Casey Dwain Campbell v. State of Utah et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Utah
• Decided: June 4, 2026
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00079
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF UTAH

CASEY DWAIN CAMPBELL, MEMORANDUM DECISION Plaintiff, AND ORDER TO CURE DEFICIENT COMPLAINT v. Case No. 2:24-CV-79-DAK STATE OF UTAH et al., District Judge Dale A. Kimball

Defendants.

Pro se plaintiff, Casey Dwain Campbell, while held at Utah State Hospital, brought this civil-rights action, see 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (2026).1 Having now screened the Complaint, Dkt. No. 4, under its statutory review function, 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915A (2026),2 the Court orders

1The federal statute creating a "civil action for deprivation of rights" reads, in pertinent part: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . ., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (2026).

2The screening statute reads: (a) Screening.--The court shall review . . . a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. (b) Grounds for dismissal.--On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint-- (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915A (2026). Plaintiff to file an amended complaint curing deficiencies if he would like to further pursue claims. A. COMPLAINT'S DEFICIENCIES The Complaint: 1. improperly names a judge as defendant, apparently without considering judicial immunity. (See below.)

2. appears to inappropriately name a prosecutor as a defendant, without considering prosecutorial immunity. (See below.)

3. possibly improperly alleges civil-rights violations on a respondeat superior theory. (See below.)

4. checks the Complaint's box "Federal officials (a Bivens claim)," when no federal officials are named as defendants.

5. possibly asserts claims attacking the validity of Plaintiff's incarceration, which should-- if at all--be timely exhausted in the state-court system before being brought in a federal habeas corpus petition, not a civil-rights complaint.

6. possibly asserts claims invalidated by the rule in Heck. (See below.)

7. does not adequately link each element of a false-arrest claim to specific, named defendant(s). See Kaufman v. Higgs, 697 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2012) ("In the context of a false-arrest claim, an arrestee's constitutional rights were violated if the arresting officer acted in the absence of probable cause that the person had committed a crime.").

8. does not adequately link each element of improper physical treatment to specific named defendant(s). (See below.)

9. does not concisely link each element of a claim of excessive force to separate individually named defendant(s). (See below.)

10. has claims apparently based on current confinement; however, the complaint appears not to have been submitted using legal help Plaintiff is constitutionally entitled to by his institution. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356 (1996) (requiring prisoners be given "'adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law' . . . to ensure that inmates . . . have a reasonably adequate opportunity to file nonfrivolous legal claims challenging their convictions or conditions of confinement") (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (emphasis added)). B. GUIDANCE FOR PLAINTIFF Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to contain "(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . .; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought." Rule 8's requirements mean to guarantee "that defendants enjoy fair notice of what the claims against them are and the grounds upon which they rest." TV Commc'ns Network, Inc. v ESPN, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1062, 1069 (D. Colo. 1991). Pro se litigants are not excused from meeting these minimal pleading demands. "This is so because a pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine whether he makes out a

claim on which relief can be granted." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Moreover, it is improper for the Court "to assume the role of advocate for a pro se litigant." Id. Thus, the Court cannot "supply additional facts, [or] construct a legal theory for plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded." Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff should consider these points before filing an amended complaint: 1. The revised complaint must stand entirely on its own and shall not refer to, or incorporate by reference, any part of the original complaint(s). See Murray v. Archambo, 132 F.3d 609, 612 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating amended complaint supersedes original). Also, an amended complaint may not be added to after filing without moving for amendment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. 2. Each defendant must be named in the complaint's caption, listed in the section of the complaint setting forth names of each defendant, and affirmatively linked to applicable claims within the "cause of action" section of the complaint. 3. The complaint must clearly state what each individual defendant--typically, a named government employee--did to violate Plaintiff's civil rights. See Bennett v. Passic, 545 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1976) (stating personal participation of each named defendant is essential allegation in civil-rights action). "To state a claim, a complaint must 'make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom.'" Stone v. Albert, 338 F. App'x 757, 759 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (cleaned up). Plaintiff should also include, as much as possible, specific dates or at least estimates of when alleged constitutional violations occurred.

