Carteret Business Partnership, Inc. v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0951-24

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION July 30, 2026 CARTERET BUSINESS APPELLATE DIVISION PARTNERSHIP, INC.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,

Respondent-Respondent. ___________________________

Argued June 4, 2026 – Decided July 30, 2026

Before Judges Mawla, Marczyk and Puglisi.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.

Dominic J. Aprile argued the cause for appellant (Bathgate Wegener & Wolf, PC, attorneys; William J. Wolf and Daniel J. Carbone, on the briefs).

Elizabeth Delahunty, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney; Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Elizabeth Delahunty, on the brief). Scott E. Reiser argued the cause for intervenor Township of Woodbridge (Javerbaum Wurgaft Hicks Kahn Wikstrom & Sinins, attorneys; Scott E. Reiser and Steven J. Eisenstein, of counsel and on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

MARCZYK, J.A.D.

Petitioner Carteret Business Partnership, Inc. (CBP) appeals from the

New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection's (DEP) November 18,

2024 final agency decision, which reversed the administrative law judge's

(ALJ) initial decision and granted the DEP's motion for summary decision.

The primary issue on appeal is whether the DEP has authority under N.J.A.C.

7:14A-22.8(a)(3)(v) to consider a treatment works approval (TWA) application

that lacks consent from the receiving wastewater treatment plant. We

conclude the DEP reasonably interpreted the regulation to require the receiving

wastewater treatment plant's consent as a mandatory prerequisite to

considering a TWA application, such that it was precluded from considering

CBP's application. Accordingly, we affirm.

I.

A. Background.

This appeal arises from the DEP's denial of CBP's TWA application to

construct and operate two gravity sanitary sewer laterals to service a sixty -

four-unit mixed-use development in the Borough of Carteret. The proposed

A-0951-24 2 development would discharge effluent into Carteret's municipal wastewater

conveyance system, which connects to the Township of Woodbridge's

wastewater conveyance system. Ultimately, the wastewater would be

conveyed into the Middlesex County Utilities Authority's (MCUA) wastewater

treatment plant. Pursuant to a 1987 agreement, Woodbridge permits Carteret

to use its sewer system to transport sewage to the MCUA.

CBP submitted the TWA application to the DEP in November 2022,

which included a WQM-003 Consent Form (Consent Form) pursuant to

N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.8(a)(3). The Consent Form included two required

signatures from Carteret, evidencing its consent and certification to the

application, in Sections A and B, respectively titled "Consent by Governing

Body" and "Certification by Wastewater Conveyance System Owner."

However, the Consent Form lacked the MCUA's signature in Section C, titled

"Certification by Wastewater Treatment Facility Owner." In an email attached

to CBP's application, the MCUA explained it would not endorse the

application because it was "administratively incomplete," as it lacked

Woodbridge's endorsement "to convey sanitary sewer flows through [its]

collection system to [the] MCUA." CBP noted Woodbridge would not agree

to convey the wastewater to the MCUA and consent to CBP's TWA application

A-0951-24 3 because of an "intermunicipal pecuniary conflict" between Carteret and

Woodbridge.

In a November 7, 2022 letter, CBP requested the DEP approve the

application pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.8(a)(3)(v), despite the fact it was

missing the MCUA's signature on the Consent Form. On November 14, 2022,

the DEP erroneously provided a notice of administrative completeness to CB P,

however, it subsequently advised CBP Section C of its Consent Form was

missing a mandatory signature. In a December 21, 2022 letter, CBP

acknowledged the MCUA's signature was still missing but reiterated its

request the DEP approve its application, again asserting the agency had the

authority to do so under N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.8(a)(3)(v)(5).

In February 2023, the DEP denied the TWA application. It reasoned it

lacked the authority to issue the permit because the MCUA—the wastewater

treatment facility owner—had not executed the Consent Form to certify the

wastewater would be treated and the plant was following the New Jersey

Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NJPDES) permit requirements. The

DEP explained:

[The] MCUA has notified this office that they will not endorse and provide consent until . . . Woodbridge provide[s] . . . consent as [the] "Wastewater Conveyance System Owner." The wastewater flow from this project will be conveyed to the MCUA for

A-0951-24 4 treatment using [a] downstream sewage conveyance system, owned and operated by . . . Woodbridge.

CBP challenged the denial and requested an adjudicatory hearing. 1 In

October 2023, the matter was referred to the OAL for a hearing before an ALJ.

Woodbridge moved to intervene, which the ALJ granted. In April 2024, the

DEP moved for summary decision. CBP opposed the motion.

B. The ALJ's Initial Decision.

On July 8, 2024, the ALJ issued an initial decision, finding the DEP had

authority to consider CBP's TWA application pursuant to N.J.A.C. 7:14A -

22.8(a)(3)(v)(5). She rejected the agency's interpretation the regulation does

not apply when the wastewater treatment facility owner is the entity

withholding consent. The ALJ reasoned the agency's interpretation was

inconsistent with the regulation's language, "which require[s] the []DEP to step

in to make a decision when the affected municipality, the sew[er]age authority,

and/or the treatment facility owner refuse[s] to do so." She noted the Law

Division had also reviewed the regulation and determined the DEP should

1 In February 2023, prior to the DEP's denial of its application, CBP filed a verified complaint in lieu of prerogative writs in the Law Division, seeking an order compelling the MCUA to consent to its TWA application. The court subsequently granted a motion to transfer venue to the Office of Administrative Law (OAL). See Carteret Bus. P'ship v. Twp. of Woodbridge, No. L-0674-23 (Law Div. Apr. 18, 2023) (order at 2). However, the matter was already before the OAL pursuant to CBP's hearing request regarding the DEP's denial of its TWA application.

A-0951-24 5 administratively resolve the issue, as CBP had asked the agency to do. The

ALJ also emphasized the regulation states the DEP "shall" consider the reasons

for the lack of consent in determining whether to approve an application.

Although the affected parties had not disclosed their reason for denying

consent, the ALJ found the agency had the authority to compel such

disclosure.

Alternatively, if the TWA regulations preclude consideration without the

MCUA's consent, the ALJ determined the DEP should instruct CBP how to

proceed without consent. Accordingly, the ALJ denied the DEP's motion for

summary decision, granted summary decision in favor of CBP, and ordered the

agency to consider CBP's TWA application on its merits. The DEP filed

exceptions to the ALJ's decision, and CBP and Woodbridge filed responses.

C. The DEP's Final Agency Decision.

On November 18, 2024, the DEP Commissioner issued a final agency

decision, reversing the ALJ's initial decision and granting the DEP's motion for

summary decision. He found the ALJ's initial decision failed to follow the

plain meaning of N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.8(a)(3)(v)(5) and "improperly imposed

requirements on [the] DEP that are not set forth in the TWA regulations."

Thus, the Commissioner concluded the DEP lacked authority under the

regulation to review CBP's TWA application without the MCUA's consent.

A-0951-24 6 The Commissioner determined summary decision was appropriate, and

the interpretation of N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.8(a)(3)(v)(5) could be resolved as a

matter of law. Indeed, "all parties agree[d] that [the] MCUA, the wastewater

treatment facility owner, did not sign [the] DEP's [Consent F]orm as part of

CBP's TWA application and that Woodbridge would also not sign the form as

a wastewater conveyance system owner." He reasoned N.J.A.C. 7:14A-

22.8(a)'s plain text, structure, history, and administrability does not allow the

DEP to review a TWA application without the wastewater treatment facility

owner's consent.

The Commissioner found although N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.8(a)(3)(v) "sets

out an alternate path for an applicant that cannot get consent as required by

N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.8(a)(3), a review of N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.8(a)(3)(v)(1)

through (5) clearly reveals that . . . path is limited only to when an 'affected

municipality' or 'affected sewerage authority' withholds such consent."

(Citations reformatted). Accordingly, he reasoned the receiving wastewater

treatment plant's consent is mandatory because it is not mentioned in those

subsections, and the DEP would have included it had the agency intended to

carve out an exception for obtaining its consent.

