Carter v. New York City Tr. Auth.

2025 NY Slip Op 32016(U)
CourtNew York Supreme Court, New York County
DecidedJune 6, 2025
DocketIndex No. 160475/2024
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2025 NY Slip Op 32016(U) (Carter v. New York City Tr. Auth.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court, New York County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carter v. New York City Tr. Auth., 2025 NY Slip Op 32016(U) (N.Y. Super. Ct. 2025).

Opinion

Carter v New York City Tr. Auth. 2025 NY Slip Op 32016(U) June 6, 2025 Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 160475/2024 Judge: Richard Tsai Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York State and local government sources, including the New York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication. FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 06/06/2025 04:03 PM INDEX NO. 160475/2024 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 15 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/06/2025

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK NEW YORK COUNTY PRESENT: HON. RICHARD TSAI PART 21 Justice ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X INDEX NO. 160475/2024 WILLIAM CARTER MOTION DATE 6/5/2025 Petitioner, MOTION SEQ. NO. 001 -v- NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, DECISION + JUDGMENT ON PETITION Respondent. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document numbers (Motion 001) 1-14 were read on this motion to/for LEAVE TO FILE .

Upon the foregoing documents, it is ADJUDGED that the petition seeking leave to serve a late notice of claim upon the respondent, or, in the alternative, seeking an order deeming the petitioner’s proposed notice of claim timely served nunc pro tunc, is DENIED, and the proceeding is dismissed.

In this proceeding, petitioner William Carter seeks leave to serve a late notice of claim upon respondent New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) for injuries that he allegedly sustained when he fell on a staircase marked as “M2LB” in the Herald Square subway station on August 28, 2023 at 2:30 p.m. (exhibit C to petition [NYSCEF Doc. No. 5], proposed notice of claim]). Alternatively, petitioner seeks an order deeming petitioner’s proposed notice of claim timely served nunc pro tunc. Respondent opposes the petition. DISCUSSION

Where an action against the NYCTA is founded on a tort (except for wrongful death), Public Authorities Law § 1212 (2) requires service of a notice of claim upon the NYCTA, prior to the commencement of the action, “within the time limited by and in compliance with all of the requirements of section [50-e] of the general municipal law.”

Under General Municipal Law § 50-e (5), courts have discretion to grant an extension of time for service of a notice of claim. “The burden of production is on the petitioner in a special proceeding, and the court applies settled summary judgment standards, under which the party seeking relief must establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting admissible evidence” (Matter of Jaime v City of New York, 41 NY3d 531, 542 [2024] [internal citations and quotations omitted]).

“In determining whether to grant or deny leave to serve a late notice of claim, the court must consider ‘in particular’ whether the municipality 160475/2024 CARTER, WILLIAM vs. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY Page 1 of 5 Motion No. 001

1 of 5 [* 1] FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 06/06/2025 04:03 PM INDEX NO. 160475/2024 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 15 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/06/2025

‘acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within [90 days of the claim’s accrual] or within a reasonable time thereafter.’ Courts are to place ‘great weight’ on this factor, which the party seeking leave has the burden of establishing through the submission of nonspeculative evidence” (id. at 540 [internal citations omitted]).

“Additionally, the statute requires the court to consider ‘all other relevant facts and circumstances’ and provides a ‘nonexhaustive list of factors that the court should weigh’. One factor the court must consider is ‘whether the delay in serving the notice of claim substantially prejudiced the public corporation in maintaining its defense on the merits’”(Matter of Newcomb v Middle Country Cent. School Dist., 28 NY3d 455, 460-461 [2016] [internal citation omitted]).

