Casey v. City of Santa Rosa

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: September 12, 2019
• Docket: 4:18-cv-07731
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ROBERT CASEY, Case No. 4:18-cv-07731-KAW

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT 9 v. COUNTY OF SONOMA AND GREG SCHMIDT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 10 CITY OF SANTA ROSA, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 39 11 Defendants.

12 13 On July 24, 2019, Defendants Greg Schmidt and the County of Sonoma filed a motion to 14 dismiss Plaintiff’s third amended complaint. 15 On September 5, 2019, the Court held a hearing, and, after careful consideration of the 16 parties’ arguments and the applicable legal authority, for the reasons set forth below, the Court 17 GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the motion to dismiss. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 On June 1, 2018, Plaintiff Robert Casey was detained and arrested in Santa Rosa, 20 California. (Third Am. Compl., “TAC,” Dkt No. 37 ¶ 16.) Plaintiff alleges that he was searching 21 for his runaway dog with the help of a stranger along a trail when Defendant officers from the 22 Santa Rosa Police Department and Defendant Sonoma County Probation Officer Greg Schmidt 23 responded. (TAC ¶ 16.) Defendant Schmidt held Plaintiff at gun point, despite the fact that the 24 officers did not have a reasonable belief that Casey was in the process of, had committed, or 25 intended to commit a crime. (TAC ¶ 17.) Plaintiff was put into a chokehold by Schmidt after 26 complying with officers to get on the ground and put his hands up. (TAC ¶ 19.) Schmidt choked 27 Plaintiff until he was unconscious. Id. As a result, Plaintiff sustained severe bruising, a 1 sworn statement that the use of the chokehold as a technique was consistent with his training and 2 appropriate to administer in these circumstances. (TAC ¶ 30.) As a result of this incident, Plaintiff 3 was charged with resisting arrest. (TAC ¶ 3.) 4 On December 26, 2018, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit. On June 20, 2019, the Court 5 granted in part and denied in part the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss the second amended 6 complaint and granted leave to amend the Monell claim. (6/20/19 Order, Dkt. No. 34.) On July 7 10, 2019 Plaintiff filed a third amended complaint alleging a state law claim of false imprisonment 8 and a malicious prosecution claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Schmidt, as well as a 9 Monell claim alleging municipal liability, pursuant to § 1983, against the County of Sonoma. 10 On July 24, 2019, Defendants Schmidt and the County of Sonoma filed a motion to 11 dismiss. (Defs.’ Mot., Dkt. No. 39.) On August 7, 2019, Plaintiff filed an opposition. (Pl.’s 12 Opp’n, Dkt. No. 43.) On August 14, 2019, Defendants filed a reply. (Defs.’ Reply, Dkt. No. 44.) 13 II. LEGAL STANDARD 14 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss based 15 on the failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss under Rule 16 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 17 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 18 In considering such a motion, a court must “accept as true all of the factual allegations 19 contained in the complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citation 20 omitted), and may dismiss the case or a claim “only where there is no cognizable legal theory” or 21 there is an absence of “sufficient factual matter to state a facially plausible claim to relief.” 22 Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 23 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732) (internal quotation 24 marks omitted). 25 A claim is plausible on its face when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the 26 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 27 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). In other words, the facts alleged must demonstrate 1 will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 2 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action” and “conclusory statements” are 3 inadequate. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th 4 Cir. 1996) (“[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat 5 a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.”). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 6 probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 7 unlawfully . . . When a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's 8 liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” 9 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (internal citations omitted). 10 Under Federal Rule of Procedure 12(b)(5), a party may file a motion to dismiss based on 11 the failure to properly effect service of the summons and the complaint pursuant to Rule 4. 12 Generally, if the court grants a motion to dismiss, it should grant leave to amend even if no 13 request to amend is made “unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by 14 the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations 15 omitted). 16 III. DISCUSSION 17 The County Defendants move to dismiss the third, fourth, and eighth causes of action. 18 (Defs.’ Mot. at 2.) 19 A. Plaintiff remains barred from alleging false imprisonment claim against the 20 County. 21 Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action is for false imprisonment. (TAC ¶¶ 61-63.) In the prior 22 order, the Court found that Plaintiff failed to comply with the California Tort Claims Act prior to 23 filing this lawsuit and must first “be relieved from his failure to timely file a claim under Section 24 945.4 before his state law claims against the County Defendants may proceed.” (6/20/19 Order at 25 7.) Plaintiff concedes that naming the County Defendants in the eighth cause of action was 26 inadvertent and that the cause of action is subject to dismissal. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 8.) 27 Accordingly, the eighth cause of action is dismissed without prejudice at to the County 1 B. Monell claim 2 Defendants move to dismiss the Monell claim against the County on the grounds that 3 Plaintiff still does not plead sufficient facts to state a claim. (Defs.’ Mot. at 6.) A municipality or 4 governmental entity cannot be found liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a theory of respondeat 5 superior. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Rather, in 6 order to hold a municipality liable for a municipal employee’s conduct under Monell, a plaintiff 7 must show that (1) that the plaintiff “possessed a constitutional right of which [he or she] was 8 deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate 9 indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights; and, (4) that the policy is the moving force 10 behind the constitutional violation.” Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 11 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Only where a municipality’s failure to 12 train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of its 13 inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city ‘policy or custom’ that is 14 actionable under § 1983.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). 15 Defendants argue that the third amended complaint continues to rely on unrelated and 16 unsubstantiated prior lawsuits against the Sonoma County Sheriff’s Office to allege a pattern and 17 practice. (Defs.’ Mot. at 7.) Indeed, Plaintiff continues to list cases that the Court previously 18 found insufficient to support a Monell claim. (6/20/19 Order at 7-8.) 19 Notwithstanding, Plaintiff’s operative complaint alleges that Schmidt’s sworn statement 20 regarding the incident described the chokehold as “a technique consistent with his training and 21 appropriate to apply in these circumstances….” (TAC ¶ 30.) Defendants, however, argue that this 22 is insufficient, because the allegations relate to the underlying incident rather than “any actual 23 policy or custom in the Sonoma County Probation Department involving application of a carotid 24 hold beyond the occurrence of the subject incident.” (Defs.’ Mot. at 8.) The Court disagrees. 25 Generally, “[p]roof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to 26 impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an 27 existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal 1 is ultimately insufficient to establish liability, a plaintiff can survive a motion to dismiss by stating 2 a plausible Monell claim based on failure to train, so long as the allegations apply to all 3 individuals that are trained using the policy at issue.” Anakin v. Contra Costa Reg'l Med. Ctr., No. 4 16-CV-00161-MEJ, 2016 WL 2893257, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 2016) (citing Dasovich v. 5 Contra Costa Cty. Sheriff Dep't, No. 14-CV-00258-MEJ, 2014 WL 4652118, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 6 Sept. 17, 2014)). Here, Plaintiff alleges that the chokehold is being used by County law 7 enforcement, and is part of their training, despite being banned by other law enforcement agencies 8 due to the dangers in applying the technique. (TAC ¶¶ 30-38.) The allegation that the use of the 9 technique is not limited to Schmidt is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, and permit Plaintiff 10 the opportunity to obtain evidence through the discovery process to support his allegations. 11 Accordingly, the third amended complaint states sufficient facts to allege a plausible 12 Monell claim, and the motion to dismiss the third cause of action is denied. 13 C. Malicious Prosecution Claim 14 Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action is for malicious prosecution. (TAC ¶¶ 40-42.) 15 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the defendant officers, including Schmidt, “intentionally 16 submitted false information to prosecute Plaintiff on criminal resisting charges.” (TAC ¶ 41.) 17 To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim, Plaintiff “must show that the defendants 18 prosecuted [him] with malice and without probable cause, and that they did so for the purpose of 19 denying [him] equal protection or another specific constitutional right.” Awabdy v. City of 20 Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 21 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995)). 22 Defendants move to dismiss on the grounds that he fails to allege sufficient facts to show 23 that the prosecution was initiated with malice, without probable cause, and for the purpose of 24 denying him a specific constitutional right. (Defs.’ Mot. at 10.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that 25 the defendants “submitted false sworn statements that fabricated Plaintiff’s actions of resistance in 26 complete contradiction of the video evidence in order to have him prosecuted.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 7.) 27 Further, he argues that the malice is “evidenced by their decision not to collect exonerating 1 Additionally, Defendants argue that the criminal case against Plaintiff’s remains pending, 2 || such that Plaintiff cannot satisfy the requirement that the prior proceeding was favorably 3 || terminated. (Defs.’ Mot. at 10.) Indeed, in order to prevail on a malicious prosecution claim, the 4 || plaintiff must also establish that the prior proceeding terminated in his favor. Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 5 1068. Here, Plaintiff concedes that his case is still pending, and asks that, to the extent that the 6 || charges are still pending, that the claim be dismissed without prejudice. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 7-8.) 7 In reply, Defendants informed the Court that a preliminary hearing was scheduled for 8 || August 26, 2019. (Defs.’ Reply at 8.) “[A] decision ... to hold a defendant to answer after a 9 || preliminary hearing constitutes prima facie—but not conclusive—evidence of probable cause.” 10 || Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1067 (citations omitted)(emphasis in original). At the hearing, Plaintiff 11 confirmed that the preliminary hearing was continued to October 1, 2019, such that his criminal 12 || proceeding remains pending. 5 13 Accordingly, the fourth cause of action is dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff may seek 14 || leave to amend to allege a malicious prosecution claim should the criminal proceeding be 3 15 terminated in his favor. 16 IV. CONCLUSION 3 17 In light of the foregoing, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND 18 || DENIED IN PART. Specifically, the motion to dismiss the Monell claim is denied. The fourth 19 cause of action for malicious prosecution is dismissed without prejudice as to all defendants, 20 || because the criminal charges are still pending. Plaintiff may seek leave to amend to include a 21 claim for malicious prosecution should the criminal case terminate in his favor. The eighth cause 22 || of action against the County Defendants is again dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff may seek 23 leave to amend the eight cause of action to add the County Defendants should his petition for 24 || relief from the claim filing requirements be granted. 25 The County Defendants shall file an answer within 21 days of this order. 26 IT IS SO ORDERED. 27 Dated: September 12, 2019 28 Kane A. WESTMORE United States Magistrate Judge