The Commissioner also found the regulatory history of N.J.A.C. 7:14A -

22.8 clearly showed the DEP's intent to require the receiving treatment plant

A-0951-24 7 owner's consent. He determined the ALJ's decision was "therefore contrary to

the applicable TWA regulations and undermine[d the] DEP's purpose in

requiring consent from the wastewater treatment facility owner to protect

public health and maintain the integrity of New Jersey's waters." Citing 41

N.J.R. 142(a) (Jan. 5, 2009), the Commissioner explained it was the

wastewater treatment facility owner's responsibility, not the DEP's, to ensure

the facility can accept the additional flow from the project and continue to

comply with its NJPDES permit. He found that interpretation also aligned

with the TWA program's general policy and purpose, as outlined in N.J.A.C.

7:14A-22.1(b). Accordingly, the Commissioner determined, "[c]onsent from

the owner of the receiving wastewater treatment plant is a non-negotiable

requirement in a TWA application and cannot be waived."

The Commissioner further found the ALJ's initial decision failed to

apply the "appropriate deferential standard to [the] DEP's interpretation and

implementation of its rules." He noted the ALJ erred in finding the DEP was

required to direct CBP on how to move forward if the agency lacked the

regulatory authority to review its TWA application. The Commissioner

reasoned "no regulatory requirement in N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.8 or in any other

TWA regulation . . . requires [the] DEP to undertake such action." He

explained:

A-0951-24 8 The reasons why [the] MCUA does not wish to consent are irrelevant to this issue of regulatory interpretation and[,] thus, there is no need to delve into the record regarding Woodbridge's position and/or contractual relationship with Carteret regarding sewer conveyance and cost-sharing of improvement projects. At the end of the day, [the] MCUA has refused to consent to CBP's TWA application, and as a result[,] N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.8(a)(3)(v)(5) does not permit [the] DEP to move forward with reviewing and/or approving CBP's application. [The] DEP has no regulatory responsibility to interject itself into a dispute between two municipalities.

[(Citation reformatted).]

II.

CBP argues the DEP deprived it of administrative justice by refusing to

consider all relevant elements of its TWA application and the reasons the

MCUA and Woodbridge denied consent. It asserts the Commissioner failed to

appreciate relevant facts and discounted relevant evidence in reaching the

agency's final decision. CBP challenges the Commissioner's statements the

DEP "did not rely on the reasons Woodbridge or [the] MCUA provided for not

providing consent," and "[t]he reasons for Woodbridge's refusal to consent . . .

are outside the scope of th[e] decision." It contends those statements are

contrary to N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.8(a)(3)(v)(5), which states the agency "shall

review the reasons for the lack of consent," and "[a]ny such reasons shall be

considered." Thus, CBP avers the DEP made a "purely technical decision

A-0951-24 9 devoid of any expert opinion or analysis of the application itself," making its

final decision "incomplete, injurious to the interests of justice and due process,

and contrary to established practice and precedent."

CBP further argues the Commissioner erred in not considering

Woodbridge's reasons for withholding consent to its application, given the

MCUA's denial rested "solely" upon its refusal to consent. It asserts the

Commissioner failed to address the ALJ's interpretation of the regulations and

the DEP's obligations, "which placed Woodbridge at the center of the case,"

and instead relied on "a literal, restrictive, and inflexible" interpretation,

contrary to federal case law, the administrative code, and the DEP's own

documents.

CBP claims, pursuant to the operational definitions in N.J.A.C. 7:14A -

22.1, both Woodbridge and the MCUA can be categorized as "an affected

sewerage entity and a treatment works owner." Thus, it contends a full and

fair review of its application should have included an investigation into "the

relevance and validity" of the reason Woodbridge, as "an affected municipality

or sewerage authority," failed to consent, which, in turn, caused the MCUA to

deny consent. CBP asserts the DEP ignored its duty to engage in necessary

fact-finding, it failed to consider all relevant evidence, dismissed the MCUA's

A-0951-24 10 and Woodbridge's reasons for not consenting as immaterial, and declined to

review its application on the merits.

Relying on Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications

Commission, 96 F.2d 554 (D.C. Cir. 1938), CBP asserts the Commissioner

ignored his obligation to act as a factfinder, as he refused to address facts in

the record and further investigate the matter to reach a just conclusion. It

contends the DEP's failure to consider all facts in the record permitted

Woodbridge to exceed its authority as a municipality by controlling CBP's

access to a sewer line. CBP contends the DEP's "strict interpretation of the

regulations . . . violated the established doctrine[s] of flexibility and fairness"

and resulted in a "rigid" final agency decision in violation of N.J.A.C. 1:1 -

1.3(a), and the DEP failed to use its equitable powers to approve CBP's

application.

