Casley Bailey v. Boston Fire Department.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: January 5, 2026
• Docket: 25-P-0275
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-275

CASLEY BAILEY

vs.

BOSTON FIRE DEPARTMENT.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Casley Bailey, filed a complaint in the

Superior Court against the defendant Boston Fire Department

(department) seeking to stay the department's ongoing

disciplinary action against him. He accompanied the complaint

with an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction to stay

the disciplinary proceedings.

Meanwhile, the same day the plaintiff filed his complaint,

the department announced its final decision and discharged him

from service as a firefighter. In opposition to the preliminary

injunction, the department argued that the request should be

dismissed as moot and also for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies. After a hearing, a Superior Court judge denied injunctive relief on the ground that the plaintiff "must first

exhaust his administrative remedies before coming to Court."

Shortly thereafter the judge dismissed the complaint because the

only relief the plaintiff sought -- the stay of the disciplinary

procedures -- had been denied.

The plaintiff appeals from the dismissal of his complaint.

He asserts that the physician who examined him in connection

with his claimed work-related injury forged a medical release;

that the department chief who oversaw the disciplinary action

was biased against him; that his union colluded with the

department and failed to provide adequate representation,

"rendering administrative remedies futile"; that the judge

failed to consider his claim of irreparable harm, particularly

the loss of health insurance for his family; and, finally, that

he was disciplined more severely than similarly situated

firefighters.

Notwithstanding these claims of "fraudulent evidence,

procedural misconduct, and labor law violations," we conclude

that the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the

injunction and dismissing the complaint for failure to exhaust

available remedies. We also note that the complaint could

properly have been dismissed as moot. See Gabbidon v. King, 414

Mass. 685, 686 (1993) (appellate court may affirm result reached

in trial court on any ground apparent on record).

2 The complaint was moot -- as is the current

appeal -- because the only relief the plaintiff sought was the

stay of the disciplinary proceedings against him, and those

proceedings were completed the day the complaint was filed. As

such, nothing remained to be stayed. "A moot case is one where

a court can order no further effective relief" (quotation and

citation omitted). Branch v. Commonwealth Employment Relations

Bd., 481 Mass. 810, 817 (2019), cert. denied, 589 U.S. 1133

(2020). Staying the already completed proceedings would have

had no effect. See Ayscough v. Andover, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 125,

127 (1984) ("Injunctive relief at this stage would act upon a

vacuum").

Moreover, at the time the preliminary injunction was denied

and the case was dismissed, the plaintiff had not yet availed

himself of the remedies available to him under the civil service

statute, G. L. c. 31, §§ 41-45. The plaintiff was a tenured

civil servant entitled to the protection of the statute.1

Documents in the plaintiff's record appendix show that within

one month of the dismissal of his complaint he was actively

challenging his termination in proceedings before the Civil

Service Commission (commission).

1 A Civil Service Commission decision included in the record appendix shows that he had successfully challenged certain disciplinary actions taken against him in the past.

3 The exhaustion doctrine "is a sound principle of law and

jurisprudence aimed at preserving the integrity of both the

administrative and judicial processes." Assuncao's Case, 372

Mass. 6, 8 (1977). "[A]llowing the administrative process to

run its course before permitting full appellate review gives the

administrative agency in question a full and fair opportunity to

apply its expertise to the statutory scheme which, by law, it

has the primary responsibility of enforcing." Id. at 8-9.2

Almost all of the plaintiff's claims on appeal can be

effectively addressed by the commission. For example, the

plaintiff's claim of disparate treatment is precisely the kind

of claim that the commission has the responsibility and

expertise to decide. See Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 447

Mass. 814, 823-824 (2006) (commission charged with authority to

review and amend penalties for purpose of promoting equitable

treatment of similarly situated employees). Likewise, his

claims of a forged document, a biased presiding officer, and

2 Technically, if proceedings before the commission had not yet commenced at the time the injunction was denied, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction would have applied, whereas once the proceedings before the commission began, the exhaustion doctrine controlled. See Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Workers' Compensation Trust Fund, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 183, 187 (2015) (explaining differences between doctrines). In any case, the rationale underlying both doctrines -- maintaining the proper relationship between administrative agencies and the courts -- is the same. See Murphy v. Administrator of the Div. of Personnel Admin., 377 Mass. 217, 221 (1979).

4 collusion can be litigated and remedied in commission

proceedings. See id. at 823 (commission "required to conduct a

de novo hearing for the purpose of finding facts anew").

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff was

required to show (1) a likelihood of success on the merits;

(2) irreparable harm; (3) that, in light of his likelihood of

success, the risk of harm to him outweighed the risk of harm to

the defendant should the injunction be granted; and (4) that an

injunction would promote, or at least not adversely affect, the

public interest. See Boston Firefighters Union, Local 718,

Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO v. Boston, 491 Mass. 556,

562-563 (2023). The plaintiff's claim of irreparable

harm -- the harm from loss of employment -- is generally not

sufficient to obtain an injunction. See id. at 569. In any

event, because the plaintiff had no likelihood of success on the

merits, the judge could properly deny injunctive relief without

considering irreparable harm or the other factors. See Boston

5 Police Patrolmen's Ass'n, Inc. v. Police Dep't of Boston, 446

Mass. 46, 53 & n.5 (2006).

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Massing, Sacks & Allen, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: January 5, 2026.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.