Casa Libre Freedom House v. Alejandro Mayorkas

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: October 16, 2024
• Docket: 2:22-cv-01510
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

O 1

6 7 United States District Court 8 Central District of California 9 10 11 CASA LIBRE/FREEDOM HOUSE et al., Case № 2:22-cv-01510-ODW (JPRx)

12 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 13 v. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF 14 ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS et al., CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT [122] [132] 15 Defendants. 16

17 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 This is a class action challenging how the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 20 (“DHS”) and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) handle and 21 process Special Immigrant Juvenile (“SIJ”) petitions. Plaintiffs are individuals who 22 submitted SIJ petitions to USCIS and organizations that provided assistance to such 23 individuals. The Court certified a class for Plaintiffs’ challenge to regulations that allow 24 USCIS in certain circumstances to suspend the statutory 180-day deadline for 25 adjudicating SIJ petitions. (Order Certify Class 20, ECF No. 91.) The Court granted 26 in part and denied in part the cross motions for summary judgment, including issuing 27 declaratory relief in favor of Plaintiffs. (Order Summ. J. 28, ECF No. 110.) The parties 28 then reached a settlement for attorney’s fees. (Mot. Prelim. Approval (“Motion” or 1 “Mot.”) 1, ECF No. 132.) The parties now move for preliminary approval of the class 2 action settlement for attorney’s fees. (Id.) For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS 3 the parties’ joint Motion.1 4 II. BACKGROUND 5 In 1990, Congress created the SIJ classification to aid noncitizen children present 6 in the United States who were declared dependent on state courts and were eligible for 7 long-term foster care. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–649, § 153, 104 Stat. 8 4978 (1990). The SIJ statute provides that “[a]ll applications for [SIJ] status . . . shall 9 be adjudicated . . . not later than 180 days after the date on which the application is 10 filed.” 8 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(2). 11 Pursuant to regulations, USCIS adheres to the following procedure with respect 12 to the 180-day deadline (the “Tolling Provisions”): 13  When an SIJ petition lacks required initial evidence, USCIS may send a Request 14 for Evidence (“RFE”) informing the petitioner what evidence is required. 15 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(8)(ii). The 180-day time period re-starts on the date USCIS 16 receives the required initial evidence. Id. §§ 103.2(b)(10)(i), 204.11(g)(1). 17  USCIS may send the petitioner an RFE or a Notice of Intent to Deny (“NOID”) 18 to request that the SIJ petition submit additional evidence. Id. § 103.2(b)(8)(iii). 19 The 180-day deadline is suspended, or “tolled,” as of the date the RFE or NOID 20 is issued and resumes when USCIS receives the requested additional evidence. 21 Id. § 103.2(b)(10)(i). 22 For SIJ petitions filed between January 1, 2020, and June 29, 2023, USCIS’s average 23 processing time to adjudicate SIJ petitions was 205 days, which is 25 days beyond the 24 180-day deadline. (Order Summ. J. 7.) 25 Plaintiffs alleged that USCIS’s policies violate the Fifth Amendment’s equal 26 protection guarantee by failing to provide SIJ petitioners with employment 27

28 1 After carefully considering the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 authorization before and after USCIS approves their petitions, unlike USCIS’s policy 2 with other visa applicants. (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶¶ 106, ECF No. 34.) Plaintiffs 3 also challenged USCIS policies as violating the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). 4 First, Plaintiffs challenged “Defendants’ policy and practice of delaying the 5 adjudication of SIJ petitions for longer than 180 days” (the “Missed Deadline Claim”). 6 (Id. ¶ 109.) Second, they challenged the Tolling Provisions themselves. (Id.) Plaintiffs 7 sought a declaration that these USCIS policies are unlawful, and a permanent injunction 8 enjoining Defendants from following these policies. (Id., Prayer ¶¶ 3–4.) 9 On October 26, 2022, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim. 10 (Order Mot. Dismiss 17, ECF No. 48.) On May 25, 2023, the Court certified the 11 following class under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule” or “Rules”) 23(b)(2) 12 and 23(b)(3), only for purposes of the Tolling Provision: 13 All Special Immigrant Juvenile petitioners, except as to members of the 14 certified class in the case entitled Moreno-Galvez v. Cuccinelli, Case No. C19-0321RSL (U.S. District Court for the Western District of 15 Washington), who have submitted or will submit Petitions for Amerasian, 16 Widow(er), or Special Immigrant (Form I-360) (“SIJ Petitions”) with the USCIS, and whose SIJ Petitions were not or in the future are not 17 adjudicated within 180 days of being filed, including but not limited to 18 petitioners who were issued a Request for Evidence or a Notice of Intent to Deny causing delay in the processing of their SIJ Petitions pursuant to 19 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(g)(1). 