CBP claims Woodbridge changed its position several times, which alone

warrants the DEP's consideration in evaluating its TWA application.

Moreover, it argues the DEP considered immaterial facts and "interject[ed]

itself into the irrelevant intermunicipal dispute" between Woodbridge and

Carteret, allowing Woodbridge to "become the sole arbiter of administrative

control over access to public works," contrary to its regulatory obligations. It

contends the DEP failed in its obligation to coordinate between municipalities

A-0951-24 11 and identify alternatives to maximize sewer capacity by refusing to get

involved in the dispute. CBP asserts N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.8(a)(3)(v)(5) was

written to allow the DEP to review the reasons for lack of consent and to

determine whether to issue a permit even when consent is withheld. It

emphasizes the regulation's plain language includes options of approving or

denying an application following a "review [of] the reasons for the lack of

consent or denial" by the "affected municipality or sewerage authority" insofar

as "such reasons shall be considered by the [DEP] in determining whether to

issue a [TWA]."

CBP further argues N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.8(a) is ambiguous about what

happens when the receiving treatment plant owner refuses to provide consent

for a TWA application, emphasizing it does not expressly prohibit the DEP

from issuing a TWA when a treatment plant owner or conveyance system

operator withholds consent. CBP asserts the regulation's plain text does not

support the DEP's position it must deny an application as administratively

incomplete in such cases. It further maintains the DEP has the authority to

review the reasons for lack of consent and issue a TWA if those reasons are

not justified. CBP claims Carteret has already paid for the necessary sewer

capacity, and Woodbridge's refusal to provide consent is rooted in an unrelated

political dispute.

A-0951-24 12 Review of an administrative agency's final determination is limited. In

re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482 (2007). We will uphold an agency's decision

"unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable,

or that it lacks fair support in the record." Stein v. Dep't of L. & Pub. Safety,

458 N.J. Super. 91, 99 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting J.B. v. N.J. State Parole Bd.,

229 N.J. 21, 43 (2017)). In evaluating whether the decision was arbitrary,

capricious, or unreasonable, we examine:

(1) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.

[In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011) (quoting In re Carter, 191 N.J. at 482-83).]

Courts are "obliged to give due deference to the view of those charged

with the responsibility of implementing legislative programs." In re

Reallocation of Prob. Officer, 441 N.J. Super. 434, 444 (App. Div. 2015)

(quoting In re N.J. Pinelands Comm'n Resol., 356 N.J. Super. 363, 372 (App.

Div. 2003)). Thus, we "give substantial deference to an agency's interpretation

of the statute it is charged with carrying out, as well as to the interpretation the

agency itself gives to its own regulations." Fedor v. Nissan of N. Am., Inc.,

A-0951-24 13 432 N.J. Super. 303, 320 (App. Div. 2013). Deference is due "because 'a state

agency brings experience and specialized knowledge to its task of

administering and regulating a legislative enactment within its field of

expertise.'" US Bank, N.A. v. Hough, 210 N.J. 187, 200 (2012) (quoting In re

Election L. Enf't Comm'n Advisory Op., 201 N.J. 254, 262 (2010)).

Nevertheless, courts will not defer to an agency's interpretation of its

own regulations if that interpretation is "plainly unreasonable." Ibid. (quoting

In re Election, 201 N.J. at 262). If a court "is satisfied after its review that the

evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom support the agency head's

decision, then it must affirm even if the court feels that it would have reached

a different result." Campbell v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, 169 N.J. 579, 587

(2001) (quoting Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 588 (1988)).

"Accordingly, it is 'a rare day when an agency cannot give a plausible

interpretation for one of its own regulations.'" In re Eastwick Coll. LPN-to-

RN Bridge Program, 225 N.J. 533, 542 (2016) (quoting US Bank, 210 N.J. at

203-04).

