Carter v. Marvel Carburetor Co.

248 N.W. 545, 263 Mich. 48, 1933 Mich. LEXIS 1097
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedMay 16, 1933
DocketDocket No. 48, Calendar No. 36,935.
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 248 N.W. 545 (Carter v. Marvel Carburetor Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carter v. Marvel Carburetor Co., 248 N.W. 545, 263 Mich. 48, 1933 Mich. LEXIS 1097 (Mich. 1933).

Opinions

The plaintiff, a former resident of St. Louis, Missouri, and engaged in the invention of automobile accessories, came to the city of Flint in 1923 at the request of the defendant, and entered into a contract with it on November 21st of that year, which is the subject of this litigation. As decision rests upon the construction which shall be *Page 49 placed upon so many of its provisions, it will be inserted in full in the margin hereto.* *Page 50

Plaintiff entered into the employ of the defendant under this contract. It is his claim that such employment terminated at the end of the first year. It appears, however, that he continued to occupy a room in defendant's plant, set apart for him, until some time in 1931. In 1926 and 1927 he spent some time in perfecting an invention spoken of as a by-pass, it being a small device to be incorporated in a carburetor to control the flow of gasoline therein. It appears that Charles Kirby, an engineer in the employ of the defendant, was likewise working on a somewhat similar design. He claims that he had no knowledge of plaintiff's efforts along the same line. An application for a patent therefor was filed by Kirby on October 5th and by the plaintiff on October 17, 1927. Letters patent were issued to plaintiff on his application on November 10, 1931.

In July, 1928, the defendant began producing a carburetor containing, as plaintiff claims, his by-pass *Page 51 device, and in that year and in 1929, 1930, and 1931 it sold to the Hudson-Essex Company approximately 484,938 of them at a specified price for each one.

In his bill of complaint plaintiff sought cancellation of the contract and the restraint of the defendant from operating under it, and an accounting for the royalties due him thereunder. The trial court found that the defendant had breached the contract, and, as the defendant stated in open court that it had no objection thereto, decreed its cancellation. He found that the plaintiff was not entitled to un-earned minimum royalties as provided for in the fifth paragraph of the contract, but that he was entitled to recover royalties on the carburetors sold to the Hudson-Essex Company in the sum of $49,936.65, and gave him decree therefor. From this allowance the defendant has taken an appeal, and from the disallowance of his claim for unearned *Page 52 minimum royalties the plaintiff has taken a cross-appeal.

Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the contract contain specific provision for the exclusive use of plaintiff's patents by defendant and the royalty to be paid him therefor. Paragraph 1 also provides for the employment of plaintiff by defendant at $300 per month "for a period of one year or less at its option," provided it should give the plaintiff, "30 days' notice of its desire to so cancel such employment and this agreement in which event such employment shall cease and this agreement thereby become null and void." If this language be given a strict construction, and the hiring be limited to a period of one year, the contract was terminated at the end of that time. But the recitals and other *Page 53 provisions therein clearly indicate that such was not the intention of the parties.

No notice was given by the defendant. On April 30, 1931, plaintiff, claiming the right so to do under the provision in paragraph 17, gave the defendant notice of cancellation for its failure to pay him the minimum royalties to which he claimed he was entitled under paragraph 5. He admits that he received from the defendant $300 every month until June 6th of that year. It is his claim that he accepted this money as compensation for the first year, ending in November, 1924, and thereafter as minimum royalties for the next two years as provided for in paragraph 5 and as applying on such royalties thereafter. It appears that nothing was said by either party at the end of the first, second, or third years about his employment or terminating the contract. The first action taken relative thereto *Page 54 was plaintiff's letter of April 30, 1931, above referred to.

It also appears that during this period of more than seven years the plaintiff was kept on the salary pay roll of the defendant, and that he received checks therefor semi-monthly during most of that time. He had an apartment or room in which he worked, and was engaged in no other work or business. If his employment ceased at the end of the first year, he would have had no right to the use of defendant's work-room thereafter, and naturally would have removed his equipment therefrom. A consideration of these facts, concerning which there is no dispute, leads us to conclude that, having accepted monthly compensation for his services under paragraph I for all these years without complaint or remonstrance, the defendant had the right to assume that he was working thereunder, and his claim now made for minimum royalties under paragraph 5 should not be allowed.

The law seems to be well settled that when one enters into the employment of another for a definite term and continues to render the same service after the expiration thereof, it will be presumed that the employment is continued under the terms of the original contract, and that its provisions continue in force. This presumption may, of course, be re-butted.Sines v. Superintendents of the Poor, 58 Mich. 503; Laughlin v.School-District No. 17, 98 Mich. 523; Reynick v. Allington Curtis Manfg. Co., 179 Mich. 631. See, also, 39 C. J. p. 49, and cases cited in footnote, and annotation in L.R.A. 1918 C, page 706 et seq.

Was the plaintiff entitled to royalties on the sales made to the Hudson-Essex Company? The conclusion above reached as to plaintiff's employment *Page 55 renders the provisions in paragraph 5 inapplicable on consideration of this question, as that paragraph applied only to defendant's rights to manufacture and sell the products of plaintiff's invention when not in its employ.

Paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of the contract clearly provide for royalties payable to plaintiff in the manufacture and sale of carburetors under plaintiff's patents, and if those sold to the Hudson-Essex Company were so manufactured, and are within the terms of the contract, recovery may be had therefor. Defendant's counsel raise several objections to the allowance made by the court as above stated.

1. That the by-pass incorporated in these carburetors was not covered by plaintiff's patent issued on November 10, 1931, but was the by-pass invented by Kirby and assigned to defendant. A number of expert witnesses were called and examined on this question. The trial court found that plaintiff's patent was used in the manufacture of this by-pass. It will serve no useful purpose to discuss the testimony in this respect. It is in most part highly technical, and not easily understood except by a patent expert. In our opinion, it supported the claim of the plaintiff and warranted the finding made.

2. That, even though the by-pass was covered by plaintiff's patent, no liability attached, for the reason that his patent was not granted until after the sales were made and after plaintiff's letter of April 30, 1931, canceling the contract, had been sent to defendant. As before stated, plaintiff filed an application for this patent on October 17, 1927, but the patent was not granted until November 10, 1931. Reliance is placed upon paragraph 8.

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Related

Schnack v. Applied Arts Corp.
278 N.W. 117 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1938)
Marvel Carburetor Co. v. Carter
274 N.W. 733 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1937)
Carter v. Marvel Carburetor Co.
256 N.W. 608 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1934)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
248 N.W. 545, 263 Mich. 48, 1933 Mich. LEXIS 1097, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carter-v-marvel-carburetor-co-mich-1933.