CASCELLA v. Canaveral Port Authority

District Court of Appeal of Florida

CASCELLA v. Canaveral Port Authority

6 So. 3d 696, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 2269, 2009 WL 722066

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedMarch 20, 2009

Docket5D08-1437

StatusPublished

This text of 6 So. 3d 696 (CASCELLA v. Canaveral Port Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

CASCELLA v. Canaveral Port Authority, 6 So. 3d 696, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 2269, 2009 WL 722066 (Fla. Ct. App. 2009).

Pincite

Opinion

GRIFFIN, J.

Raymond Cascella [“Cascella”] appeals the trial court’s summary final judgment in favor of the Canaveral Port Authority [“CPA”]. On appeal, Cascella argues that the trial court erred because a material issue of fact existed as to whether he had a leasehold interest in real property to transfer through assignment.

In prior bankruptcy proceedings, there had been a specific finding of the Bankruptcy Court that the lease at issue was validly terminated prior to April 6, 1999, thereby invalidating Cascella’s effort to assign the lease in 2001. We understand Cascella’s argument why the lease was not terminated and was subject to assignment; however, the unexplained source of the subsequent events on which he relies appears to be due to some arcanum of bankruptcy law or an incomplete record. Even if the bankruptcy order were not disposi-tive, the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of CPA because, under the facts, it did not, as a matter of law, unreasonably withhold consent. See Sun First Nat’l Bank v. Grinnell, 416 So.2d 829 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).

AFFIRMED.

LAWSON and COHEN, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

GRIFFIN, J.

Raymond Cascella [“Cascella”] appeals the trial court’s summary final judgment in favor of the Canaveral Port Authority [“CPA”]. On appeal, Cascella argues that the trial court erred because a material issue of fact existed as to whether he had a leasehold interest in real property to transfer through assignment.

In prior bankruptcy proceedings, there had been a specific finding of the Bankruptcy Court that the lease at issue was validly terminated prior to April 6, 1999, thereby invalidating Cascella’s effort to assign the lease in 2001. We understand Cascella’s argument why the lease was not terminated and was subject to assignment; however, the unexplained source of the subsequent events on which he relies appears to be due to some arcanum of bankruptcy law or an incomplete record. Even if the bankruptcy order were not disposi-tive, the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of CPA because, under the facts, it did not, as a matter of law, unreasonably withhold consent. See Sun First Nat’l Bank v. Grinnell, 416 So.2d 829 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).

AFFIRMED.

LAWSON and COHEN, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

6 So. 3d 696, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 2269, 2009 WL 722066, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cascella-v-canaveral-port-authority-fladistctapp-2009.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack