Caruso v. Cavalry Portfolio SVCS

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: September 30, 2019
• Docket: 3:19-cv-01224
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ERIC CARUSO, Case No.: 19-CV-1224-CAB-AHG

12 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS 13 v. 14 CAVALRY PORTFOLIO SVCS et al., [Doc. Nos. 11, 13, 19, 23] 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 19 Before the Court are Defendants Portfolio Recovery, Hunt & Henriques, Mercantile 20 Adjustments Bureau, Trans Union LLC, and Experian Information Solutions Inc.’s 21 (collectively “Defendants”) motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint. [Doc. Nos. 11, 13, 22 19, 23.] The Court deems the motions suitable for determination on the papers submitted 23 and without oral argument. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, 24 Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. 25 I. BACKGROUND 26 On July 1, 2019, Plaintiff Eric Caruso proceeding pro se, filed his complaint against 27 Cavalry Portfolio Services, Portfolio Recovery, Hunt & Henriques, Mercantile 28 Adjustments Bureau, ARS National Services Inc., MRS BPO LLC, Trans Union LLC, 1 Experian Information Solutions Inc., and Equifax Information Services LLC. [Doc. No. 2 1.] Cavalry Portfolio Services and ARS National Services Inc. have been dismissed with 3 prejudice. [Doc. No. 32.] Defendant MRS BPO LLC has filed an answer [Doc. No. 23], 4 and Defendant Equifax Information Services LLC filed a notice of settlement on 5 September 19, 2019 [Doc. No. 36.]. The pending motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint 6 are made on the same or similar grounds. The complaint alleges violations under the 7 Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. (“TCPA”); the Fair Debt 8 Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. (“FDCPA”); the Fair Credit Reporting 9 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. (“FCRA”); the California Consumer Credit Reporting 10 Agencies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1785, et seq. (“CCRAA”); and the California Rosenthal 11 Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1788, et seq. (“Rosenthal Act” or 12 “RFDCPA”). 13 A. Factual Allegations as to the “Credit Bureau Defendants” 14 Plaintiff categorizes Defendants Portfolio Recovery, Hunt & Henriques, and 15 Mercantile Adjustments Bureau as the “credit bureau defendants.” [Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 41.] 16 According to the complaint, the credit bureau defendants called Plaintiff’s emergency cell 17 phone number more than twenty times, many times before 8:00 a.m. and after 9:00 p.m. 18 between the dates of October 3, 2018, and July 1, 2019, often on the same business day. 19 [Id. at ¶¶ 45–47.] Plaintiff alleges that none of these calls were made for emergency 20 purposes and were made by using automatic telephone dialing system capabilities or 21 artificial or prerecorded messages or voices. [Id. at ¶¶ 48, 50.] Plaintiff also states that 22 some of the named credit bureau defendants called Plaintiff more than eighty times at all 23 hours of the day often on the same day, attempting to assert a right to enforce a consumer 24 debt allegedly owed by Plaintiff. [Id. at ¶¶ 49, 51.] Further, Plaintiff alleges that on 25 numerous occasions he demanded in writing that the credit bureau defendants provide him 26 with written “verification” and consumer debt “validation” as it pertained to any alleged 27 consumer debt, which the credit bureau defendants have ignored. [Id. at ¶ 53.] Plaintiff 28 alleges he has no business debt, and therefore the alleged debt could only have been used 1 for personal, family, or household purposes. [Id. at ¶ 59.] Plaintiff also states the “alleged 2 debt is not [his] consumer debt” [Id. at ¶ 103], and “an alleged non-existent consumer debt 3 he never owed.” [Id. at ¶ 125]. 4 B. Factual Allegations as to the “Credit Reporting Agency Defendants” 5 Plaintiff categorizes Defendants Trans Union LLC and Experian Information 6 Solutions Inc. as the “credit reporting agency defendants.” [Id. at ¶ 42.] According to the 7 complaint, around September 2018, Plaintiff checked his consumer credit report from the 8 credit reporting agency defendants and discovered several negative consumer credit 9 accounts reported by the credit bureau defendants named above as well as from the credit 10 reporting agency defendants. [Id. at ¶ 143.] Plaintiff states all of these negative accounts 11 were unfamiliar to him and he was never informed by any of the furnishers or the credit 12 reporting agency defendants of their negative credit reporting activities. [Id.] Plaintiff 13 contacted all of the Defendants disputing the negative accounts and requested an 14 investigation of such. [Id. at ¶ 144.] After further requests for investigation, the 15 Defendants continued to report the negative accounts on his credit report and failed to 16 provide him the requested “verification” and “validation.” [Id. at ¶¶ 145–147.] Plaintiff 17 alleges he has never had any business dealings or had any accounts with any of the 18 Defendants. [Id. at ¶ 159.] 19 II. LEGAL STANDARD 20 Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may bring a motion to dismiss based on the failure to 21 state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the 22 sufficiency of a complaint as failing to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 23 plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). For purposes 24 of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint 25 as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” 26 Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). 27 Even under the liberal pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2), which requires only that a 28 party make “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 1 relief,” a “pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the 2 elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 3 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted 4 inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 5 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) 6 (“[A]llegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a 7 cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair 8 notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.”). “Determining 9 whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that 10 requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 11 556 U.S. at 679. 12 III. DISCUSSION 13 Initially, each Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law 14 because Plaintiff improperly asserts sweeping allegations against all named Defendants 15 without specifying which Defendants committed which act, thereby failing to give proper 16 notice. The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff has failed to comply with Rule 8. 17 Plaintiff’s complaint is replete with broad conclusory allegations towards all named 18 Defendants generally and fails to identify which Defendant is responsible for which alleged 19 wrongful act. Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations of any wrongful acts consist primarily of 20 copying the statutory language under each of his claims with little to no facts offered in 21 support. Plaintiff categorizes the Defendants and then proceeds to refer to all Defendants 22 throughout the complaint with abbreviations. Plaintiff then alleges all of the Defendants 23 committed all of the alleged violations in the complaint. In some instances, the complaint 24 refers to the abbreviated entities “DCI, ICSI, CRM” which do not appear to be in reference 25 to any parties to this case. [Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 76, 105, 137.] Plaintiff’s generalized 26 allegations do not provide the Defendants with fair notice as to the basis of Plaintiff’s 27 claims because Defendants and the Court cannot determine which Defendants are 28 responsible for which act. “Experience teaches that, unless cases are pled clearly and 1 precisely, issues are not joined, discovery is not controlled, the trial court’s docket becomes 2 unmanageable, the litigants suffer, and society loses confidence in the court’s ability to 3 administer justice.” Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 2000) 4 (citations and quotations omitted). 5 By submitting imprecise and sprawling claims, Plaintiff effectively “calls on the 6 court to disentangle and interpret his allegations.” Kuzmicki v. Hanrahan, No. 3:17-CV- 7 00342-RCJ-VPC, 2018 WL 2088745, at *6 (D. Nev. May 4, 2018), report and 8 recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-00342-RCJ-VPC, 2018 WL 3577246 (D. Nev. 9 July 25, 2018). The Court is reluctant to do so. See Jacobson v. Schwartzenegger, 226 10 F.R.D. 395, 397 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“[N]either the Court nor opposing counsel should be 11 required to expend time and effort searching through large masses of conclusory, 12 argumentative, evidentiary and other extraneous allegations in order to discover whether 13 the essentials of claims asserted can be found in such a melange.” (Silver v. Queen’s Hosp., 14 53 F.R.D. 223, 226–27 (D. Haw. 1971)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint is 15 DISMISSED with leave to amend to plead more precisely and coherently which 16 Defendants committed which acts that Plaintiff alleges were violations and sufficient facts 17 in support of such allegations. 18 The Court reiterates that the purpose of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, and its 19 requirements that allegations be pled with sufficient specificity, is to put the opposing party 20 on notice of the wrong they allegedly committed so that they can adequately defend 21 themselves. FED. R. CIV. P. 8; see Gauvin v. Trombatore, 682 F. Supp. 1067, 1071 (N.D. 22 Cal. 1988) (lumping together of multiple defendants in one broad allegation fails to satisfy 23 notice requirement of Rule 8(a)(2)). Even if the Court were to “disentangle and interpret 24 [Plaintiff’s] allegations,” Kuzmicki, 2018 WL 2088745, at *6, Plaintiff’s allegations 25 nevertheless fail under Rule 12(b)(6) as discussed below. 