Casey v. Chemical Bank

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Casey v. Chemical Bank

245 A.D.2d 258, 664 N.Y.S.2d 825, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12133

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 1, 1997

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 245 A.D.2d 258 (Casey v. Chemical Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Casey v. Chemical Bank, 245 A.D.2d 258, 664 N.Y.S.2d 825, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12133 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997).

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Opinion

—In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for negligence, the defendants appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Feuerstein, J.), dated October 23, 1996, as granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for an award of costs and the imposition of sanctions for frivolous conduct pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for an award of costs and the imposition of sanctions for frivolous conduct pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 is denied.

The defendants in the instant case refused to release the plaintiffs’ bank accounts until directed by court order to do so. Their conduct caused the plaintiffs to commence the instant action, and caused the plaintiffs to move in the instant action for an order directing them to release the funds. The court found that their conduct constituted gross negligence justifying the imposition of costs and sanctions of $1,000 “representing the cost to plaintiffs in bringing the instant motion and as sanctions for the dilatory conduct of the defendants”.

The law is well settled that “[a] court may not impose a sanction on a litigant or an attorney absent a statute or rule granting the power to do so” (Eirand v Macri, 213 AD2d 585; see, Matter of A.G. Ship Maintenance Corp. v Lezak, 69 NY2d 1).

22 NYCRR 130-1.1 is addressed to frivolous conduct by a party in civil litigation (see, People v Vonwerne, 155 Misc 2d 311). It does not apply to tortious conduct in general, nor is it a substitute for the court’s power to punish for contempt of its own orders (see, Matter of Kernisan v Taylor, 171 AD2d 869, 870).

In the instant case, the defendants never resorted to civil litigation. The fact that they engaged in conduct which caused the plaintiffs to resort to civil litigation against them may or may not constitute a civil cause of action against them. However, it is not a basis for imposing sanctions pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1. Thompson, J. P., Friedmann, Krausman and Goldstein, JJ., concur.

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—In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for negligence, the defendants appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Feuerstein, J.), dated October 23, 1996, as granted that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for an award of costs and the imposition of sanctions for frivolous conduct pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the plaintiffs’ motion which was for an award of costs and the imposition of sanctions for frivolous conduct pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 is denied.

The defendants in the instant case refused to release the plaintiffs’ bank accounts until directed by court order to do so. Their conduct caused the plaintiffs to commence the instant action, and caused the plaintiffs to move in the instant action for an order directing them to release the funds. The court found that their conduct constituted gross negligence justifying the imposition of costs and sanctions of $1,000 “representing the cost to plaintiffs in bringing the instant motion and as sanctions for the dilatory conduct of the defendants”.

The law is well settled that “[a] court may not impose a sanction on a litigant or an attorney absent a statute or rule granting the power to do so” (Eirand v Macri, 213 AD2d 585; see, Matter of A.G. Ship Maintenance Corp. v Lezak, 69 NY2d 1).

22 NYCRR 130-1.1 is addressed to frivolous conduct by a party in civil litigation (see, People v Vonwerne, 155 Misc 2d 311). It does not apply to tortious conduct in general, nor is it a substitute for the court’s power to punish for contempt of its own orders (see, Matter of Kernisan v Taylor, 171 AD2d 869, 870).

In the instant case, the defendants never resorted to civil litigation. The fact that they engaged in conduct which caused the plaintiffs to resort to civil litigation against them may or may not constitute a civil cause of action against them. However, it is not a basis for imposing sanctions pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1. Thompson, J. P., Friedmann, Krausman and Goldstein, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

245 A.D.2d 258, 664 N.Y.S.2d 825, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 12133, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/casey-v-chemical-bank-nyappdiv-1997.

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