On a de novo review of an agency's interpretation of one of its

regulations, "[w]e interpret a regulation in the same manner that we would

interpret a statute." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting US Bank, 210 N.J. at

199). Our "paramount goal" is to determine the intent of the drafter, which can

A-0951-24 14 generally be "found in the actual language of the enactment." US Bank, 210

N.J. at 199. We will not "rearrange the wording of the regulation, if it is

otherwise unambiguous, or engage in conjecture that will subvert its plain

meaning." Ibid. "Should the plain language analysis yield more than one

plausible interpretation of the regulation, a reviewing court may consider

extrinsic sources, including 'the long-standing meaning ascribed to the

language by the agency charged with its enforcement.'" In re Eastwick, 225

N.J. at 542 (quoting Bedford v. Riello, 195 N.J. 210, 222 (2008)). "If,

however, the regulation's 'language is clear, then the interpretative process will

end without resort to extrinsic sources.'" Ibid. (quoting Bedford, 195 N.J. at

222). "In short, we must construe the regulation as written." US Bank, 210

N.J. at 199.

Summary decisions under N.J.A.C. 1:1-12.5 are governed by

"substantially the same [standard] as that governing a motion under Rule 4:46-

2 for summary judgment in civil litigation." L.A. v. Bd. of Educ. of Trenton,

221 N.J. 192, 203 (2015) (quoting Contini v. Bd. of Educ. of Newark, 286 N.J.

Super. 106, 121 (App. Div. 1995)). We must determine "whether the

competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party in consideration of the applicable

evidentiary standard, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the

A-0951-24 15 alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Brill v. Guardian

Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 523 (1995).

N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.8(a), in pertinent part, provides:

Persons who propose to build, install, or modify treatment works that require the [DEP]'s approval pursuant to this subchapter, shall submit the following information and documents in the manner prescribed in this subchapter:

....

3. A resolution and/or written statement of consent from the affected municipality, sewerage authority, owner of the receiving treatment plant, owner/operator of the wastewater conveyance system into which the project will directly connect, and district sludge management lead planning agency (if applicable, see (a)(3)(ii) below) or completion of the [DEP]'s [Consent Form].

....

iii. Written statements of consent from the affected sewerage authority shall contain a certification concerning the plant's compliance with applicable NJPDES permit requirements.

iv. A written statement of consent from the owner/operator of the conveyance system must

A-0951-24 16 certify that the conveyance system has adequate conveyance capacity as defined in N.J.A.C. 7:14A- 1.2, to convey the additional flow.

[(Emphases added) (citations reformatted).]

N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.8(a)(3)(v), in turn, states:

If an applicant is unable to obtain the required written statement of consent, then the applicant may choose to follow the procedures stated in (a)(3)(v)(1) through (5) below. . . .

(1) The affected sewerage authority or municipality shall submit a written statement of consent to the application or submit written comments to the [DEP] within [sixty] days of the request for consent. Prior to the expiration of the [sixty-]day period to respond [to] a request for a written statement of consent, the municipality or sew[er]age authority may request a [thirty-]day extension for review of a request for consent.

(2) Any document issued by a sewerage authority or municipality which is tentative, preliminary, or conditional approval shall not be considered a statement of consent.

(3) When the affected sewerage authority or municipality does not consent to a project, it shall state all reasons for rejection or disapproval in a resolution and send a certified copy of the resolution to the [DEP].

A-0951-24 17 (4) When the affected municipality or sewerage authority expressly denies a request for a written statement of consent for a project, the permit application may be determined by the [DEP] to be incomplete for processing; or in the alternative, the [DEP] may review the reasons for denial. Any such reasons shall be considered by the [DEP] in determining whether to issue a [TWA] or sewer connection approval in accordance with this subchapter.

(5) When the affected municipality or sewerage authority does not issue either a written statement of consent or a denial of the request for consent, the [DEP], upon receipt of proof that the applicant has delivered to the affected agency a written request for a written statement of consent, shall review the reasons for the lack of consent or denial, if known on the basis of reasonably reliable information. Any such reasons shall be considered by the [DEP] in determining whether to issue a [TWA] or sewer connection approval in accordance with this subchapter.

[(Emphases added) (citation reformatted).]

The Commissioner's interpretation of N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.8(a) in the

DEP's final agency decision was reasonable and entitled to deference. See US

Bank, 210 N.J. at 200. His reading of the plain language of the regulation

logically differentiated between an "affected municipality or sewerage

authority" and a "receiving wastewater treatment plant" in finding N.J.A.C.