The Appellate Divisions have held that courts must also consider whether petitioner has a reasonable excuse for the delay, but the “failure to offer a reasonable excuse is not necessarily fatal” (Clarke v New York City Tr. Auth., 222 AD3d 552, 553 [1st Dept 2023]; Guerre v New York City Tr. Auth., 226 AD3d 897, 898 [2d Dept 2024]). “[W]here there is actual notice and absence of prejudice, the lack of a reasonable excuse will not bar the granting of leave to serve a late notice of claim” (Guerre, 226 AD3d at 898 [quotation marks and citation omitted]). Thus, petitioner essentially needs to prove only the actual knowledge and substantial prejudice factors to be entitled to leave to serve a late notice of claim.

Reasonable excuse

Here, petitioner has not identified a reasonable excuse for his delay in serving the notice of claim. Indeed, in petitioner’s reply papers, petitioner argues that “the lack of a reasonable excuse is not, standing by itself, sufficient to deny an application for leave to serve and file a late notice of claim” (reply affirmation in further support of petition [NYSCEF Doc. No. 11] ¶ 4 [internal quotation marks omitted]).1

Actual knowledge of the essential facts

“The actual knowledge requirement contemplates actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim, not knowledge of a specific legal theory” (Matter of Townson v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 158 AD3d 401, 403 [1st Dept 2018]; Matter of Grande v City of New York, 48 AD3d 565 [2nd Dept 2008]). However, “knowledge of the facts underlying an occurrence does not constitute knowledge of the claim. What satisfies the statute is not knowledge of the wrong. What the statute exacts is notice of [the] ‘claim’” (Chattergoon v New York City Hous. Auth., 161 AD2d 141 [1st Dept 1990], affd Matter of Chattergoon v New York City Hous. Auth., 78 NY2d 958 [1991]; see also Bullard v City of New York, 118 AD2d 447 [1st Dept 1986]). “The

1 To the extent that petitioner’s excuse might be that he believed that the City of New York was the appropriate entity to serve a notice of claim on and that “he only recently came to realize that he may have a claim against the NYCTA”, such an excuse would be “unacceptable” (Matter of Abramovitz v City of New York, 99 AD3d 1000, 1001 [2d Dept 2012]). 160475/2024 CARTER, WILLIAM vs. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY Page 2 of 5 Motion No. 001

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statute contemplates not only knowledge of the facts, but also how they relate to the legal claim to be asserted” (Carpenter v City of New York, 30 AD3d 594, 595 [2d Dept 2006]). Actual knowledge of the facts underlying the claim includes knowledge of the injuries or damages (Arnold v Town of Camillus, 222 AD3d 1372, 1377 [4th Dept 2023]).

In arguing that respondent timely acquired actual knowledge of the of the essential facts constituting his claim, petitioner points to a letter from the City of New York, dated January 29, 2024, which is reproduced below in pertinent part:

(exhibit B to petition [NYSCEF Doc. No. 4], claim rejection letter from City [highlighting added]).

Petitioner contends that, based on the above highlighted language, “the City contacted NYCTA to conduct an investigation, so the NYCTA gained knowledge of the incident within that timeframe” (petition [NYSCEF Doc. No. 1] ¶ 20).

However, this does not constitute “nonspeculative evidence that [respondent] acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days of the accrual of the claim, or within a reasonable time thereafter” (Rivera v New York City Dept. of Transportation, 235 AD3d 510, 511 [1st Dept 2025]; see also Matter of Lewis v E. Ramapo Cent.

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Related

Chattergoon v. New York City Housing Authority
580 N.E.2d 406 (New York Court of Appeals, 1991)
Matter of Richardson v. New York City Hous. Auth.
136 A.D.3d 484 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2016)
Newcomb v. Middle Country Central School District
68 N.E.3d 714 (New York Court of Appeals, 2016)
Grande v. City of New York
48 A.D.3d 565 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2008)
Fredrickson v. New York City Housing Authority
87 A.D.3d 425 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 2011)
Bullard v. City of New York
118 A.D.2d 447 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1986)
Chattergoon v. New York City Housing Authority
161 A.D.2d 141 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1990)

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Bluebook (online)
2025 NY Slip Op 32016(U), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carter-v-new-york-city-tr-auth-nysupctnewyork-2025.