Casey Price v. Walter Kane and Spouse Doe Kane, spouses and the marital community thereof

Opinion

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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 CASEY PRICE, an unmarried man, Case No. 2:24-cv-01161-TMC 8 Plaintiff, Consolidated with 3:24-cv-05698-TMC 9 v. ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS 10 WALTER KANE and SPOUSE DOE KANE, 11 spouses and the marital community thereof, 12 Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs. 13 14 CRISTINE CRIMMINS, 15 Plaintiff, v. 16 WALTER KANE and SPOUSE DOE KANE, 17 spouses and the marital community thereof, 18 Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs. 19 20 21 22 23 24 1 WALTER KANE and SPOUSE DOE KANE, 2 spouses and the marital community thereof,

3 Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs, 4 v.

5 SIXT RENT A CAR LLC, Delaware entity, and JACK’S MOBILE MECHANICS, LLC, 6 a Washington entity,

7 Third-Party Defendants. 8

9 I. INTRODUCTION 10 Before this Court is a collection of motions brought by Plaintiffs Casey Price and 11 Christine Crimmins and Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Walter Kane (collectively 12 “Movants”). In a joint motion, the Movants seek: (1) leave to amend the complaints of Plaintiffs 13 Price and Crimmins; (2) leave to amend Defendant Kane’s third-party complaint; and (3) remand 14 to Pierce County Superior Court. Dkt. 87. 15 For the following reasons, the joint motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 16 The Court GRANTS Movants’ request to amend their respective complaints to add Washington 17 State and Kitsap County as Defendants. With the addition of those Defendants, the Court is 18 divested of jurisdiction. Movants’ request for remand is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 19 The Court has no authority to remand the consolidated case to Pierce County Superior Court. 20 The case is deconsolidated, and each case is remanded to the court where it began. 21 II. BACKGROUND 22 This is a consolidated case that concerns an August 5, 2023 collision between two 23 vehicles on State Road 104 in Kitsap County. Dkt. 1-2 ¶¶ 1.1, 2.1–2.4. One vehicle, a 24 motorcycle, was operated by Price with Crimmins riding behind him as a passenger. Id. ¶¶ 2.1– 1 2.3; Dkt. 32 ¶¶ 2.2–2.4. The other vehicle, a car, was operated by Kane. Dkt. 1-2 ¶ 2.2. Plaintiffs 2 Price and Crimmins allege that Kane’s car moved into an oncoming lane and collided with them. 3 Id. ¶ 2.1; Dkt. 32 ¶ 2.4. Kane’s car was rented from Sixt Rent a Car, LLC (“Sixt”). Dkt. 20 ¶ 44.

4 Jack’s Mobile Mechanics, LLC (“JMM”) “inspected and repaired that car before the accident.” 5 Id. ¶¶ 2, 16. Kane alleges that the accident occurred because of the unsafe condition of the rental 6 car. Id. ¶¶ 53–55. 7 A. Price v. Kane et al., No. 3:24-cv-05698 8 Price sued Kane in Kitsap County Superior Court on March 6, 2024. Price v. Kane et al., 9 No. 3:24-cv-05698, Dkt.1-2 at 1. Price alleged that Kane negligently “entered the oncoming lane, 10 and collided head on with [him].” Id. ¶¶ 2.1–2.4. 11 On August 22, 2024, Kane removed the case to federal court based on diversity 12 jurisdiction. Price, No. 3:24-cv-05698, Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 2, 6; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441(a). Price’s 13 case was consolidated with the instant case on October 11, 2024. Dkt. 9.

14 B. The instant case Crimmins initiated the instant case in King County Superior Court on March 15, 2024. 15 Dkt. 1 at 6. Kane removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 2. 16 On November 27, 2024, the Court set these deadlines: (1) motions to join parties were to 17 be filed no later than February 25, 2025; and (2) amended pleadings were to be filed no later than 18 March 10, 2025. Dkt. 18 at 1. 19 Kane filed a third-party complaint against Sixt and JMM on January 14, 2025. Dkt. 20 20 ¶ 2. Plaintiffs Price and Crimmins filed amended complaints adding Sixt and JMM as defendants 21 on March 3 and 6, 2025. Dkts. 30, 32. On July 10, 2025, Kane answered the amended 22 complaints. Dkts. 49, 50. Each answer contained an affirmative defense asserting that the 23 accident was also due to Washington State’s “design, signage and maintenance of the roadway 24 1 where the accident occurred.” Dkt. 49 at 7; Dkt. 50 at 8. Movants conducted a 30(b)(6) 2 deposition of Washington State on November 24, 2025, and obtained evidence that “the County 3 requested warning signage, lights and other safety measures for the area prior to the subject

