Alex V. Mitchell, Respondent.
A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Prohibition.
Nancy A. Hass, P.A., and Nancy A. Hass (Fort Lauderdale), for petitioner.
Bresky Law, and Robin Bresky (Boca Raton) and Jonathan Mann (Boca Raton), for respondent.
Before LINDSEY, MILLER, and LOBREE, JJ.
MILLER, J. Through these proceedings, the mother, Cassidy S. Miller, seeks a writ
of prohibition to prevent the lower tribunal from continuing to exercise
jurisdiction over her minor child in a paternity action filed by the father, Alex
V. Mitchell. She contends New Jersey is the child’s home state for purposes
of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”),
as codified in section 61.501 et seq., Florida Statutes, thus jurisdiction lies in
the New Jersey family court in which an action over custody of the child was
previously filed. Concluding the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction, we
deny relief.
BACKGROUND
The mother and father lived with the paternal grandparents in Florida
for several years, but, after the child was conceived, they moved to New
Jersey seeking the care of a particular obstetrician. The mother ultimately
gave birth in New York, and, shortly thereafter, the parties returned to Florida
with the child. Although their initial intention was to vacation, the couple
again took up residence with the paternal grandparents, this time for more
than six months. During that time, the mother returned to New Jersey on
multiple occasions to tend to her wellness center.
The parties’ relationship eventually deteriorated, and the mother
returned to New Jersey with the child. There, the mother sought an
2 injunction for protection against domestic violence, and, within a week, the
father filed a paternity action in Miami-Dade County. The following day, the
mother filed a child custody case in New Jersey. She then filed a motion to
dismiss the paternity action pending in Miami-Dade County, contending New
Jersey had primary jurisdiction over the child under the UCCJEA. After
conducting a multi-day evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion.
The instant petition ensued.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
To the extent subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA implicates
a question of law, we apply a de novo standard of review. N.B. v. Dep’t of
Child. of Fams., 274 So. 3d 1163, 1166 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). Factual findings
supporting jurisdiction, however, are reviewed for competent, substantial
evidence. See Martinez v. Lebron, 284 So. 3d 1146, 1149 (Fla. 5th DCA
2019).
LEGAL ANALYSIS
“Subject matter jurisdiction—the ‘power of the trial court to deal with a
class of cases to which a particular case belongs’—is conferred upon a court
by constitution or by statute.” Strommen v. Strommen, 927 So. 2d 176, 179
(Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (quoting Cunningham v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 630
So. 2d 179, 181 (Fla. 1994)). A court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction
3 over interstate child custody disputes is determined by the UCCJEA, a
uniform law that has been adopted in some form by all states, except for
Massachusetts. 1 Linda D. Elrod, Child Custody Practice and Procedure §
3:8 (2021). The UCCJEA aims to avoid jurisdictional competition between
states or countries, promote interstate cooperation, avoid re-litigation of
another state’s custody decisions, and facilitate enforcement of another
state’s custody decrees. See § 61.502, Fla. Stat. (2021); N.J. Stat. Ann. §
2A:34-53 (West 2021).
In 2002, the Florida Legislature adopted provisions of the UCCJEA, as
codified in chapter 61, Florida Statutes. See Steckler v. Steckler, 921 So. 2d
1 The circuit courts of Florida are “superior courts of general jurisdiction, and nothing is intended to be out of the jurisdiction of a superior court, except that which specially appears so to be.” Curtis v. Albritton, 132 So. 677, 681 (Fla. 1931); see Art. V, § 5(b), Fla. Const.; § 26.012, Fla. Stat. As the United States Supreme Court has noted: “Jurisdiction” refers to “a court’s adjudicatory authority.” Accordingly, the term “jurisdictional” properly applies only to “prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction)” implicating that authority. . . . [W]e have encouraged federal courts and litigants to “facilitat[e]” clarity by using the term “jurisdictional” only when it is apposite. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 160–61 (2010) (third alteration in original) (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004)). Applying these principals, although some cases discuss the UCCJEA in terms of circumscribing jurisdiction, the UCCJEA is more properly understood as guiding a court’s exercise of existing jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re E.D., 812 N.W.2d 712 (Iowa 2012).
4 740, 742 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). 2 Pursuant to the initial child custody
provision of the UCCJEA, as set forth in section 61.514, Florida Statutes,
jurisdiction to determine initial custody matters is vested in the “home state”
of the child. 3 Arjona v. Torres, 941 So. 2d 451, 454 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).