26 A. The TCPA Violations 27 Plaintiff alleges violations of the TCPA against all of the credit bureau defendants. 28 [Doc. No. 1 at 16–22.] Plaintiff mostly repeats statutory language under the TCPA and 1 refers to the credit bureau defendants’ alleged actions against all consumers seemingly 2 nationwide. The Court finds such portions of the complaint largely unnecessary and futile. 3 As far as Plaintiff’s allegations pertaining to him, as stated above, Plaintiff merely repeats 4 the language under the TCPA and alleges the violations were committed by all of the credit 5 bureau defendants generally. Plaintiff’s complaint lacks any facts pertaining to the conduct 6 of any specific credit bureau defendant and their actions against him which could result in 7 a sufficient TCPA claim. 8 To successfully plead a TCPA claim, a plaintiff must allege defendant (1) called a 9 cellular telephone number; (2) using an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice; (3) 10 without the recipient’s prior express consent. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1); Los Angeles Lakers, 11 Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 869 F.3d 795, 804 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Meyer v. Portfolio 12 Recovery Assocs., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2012). 13 To “make” a call under the TCPA the person must either (1) directly make the call, 14 or (2) have an agency relationship with the person who made the call. See Gomez v. 15 Campbell-Ewald, Co., 768 F.3d 871, 877–79 (9th Cir. 2014). An ATDS is “equipment 16 which has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random 17 or sequential number generator.” Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 954 18 (9th Cir. 2009). Under 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1), an ATDS is defined as “equipment which 19 has the capacity—(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random 20 or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” An ATDS “need not 21 actually store, produce, or, call randomly or sequentially generated telephone numbers, it 22 need only have the capacity to do it.” Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 951. Courts in this district 23 have taken two approaches when facing a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the 24 allegations of use of an ATDS are insufficient. See Maier v. J.C. Penney Corp., No. 13- 25 CV-0163–IEG (DHB), 2013 WL 3006415 at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 13, 2013). Under the first 26 approach, courts permit a plaintiff to make minimal allegations at the complaint stage, 27 permitting discovery to proceed on the issue of ATDS, because the information is in the 28 sole possession of the defendant. Id., citing In re Jiffy Lube Int’l Inc., Text Spam Litig., 1 847 F.Supp.2d 1253, 1260 (S.D. Cal. 2012). Under the second approach, factual 2 allegations beyond mere statutory language are required which may lead to the inference 3 that an ATDS was used. See Maier, 2013 WL 3006415 at *3. 4 Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege that an ATDS was used or that there was a 5 TCPA violation under either approach. Plaintiff’s complaint simply parrots the statutory 6 definition of an ATDS and other provisions of the TCPA, but the Defendants would have 7 no way of determining if they have any information in their possession with respect to such 8 calls with Plaintiff’s conclusory and sweeping allegations. Plaintiff does not allege the 9 phone number belonging to any of the credit bureau defendants was used to make the calls 10 to him, the content of such calls, or any circumstances that could support an inference that 11 the calls were placed with an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice. Plaintiff’s 12 conclusory allegations fall short of what is required for plausibility. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 13 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims under the TCPA are DISMISSED with leave to amend 14 for failure to state a claim. 15 B. The FDCPA and Rosenthal Act Violations 16 Plaintiff alleges several violations of the FDCPA against all of the credit bureau 17 defendants and violations of the Rosenthal Act against all of the Defendants. [Doc. No. 1 18 at 23–29, 36–37.] 19 The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from engaging in abusive, deceptive, and 20 unfair practices in the collection of consumer debts. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692. “In order to 21 state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must show: 1) that he is a consumer; 2) that the 22 debt arises out of a transaction entered into for personal purposes; 3) that the defendant is 23 a debt collector; and 4) that the defendant violated one of the provisions of the FDCPA.” 