20 21 (Order Certify Class 27.) The Court also appointed Peter Schey and Sarah Kahn of the 22 Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law as class counsel (“Class Counsel”), 23 and Carlos Abel Hernandez Arevalo and Rene Isai Serrano Montes as class 24 representatives (“Class Representatives”). (Id. at 28.) 25 On July 31, 2023, the Court ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment. 26 (Order Summ. J.) Although the Court dismissed the Missed Deadline Claim, it found 27 that the Tolling Provisions violate the APA. (Id. 13.) In so ruling, the Court issued 28 declaratory, but not injunctive, relief to the Plaintiffs. (Id. 28.) Both parties appealed. 1 (Defs.’ Notice Appeal, ECF No. 116; Pls.’ Notice Appeal, ECF No. 118.) On 2 December 12, 2023, the Ninth Circuit approved the parties’ voluntary dismissal of the 3 cross-appeals. (Order 9th Cir., ECF No. 121.) The Court’s order on the cross-motions 4 for summary judgment thus became final. 5 On January 11, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney’s fees seeking a 6 $607,885.43 award in attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice 7 Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. (Mot. Att’y Fees (“MAF”) 2, 11–12, ECF No. 122.) 8 On July 4, 2024, the parties agreed to settle Plaintiffs’ claims under the EAJA (the 9 “Proposed Settlement”). (Mot., Ex. 1 (“Settlement Agreement”), ECF No. 132-1.) The 10 parties now seek preliminary approval of the Proposed Settlement awarding Class 11 Counsel $350,000.00 in attorney’s fees, expenses, and taxable costs. (Mot. 3.) 12 III. TERMS OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT 13 Under the Proposed Settlement, Plaintiffs and Class Counsel release Defendants 14 “from any and all claims by Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ Counsel for or arising from 15 attorney’s fees for work that has been performed or payment or reimbursement of 16 expenses or costs that have been incurred in connection with this Action.” (Settlement 17 Agreement § III.2.) They also release claims “under [the] EAJA and any other basis 18 for seeking payment of fees and expenses that have been incurred in the Action, 19 including fees and costs expended in reaching this Agreement.” (Id.) In consideration 20 for these releases, Defendants will pay Class Counsel $350,000 “for costs, attorneys’ 21 fees and litigation expenses incurred in connection with the Action.” (Id. § III.1.) 22 IV. LEGAL STANDARD 23 Under the EAJA, a court must “award attorney’s fees to an eligible prevailing 24 party in a civil suit brought against the United States unless the government’s position 25 is substantially justified or special circumstances make an award unjust.” Love v. Reilly, 26 924 F.2d 1492, 1494 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)). 27 “The claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class . . . may be settled . . . only 28 with the court’s approval.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). “If the proposal would bind class 1 members, the court may approve it only after a hearing and only on finding that it is 2 fair, reasonable, and adequate. . . . ” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). 3 Courts scrutinize class action settlements “to protect the unnamed members of 4 the class from unjust or unfair settlements affecting their rights.” In re Syncor ERISA 5 Litig., 516 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008). Nonetheless, “there is a strong judicial 6 policy that favors settlements, particularly where complex class action litigation is 7 concerned.” Id. at 1101. Once a court preliminarily approves the settlement, the court 8 “must direct appropriate notice to the class” and grant final approval “only after a 9 hearing.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(A), (B)(2). With respect to a settlement of a class 10 certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the “court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to 11 all class members who would be bound by the proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B). 12 V. DISCUSSION 13 The Court first considers whether it may grant preliminary approval for the 14 Proposed Settlement. (See Settlement Agreement.) The Court then reviews whether 15 the class notice (“Proposed Class Notice”) is sufficient. (See Mot. 1, Ex. 2 (“Proposed 16 Class Notice”), ECF No. 132-2.) 