A-0951-24 18 7:14A-22.8(a)(3)(v) does not provide an "alternate path" for approval of TWA

applications lacking the owner of the receiving wastewater treatment plant's

consent. N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.8(a)(3)(v)(5) expressly states it applies when an

"affected municipality or sewerage authority does not issue either a written

statement of consent or a denial of the request for consent," but it does not

mention the receiving wastewater treatment plant's owner. As the

Commissioner found, the receiving wastewater treatment plant is not expressly

mentioned anywhere in N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.8(a)(3)(v)(1) to (5). Furthermore,

the plain language of N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.8(a)(3) requires consent from the

owner of the receiving wastewater treatment plant—here, the MCUA. In the

absence of such consent, the DEP sensibly interpreted the regulations in

concluding it was not authorized to review CBP's TWA application.

"If a regulation includes particular language in one section but omits it

in another, 'it is generally presumed that [the state agency] acts intentionally

and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.'" Est. of Campagna v.

Pleasant Point Props., LLC, 464 N.J. Super. 153, 176 (App. Div. 2020)

(alteration in original) (quoting N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v.

R.L.M., 236 N.J. 123, 148 (2018)) (finding regulations, which made a

prospective owner or operator's criminal history a basis to deny licensure, but

did not contain any comparable provisions about the significance of a

A-0951-24 19 prospective resident's criminal history, signified there was no codified duty to

perform criminal background checks of prospective residents). As the

Commissioner reasoned, had the DEP intended to carve out an exception to

obtaining the receiving wastewater treatment plant's consent, as it did for an

"affected municipality or sewerage authority," it would have expressly stated

so in N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.8(a)(3)(v)(5). See J.H. v. R & M Tagliareni, LLC,

239 N.J. 198, 215 (2019) ("Had the [Department of Community Affairs]

determined that radiators required covering, the agency possessed the

knowledge and expertise to include them in N.J.A.C. 5:10-14.3(d)'s language,

and [the agency] could have very easily done so."). Accordingly, we are

unpersuaded by CBP's arguments and conclude the regulation's plain language

and structure support the DEP's interpretation it did not have the authority to

review the reasoning behind the MCUA's or Woodbridge's lack of consent.

The Commissioner's finding the DEP intended to mandate the owner of a

receiving wastewater treatment plant's consent based on the regulatory history

was reasonable. In the DEP's January 5, 2009 response to a comment, it

explained the agency's purpose in requiring the owner of the receiving

treatment plant's consent:

The TWA program does not allocate flow capacity for projects subject to TWA. This is the responsibility of the owner of the receiving wastewater treatment plant and owner/operator of the wastewater conveyance

A-0951-24 20 system into which the project will directly connect. Subject to meeting all other administrative and technical requirements, TWAs can be processed for approval, as long as the owner of the receiving wastewater treatment plant and owner/operator of the wastewater conveyance system into which the project will directly connect consent to the additional flow anticipated from the project. Such consent is one of the TWA administrative requirements found in N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.8(a)(3).

[41 N.J.R. 142(a), 171-72 (Jan. 5, 2009) (response to comment 195) (emphases added) (citation reformatted).]

Accordingly, the regulatory history expressly states the owner of the

receiving wastewater treatment plant's consent is an "administrative

requirement[]," implying the DEP cannot approve a TWA application lacking

such consent. See ibid. The Commissioner's interpretation is supported by the

TWA program's purpose to place the responsibility on "the sewerage authority

and/or treatment plant owner/operator to implement timely corrective actions

and to ensure that additional connections to the treatment works do not result

in [violations of their DEP permits or the overflow of conveyance systems]."

N.J.A.C. 7:14A-22.1(b).

Given it was undisputed the MCUA did not sign the Consent Form

attached to CBP's application, the DEP was not required to engage in

additional fact-finding or review the MCUA's or Woodbridge's reasoning for

their withholding consent. Accordingly, we affirm the DEP's November 18,

A-0951-24 21 2024 final agency decision and hold it reasonably interpreted its regulations to

require the consent of the owner of the receiving wastewater treatment plant as

a prerequisite to it considering a TWA application. Its findings were not

arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, and we discern no basis to disturb its

decision.

To the extent we have not specifically addressed any remaining

arguments CBP raised, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

A-0951-24 22