24 Freeman v. ABC Legal Servs. Inc., 827 F.Supp.2d 1065, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2011). 25 The Rosenthal Act is the California state equivalent of the Fair Debt Collection 26 Practices Act. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1788 et seq. The RFDCPA “mimics or incorporates 27 by reference the FDCPA’s requirements . . . and makes available the FDCPA’s remedies 28 for violations.” Riggs v. Prober & Raphel, 681 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2012). The 1 RFDCPA states that “every debt collector collecting or attempting to collect a consumer 2 debt shall comply with the provisions of Sections 1692b to 1692j” of the FDCPA. Cal. 3 Civ. Code § 1788.17. To establish a violation of the RFDCPA, a plaintiff must show (1) 4 the defendant was attempting to collect a “consumer debt,” (2) the defendant was a “debt 5 collector,” (3) the plaintiff was a “debtor,” and (4) the defendant’s collection activities 6 violated the FDCPA and thus the RFDCPA. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.17. 7 Plaintiff’s FDCPA and Rosenthal Act claims fail for several reasons. First, Plaintiff 8 states all Defendants are debt collectors, but fails to allege any facts to support such a 9 conclusion. A “debt collector” is “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate 10 commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of 11 any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed 12 or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Plaintiff fails to 13 provide any factual basis from which the Court could plausibly infer that the Defendants’ 14 principal purpose is the collection of debts or that either Defendant regularly collects or 15 attempts to collect debts owed or due to another. Nor does Plaintiff provide facts to infer 16 the alleged debt at issue was owed or due to another. 17 Plaintiff also fails to set forth any factual allegations to suggest that any Defendant 18 engaged in conduct prohibited by the FDCPA or Rosenthal Act beyond mere conclusory 19 allegations repeating the provisions under each statute. Again, because Plaintiff fails to 20 identify which Defendants made which calls or any factual content of such calls the 21 Defendants in this case would be unable to defend themselves as to Plaintiff’s conclusory 22 allegations. Defendants would be unable to determine whether or not calls were made at 23 any unusual time or place, whether calls were made with the intent to annoy, abuse, or 24 harass, or whether calls were made without meaningful disclosure of identity. Further, 25 Plaintiff has not alleged any false, deceptive, or misleading representation was made by 26 any of the Defendants in such calls. 27 Lastly, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the debt at issue are insufficient. A “debt” 28 is defined as “any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out 1 of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject 2 of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not 3 such obligation has been reduced to judgment.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). Proving the 4 existence of a “debt” is a “threshold” issue in every FDCPA action. Turner v. Cook, 362 5 F.3d 1219, 1226–27 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, Plaintiff first states that “[t]he same consumer 6 business debt[s] allegedly owed to all of the defendant’s [sic] herein arose out of a 7 transaction that was primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” [Doc. No. 1 8 at ¶ 58.] Then, Plaintiff states the “alleged debt is not [his] consumer debt” [Id. at ¶ 103], 9 and “an alleged non-existent consumer debt he never owed.” [Id. at ¶ 125]. Plaintiff’s 10 allegations are contradictory and provide no factual basis to infer that the debt at issue was 11 indeed an obligation arising out of a transaction primarily for personal, family, or 12 household purposes as required under the FDCPA and Rosenthal Act. 13 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims under the FDCPA and Rosenthal Act are 14 DISMISSED with leave to amend for failure to state a claim. 15 C. The FCRA Violations 16 Plaintiff alleges violations of the FCRA pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681 against all of 17 the Defendants except counts X and XI which he alleges against only the credit reporting 18 agency defendants. [Doc. No. 1 at 30–34, 37–39.] 19 1. § 1681s-2 20 The FCRA aims to “ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency in 21 the banking system, and protect consumer privacy.” Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 22 U.S. 47, 52 (2007). The FCRA imposes duties on “furnishers” as well as imposing 23 responsibilities on the consumer reporting agencies. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2; Gorman v. 24 Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1154 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Section 1681s-2 sets 25 forth ‘[r]esponsibilities of furnishers of information to consumer reporting agencies.’”). 26 Section 1681s-2(b) imposes obligations on furnishers that are “triggered ‘upon notice of 27 dispute’ – that is, when a person who furnished information to a [consumer reporting 28 agency] receives notice from the [consumer reporting agency] that the consumer disputes 1 the information.” Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1154. Pursuant to section 1681s-2(b)(1), after 2 receiving notice of a dispute, a furnisher must “conduct an investigation with respect to the 3 disputed information” among other responsibilities. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A). 4 “[T]hese duties arise only after the furnisher receives notice of dispute from a [consumer 5 reporting agency]; notice of dispute received directly from the consumer does not trigger 6 furnishers’ duties under subsection (b).” Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1154. 7 The credit reporting agency defendants are not furnishers of information; rather, they 8 are consumer reporting agencies as defined by § 1681a(f) of the FCRA. Accordingly, 9 Plaintiff’s claims under § 1681s-2 of the FCRA as to the credit reporting agency defendants 10 Trans Union, LLC and Experian Information Solutions Inc. are DISMISSED with 11 prejudice. As to the credit bureau defendants, Plaintiff alleges he sent notices of disputes 12 to all of the named Defendants but does not allege sufficient facts to support an inference 13 that any of the Defendants received a notice of dispute from a credit reporting agency as 14 required. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims under § 1681s-2(b) are DISMISSED with leave 15 to amend for failure to state a claim. Section 1681s-2(a) also imposes duties upon 16 furnishers of information. However, there is no private right of action under section 1681s- 17 2(a); a violation of this section can be pursued only by federal or state officials, and not by 18 a private party. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(c)(1); Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1162. Accordingly, 19 Plaintiff’s claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a) are DISMISSED with prejudice. 20 2. § 1681b 21 “The FCRA imposes civil liability on any person who obtains a consumer report for 22 an impermissible purpose.” Thomas v. Fin. Recovery Servs., No. EDCV 12-1339 PSG 23 (Opx), 2013 WL 387968, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2013); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. 24 Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss on a section 1681b claim, “the plaintiff must allege 25 facts that, if proven, would establish that the defendant did not have a permissible purpose 26 for obtaining the credit report at issue.” Thomas, 2013 WL 387968 at *4. “[B]are 27 allegations that the defendant did not have a permissible purpose for obtaining a credit 28 report, without more, are insufficient.” Id. “Merely reciting each of the permissible 1 circumstances and denying that they apply is similarly inadequate.” Id. 2 Here, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that 3 any Defendant obtained his consumer report for an impermissible purpose. Plaintiff merely 4 alleges the Defendants did not have a permissible purpose because he never had any 5 business dealings or accounts with defendants. “However, a credit report can be accessed 6 without a consumer’s permission for other ‘permissible purposes’ under the FCRA.” Jones 7 v. Best Serv. Co., No. CV 14-9872 SS, 2017 WL 490902, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2017); 8 see also Perretta v. Capital Acquisitions & Mgmt. Co., No. C-02-05561 RMW, 2003 WL 9 21383757, at *5 n.7 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2003) (noting that “section 1681b does not appear 10 to require the existence of a debtor-creditor relationship for a party to lawfully acquire a 11 consumer report”). Plaintiff’s complaint “offers no factual basis to infer what purpose— 12 permissible or impermissible—[defendants] had in making” inquiries on his credit report, 13 and therefore it does not allege a plausible claim that defendants’ purposes for obtaining 14 his credit report were impermissible. Perez v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, No. CIV. 15 12-1603 JAG, 2012 WL 5373448, at *2 (D.P.R. Oct. 30, 2012); see also Twombly, 550 16 U.S. at 570. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims under § 1681b are DISMISSED with leave 17 to amend for failure to state a claim. 18 3. §§ 1681e and 1681i 19 15 U.S.C. § 1681e provides that “[w]henever a consumer reporting agency prepares 20 a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible 21 accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.” 