4 collision, and that such measures were implemented only after the accident.” Dkt. 87 at 4; see 5 Dkt. 88 at 10–11. 6 Movants filed their joint motion on January 2, 2026. Dkt. 87. Sixt responded on January 7 23, 2026. Dkt. 101. Kane and Crimmins replied on January 30, 2026. Dkts. 125, 128. 8 III. LEGAL STANDARDS Motions to amend a complaint are ordinarily governed by Federal Rule of Civil 9 Procedure 15(a)(2), which provides that a “court should freely give leave [to amend] when 10 justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). When the motion concerns a request to add a non- 11 diverse defendant following removal, however, it is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). Sardinas 12 v. United Airlines, Inc., No. C19-0257JLR, 2019 WL 4594600, at *1–2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 23, 13 2019) (citing Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691 (9th Cir. 1998)). 14 “If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would 15 destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the 16 action to the State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). “Section 1447(e) is permissive and ‘clearly gives 17 the district court the discretion to deny [or permit] joinder.’” Sardinas, 2019 WL 4594600, at *3 18 (alteration in original) (quoting Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 691). In determining whether to allow 19 joinder of a non-diverse defendant under Section 1447(e), courts consider six factors: 20 (1) whether the party sought to be joined is needed for just adjudication and would 21 be joined under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a); (2) whether the statute of limitations would prevent the filing of a new action against the new defendant in state court; 22 (3) whether there has been an unexplained delay in seeking to join the new defendant; (4) whether plaintiff seeks to join the new party solely to defeat federal 23 jurisdiction; . . . (5) whether the claims against the new defendant appear valid; and (6) whether denial of joinder will prejudice the plaintiff. 24 1 Id. (citing Parris v. Jacobs Eng’g Grp., Inc., No. C19-0128-JCC, 2019 WL 3219422, at *2 2 (W.D. Wash. July 17, 2019)). 3 IV. DISCUSSION A. Joinder 4 The deadlines to join parties and amend pleadings were February 25 and March 10, 2025, 5 respectively. Dkt. 18 at 1. Movants seek to amend their complaints and add Washington State 6 and Kitsap County (collectively “the Governmental entities”) nearly a year later. Dkt. 87 at 2. 7 Because joinder of the non-diverse potential defendants would destroy diversity jurisdiction, see 8 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), Section 1447(e) applies here. The Court will consider the six factors under 9 Section 1447(e) in turn. 10 1. Needed for just adjudication 11 The first factor considers “whether the party sought to be joined is needed for just 12 adjudication and would be joined under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a).” Sardinas, 2019 WL 4594600, at 13 *3. Rule 19(a) requires joinder if “in that person’s absence, the court cannot accord complete 14 relief among existing parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A). 15 Movants argue that the Governmental entities are necessary for several reasons. First, 16 “the roadway design, maintenance, signage, and traffic control measures implemented by the 17 [Governmental entities] are directly related” to the crash. Dkt. 128 at 3. Second, lack of joinder 18 would “enable ‘empty chair’ defenses,” allowing Defendants to blame absent parties for Price 19 and Crimmins’s damages. Id. Third, if joinder is denied, Movants would have to bring claims 20 against the Governmental entities arising from the same facts in a parallel state case. Id. at 3–4. 21 Sixt argues that the Governmental entities are not necessary parties under Rule 19 as they are 22 merely joint tortfeasors. Dkt. 101 at 4. 23 24 1 It is true that under Rule 19, “it is not necessary for all joint tortfeasors to be named as 2 defendants in a single lawsuit.” Temple v. Synthes Corp., 498 U.S. 5, 7 (1990). It is also true that 3 “courts should consider whether a party sought to be joined after removal would meet the

4 standard for a necessary party.” Ballard Condos. Owners Ass’n v. Gen. Sec. Indem. Co. of Ariz., 5 No. C09-484 RSL, 2011 WL 13193265, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 2011). That said, 6 “amendment under section 1447(e) is a less restrictive standard than for joinder under Rule 7 19(a).” Id. 8 Courts have generally held that the first factor “favors joinder and remand when failure to 9 join will lead to separate and redundant actions, but not when defendants are only tangentially 10 related to the cause of action or would not prevent complete relief.” Wilner v. Okta, Inc., No. 11 2:22-CV-169-BJR, 2022 WL 5133743, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 5, 2022) (internal quotation 12 marks omitted) (quoting Chan v. Bucephalus Alt. Energy Grp., LLC, No. C 08-04537 JW, 2009 13 WL 1108744, *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2009)). Here, the claims against Kane, Sixt, and JMM