“Home state” is defined as “the state in which a child lived with a parent or a
person acting as a parent for at least [six] consecutive months immediately
before the commencement of a child custody proceeding.” § 61.503(7), Fla.
Stat.4 In computing the requisite six-month period, “[a] . . . temporary
absence of [a parent or person acting as a parent] is part of the period.” Id.;
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-54 (West). Moreover, “[t]he state with home state
jurisdiction over the child has [jurisdictional] priority under the UCCJEA.”
Baker v. Tunney, 201 So. 3d 1235, 1237 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016); see also §
61.514, Fla. Stat.; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-65 (West).
Here, the facts adduced below support the determination the child lived
with his parents in Florida for more than six consecutive months, and
although the child was absent from the state at the time the initial paternity
2 New Jersey’s version of the UCCJEA is codified in sections 2A:34-53 to 95 of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated. 3 There is an exception for temporary emergency jurisdiction. See § 61.517, Fla. Stat. 4 The New Jersey statute contains an identical definition. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-54 (West).
5 petition was filed, his father continued to live in Florida. The mother,
however, contends she only extended her stay in Florida due to the global
COVID-19 pandemic and she was stymied in her efforts to renew her lease
in New Jersey. Although we appreciate the vastly divergent facts presented
by the parties below, as observed by the trial judge, “[t]he parties desires and
future plans, however, are immaterial to jurisdiction.” Further, the scope of
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Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed October 6, 2021. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D21-1621 Lower Tribunal No. 20-12633 ________________
Cassidy S. Miller, Petitioner,
vs.
Alex V. Mitchell, Respondent.
A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Prohibition.
Nancy A. Hass, P.A., and Nancy A. Hass (Fort Lauderdale), for petitioner.
Bresky Law, and Robin Bresky (Boca Raton) and Jonathan Mann (Boca Raton), for respondent.
Before LINDSEY, MILLER, and LOBREE, JJ.
MILLER, J. Through these proceedings, the mother, Cassidy S. Miller, seeks a writ
of prohibition to prevent the lower tribunal from continuing to exercise
jurisdiction over her minor child in a paternity action filed by the father, Alex
V. Mitchell. She contends New Jersey is the child’s home state for purposes
of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”),
as codified in section 61.501 et seq., Florida Statutes, thus jurisdiction lies in
the New Jersey family court in which an action over custody of the child was
previously filed. Concluding the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction, we
deny relief.
BACKGROUND
The mother and father lived with the paternal grandparents in Florida
for several years, but, after the child was conceived, they moved to New
Jersey seeking the care of a particular obstetrician. The mother ultimately
gave birth in New York, and, shortly thereafter, the parties returned to Florida
with the child. Although their initial intention was to vacation, the couple
again took up residence with the paternal grandparents, this time for more
than six months. During that time, the mother returned to New Jersey on
multiple occasions to tend to her wellness center.
The parties’ relationship eventually deteriorated, and the mother
returned to New Jersey with the child. There, the mother sought an
2 injunction for protection against domestic violence, and, within a week, the
father filed a paternity action in Miami-Dade County. The following day, the
mother filed a child custody case in New Jersey. She then filed a motion to
dismiss the paternity action pending in Miami-Dade County, contending New
Jersey had primary jurisdiction over the child under the UCCJEA. After
conducting a multi-day evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion.
The instant petition ensued.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
To the extent subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA implicates
a question of law, we apply a de novo standard of review. N.B. v. Dep’t of
Child. of Fams., 274 So. 3d 1163, 1166 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). Factual findings
supporting jurisdiction, however, are reviewed for competent, substantial
evidence. See Martinez v. Lebron, 284 So. 3d 1146, 1149 (Fla. 5th DCA
2019).
LEGAL ANALYSIS
“Subject matter jurisdiction—the ‘power of the trial court to deal with a
class of cases to which a particular case belongs’—is conferred upon a court
by constitution or by statute.” Strommen v. Strommen, 927 So. 2d 176, 179
(Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (quoting Cunningham v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 630
So. 2d 179, 181 (Fla. 1994)). A court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction
3 over interstate child custody disputes is determined by the UCCJEA, a
uniform law that has been adopted in some form by all states, except for
Massachusetts. 1 Linda D. Elrod, Child Custody Practice and Procedure §
3:8 (2021). The UCCJEA aims to avoid jurisdictional competition between
states or countries, promote interstate cooperation, avoid re-litigation of
another state’s custody decisions, and facilitate enforcement of another
state’s custody decrees. See § 61.502, Fla. Stat. (2021); N.J. Stat. Ann. §
2A:34-53 (West 2021).
