Casner v. Bituminous Casualty Corporation

158 S.W.2d 618, 289 Ky. 340, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 539
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976)
DecidedJanuary 30, 1942
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 158 S.W.2d 618 (Casner v. Bituminous Casualty Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976) primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Casner v. Bituminous Casualty Corporation, 158 S.W.2d 618, 289 Ky. 340, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 539 (Ky. 1942).

Opinion

*341 Opinion op the Court by

Judge Tilpord

Affirming.

This is an appeal from a judgment in a common law-action tried by the court without the intervention of a jury, and involves primarily the correctness of the court’s findings of fact rather than his interpretation of the law applicable thereto.

The appellee is a corporation engaged in insuring employers operating under Workmen’s Compensation Acts; and the appellants, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiffs, are respectively, the trustee in bankruptcy of a coal mining corporation which operated under the Kentucky Workmen’s Compensation Law, and the mother and only dependent of one A. B. Melton who was killed on November 3,1937, while in the Coal Company’s employ. Compensation for Melton’s death had been duly awarded his dependent, and this action was instituted against the Insurance Company to recover the indebtedness created.

Thus supplemented, a recitation of the trial court’s findings of fact and law will suffice to present to the reader the issues which that court was called upon to determine :

“Findings of Fact.
“1. Effective June 16, 1936, the defendant issued to Hall-Luton Coal & Mining Company a policy of Workmen’s Compensation Insurance No. X-19691. Said policy contained the following provisions:—
“ ‘This policy may be cancelled at any time by either of the parties upon written notice to the other party stating when, not less than ten days thereafter, cancellation shall be effective. The effective date of such cancellation shall then be the end of the policy period.’
“2. Prior to August, 1937, notices of cancellation of the policy had been given by defendant to Hall-Luton Coal & Mining Co. but by agreement be-' tween the parties the policy had not been cancelled.
“3. On August —, 1937, the defendant, by letter to the chief officer of Hall-Luton Coal & Mining Company, gave notice that in the future the provisions of the policy concerning payment of premiums must be complied with.
*342 “4. After this letter, no notice of cancellation was given by the defendant to the Hall-Luton Coal Mining Company until October 21,1937, when notice was properly given to Hall-Luton Coal & Mining Company that the policy would be cancelled effective November 1, 1937.
“5. The death, the award for which is sought to be collected herein, resulted from an accident which occurred on November 3, 1937/
“6. In November, 1937, and after the happening of said accident, the Hall-Luton Coal & Mining Company, by letter, recognized that the policy had been cancelled effective November 1, 1937, and sought to secure another policy of insurance.”
“Findings of Law.
“1. The defendant, under the terms of the policy contract, had the right to cancel said policy at any time upon ten day’s notice, and was not estopped to cancel same when it did so in October, 1937.
“2. The notice of cancellation given October 21,1937, effective November 1,1937, was an effective cancellation of and did cancel said policy effective November 1, 1937.
“3. The defendant had no policy of "Workmen’s Compensation Insurance in effect on the risk of the Hall-Luton Coal Mining Company, on November 3, 1937, at the time the accident happened, the award for which is sought to be enforced herein.”

The court’s findings upon the disputed issues of fact were based upon the testimony of J. Craig Riddle and Hayden Younggren, the former, an agent and adjuster of the Insurance Company, and the latter, its cashier, both of whom were introduced as if under cross-examination by the plaintiff. While somewhat indefinite as to details, it was sufficient, considered in conjunction with the exhibits, to establish the fact that on October 21, 1937, on its usual form, the Insurance Company notified the employer Coal Company of the cancellation of the policy, and that “all liability of this Company will terminate at 12:01 A. M. November 1, 1937. Remarks: For non-payment of August earned premium.” It is true that Younggren, who was at that time cashier at the *343 Louisville office, testified that he mailed the notice to Riddle at Madisonville on October 21st, and that Riddle testified that he delivered the notice in person to the secretary of the Coal Company in that City on the same date. But it is clear from the remainder of Younggren’s testimony that he was referring to the date of the notice and not the date it was mailed from the Louisville office to the Madisonville agent, since, as explained by the witness, “It was our practice at that time to issue those notices two or three days in advance so that the agent could receive them and deliver them in time for the 10 day’s notice.” The plaintiff did not attempt to contradict this testimony; and the fact that the testimony was given “as if under cross-examination” does not militate against its effectiveness.

In the second paragraph of their reply, the plaintiffs alleged “that the defendant did on October 21, 1937, attempt to give to the Hall-Luton Coal Mining Company written notice that it had cancelled said policy effective at 12:01 A. M. November 1, 1937; but -that said notice was not legally given and was of no force and effect.” And on November 12, 1937, the Coal Company wrote the Insurance Company the following letter:

“Bituminous Casualty Corp.,
“Louisville, Ky.
“Gentlemen:
“Re: Compensation Policy S-19691
“Your records will indicate that you have insured our mine under the above Policy since we started business and we have always paid the premiums, altho at times we have been delinquent. We received the cancellation notice forwarded to us that was effective November 1st, for the non-payment of our August premium, but as was our custom, when we received our check on October 30th, we issued a check to you for payment of the premium and the fact that it was not mailed to you until November 3rd was due to an oversight on the part of our bookkeeper. We realize that under a strict interpretation of the rules and regulations effective cancellations, we had no coverage when the accident occurred at our mine resulting in the death of A. R. Melton, however, since we had always paid our premiums and the fact that the August premium was not paid *344 before tbe cancellation went into effect was due to oversight on the part of our employee that should have mailed the check, we feel that you should assume the loss.
“Please reinstate our policy effective November 15th and if you will do this we assure you that our premiums will be paid promptly, in the future.
“Thanking you for your advices, we are,
“Yours very truly,

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Bluebook (online)
158 S.W.2d 618, 289 Ky. 340, 1942 Ky. LEXIS 539, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/casner-v-bituminous-casualty-corporation-kyctapphigh-1942.