4. Each cause of action, together with the facts and citations that directly support it, should be stated separately. Plaintiff should be as brief as possible while still using enough words to fully explain the "who," "what," "where," "when," and "why" of each claim. Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) ("The [Bell Atlantic Corp. v.] Twombly Court was particularly critical of complaints that 'mentioned no specific, time, place, or person involved in the alleged [claim].' [550 U.S. 544, 565] n.10 (2007). Given such a complaint, 'a defendant seeking to respond to plaintiff's conclusory allegations . . . would have little idea where to begin.' Id."). 5. Plaintiff may not name an individual as a § 1983 defendant based solely on supervisory position. See Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.2d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996). 6. Grievance denial alone, unconnected to "violation of constitutional rights alleged by plaintiff, does not establish personal participation under § 1983." Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009). 7. "No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under . . . Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C.S. § 1997e(a) (2026). However, Plaintiff need not include grievance details in the complaint. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that must be raised by defendants. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). 8. Judicial Immunity. It is well settled that judges "are absolutely immune from suit unless they act in 'clear absence of all jurisdiction,' meaning that even erroneous or malicious

acts are not proper bases for § 1983 claims." Segler v. Felfam Ltd. P'ship, 324 F. App'x 742, 743 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978)). The judge here very well may have been acting in a judicial capacity in presiding over Plaintiff’s case(s); if so, such actions are entitled to absolute immunity. See Doran v. Sanchez, 289 F. App'x 332, 332 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished). 9. Prosecutorial immunity. Prosecutors acting within the scope of their duties enjoy absolute immunity from suit under § 1983. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976). The prosecutors' acts, as alleged by Plaintiff, possibly relate to advocacy. The prosecutor defendants therefore may be entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity from this lawsuit. 10. Respondeat superior. The Supreme Court holds that, in asserting a § 1983 claim

against a government agent in an individual capacity, "a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 676 (2009). Consequently, there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. See id. ("Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution."); Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Entities may not be held liable on the sole ground of an employer-employee relationship with a claimed tortfeasor. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 689. Supervisors are considered liable for their own unconstitutional or illegal policies only, and not for employees' tortious acts. See Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307-08 (10th Cir. 1998). 11. Affirmative link. [A] plaintiff who brings a constitutional claim under § 1983 can't obtain relief without first satisfying the personal-participation requirement. That is, the plaintiff must demonstrate the defendant "personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation" at issue. Vasquez v. Davis, 882 F.3d 1270, 1275 (10th Cir. 2018). Indeed, because § 1983 is a "vehicle[] for imposing personal liability on government officials, we have stressed the need for careful attention to particulars, especially in lawsuits involving multiple defendants." Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1225 (10th Cir. 2013); see also Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1250 (explaining that when plaintiff brings § 1983 claims against multiple defendants, "it is particularly important . . . that the complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom"); Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 532-33 (10th Cir. 1998)) (holding that district court's analysis of plaintiff's § 1983 claims was "infirm" where district court "lump[ed]" together plaintiff's claims against multiple defendants--"despite the fact that each of the defendants had different powers and duties and took different actions with respect to [plaintiff]"--and "wholly failed to identify specific actions taken by particular defendants that could form the basis of [a constitutional] claim").

Estate of Roemer v. Johnson, 764 F. App'x 784, 790-91 (10th Cir. 2019). "A plaintiff's failure to satisfy this requirement will trigger swift and certain dismissal." Id. at 790 n.5. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit has "gone so far as to suggest that failure to satisfy the personal-participation requirement will not only justify dismissal for failure to state a claim; it will render the plaintiff's claim frivolous." Id. 12. Heck. Plaintiff's claims possibly include some allegations that if true may invalidate Plaintiff's incarceration. "In Heck, the Supreme Court explained that a § 1983 action that would impugn the validity of a plaintiff's [incarceration] cannot be maintained unless the [basis for incarceration] has been reversed on direct appeal or impaired by collateral proceedings." Nichols v. Baer, 315 F. App'x 738, 739 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994)). Heck keeps litigants "from using a § 1983 action, with its more lenient

pleading rules, to challenge their [incarceration] without complying with the more stringent exhaustion requirements for habeas actions." Butler v. Compton, 482 F.3d 1277, 1279 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Plaintiff argues that his constitutional rights were, in part, breached in a way that may attack Petitioner's very imprisonment. Heck requires that, if a plaintiff requests § 1983 damages, this Court must decide whether judgment for the plaintiff would unavoidably imply the invalidity of Plaintiff's incarceration. Id. at 487. Here, it appears it may. If this Court were to conclude that Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated in a prejudicial manner, it would be stating that Plaintiff's incarceration was invalid. Thus, the involved claims "must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that [a] conviction or sentence has already been invalidated." Id.

