Carver v. Hanover Township School District

17 Pa. D. & C. 116, 1932 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 98
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Luzerne County
DecidedAugust 12, 1932
DocketNo. 7
StatusPublished

This text of 17 Pa. D. & C. 116 (Carver v. Hanover Township School District) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Luzerne County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carver v. Hanover Township School District, 17 Pa. D. & C. 116, 1932 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 98 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932).

Opinion

Valentine, J.,

— This is a taxpayers’ hill, praying that the levy adopted by the school directors of the defendant school district for the fiscal year beginning July, 1932, and ending July, 1933, he reduced from 13.1 mills to 9.3 mills.

[118]*118The necessity for a prompt decision has required us to dispose of the application in the absence of the record of the testimony; nor does the time at our disposal permit an extended discussion of the various items attacked.

Plaintiffs’ contentions may be summarized with the statement (a) that in the preparation of the budget the defendant officials failed to take into consideration certain assets of the school district, and (b) that certain positions designated in the budget are unnecessary and, in other instances, the amounts designated are unreasonable and excessive.

The relief sought is based upon the allegations that the defendant directors “have abused the discretion reposed in them by law, have acted arbitrarily and capriciously, have been actuated by motives other than the public welfare, and in preparing said budget and making said levy have not acted in good faith, and, in effect, have committed a fraud on the taxpayers of said school district.”

Abuse of discretion usually springs from improper influences, a disregard of duty, or a violation of law: Hibbs v. Arensberg, 276 Pa. 24, 27. If the facts admit of no other conclusion than that the determination of the board has been influenced by other considerations than the public interest, no matter what these may be, the law will regard it as an abuse of discretion: Lamb v. Redding, 234 Pa. 481, 484.

The preparation of the budget is provided for by section 563 of the School Code, as amended, which stipulates:

“The board of school directors of each school district of the . . third . . class shall, annually, at or before the time of levying the annual school taxes, prepare a budget of the amount of funds that will be required by the school district in its several departments for the following fiscal year. Such budget shall be apportioned to the several classes of expenditures of the district as the board of school directors thereof may determine; and thereafter no moneys apportioned for any class of expenditures shall be used for purposes other than designated for said class in said budget until after affirmative action by the board of directors at a legal meeting. The total amount of such budget shall not exceed the amount of funds, including the proposed annual tax levy and State appropriation, available for school purposes in that district.”

The levying of school taxes is regulated by section 537, as amended, which provides:

“In all school districts of the . . third . . class, all school taxes shall be levied and assessed by the board of school directors therein, during the month of April or May each year, for the ensuing fiscal year; and in school districts of the second class shall not exceed twenty mills on the dollar, and in school districts of the third and fourth class shall not exceed twenty-five mills on the dollar, on the total amount of the assessed valuation of all property taxable for school purposes therein: Provided, that each school district of the second, ■ third or fourth class may also collect a per capita tax on each resident or inhabitant of such district over twenfy-one years of age, as herein provided.”

Defendants’ contention that “there can be no abuse of discretion in budgeting any amount unless an excessive amount is spent” may be disposed of with the observation that such conclusion would afford no relief to an overburdened taxpayer, faced with an abnormally high levy, which would produce more funds than were needed.

(a) The amounts which plaintiffs allege should be added as resources are (1) amount of taxes on real estate which a majority of the defendant directors undertook to abate or exonerate, viz., $3292.17; (2) the amount owed by [119]*119the tax collector, $3808.53, and (3) the amount in the treasury in excess of $35,000 (the sum set forth in the budget as being the balance on hand as of July 4, 1932), viz., $15,593.44.

1. The so-called abatements constituted an attempt on the part of the majority of the members of the school board to relieve the owners of real estate from liability for the payment of taxes assessed thereon. They lack legal authority to take such action.

2. The tax collector admitted owing the district $3808.53, and the amounts embraced in the first and second items should be added to the balance on hand.

3. The treasurer’s report submitted on July 1st showed cash on hand amounting to $50,593.14, the fiscal year ending July 5th. At a meeting held on that date, bills amounting to $8942.44 were paid. After deducting the amount of these bills, the balance on hand at the end of the fiscal year was $41,664.20, in addition to the sum of $989 which represented the balance in the special pay-roll fund, making a total of $42,653.20. Thus the amount actually on hand in excess of the amount of $35,000 as set forth in the budget was $7653.20. While we are unable to conclude that a failure to estimate the exact amount on hand at the beginning of the fiscal year is an abuse of discretion, or arose from improper influences, a 'disregard of duty or a violation of the law, good judgment would dictate that the budget should now be reformed on the basis of the amount actually on hand.

(b) The items of the budget attacked are as follows: ■ (A-l) Secretary’s salary, $2400; supply clerk for secretary’s office, salary $2100; (A-7) treasurer’s commission, $6200; (A-8) tax collector’s commission, $6400; (A-14) superintendent of grounds and buildings, salary, $2400; (B-l) salaries of special teachers, $22,150; (B-8) salaries of principals and teachers, $298,950; (B-9) text books, $14,000; (B-10) supplies, $11,050; (C-l) libraries, salaries, $9000; (C-8) transportation of pupils, $15,000; (D-l) wages of janitors, matrons and maintenance crew, $48,870; (E-5) repairs and replacement of furniture, $4500; (C-2) payment to sinking fund, $99,536.36; (C-5) appeal from triennial assessment, $15,000.

(A-l) The budget designates for the secretary’s salary the sum of $2400. In addition to the secretary, the other employes engaged in connection with the work that might properly come under the supervision of the secretary are district clerk, salary $2200; supply eíerk, salary $2100, and a stenographer, at a salary of $1500. We cannot but conclude that in fixing the salary of the secretary at $2400 the board was influenced by other considerations than the public interest. The stenographer takes the minutes of the meetings of the board in shorthand and transcribes them. The work performed by the secretary is negligible. A salary of seventy-five dollars per month or $900 per year is ample and reasonable compensation for the duties performed by him; nor can we conceive that it is necessary that this school district, with only twelve school buildings, should employ a supply clerk at an annual salary of $2100 in addition to a district clerk at an annual salary of $2200. There is no real necessity for the supply clerk, and the position should be eliminated.

(A-7) Treasurer’s commission. The treasurer’s compensation fixed at $6200 is grossly excessive. A bank has been duly designated as depository of the school funds. The duties performed by the treasurer are to receive the funds of the school district and deposit same in the bank and sign checks.

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Related

Lamb v. Redding
83 A. 362 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1912)
Hibbs v. Arensberg
119 A. 727 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1923)
Mason v. Wilkes-Barre Twp.
68 Pa. Super. 486 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1917)

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Bluebook (online)
17 Pa. D. & C. 116, 1932 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 98, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carver-v-hanover-township-school-district-pactcomplluzern-1932.