Carter v. Holzman Law, PLLC

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedMarch 20, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-11990
StatusUnknown

This text of Carter v. Holzman Law, PLLC (Carter v. Holzman Law, PLLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carter v. Holzman Law, PLLC, (E.D. Mich. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION IMANI CARTER,

Plaintiff, Case No. 24-cv-11990 Hon. Matthew F. Leitman v. HOLZMAN LAW, PLLC, et al.,

Defendants. __________________________________________________________________/ ORDER (1) OVERRULING DEFENDANT’S OBJECTION TO REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (ECF No. 33); (2) ADOPTING RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION OF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (ECF No. 32); AND (3) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 19)

In this action, pro se Plaintiff Imani Carter claims that Defendant Holzman Law, PLLC (“Holzman”) violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. (the “FCRA”) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. (the “FDCPA”) when Holzman attempted to collect a debt that Carter owes. (See Am. Compl., ECF No. 10.) Holzman moved to dismiss Carter’s claims (see Mot., ECF No. 19), and on February 13, 2025, the assigned Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation in which he recommended that the Court grant Holzman’s motion in part and deny the motion in part (the “R&R”). Holzman has now filed a timely objection to the R&R. (See Obj., ECF No. 33.) For the reasons explained below, Holzman’s objection is OVERRULED and its motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as set forth in the R&R.

I A The Magistrate Judge explained the factual background and procedural

history of this case in detail in the R&R. (See R&R, ECF No. 32, PageID.140-144.) In brief, Carter alleges that after she “incurred a financial obligation […] for an auto loan,” she fell behind on her payments and defaulted on the loan. (Am. Compl. at ¶ 11, ECF No. 10, PageID.30-31.) Holzman thereafter “commenced a lawsuit” against

Carter in state court “for the debt owed.” (Id. at ¶ 12, PageID.31.) On November 14, 2023, the state district court entered a default judgment against Carter. (See id. at ¶ 13.) Carter says, among other things, that when attempting to collect on that default

judgment, Holzman has “added interest” to the amount she owes that is “not allowed by the contract nor by Michigan law,” and she insists that Holzman is “not reporting accurate payment balances” it receives from her. (Id. at ¶¶ 27-29, PageID.32-33.) In her Amended Complaint, Carter brings three claims against Holzman:

 Failing to investigate and modify inaccurate information in violation of Section 1681s-2(b) of the FCRA (the “FCRA Claim”);  Making misleading representations about the amount Carter owes and the amount received from her in violation of Section

1692e(2)(A) of the FDCPA (the “Section 1692e Claim”); and  Attempting to collect more than what she owes in violation of Section 1692f(1) of the FDCPA (the “Section 1692f Claim”).

B On August 23, 2024, Holzman filed a motion to dismiss all of Carter’s claims. (See Mot., ECF No. 19.) The motion was referred to the assigned Magistrate Judge. (See Order, ECF No. 21.) The Magistrate Judge held a hearing on the motion, and

on February 13, 2025, he issued the R&R. (See R&R, ECF No. 32.) In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court (1) dismiss the FCRA Claim, (2) dismiss the Section 1692e Claim, but (3) deny the motion with respect to the Section

1692f Claim. (See id.) At the conclusion of the R&R, the Magistrate Judge informed the parties that if they wished to seek review of any of his recommendations, they needed to file specific objections with the Court within 14 days. (See id., PageID.152.) Holzman

filed a timely objection on February 26, 2025. (See Obj., ECF No. 33.) Carter did not file any objections to the R&R.1 The Court will address Holtzman’s objection in detail below.

II When a party objects to portions of a Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation, the Court reviews those portions de novo. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(b)(3); Lyons v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 351 F.Supp.2d 659, 661 (E.D. Mich. 2004). The Court has no duty to conduct an independent review of the portions of the R&R to which the parties did not object. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985). III

Holzman raises a single, narrow objection to the recommendation in the R&R. It argues that the Magistrate Judge erred when he recommended that the Court deny its motion to dismiss the Section 1692f Claim. Holzman says that “[a]t most,

[Carter] has alleged that fees were added to her default judgment that were not permitted by her contract. That is not sufficient to state a claim [under Section

1 The failure to object to an R&R releases the Court from its duty to independently review the matter. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985). See also Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, (6th Cir. 1987) (explaining that where party fails to file “timely objections” to report and recommendation, court may accept that recommendation “without expressing any view on the merits of the magistrate’s conclusions”). Likewise, the failure to file objections to an R&R waives any further right to appeal. See Howard v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, because Carter has not filed any objections to the R&R, the Court will adopt the Magistrate Judge’s recommended disposition of Carter’s FCRA Claim and Section 1692e Claim, and it will DISMISS those claims. 1692f] because Michigan law expressly permits the addition of fees to a judgment and the [FDCPA] specifically states that it is not a violation of [that] Act to collect

amounts that are permitted by law.” (Obj., ECF No. 33, PageID.154.) Holzman therefore insists that Carter’s Section 1692f Claim fails because she did “not, and cannot, allege that [Holzman] collected any amounts that were not permitted by

law.” (Id. See also id., PageID.156: “The Magistrate failed to note [] that [Carter] did not allege that the fees [added to her default judgment] were not authorized by law.”) The Court disagrees and overrules Holzman’s objection. While Carter’s Amended Complaint is not artfully drafted, she does allege

that Holzman collected amounts that were “not permitted by law.” Indeed, in paragraph 27 of her Amended Complaint, she alleges that “Holzman added an interest chart to the [state court] lawsuit showing 16 percent would be added daily[,]

nevertheless, this interest was not allowed by the contract nor by Michigan law.” (Am. Compl. at ¶ 27, ECF No. 10, PageID.32; emphasis added.) And that allegation was expressly incorporated into her Section 1692f Claim. (See id. at ¶ 48, PageID.35.) Thus, contrary to Holzman’s representations in its objection that Carter

“has not, and cannot, allege that [Holzman] collected any amount that was not authorized by law” (Obj., ECF No. 33, PageID.158), Carter did include such an allegation in her Amended Complaint. And while Carter’s allegations could have

been articulated more clearly and directly, given that pro se pleadings should be “liberally construed,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the Court concludes that Carter’s Section 1692f Claim sufficiently alleges that Holzman

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