Casey v. Metropolitan
Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
October 4, 1994 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 93-2204
PATRICK M. CASEY,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant, Appellee.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Shane Devine, Senior U.S. District Judge]
__________________________
____________________
Before
Torruella, Cyr and Boudin,
Circuit Judges.
______________
____________________
Francis G. Murphy, Jr., with whom Nixon, Hall & Hess, P.A. was on
______________________ ________________________
brief for appellant.
Alice Olsen Mann with whom Karyn T. Hicks and Morrison, Mahoney &
_________________ ______________ ___________________
Miller were on brief for appellee.
______
____________________
____________________
Per Curiam. In April 1989, Patrick Casey was traveling
__________
in New Hampshire in a Subaru owned and driven by his fiancee,
Susan Donahue. Seeing an injured dog in the lane directly
ahead of them, Donahue parked in the breakdown lane. Casey
got out and picked up the dog in order to take him to a
veterinarian. While Casey was returning to the Subaru but
still about ten feet away from its rear, he was struck by
another car and severely injured. The driver of the other
car, caught after a chase, had a blood alcohol level of .22
per cent, was violating a license restriction requiring
corrective lenses, and had no liability insurance coverage in
effect.
Casey eventually sued Metropolitan Insurance Company
which had insured Donahue's Subaru. Casey claimed to be
covered by the uninsured driver provisions of the policy
which are described below, but Metropolitan denied coverage.
Casey's suit, brought in the New Hampshire superior court,
was removed to federal court. On May 17, 1993, the district
court, based on stipulated facts, ruled on summary judgment
that Casey was not covered under the uninsured motorist
portion of the policy.1
After the district court's ruling on the uninsured
motorist provision, Casey filed a motion to reform the policy
____________________
1The court also held that Casey was entitled to benefits
under the policy's personal injury protection provisions.
Metropolitan does not challenge the latter ruling.
-2-
-2-
to have himself listed as an additional named insured. The
magistrate-judge rejected this motion, the trial upheld the
ruling, and a final judgment was entered. Casey's appeal
followed. We affirm.
At the threshold, we note that the Metropolitan policy
stated that it was a contract made under, and incorporating,
Massachusetts laws relating to automobile insurance. Donahue
and Casey lived in Massachusetts, and the Subaru was
registered there. On appeal, Casey suggests that New
Hampshire law may be pertinent insofar as its declaratory
action statute under which Casey sued places the burden of
proof to disprove coverage on the insurance company, N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. 491:22-a, and New Hampshire courts construe
ambiguities against the insurer. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins.
___________________________
Co. v. Cookinham, 604 A.2d 563 (N.H. 1992).
__ _________
Massachusetts law appears to be otherwise as to the
burden of proof. See Kelleher v. American Mutual Ins. Co. of
___ ________ ___________________________
Boston, 590 N.E.2d 1178, 1180 (Mass. App. Ct.), review
______ ______
denied, 597 N.E.2d 444 (Mass. 1992). Similarly, where (as
______
here) the standard policy language is prescribed by statute,
Massachusetts courts do not construe the language against the
insurer. Bilodeau v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 467
________ _______________________________
N.E.2d 137, 140 (1984). It appears to us that the New
Hampshire courts would apply Massachusetts law in this case,
since the policy was made and the car kept in that state.
-3-
-3-
See Glowski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 589 A.2d 593, 595 (N.H.
___ _______ _________________
1991); cf. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S.
___ _________ ________________________
487 (1941) (in diversity cases the forum state's choice of
law rules govern). As it happens, the burden of proof is
irrelevant where the facts are stipulated, and the policy is
not ambiguous.
We assume favorably to Casey that "the application of
policy language to known facts presents a question of law for
the court," Kelleher, 590 N.E.2d at 1180, and in any event
________
our review of summary judgment is plenary. The uninsured
motorist portion of the policy, in describing the scope of
coverage, states that "[w]e will pay damages to or for . . .
`[y]ou, or any household member' or `[a]nyone occupying your
auto with your consent at the time of the accident.'" Casey
claims coverage under each of these three alternatives.
We begin with the reference to "you." The introductory
section of the policy states th
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Casey v. Metropolitan, (1st Cir. 1994).
Casey v. Metropolitan (Casey v. Metropolitan) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.
Related
Horace Mann Insurance Co. v. Neuville
465 N.W.2d 432 (Court of Appeals of Minnesota, 1991)
Miller v. Loman
518 N.E.2d 486 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 1987)
Kelleher v. American Mutual Ins. Co. of Boston
590 N.E.2d 1178 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1992)
Vaiarella v. Hanover Insurance
567 N.E.2d 916 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1991)
Santos v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.
556 N.E.2d 983 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1990)
Polaroid Corp. v. the Travelers Indemnity Co.
610 N.E.2d 912 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1993)
Glowski v. Allstate Insurance
589 A.2d 593 (Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1991)
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Cookinham
604 A.2d 563 (Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1992)