15 22 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681i, if the completeness or accuracy of any 23 item of information contained in a consumer’s file at a consumer reporting agency is 24 disputed by the consumer and the consumer notifies the agency directly, or indirectly 25 through a reseller, of such dispute, the agency shall, free of charge, conduct a reasonable 26 reinvestigation to determine whether the disputed information is inaccurate and record the 27 current status of the disputed information . . . before the end of the 30-day period beginning 28 on the date on which the agency receives the notice of the dispute from the consumer or 1 reseller. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). 2 Both provisions require Plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of inaccurate 3 reporting. See Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 890 (9th Cir. 2010) 4 (quoting Dennis v. BEH-1, LLC, 520 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2008)) (addressing § 1681i); 5 Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 6 Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 1991)) 7 (addressing §1681e(b)). “[A]n item on a credit report can be ‘incomplete or inaccurate’ . . 8 . ‘because it is patently incorrect, or because it is misleading in such a way and to such an 9 extent that it can be expected to adversely affect credit decisions.’” Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 10 890 (quoting Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1163 (9th Cir. 2009)). 11 Plaintiff vaguely alleges that the credit reporting agency defendants failed to delete 12 inaccurate information on his credit report but fails to allege what account(s) or what 13 information was inaccurate. Plaintiff also fails to allege when and how he notified the 14 credit reporting agency defendants of any specific inaccuracy. Plaintiff’s allegations are 15 devoid of any factual basis to support an inference that the credit reporting agency 16 defendants reported any specific inaccurate information or failed to use reasonable 17 procedures to assure the accuracy of information contained in his credit report. 18 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims under §§ 1681e and 1681i are DISMISSED with leave to 19 amend for failure to state a claim. 20 D. The CCRAA Violations 21 Plaintiff alleges violations of the CCRAA against all of the Defendants but fails to 22 cite to any specific provision under the CCRAA. [Doc. No. 1 at 34–36.] 23 The CCRAA provides that “[a] person shall not furnish information on a specific 24 transaction or experience to any consumer credit reporting agency if the person knows or 25 should know the information is incomplete or inaccurate.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.25(a). 26 In order to state a claim for violation of the CCRAA, the plaintiff must demonstrate “that 27 an actual inaccuracy exist[s].” Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 890. Information is inaccurate if it 28 is “patently incorrect” or “misleading in such a way and to such an extent that it can be 1 ||expected to adversely affect credit decisions.” Jd. at 891. Because the CCRAA is 2 ||“substantially based on the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), judicial 3 ||interpretation of the federal provisions is persuasive authority and entitled to substantial 4 || weight when interpreting the California provisions. /d. at 889 (citations omitted). 5 As discussed above, Plaintiff fails to allege what account(s) or what information, if 6 ||any, was inaccurate. Plaintiff presents no facts alleging when and how he notified each of 7 || the Defendants or what if any specific inaccuracy. Plaintiff's allegations are devoid of any 8 factual basis to support an inference that the Defendants reported any specific inaccurate 9 ||information or failed to use reasonable procedures to assure the accuracy of information 10 |/contained in his credit report. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims under the CCRAA are 11 |] DISMISSED with leave to amend for failure to state a claim. 12 IV. CONCLUSION 13 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss 14 || Plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff's claims under § 1681s-2 of the FCRA as to the credit 15 ||reporting agency defendants Trans Union, LLC and Experian Information Solutions Inc. 16 || and Plaintiff's claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a) as to all Defendants are DISMISSED 17 || with prejudice. Plaintiff's remaining claims are DISMISSED with leave to amend. 18 || Plaintiff is cautioned that if his First Amended Complaint does not cure the deficiencies 19 |/identified in this Order, his clatms may be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to 20 |jamend. The First Amended Complaint shall be filed within thirty (30) days of this Order. 21 It is SO ORDERED. 22 ||Dated: September 30, 2019 € □ 23 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 24 United States District Judge 25 26 27 28