13. Inadequate physical treatment. These are the standards governing such claims: Prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). An inmate raising an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim must prove both an objective and subjective component associated with the deficiency. Id. at 834. The objective component requires conditions sufficiently serious so as to (1) deprive an inmate "of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities" or (2) subject an inmate to "a substantial risk of serious harm." Shannon v. Graves, 257 F.3d 1164, 1168 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). "The subjective component requires that a defendant prison official have a culpable state of mind, that he or she acts or fails to act with deliberate indifference to inmate health and safety." Id. To prove deliberate indifference, a prisoner must adduce sufficient facts to show the defendant knew of and disregarded "an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Under this standard, "the official must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. This high standard for imposing personal liability on prison officials (i.e., the same standard of subjective recklessness used in the criminal law) is necessary to ensure that only those prison officials that inflict punishment are liable for violating the dictates of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 835-45; see also Self v. Crum, 439 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that Farmer's "subjective component is not satisfied[] absent an extraordinary degree of neglect"); Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 191 F.3d 1281, 1286 (10th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that Farmer's deliberate indifference standard sets out a "stringent standard of fault").

Brooks v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 12 F.4th 1160, 1173 (10th Cir. 2021). 14. Excessive Force. This is general information on an excessive-force cause of action: "An excessive force claim involves two prongs: (1) an objective prong that asks if the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation, and (2) a subjective prong under which the plaintiff must show that the officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind." Redmond v. Crowther, 882 F.3d 927, 936 (10th Cir. 2018) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). An official's state of mind is sufficiently culpable "if he uses force maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm, rather than in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We have long recognized "that a prison guard, to maintain control of inmates, must often make instantaneous, on-the-spot decisions concerning the need to apply force without having to second-guess himself." Sampley v. Ruettgers, 704 F.2d 491, 496 (10th Cir. 1983). So "when prison officials must act to preserve internal order and discipline, we afford them wide-ranging deference." Redmond, 882 F.3d at 938 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although this deference does not protect "actions taken in bad faith and for no legitimate purpose," it does prevent us from substituting our "judgment for that of officials who have made a considered choice." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Lehman v McKinnon, No. 20-1312, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 27250, at *5-6 (10th Cir. Sept. 10, 2021) (unpublished). C. ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 1. Plaintiff must within thirty days cure the Complaint's deficiencies noted above by filing a document entitled, "Amended Complaint," that does not refer to or include any other document. Dkt. No. 4. 2. The Clerk's Office shall mail Plaintiff the Pro Se Litigant Guide with a blank-form civil-rights complaint which Plaintiff must use to pursue an amended complaint. 3. If Plaintiff fails to timely cure the above deficiencies according to this Order's instructions, this action will be dismissed without further notice. 4. The amended complaint shall not include any claims outside the dates and allegations of transactions and events contained in the Complaint. Id. The Court will not address any such new claims or outside allegations, which will be dismissed. If Plaintiff wishes to raise other claims and allegations, Plaintiff may do so only in a new complaint in a new case. If an amended complaint is filed, the Court will screen each claim and defendant for dismissal or an order effecting service upon valid defendants who are affirmatively linked to valid claims. 5. Plaintiff must tell the Court of any address change and timely comply with Court orders. See D. Utah Civ. R. 83-1.6(b) ("An unrepresented party must immediately notify the Clerk's Office in writing of any name, mailing address, or email address changes."). Failure to do so may result in this action's dismissal for failure to prosecute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) ("If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it. Unless the dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) and any dismissal not under this rule--except one for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19--operates as an adjudication

on the merits."). 6. Extensions of time are disfavored, though reasonable extensions may be granted. Any motion for time extension must be filed no later than fourteen days before the deadline to be extended. 7. No direct communication is to take place with any judge. All relevant information, letters, documents, and papers, labeled with case number, are to be directed to the court clerk. 8. Plaintiff must observe this District of Utah local rule: "A party proceeding without an attorney (unrepresented party or pro se party) is obligated to comply with: (1) the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) these Local Rules of Practice; (3) the Utah Standards of Professionalism and Civility; and (4) other laws and rules relevant to the action." DUCivR 83-1.6(a). DATED this 4" day of June 2026. BY THE COURT: TDL K eee JUDGE DALE A. KIMBAL United States District Court