Casas-Lucas v. Bondi

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedOctober 22, 2025
Docket24-6723
StatusUnpublished

This text of Casas-Lucas v. Bondi (Casas-Lucas v. Bondi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Casas-Lucas v. Bondi, (9th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 22 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ELISABET DEL PILAR CASAS- No. 24-6723 LUCAS; JHOSTIN ARMANDO Agency Nos. DELGADO-CASAS; AIRTHON YOHAO A240-515-934 DELGADO-CASAS; GENCCO ADRIANO A240-515-759 DELGADO-CASAS, A240-515-933 A240-515-760 Petitioners,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 20, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: GOULD, OWENS, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

Elisabet Del Pilar Casas-Lucas (“Casas-Lucas”) and her three children

(collectively, “Petitioners”) petition this court to vacate the Board of Immigration

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order denying

Petitioners’ applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under

the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8

U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition.

1. “Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning, we review

both decisions.” Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1016 (9th Cir.

2023) (citing Garcia-Martinez v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 2018)).

We review the denial of an application for asylum and withholding of removal for

substantial evidence. Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2021). The

substantial evidence standard is deferential, allowing reversal only when “any

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”

Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 703 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting

Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) (emphasis added)).

2. “To be eligible for asylum, a petitioner has the burden to demonstrate

a likelihood of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of

race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political

opinion.” Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1059 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that the abuse Casas-Lucas

faces from the father of her children, Armando Delgado Vasquez, rises to the level

of “persecution” but is due to Armando’s drug use and financial disputes, not due

2 24-6723 to Casas-Lucas’s gender or her membership in any particular social group.1

Because of this lack of nexus to a protected social group, Petitioner Casas-Lucas

cannot prevail on her claims for asylum or withholding of removal.

Simiarly, the agency’s conclusion that anonymous extortionary threats

Casas-Lucas received on her motorcycle taxi were not sufficient to constitute

“persecution” in order to sustain a remedy for asylum or withholding of removal is

supported by substantial evidence. We have recognized that “[p]ersecution is an

extreme concept,” Kaur v. Wilkinson, 986 F.3d 1216, 1222 (9th Cir. 2021)

(citations omitted), and as such, “does not include every sort of treatment our

society regards as offensive.” Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995)

(citations omitted). We have recognized that threats alone “are very rarely

sufficient to rise to the level of persecution,” Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 647

(9th Cir. 2021), but that we “generally look at all of the surrounding circumstances

to determine whether . . . threats are actually credible and rise to the level of

persecution.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019). The

1 We decline to address Petitioners’ three new proposed particular social groups raised for the first time on appeal because Petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies in raising these arguments before the IJ and BIA. See Yanez Guzman v. Garland, No. 22-966, 2024 WL 687451, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 20, 2024) (finding failure to exhaust newly raised social group under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)). Regardless, the agency considered, sua sponte, Casas-Lucas’s membership in a potential gender-based social group and properly found that any abuse she suffers from Armando is not due to gender.

3 24-6723 record supports the agency’s conclusion that these threats, in context, do not rise to

the level of “persecution” we have required in the past. Because we are not

compelled to hold otherwise, we affirm the agency’s denial of asylum and

withholding of removal. See Villegas Sanchez v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1173, 1179

(9th Cir. 2021) (“Mere threats, without more, do not necessarily compel a finding

of past persecution.”).

3. Finally, we decline to address Petitioners’ CAT claim. Petitioners did

not file a timely appeal brief before the BIA, and the BIA reviewed only those

arguments and claims that were raised in Petitioners’ Notice of Appeal. Abebe v.

Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, 1208 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (per curiam) (finding that

when a petitioner fails to file a brief before the BIA, then “the notice of appeal

serves in lieu of a brief, and [the petitioner] will be deemed to have exhausted all

issues raised therein”). Because Petitioners did not substantively address the CAT

claim, the BIA deemed the claim waived. We decline to review a claim when that

claim has not been exhausted before the administrative agency. See 8 U.S.C. §

1252(d)(1) (“A court may review a final order of removal only if the [noncitizen]

has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the [noncitizen] as of

right”); see also Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 417-19 (2023) (holding

§ 1252(d)(1) to be a non-jurisdictional but mandatory claim processing rule).

4 24-6723 PETITION DENIED.2

2 The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues. The motion for stay of removal is otherwise denied. See Dkt. No. 2.

5 24-6723

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Related

Abebe v. Mukasey
554 F.3d 1203 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)
Jose Garcia-Martinez v. Jefferson Sessions
886 F.3d 1291 (Ninth Circuit, 2018)
Jose Duran-Rodriguez v. William Barr
918 F.3d 1025 (Ninth Circuit, 2019)
Santos-Zacaria v. Garland
598 U.S. 411 (Supreme Court, 2023)

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