17 A. Preliminary Settlement Approval 18 In class actions, courts may approve a settlement agreement only when the 19 settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). “At the 20 preliminary approval stage, the court evaluate[s] the terms of the settlement to 21 determine whether they are within a range of possible judicial approval.” Spann v. J.C. 22 Penny Corp., 314 F.R.D. 312, 319 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (alteration in original) (internal 23 quotation marks omitted). At this stage, a “full fairness analysis is unnecessary” 24 because the court must hold a hearing before giving final approval. Grady v. RCM 25 Techs. Inc., 671 F. Supp. 3d 1065, 1072 (C.D. Cal. 2023). Thus, “the settlement need 26 only be potentially fair.” Acosta v. Trans Union, LLC, 243 F.R.D. 377, 386 (C.D. Cal. 27 2007). Ultimately, “[t]he initial decision to approve or reject a settlement proposal is 28 1 committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Officers for Just. v. Civ. Serv. 2 Comm’n of S.F., 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982). 3 To determine whether a settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate,” courts 4 consider the following factors: whether “(A) the class representatives and class counsel 5 have adequately represented the class; (B) the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length; 6 (C) the relief provided for the class is adequate . . . ; and (D) the proposal treats class 7 members equitably relative to each other.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2), Lalli v. First Team 8 Real Est.—Orange Cnty., No. 8:20-cv-00027-JWH (ADSx), 2022 WL 8207530, at *3 9 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2022). 10 1. Adequate Class Representation 11 Having previously found that Class Counsel and Class Representatives were 12 adequate representatives for purposes of class certification, (Order Certify Class 18–19, 13 28), the Court now finds that Class Counsel and Class Representatives adequately 14 represented the class. See In re Snap Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 2:17-cv-03679-SVW, 15 2021 WL 667590, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2021) (finding adequate representation 16 where court had previously appointed class representatives and class counsel and both 17 had “prosecuted the case with diligence and success”). 18 Class Counsel engaged the class throughout the litigation by, for example, 19 providing “case summaries and updates in English and Spanish,” bringing Class 20 Representatives and a translator to settlement negotiations, and “holding community 21 meetings to solicit input from stakeholders.” (Mot. 7.) Moreover, Class Counsel and 22 Class Representatives delivered a favorable outcome on summary judgment in the form 23 of declaratory relief. (See Order Summ. J. 28.) Therefore, at this preliminary approval 24 stage, the Court finds adequate class representation. 25 2. Negotiated at Arm’s Length 26 In evaluating a proposed settlement, courts focus on whether “the agreement is 27 not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating 28 parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all 1 concerned.” Officers for Just., 688 F.2d at 625. A court may preliminarily approve a 2 settlement if the proposed settlement, among other things “appears to be the product of 3 serious, informed, non-collusive negotiations, [and] has no obvious deficiencies.” In re 4 Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2007). Where 5 attorney’s fees originate from a common recovery fund that feeds monetary relief to 6 class members, courts assess the fees with more skepticism because of the “potential 7 for conflict in the allocation.” Lopez-Venegas v. Johnson, No. 2:13-cv-03972-JAK 8 (PLAx), 2015 WL 13916876, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2015); cf. Knisley v. Network 9 Assocs., Inc., 312 F.3d 1123, 1125 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that one of the risks of class 10 action settlement is that “class counsel may collude with the defendants, tacitly reducing 11 the overall settlement in return for a higher attorney’s fee”). 12 The parties entered settlement negotiations after this Court issued declaratory 13 relief. (Mot. 8.) Settlement negotiations continued for four months and included 14 “various emails discussing the strengths of Plaintiffs’ claims and Defendants’ 15 defenses.” (Id. at 7–8.) The Court has not been presented with any facts suggesting 16 fraud, overreaching, or collusion. In fact, the risk of collusion is not high because 17 Plaintiffs lack monetary relief, and Class Counsel’s compensation does not originate 18 from a common fund. Cf. Lopez-Venegas, 2015 WL 13916876, at *9 (approving 19 attorney’s fee award where fees were not paid from common fund). Therefore, for the 20 purpose of preliminary approval of the settlement, the Court finds the parties negotiated 21 the Proposed Settlement at arm’s length. 22 3. Adequate Relief for the Class 23 To determine whether “relief provided for the class is adequate,” courts consider 24 “(i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal; (ii) the effectiveness of any proposed 25 method of distributing relief to the class . . .; (iii) the terms of any proposed award of 26 attorney’s fees, including timing of payment;” and (iv) any agreement made in 27 connection with the proposal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(C); Lalli, 2022 WL 8207530, 28 at *4. Further, “the Ninth Circuit asks district courts to undertake an additional search 1 for more subtle signs that class counsel have allowed pursuit of their own self-interests 2 and that of certain class members to infect the negotiations.” Lalli, 2022 WL 8207530, 3 at *3. (internal quotation marks omitted). This additional search requires courts to 4 consider: “(1) whether counsel ‘receive[d] a disproportionate distribution of the 5 settlement’; (2) whether the parties agreed to a ‘clear sailing arrangement’; and 6 (3) whether the settlement includes a ‘kicker’ or ‘reverter’ clause.” Id. (alteration in 7 original) (quoting Briseño v. Henderson, 998 F.3d 1014, 1023 (9th Cir. 2021)). 8 First, the Court finds that the costs, risks, and delay of appeal favor preliminary 9 approval of the Proposed Settlement—without a settlement, there is a substantial risk 10 that the parties will expend resources litigating attorney’s fees. (See MAF 2, 11–12 11 (requesting $607,885.43 in fees).) Second, because the class received declaratory—not 12 monetary—relief, the Court has no concerns with the effectiveness of distributing relief 13 to the class. Third, the parties submitted the agreement as required under the fourth 14 element. (See Settlement Agreement.) 15 There is also no indication of foul play in the negotiations by Class Counsel. The 16 Proposed Settlement does not contain a kicker or a reverter clause. The Proposed 17 Settlement includes a clear sailing arrangement whereby Defendants agree to support 18 the request for attorney’s fees. (See Settlemet Agreement III.5.) However, this is not 19 cause for concern because the settlement only relates to payment of attorney’s fees that 20 do not reduce recovery for the class. For the same reason, there is no unfair distribution 21 of the settlement to class members. Therefore, negotiations do not contain “subtle 22 signs” that Class Counsel may have prioritized their gains over those of the class 23 members. See Lalli, 2022 WL 8207530, at *3. 24 The analysis thus turns to determining whether the Proposed Settlement provides 25 adequate relief to the class. The parties agreed to settle the EAJA claims for attorney’s 26 fees. (Mot. 4.) If the EAJA supports the requested relief, then the Proposed Settlement 27 is adequate. Under the EAJA, a court must “award attorney’s fees to an eligible 28 prevailing party in a civil suit brought against the United States unless the government’s 1 position is substantially justified or special circumstances make an award unjust.” Love, 2 924 F.2d at 1494 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)). 3 a. Eligible Party 4 Parties eligible for attorney’s fees under the EAJA include “individual[s] whose 5 net worth did not exceed $2,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed” or “any owner 6 of an . . . organization” with less than 500 employees and no more than $7,000,000 in 7 net worth at the time the civil action was filed. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). 8 In this case, class members are indigent juvenile immigrants, less than twenty- 9 one years old, who are ineligible for employment, and therefore qualify as an eligible 10 party under the EAJA. See (Order Certify Class 27 (defining class to include SIJ 11 petitioners)); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (defining “special immigrant”). The 12 organizational Plaintiff seeking attorney’s fees—Casa Libre—qualifies under this 13 second classification because it is a non-profit organization with less than $7,000,000 14 in net worth and no full-time employees. (See MAF Ex. 1 (“Decl. Peter Schey ISO 15 MAF” or “Decl. Schey”) ¶ 9, ECF No. 122-1.) Plaintiffs are thus eligible parties under 16 the EAJA. 17 b. Prevailing Party 18 To meet the EAJA “prevailing party” standard, a party must show that a court’s 19 “actions resulted in a ‘material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties’ and . . . 20 the alteration was ‘judicially sanctioned’” to the party’s benefit. Li v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 21 913, 917 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t 22 of Heath & Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604–05 (2001)). A “party need not succeed on 23 every claim in order to prevail.” Rosebrock v. Beiter, No. 2:10-cv-01878-SJO (SSx), 24 2015 WL 13709619, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2015) (quoting Carbonell v. INS, 25 429 F.3d 894, 900 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing plaintiff as a prevailing party 26 because he “received much of the relief he sought in the district court”)). 