14 concern the same facts as the new claims against the Governmental entities. If joinder were 15 denied, the Movants would have to pursue a parallel case in state court against the Governmental 16 entities. Accordingly, the first factor favors joinder. 17 2. Statute of limitations 18 “The second factor considers whether the statute of limitations would prevent the filing 19 of a new action against the new defendants in state court.” City of Issaquah v. ORA Talus 90, 20 LLC, No. C18-00910-RSM, 2021 WL 693649, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 23, 2021). 21 The Movants and Sixt, using the same facts, come to opposite legal conclusions. Movants 22 argue that this factor weighs in favor of joinder because their new claims are not barred by

23 Washington’s statute of limitations. Dkt. 128 at 4 (citing Burch v. Ford Motor Co., 758 F. Supp. 24 3d 1092, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2024)). Sixt responds that this factor weighs against joinder for the 1 same reason. Dkt. 101 at 5–6 (citing Meline v. Optumhealth Care Sols., Inc., No. 3:15-CV-5780- 2 RBL, 2016 WL 491844, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 9, 2016)). 3 Courts are split as to how to analyze this factor. Some weigh the availability of a parallel

4 state case in favor of joinder. See, e.g., Burch, 758 F. Supp. 3d at 1100 (“Ford does not contend 5 that any statute of limitations would preclude an original action against the Future in state court. 6 This factor, therefore, supports permitting Burch’s joinder of Future.”); Rhem v. Safeway Inc., 7 No. C13-5545 BHS, 2014 WL 465791, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 4, 2014) (“To try all claims 8 together in a state court action is appropriate as all of them are state law claims, essentially 9 arising out of the same transaction or occurrence, or set of transactions or occurrences, and it is 10 in the interest of judicial economy to do so.”). 11 Some find the availability of a parallel state case neutral. See, e.g., Johnson v. Or. Mut. 12 Ins. Co., No. C23-5827 BHS, 2024 WL 21390, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 2, 2024) (“Because it is 13 not too late [to sue separately in state court], this factor is neutral.”).

14 However, most courts weigh the availability of a parallel state case against joinder. See, 15 e.g., Beach v. Texaco Inc., No. 2:25-CV-01146-JNW, 2025 WL 3706533, at *3 (W.D. Wash. 16 Dec. 22, 2025) (“Here, the statute of limitations does not preclude Plaintiffs from seeking relief 17 against Energy Transfer in a separate lawsuit. Thus, this factor weighs against joinder.”); Soptich 18 v. Stryker Corp., No. C19-00744 RAJ, 2019 WL 6769368, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 12, 2019) 19 (“Because the statute of limitations does not preclude Plaintiff from filing suit against the 20 Additional Defendants in state court, this factor favors denying joinder.”); Sardinas, 2019 WL 21 4594600, at *3 (“Defendants do not allege that Plaintiffs would be barred under any statute of 22 limitations from suing the gate agents in state court for the alleged conduct. . . . Therefore, this

23 factor weighs in favor of denying joinder.”); Ballard Condos. Owners Ass’n, 2011 WL 24 13193265, at *3 (“Plaintiff argues that its claims against Griffin would not be time-barred. This 1 factor does not support amendment.”); Milton v. Xerox Corp., No. C15-5618 BHS, 2016 WL 2 641130, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 18, 2016) (“[T]he statute of limitations would not preclude 3 Milton from filing suit against Gidlof in Washington, which favors denying joinder.”).

4 “Generally, if a statute of limitations does not bar a plaintiff from filing suit in state 5 court, a federal court may be less inclined to permit joinder of a non-diverse defendant because 6 he could still theoretically seek relief from state court.” Vasquez v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l 7 Ass’n, 77 F. Supp. 3d 911, 922 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting Graunstadt v. USS-Posco Indus., No. 8 C 10-03225 SI, 2010 WL 3910145, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2010)). Consistent with how most 9 courts have ruled on this issue, the Court finds that this factor weighs against joinder. 10 3. Unexplained delay 11 With this factor, a court considers “whether there has been an unexplained delay in 12 seeking to join the new defendants.” City of Issaquah, 2021 WL 693649, at *5. “Delay is 13 measured from the time of removal.” Id. However, “[t]here are no well-developed guidelines for

