Carver v. Bond/Fayette/Effingham Regional Board of School Trustees

561 N.E.2d 135, 203 Ill. App. 3d 799, 63 Educ. L. Rep. 560, 148 Ill. Dec. 829, 1990 Ill. App. LEXIS 1283
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
DecidedAugust 21, 1990
DocketNo. 5-89-0091
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 561 N.E.2d 135 (Carver v. Bond/Fayette/Effingham Regional Board of School Trustees) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carver v. Bond/Fayette/Effingham Regional Board of School Trustees, 561 N.E.2d 135, 203 Ill. App. 3d 799, 63 Educ. L. Rep. 560, 148 Ill. Dec. 829, 1990 Ill. App. LEXIS 1283 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990).

Opinions

JUSTICE CHAPMAN

delivered the opinion of the court:

A joint petition for detachment and annexation was filed on behalf of the Carvers and the Barths (appellants), who sought detachment of certain real property from the Mulberry Grove Community Unit School District No. 1 (Mulberry School District), and annexation to the Carlyle Community Unit, School District No. 1 (Carlyle School District). After an administrative hearing conducted before the Regional Board of School Trustees of Bond, Fayette and Effingham Counties (B/F/E Board), and before the Regional Board of School Trustees of Clinton and Washington Counties (C/W Board), the two boards took separate votes on the issue presented by the petition. The B/F/E Board voted four votes against and three votes in favor of detachment and annexation. The C/W Board voted four votes in favor and zero votes against the petition. The regional superintendent of schools of Bond, Fayette and Effingham Counties thereupon entered an order denying the prayer of the petition. Appellants filed a complaint for judicial review in the circuit court. The circuit court denied the relief sought. It is from the circuit court’s decision that the Carvers and the Barths appeal.

The appellants first contend that it was error for the B/F/E Board and the C/W Board to vote separately on the petition and to render separate orders. Appellants argue that a reversal of the cause is mandated because the requirements of the School Code were not followed.

Appellants refer in particular to sections 7 — 2 and 7 — 6 of the School Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 122, pars. 7 — 2, 7 — 6.) Appellants point out that the statutory language in sections 7 — 2 and 7 — 6, referring to joint hearings, was recently added with the enactment of Public Act 85 — 260. (Pub. Act 85 — 260, eff. Jan. 1, 1988.) Pertinent provisions of section 7 — 2 of the School Code as they read prior and subsequent to the enactment of Public Act 85 — 260 are as follows:

“Boundaries of existing school districts lying within two or more counties may be changed by detachment, annexation, division, dissolution or any combination thereof by the concurrent action of, taken following a joint hearing before, the regional boards board of school trustees of each region affected. *** (a) the region in which the regional superintendent of schools has supervision ever the district from which the petition seeks to have territory detached 444 and (fe) the regional board of school trustees of the region in which the regional superintendent of schools has supervision ever the district to which the territory is proposed to he annexed.” (Additions in text are indicated by underline; deletions by strikeouts.) 1987 111. Laws 1550.

Prior to changes implemented by Public Act 85 — 260, section 7 — 6 also did not include any reference to a joint hearing by the regional boards of school trustees. The pertinent changes implemented by the act with regard to section 7 — 6 are:

“Within 10 days after the conclusion of a joint hearing required under the provisions of Section 7 — 2, each regional board of school trustees shall meet together and render a decision with regard to the joint hearing on the petition. If the regional boards of school trustees fail to enter a joint order either granting or denying the petition, the regional superintendent of schools for the educational service region in which the joint hearing is held shall enter an order denying the petition ***.
* * *
When more than one regional board of school trustees rv*| n flf O /it f n A ATI A A An m tt a* 1a a V\ a! ill AA A Afll 1 «T t! ATT aa! AHI A A1 1x1 Uo t d vLi 111 v v 11U 11Uul illg LIIU jU U 1>11/1U11 oilcv11 clX LUI Ull lJUl lllc its final order send forthwith a certified copy of the transcript ef the hearing and rehearing, if any, te the other regional board who shall within 30 days conduct a hearing as provided in this section en the transcript and cither grant or deny the request in the petition/’ (Additions in text are indicated by underline; deletions by strikeouts.) 1987 111. Laws 1552-53.

The primary rule of statutory construction is that the court must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. (People v. Robinson (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 469, 475, 433 N.E.2d 674, 677.) This is to be done primarily from a consideration of the statutory language itself, which affords the best means of its exposition, and if the legislative intent can be ascertained therefrom it must prevail and will be given effect without resorting to other aids for construction. Franzese v. Trinko (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 136, 139, 361 N.E.2d 585, 587.

Appellants argue that the current statutes include numerous references to “joint hearing” and “decision,” as opposed to the statutory language prior to Public Act 85 — 260, regional boards of school trustees meeting jointly must vote as a single deliberative body and render a single decision on a petition.

An examination of the language used in the statutes reveals that the legislature did not intend the regional boards to vote as one body or to render a single decision based on a cumulative tally of their votes. The substantive change implemented in the current version of section 7 — 2 is the requirement that the regional school boards hear and consider the evidence at a joint hearing, instead of the former practice of one board hearing the evidence first hand, and then forwarding a transcript of the proceedings to the other board for review. We note that both the current version of section 7 — 2 and its predecessor provide that the action to be taken by the regional boards is concurrent. The words “concurrent action” do not mean or imply joint action, but the independent action of each board, acting separately, each agreeing to such change. (Compare People ex rel. Chamberlin v. Trustees of Schools of Township No. 1 (1943), 319 Ill. App. 370, 378, 49 N.E.2d 666, 671 (interpreting similar statutory language of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, ch. 122, par. 47).) Had the legislature intended the boards to act jointly, both during their hearings and their voting, it is illogical that the statutes would have referred only to joint hearings while referring to the board’s actions as concurrent in section 7 — 2. We cannot hold to the contrary because we are not authorized to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports. Western National Bank v. Village of Kildeer (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 342, 350,167 N.E.2d 169, 173-74.

Recognizing that statutory provisions relating to the same subject matter should be construed harmoniously (Howard v. Board of Education of Freeport School District No. 145 (1987), 160 Ill. App. 3d 309, 312, 513 N.E.2d 545

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Related

Carver v. Bond/Fayette/Effingham Regional Board of School Trustees
586 N.E.2d 1273 (Illinois Supreme Court, 1992)

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Bluebook (online)
561 N.E.2d 135, 203 Ill. App. 3d 799, 63 Educ. L. Rep. 560, 148 Ill. Dec. 829, 1990 Ill. App. LEXIS 1283, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carver-v-bondfayetteeffingham-regional-board-of-school-trustees-illappct-1990.