Carter v. W. J. Dyer & Bro.

243 N.W. 436, 186 Minn. 413, 1932 Minn. LEXIS 911
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota
DecidedJuly 1, 1932
DocketNo. 28,861.
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 243 N.W. 436 (Carter v. W. J. Dyer & Bro.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Minnesota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carter v. W. J. Dyer & Bro., 243 N.W. 436, 186 Minn. 413, 1932 Minn. LEXIS 911 (Mich. 1932).

Opinions

Olsen, J.

Certiorari to revieAv a decision of the industrial commission aAvarding compensation to Antoinette Carter for the death of her husband.

The decedent, William F. Carter, while washing windo\vs of a building OAvned and occupied by W. J. Dyer & Bro. accidentally fell from a windoAv in an upper story of the building and was killed on March 12, 1931. The referee of the industrial commission found that at the time of the accident decedent Avas in the employ of W. J. Dyer & Bro. and earning Avages at the rate or sum of $30 per week; that the injury causing his death was accidental and arose out of and in the course of his said employment, and aAvarded compensation. On appeal to the industrial commission the findings and aAvard made by the referee were approved and adopted as the findings and aAvard of the commission.

The relators here, W. J. Dyer & Bro. and Anchor Casualty Company, challenge the findings of fact and award of compensation principally on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the finding that the decedent Avas an employe of W. J. Dyer & Bro. Avithin the meaning of the compensation laAv at the time of his injury and death. Their contention is that the eiddence conclusively shows that decedent Avas an independent contractor and not an employe. If from the evidence and the inferences reasonably to be *415 drawn therefrom the industrial commission could reasonably find that decedent was an employe within the meaning of the workmen’s compensation law and not an independent contractor, then that settles the question. On the other hand, if from the evidence and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the only conclusion reasonably to be arrived at is that the decedent was an independent contractor and not an employe as defined by the compensation law, then the commission was in error in its findings and award.

Window washing is humble work, performed mostly by hand labor. It is usually done by servants, janitors, or cleaners hired by the owner or occupant of the building. It may be a part of the services for which a janitor or servant is regularly hired, or it may be the only service for which a person is hired. It may be paid for by being included in the monthly or weekly wages of a servant, or it may be paid for by the day, hour, or so much per window, or so much for a building.

A brief statement of facts seems necessary. For some years, up to about 18 months before the accident, the decedent was in the employ of a corporation engaged in the window washing business in the city of St. Paul. He worked as a window washer. There can be no doubt that while so engaged he was the servant and employe of the corporation for whom he worked. He then commenced to work for others in the same occupation, and, as far as appears, to work in the same manner as before, except that thereafter he hired out to the owners and occupants of buildings who had window washing to be done. There was a change of employers but no change in the occupation or in the manner of doing the work. Windows are not generally washed every day, but at more or less regular intervals; and, except in very large buildings, a window washer could not be steadily employed in one building. In order to occupy his time decedent sought and obtained employment to wash the windows in a number of buildings. He made a list of his employers, and at the time of his death had some 23 or 24 different customers or employers for whom he washed windows at stated times or whenever called. He had no place of business but ar *416 ranged for a place where he could be called by telephone. He provided himself with the necessary ladder and utensils for doing the work. In most cases his compensation was paid at the rate of a fixed price per window. In one or more cases his work included some cleaning of offices and he was paid by the month. He sometimes employed a helper, and had such a helper with him at the time of the accident. There were and are a number of corporations, companies, and individuals engaged in the business of window washing in the city of St. Paul, and decedent was in competition with them in his work.

W. J. Dyer & Bro. were in the business of buying and selling musical instruments, radios, and things incident thereto. For some 18 months prior to his death decedent had been employed by them to wash the windows of their building Avhenever needed. There Avas no stated time for doing the work. Whenever called or informed that it Avas needed, the windoAvs Avere Avashed. The Avashing Avas done on an average of once every tAvo or three months, sometimes oftener. Decedent Avas paid 10 cents a Avindow for the smaller AvindoAvs and 20 cents a window for the larger ones for each washing. The contract of hiring, except as to the price, Avas not very definite. There Avas no time fixed. Either party could terminate the contract at Avill. If the work was not satisfactory the employer could require decedent to do it over or discharge him. Decedent Avas not on the pay roll of Dyer & Bro. but Avas paid after each Avashing. WindoAV Avashing, as so carried on, did not require much supervision by the employer. Decedent knew Iioav to do the Avork. He was given access to the rooms in the building and did the work. Taking into consideration the nature of the Avork, the manner in Avhich it was performed, and the contract of employment here shown, the industrial commission could reasonably find that decedent was an employe and not an independent contractor.

One of the tests is whether the employer has the right to control. Hothing appears in the evidence to deprive the employer here of full control over the work. As far as appears, it could determine Avhen the work Avas to be done and the manner in Avhich it should be *417 done. As far as appears, it had the same right of control over the decedent as it would have had over any other of its servants, doing the same work, and it had the right to discharge.

In State ex rel. V. & R. L. Co. v. District Court, 128 Minn. 43, 150 N. W. 211, it is held that the test of Avhether a person is an employe is the right of control, and that, unless it appears conclusively that the right to control and supervise the Avork Avas not reserved, the question of whether the relation of employer and employe exists is a question of fact. While these rules there stated are taken from the cited negligence cases, they are there applied to the case under the Avorkmen’s compensation laAv.

Later cases are Herron v. Coolsaet Bros. 158 Minn. 522, 198 N. W. 134; Schullo v. Village of Nashwauk, 166 Minn. 186, 207 N. W. 621; Angell v. White Eagle O. & R. Co. 169 Minn. 183, 210 N. W. 1004; Lampi. v. Koponen, 178 Minn. 133, 226 N. W. 475; Reigel v. J. B. Finch T. Co. Inc. 182 Minn. 289, 234 N. W. 452; Barker v. Bemidji W. P. Co. 184 Minn. 366, 238 N. W. 692.

The fact that decedent provided his OAvn ladder and small equipment and that he at times employed a helper is not of particular importance. Lynch v. Hutchinson Produce Co. 169 Minn. 329, 211 N. W. 313.

It is stated, but not much argued, that decedent’s employment Avas casual and not in the usual course of the business of the employer. But for the fact that there was a continuing contract or employment for some 18 months, the employment might Avell be termed casual.

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Bluebook (online)
243 N.W. 436, 186 Minn. 413, 1932 Minn. LEXIS 911, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carter-v-w-j-dyer-bro-minn-1932.