14 evaluating the timeliness of such a motion.” Wilner, 2022 WL 5133743, at *3. 15 Movants argue that “there is no unexplained delay,” as they moved for leave to amend 16 “following further factual development” from the November 24, 2025 deposition. Dkt. 87 at 9. In 17 response, Sixt argues that Movants have not “offered any credible basis for the delay,” as they 18 had notice of the Governmental entities’ possible role in the accident on July 10, 2025, with 19 Kane’s amended answers. Dkt. 101 at 6–7. 20 This case was removed to federal court on July 31, 2024, and the joint motion was filed 21 on January 2, 2026— a total delay of about 17 months. Dkts. 1, 87. But any delay from July 31, 22 2024 to November 24, 2025 can be explained by the fact that Movants did not learn of the

23 County’s requests for “warning signage, lights and other safety measures” until the deposition. 24 Dkt. 87 at 4. In other words, based on the record before this Court, this is when Movants first 1 learned of information leading to a plausible claim against the Governmental entities. 2 Accordingly, the Court finds that the amount of unexplained delay is 39 days, measured from the 3 November 24, 2025 deposition to the filing of the instant motion on January 2, 2026. This factor

4 favors joinder. 5 4. Motivation behind joinder 6 With the fourth factor, courts consider “whether the plaintiff seeks to join the new party 7 solely to defeat federal jurisdiction.” City of Issaquah, 2021 WL 693649, at *6. Movants argue 8 that they seek joinder not to defeat federal jurisdiction but because “the record reflects a 9 legitimate substantive basis for adding the State.” Dkt. 87 at 9. They also point out that one of 10 the Movants, Kane, is the one who removed the case to federal court. Id. In response, Sixt argues 11 that the Movants “have offered nothing but conclusory statements that they are not motivated by 12 trying to destroy diversity.” Dkt. 101 at 7. The Court finds no basis to infer an improper motive. 13 Kane removed the case to federal court, later added affirmative defenses discussing the

14 Governmental entities, and, along with Price and Crimmins, now seeks to add the entities as 15 parties. This factor favors joinder. 16 5. Validity of claims With the fifth factor, courts consider whether the claims against the new defendants 17 “seem valid.” Beach, 2025 WL 3706533, at *3. “[C]ourts do not consider whether the plaintiffs 18 have produced evidence to substantiate their claims at this stage—only whether the claims 19 against the new defendant seem facially legitimate.” Id. 20 Movants argue that the claims against the Governmental entities are facially valid 21 because, before the accident, the Governmental entities did not take any action on requests to 22 make the relevant portion of State Route 104 safer. Dkt. 87 at 9–10. Sixt takes no position on the 23 24 1 viability of Movants’ new claims. Dkt. 101 at 7. The claims seem plausible on their face. This 2 factor favors joinder. 3 6. Prejudice

4 With the sixth factor, courts consider “whether denial of joinder will prejudice the 5 plaintiff.” Sardinas, 2019 WL 4594600, at *3. “Prejudice exists if the proposed defendant is 6 ‘crucial’ to the case. Prejudice does not exist if complete relief can be afforded without that 7 defendant.” Burch, 758 F. Supp. 3d at 1101 (quoting Sabag v. FCA US, LLC, No. 2:16-CV- 8 06639-CAS(RAOX), 2016 WL 6581154, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2016)). 9 Movants argue that they would be prejudiced if joinder were denied because the claims 10 against the Governmental entities arise from the same facts and involve the same legal issues, 11 leading to duplicative litigation in state court. Dkt. 128 at 7–8. In response, Sixt makes two 12 arguments: first, that pursuing parallel suits in both federal and state courts would not prejudice 13 Movants, and second, that Sixt will be prejudiced if the joint motion is granted because the case

14 has progressed significantly. Dkt. 101 at 8–9. 15 The Court finds Sixt’s arguments unpersuasive. If denial of joinder required Movants to 16 pursue “two substantially similar lawsuits in two different forums,” then this factor would weigh 17 in favor of joinder. See Burch, 758 F. Supp. 3d 1092, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2024); Rhem, 2014 WL 18 465791, at *3 (“Denying joinder of Johnson and forcing Rhem to litigate a case with related 19 claims in two courts would prejudice Rhem.”); Milton, 2016 WL 641130, at *4 (“Milton would 20 possibly be required to litigate two related cases in two different courts. Denying Gidlof’s 21 joinder will therefore prejudice Milton, which weighs in favor of permitting joinder.”). 22 Additionally, this factor generally considers prejudice to the plaintiffs. See Meline, 2016 WL