In 2002, the Florida Legislature adopted provisions of the UCCJEA, as
codified in chapter 61, Florida Statutes. See Steckler v. Steckler, 921 So. 2d
1 The circuit courts of Florida are “superior courts of general jurisdiction, and nothing is intended to be out of the jurisdiction of a superior court, except that which specially appears so to be.” Curtis v. Albritton, 132 So. 677, 681 (Fla. 1931); see Art. V, § 5(b), Fla. Const.; § 26.012, Fla. Stat. As the United States Supreme Court has noted: “Jurisdiction” refers to “a court’s adjudicatory authority.” Accordingly, the term “jurisdictional” properly applies only to “prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction)” implicating that authority. . . . [W]e have encouraged federal courts and litigants to “facilitat[e]” clarity by using the term “jurisdictional” only when it is apposite. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 160–61 (2010) (third alteration in original) (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004)). Applying these principals, although some cases discuss the UCCJEA in terms of circumscribing jurisdiction, the UCCJEA is more properly understood as guiding a court’s exercise of existing jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re E.D., 812 N.W.2d 712 (Iowa 2012).
4 740, 742 n.1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006). 2 Pursuant to the initial child custody
provision of the UCCJEA, as set forth in section 61.514, Florida Statutes,
jurisdiction to determine initial custody matters is vested in the “home state”
of the child. 3 Arjona v. Torres, 941 So. 2d 451, 454 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).
“Home state” is defined as “the state in which a child lived with a parent or a
person acting as a parent for at least [six] consecutive months immediately
before the commencement of a child custody proceeding.” § 61.503(7), Fla.
Stat.4 In computing the requisite six-month period, “[a] . . . temporary
absence of [a parent or person acting as a parent] is part of the period.” Id.;
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-54 (West). Moreover, “[t]he state with home state
jurisdiction over the child has [jurisdictional] priority under the UCCJEA.”
Baker v. Tunney, 201 So. 3d 1235, 1237 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016); see also §
61.514, Fla. Stat.; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-65 (West).
Here, the facts adduced below support the determination the child lived
with his parents in Florida for more than six consecutive months, and
although the child was absent from the state at the time the initial paternity
2 New Jersey’s version of the UCCJEA is codified in sections 2A:34-53 to 95 of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated. 3 There is an exception for temporary emergency jurisdiction. See § 61.517, Fla. Stat. 4 The New Jersey statute contains an identical definition. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-54 (West).
5 petition was filed, his father continued to live in Florida. The mother,
however, contends she only extended her stay in Florida due to the global
COVID-19 pandemic and she was stymied in her efforts to renew her lease
in New Jersey. Although we appreciate the vastly divergent facts presented
by the parties below, as observed by the trial judge, “[t]he parties desires and
future plans, however, are immaterial to jurisdiction.” Further, the scope of
our review is constrained to determining whether the factual underpinnings
of the decision below are supported by competent, substantial evidence. In
this regard, “[i]t is not the function of the appellate court to substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court through re-evaluation of the testimony and
evidence from the record on appeal before it,” and the factual conclusions
below are amply supported. Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13, 16 (Fla. 1976).
Finally, the record reflects that, once paternity testing was complete,
the New Jersey tribunal determined the child had resided in Florida for
eleven months preceding the filing of the petition. Consequently, it deferred
to the Florida court and declined to exercise further jurisdiction. See §
61.519(1) Fla. Stat. (“[A] court of [Florida] may not exercise its [home state]
jurisdiction . . . [if] a proceeding concerning the custody of the child had been
commenced in a court of another state [properly exercising] jurisdiction . . .
unless the proceeding has been terminated or is stayed by the court of the
6 other state because a court of this state is a more convenient forum under s.
61.520.”); see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:34-70 (West). Under these
circumstances, we conclude Florida retained “jurisdictional priority,” and the
trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction was proper. See § 61.514(1)(a), Fla. Stat.;
M.A.C. v. M.D.H., 88 So. 3d 1050, 1054 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (“[T]he home
state determination under section 61.514(1)(a) allows for Florida to exercise
jurisdiction if, at any time within the six months preceding the filing of the
petition, Florida qualified as the home state.”); Karam v. Karam, 6 So. 3d 87,
90 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (“Under the UCCJEA, jurisdictional priority lies in the
child’s home state.”). Accordingly, prohibition does not lie, and we deny the
petition.
Petition denied.