27 Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief. (See FAC, Prayer ¶¶ 3–4.) 28 The Court awarded Plaintiffs declaratory relief on one of its claims. (See Order Summ. 1 J. 28.) This “judicially sanctioned” outcome created a “material alteration of the 2 [parties’] legal relationship.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc., 532 U.S. at 604–05. 3 Therefore, Plaintiffs are a “prevailing party” for purposes of the EAJA. See Rosebrock, 4 2015 WL 13709619, at *6, 8 (finding plaintiff to be a “prevailing party” under the 5 EAJA where the court granted declaratory, but not injunctive, relief). 6 c. Substantially Justified Position 7 Once the movant establishes that it is a prevailing party, “[t]he burden of proving 8 the special circumstances or substantial justification exception to the mandatory award 9 of fees under the EAJA rests with the government.” Love, 924 F.2d at 1495. If 10 Defendants “do not oppose” the EAJA fee motion, “the Court need not decide whether 11 Defendants meet this burden.” Hernandez v. Garland, No. 5:16-cv-00620-JGB (KKx), 12 2022 WL 1176752, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2022). Here, Defendants agree to the 13 Proposed Settlement, join the Motion, and do not assert that their position was 14 substantially justified. Therefore, Defendants do not establish that an exception applies. 15 d. Reasonableness of Attorney’s Fees and Costs 16 Courts apply the lodestar method “to determine what constitutes a reasonable fee 17 award under the EAJA.” Costa v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1135 18 (9th Cir. 2012). To calculate the lodestar figure, courts “multipl[y] the number of hours 19 the prevailing party reasonably spent on litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Kim v. 20 Allison, 8 F.4th 1170, 1180 (9th Cir. 2021). Courts may adjust this figure “by an 21 appropriate positive or negative multiplier reflecting a host of ‘reasonableness’ factors.” 22 In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 941–42 (9th Cir. 2011). 23 EAJA attorney rates are based on “prevailing market rates for the kind and quality 24 of the services furnished, except that . . . attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of 25 $125 per hour.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). Nonetheless, courts may “determine[] that 26 an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of 27 qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.” Id.; Thangaraja 28 v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 876–77 (9th Cir. 2005) (awarding cost-of-living increase). 1 The Ninth Circuit provides guidance on rates adjusted for “an increase in the cost of 2 living” (“Adjusted Rates”). See Statutory Maximum Rates Under the Equal Access to 3 Justice Act, U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit, https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/attorneys/ 4 statutory-maximum-rates/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2024) [hereinafter EAJA Maximum 5 Rates]. Courts may also adjust rates “if there was a limited availability of attorneys 6 having some distinctive knowledge or specialized skill needful for the litigation.” Love, 7 924 F.2d at 1496 (internal quotation marks omitted). 8 Plaintiffs submitted detailed timesheets that show Class Counsel worked 9 1,063.10 hours. (Decl. Schey ¶ 12, Exs. C (“Schey’s Timesheet”), D (“Other Attorney 10 Timesheets”), ECF No. 122-1.) Under the Adjusted Rates, Class Counsel would be 11 entitled to $256,016.10 in attorney’s fees.2 (Id.); see EAJA Maximum Rates. Prior to 12 the settlement, Plaintiffs asked for a special adjustment to lead counsel Schey’s hourly 13 rates: from $217.54 to $1,100 in 2021, $234.95 to $1,200 in 2022, and $244.62 to 14 $1,300 in 2023. (See MAF 8–11.) The Court need not—and does not—decide whether 15 Schey is entitled to this high of an adjustment. Instead, the Court need only decide 16 whether Schey is entitled to an hourly rate of $513.34 to get to the $350,000 agreed- 17 upon amount.3 18 Because this rate is neither contested nor outside of the Court’s discretion, and 19 Class Counsel has shown that there is limited availability of attorneys having some 20 distinctive knowledge or specialized skill needful for this litigation and available at the 21 statutory rate, (see MAF 9–10); Love, 924 F.2d at 1496, the Court finds the hourly rate 22 “within the range of possible approval,” In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 23 2d at 1079; see e.g., Flores v. Barr, No. 2:85-cv-4544-DMG (AGRx), 2019 WL 24 2 The breakdown is as follows: 25 2021: $3,839.58 (17.65 hours at $217.54 per hour); 2022: $86,532.09 (368.3 hours at $234.95 per hour); and 26 2023: $165,644.43 (677.15 hours at $244.62 per hour). 