23 491844, at *3 (“The last factor is whether [Plaintiff] will suffer prejudice if joinder is denied.”); 24 1 Ballard Condos. Owners Ass’n, 2011 WL 13193265, at *4; Beach, 2025 WL 3706533, at *3 2 (“[T]he sixth factor . . . considers prejudice to the plaintiff.”). 3 Because the Movants would be made to litigate two related cases in two different forums

4 if joinder were denied, this factor favors joinder. 5 7. Balancing the factors 6 In total, five factors weigh in favor of joinder, and one weighs against joinder. Having 7 considered the balance of the factors, the Court concludes that Movants should be permitted to 8 add the Governmental entities to their complaints and GRANTS their motions to amend. 9 B. Remand Price initially filed suit in Kitsap County Superior Court. Price v. Kane et al., No. 3:24- 10 cv-05698, Dkt.1-2 at 1. Crimmins filed the instant case in King County Superior Court. Dkt. 1 at 11 6. Movants seek remand to Pierce County Superior Court. Dkt. 87 at 2. To support this request, 12 they argue that Pierce County is the proper venue under RCW 36.01.050. Id. 13 The Court must consider two questions: first, whether this Court has the authority to 14 remand a case to a court other than the one from which it was removed, and second, whether 15 consolidation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a) affects the appropriate venue for 16 remand. The Court will consider each question in turn. 17 As to the first question, the Court lacks authority to remand the instant case to Pierce 18 County Superior Court. “‘Remand’ means ‘send back.’ It does not mean ‘send elsewhere.’” 19 Bloom v. Barry, 755 F.2d 356, 358 (3d Cir. 1985). “The only remand contemplated by the 20 removal statute is a remand ‘to the State court from which it was removed.’” Id. (quoting 28 21 U.S.C. § 1447(d)); Konold v. Superior Int’l Indus. Inc., 911 F. Supp. 2d 303, 309 (W.D. Pa. 22 2012) (“This case was removed from the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County and can 23 only be remanded to that Court.”). 24 1 As to the second question, the Court concludes that the two cases are to be 2 deconsolidated and remanded to the courts from which they were removed. “[C]onsolidation of 3 cases under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42 does not strip the cases of their individual identities.” Skov v.

4 Lakeview Health Sys., LLC, No. 3:24-CV-732-MMH-LLL, 2025 WL 1891869, at *2 (M.D. Fla. 5 July 9, 2025) (alteration in original) (quoting Boardman Petro., Inc. v. Fed. Mut. Ins. Co., 135 6 F.3d 750, 752 (11th Cir. 1998)). Because “each individually filed case must maintain its own 7 identity,” a court “will deconsolidate the cases” for purposes of remand. Id. Upon remand, the 8 parties are of course free to file motions in state court to transfer venue or consolidate the state 9 actions as they see fit. 10 V. CONCLUSION For the reasons explained above, Movants’ motion to amend their complaints is 11 GRANTED. With the addition of Washington State and Kitsap County as defendants, the Court 12 is divested of jurisdiction. Movants’ motion to remand is GRANTED in part and DENIED in 13 part. The Court has no authority to remand the consolidated case to Pierce County Superior 14 Court. The case is deconsolidated, and each case is remanded to the court from which it was 15 removed. 16 1. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e), all claims arising from Price v. Kane et al., No. 17 3:24-cv-05698, are REMANDED to the Superior Court of Kitsap County, 18 Washington; 19 2. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e), the Clerk shall mail a certified copy of this 20 Order to the Clerk for the Superior Court of Kitsap County, Washington; and 21 3. The Clerk shall transmit the record herein to the Clerk for the Superior Court of 22 Kitsap County, Washington; 23 4. Following remand, the Clerk shall close Price v. Kane et al., No. 3:24-cv-05698. 24 1 5. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e), all claims arising from the instant case of 2 Crimmins v. Kane are REMANDED to the Superior Court of King County, 3 Washington; 4 6. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e), the Clerk shall mail a certified copy of this 5 Order to the Clerk for the Superior Court of King County, Washington; and 6 7. The Clerk shall transmit the record herein to the Clerk for the Superior Court of 7 King County, Washington; 8 8. Following remand, the Clerk shall close the instant case. 9 9. All other pending motions in this consolidated federal action (Dkts. 85, 89, 91, 94 10 and 97) are DENIED as moot. 11 The Clerk is directed to send uncertified copies of this Order to all counsel of record. 12 Dated this 23rd day of February, 2026. 13

United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24