3 Under the Adjusted Rates, Class Counsel would be entitled to $256,016.10 in attorney’s fees. See 27 EAJA Maximum Rates. Schey worked 341.02 hours on this case. (Schey’s Timesheet.) Therefore, to 28 make up the $93,983.90 difference from the Adjusted Rates to requested fees, Schey would need to be credited with an hourly rate of $513.34. (See Schey’s Timesheet); EAJA Maximum Rates. 1 7171539, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2019) (approving $950 hourly rate for Schey 2 because he is “uniquely positioned” to litigate the case); Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 3 938, 966 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that “the court need not inquire into the reasonableness 4 of the fees even at the high end with precisely the same level of scrutiny as when the 5 fee amount is litigated”). 6 For the foregoing reasons, the Proposed Settlement provides adequate relief to 7 the class. 8 4. Equitable Treatment of Class Members 9 Lastly, the Court must ensure that “the proposal treats class members equitably 10 relative to each other.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(D). A court may preliminarily approve 11 a settlement and direct notice to the class if “the proposed settlement . . . does not 12 improperly grant preferential treatment to class representatives or segments of the 13 class.” In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d at 1079. Because the Proposed 14 Settlement makes no distinctions among class members, the Court finds that the 15 Proposed Settlement treats class members equitably relative to each other. Therefore, 16 the Court finds that the Proposed Settlement is within the range of possible judicial 17 approval, and preliminary approves the Proposed Settlement. 18 B. Sufficiency of Notice 19 To evaluate a class settlement notice, the Court must analyze the notice type and 20 the notice content. The Court finds the Proposed Class Notice sufficient. 21 1. Type of Notice 22 Once a court determines it is likely to approve a class settlement, it “must direct 23 notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound by the 24 proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(B). Defendants plan to post the Proposed Class 25 Notice, in English and in Spanish, to the USCIS website for at least twenty days. 26 (Mot. 11–12; see Settlement Agreement § III.5.) Plaintiffs will also post a copy on 27 Class Counsel’s website for the same duration. (Mot. 11–12; see Settlement Agreement 28 1 § III.5.) The Court finds, under the circumstances of this case, the notice reasonable for 2 class members. 3 2. Content of Notice 4 The Court certified the class under Rule 23(b)(2) for injunctive and declaratory 5 relief, and subsequently granted the declaratory relief on summary judgment. (Order 6 Certify Class 27; Order Summ. J. 28.) For a class certified under Rule 23(b)(2), the 7 Court “may direct appropriate notice to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A). 8 Here, the parties sufficiently describe the nature of the action, the class certified, 9 claims, and the issues in the action. (See Proposed Class Notice 1.) The parties will 10 also inform class members of rights waived to bring claims “arising from attorneys’ 11 fees . . . in connection with this lawsuit.” (Id. at 2.) Moreover, the parties will instruct 12 opposing class members to submit objections in writing within thirty days of the Court’s 13 preliminary approval. (Id. at 2–3.) Therefore, the Court finds Proposed Class Notice 14 sufficient. 15 VI. CONCLUSION 16 The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval. (ECF 17 No. 132.) The Court (1) preliminary approves the Proposed Settlement and 18 (2) approves the form and method of the parties’ Proposed Class Notice, provided that, 19 in lieu of the last paragraph of the Proposed Class Notice, the parties include the date, 20 time, and place of the Final Approval Hearing in the notice. Accordingly, the Court 21 DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorney’s Fees, (ECF No. 122.), as moot. 22 The Final Approval Hearing shall be held on December 16, 2024, at 1:30 p.m., 23 at the United States Courthouse, 350 West First Street, Courtroom 5D, Los Angeles, 24 CA 90012. No later than five (5) days after the objection deadline provided in the 25 Proposed Class Notice, the parties shall file with the Court any objections received or a 26 notice that no objections were received. No later than thirty-five (35) days before the 27 Final Approval Hearing, Plaintiffs shall file with the Court a motion for final approval 28 of the settlement along with an application for attorney’s fees and costs in accordance 1 || with Rule 23(h). If any opposition is filed, either party may file a reply in support of 2 || the motion for final approval of the settlement no later than fourteen (14) days before 3 || the Final Approval Hearing. 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 7 October 16, 2024 . g et Ae 10 OTIS D. GHT, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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