Carter v. Corrections CV-94-113-B 08/15/95 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Scott A. Carter
v. No. 94-113-B
Commissioner, New Hampshire Department of Corrections, et al.
O R D E R
Pro se plaintiff Scott A. Carter brings a civil rights
action alleging violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights at New Hampshire State Prison ("NHSP"). The defendants,1
Nathan Sidley, director of medical services, and Stephen
Gressitt, staff psychiatrist, move for summary judgment. For the
following reasons, I grant summary judgment in their favor.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
I review the defendants' motion for summary judgment under
the familiar standard. Summary judgment is appropriate if the
materials in the record show that no genuine dispute as to any
material facts exists and that the moving party, the defendants
1 The claims against the other defendants, former and present commissioners of the department of corrections, were dismissed previously. here, are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c). I must view the record in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party, the plaintiff, and resolve all reasonable
factual inferences in his favor. Oliver v. Digital Equipment
Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). If the defendants
present a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that a material factual dispute
renders summary judgment inappropriate. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986) . I recite the pertinent
facts in light of the summary judgment standard and then address
the legal issues.
BACKGROUND
Scott Carter was admitted to NHSP on November 2, 1992, to
serve three and a half to seven years for burglary. He was
eighteen years old. On October 21, 1992, while he was in the
Belknap County House of Corrections, Carter was evaluated by Dr.
Marcosa Santiago on the recommendation of Carter's psychological
counselor. Dr. Santiago diagnosed major depression and
recommended both continued counselling and treatment with a
"tricyclic antidepressant" that would also address Carter's
impulsivity. The antidepressant prescription from Dr. Santiago
2 was filled for Carter and delivered to him.
Carter hoped to participate in the Shock Incarceration
program at NHSP. He had the prescribed antidepressant medication
with him when he was admitted to NHSP, but had not begun the
course of treatment because his attorney warned him that hewould
not be eligible for the Shock program if he were taking
psychotropic medication. He indicated on intake sheets that he
was not taking medications. The intake staff sent Carter's
medication to the prison pharmacy. He underwent a psychological
evaluation for the Shock program on November 25 and December 1,
1992, and was found to be fit for the program. The examining
psychologist noted that Carter's results might be skewed by his
desire to present himself favorably and to minimize his faults,
and he also gualified his evaluation to the factors known at the
time. Carter entered the Shock program on December 7 but left
the next day due to stress.
The medication was never returned to Carter. On January 27,
1993, he reguested a session with defendant Dr. Gressitt
concerning the medication. In the meantime, on February 3,
Carter was seen by a psychologist in the mental health clinic for
trouble sleeping. The psychologist noted Carter's fidgeting and
mild depression, and referred Carter for a psychiatric
3 evaluation.
Carter arrived forty-five minutes late to his psychiatric
appointment with Dr. Gressitt on February 18 because of reported
problems leaving his unit, and the appointment had to be
rescheduled. The next note in Carter's medical record of a
psychiatric consult is on May 27. At that time. Dr. Gressitt
wrote that the appointment was to clarify administration of
Carter's medication, that he would refer Carter to mental health
for an evaluation and would schedule another appointment, and
that Carter "states he is doing o.k. now." Dr. Gressitt's notes
in the record say that Carter missed his appointments on June 4
and July 9.
On July 29, Dr. Gressitt wrote that Carter was guiet during
the interview but responsive to direct guestions and that he
complained of sleeping problems. Carter also asked for
antidepressant medication. Dr. Gressitt referred him to the
mental health clinic and noted that Carter said he would be
alright until then. Carter next saw Dr. Gressitt on August 12.
At that time. Dr. Gressitt wrote that he told Carter that because
he was being counselled by the mental health clinic, he would not
see him again unless he was referred.
4 In late August, the NHSP acting commissioner received a
letter from an attorney on Carter's behalf asking that the prison
consider allowing Carter to participate in an alternative
incarceration program such as the Shock program while he was
taking the antidepressant medication prescribed by Dr. Santiago.
Dr. Sidley responded that the prison staff did not feel that
Carter needed antidepressant medication and that it would not
help him adapt to the Shock program. Carter filed a reguest slip
with Dr. Sidley on September 28 complaining that Dr. Gressitt had
not evaluated him or provided him with his antidepressant
medication. Dr. Sidley responded that he thought Dr. Gressitt
had already evaluated Carter. Carter then explained that his
complaint was lack of treatment for depression. Dr. Sidley
responded that Dr. Gressitt had evaluated Carter and determined
that he did not need medication. No written evaluation by Dr.
Gressitt appears in the record.
On October 1, Carter again asked to speak with Dr. Gressitt
about his antidepressant medication, and Dr. Gressitt responded
that he had asked that an appointment be scheduled. On October
17 and November 1, Carter reguested that Dr. Sidley arrange an
outside psychiatric consultation for him to determine whether he
needed the medication prescribed by Dr. Santiago. Dr. Sidley
5 responded on November 10, "Perhaps if you go to sick call and
request a psychiatric appointment, a time can be set for you to
see [two doctors] both of whom now work in the prison." The same
day Carter filed a grievance concerning the lack of attention to
his treatment for depression. The response two weeks later was
that he would be receiving an appointment. In the meantime. New
Hampshire Legal Assistance wrote to the Attorney General's office
on November 17 detailing Carter's complaint and asking that the
prison either give him his medication or refer him for an outside
psychiatric evaluation.
Carter was seen by Dr. Schopick, a psychiatrist working in
the prison, on November 29. Dr. Schopick found Carter to be
depressed and experiencing sleep problems. He diagnosed a
serious problem with anxiety and a secondary problem with
depression.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Carter v. Corrections CV-94-113-B 08/15/95 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Scott A. Carter
v. No. 94-113-B
Commissioner, New Hampshire Department of Corrections, et al.
O R D E R
Pro se plaintiff Scott A. Carter brings a civil rights
action alleging violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights at New Hampshire State Prison ("NHSP"). The defendants,1
Nathan Sidley, director of medical services, and Stephen
Gressitt, staff psychiatrist, move for summary judgment. For the
following reasons, I grant summary judgment in their favor.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
I review the defendants' motion for summary judgment under
the familiar standard. Summary judgment is appropriate if the
materials in the record show that no genuine dispute as to any
material facts exists and that the moving party, the defendants
1 The claims against the other defendants, former and present commissioners of the department of corrections, were dismissed previously. here, are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c). I must view the record in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party, the plaintiff, and resolve all reasonable
factual inferences in his favor. Oliver v. Digital Equipment
Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). If the defendants
present a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that a material factual dispute
renders summary judgment inappropriate. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986) . I recite the pertinent
facts in light of the summary judgment standard and then address
the legal issues.
BACKGROUND
Scott Carter was admitted to NHSP on November 2, 1992, to
serve three and a half to seven years for burglary. He was
eighteen years old. On October 21, 1992, while he was in the
Belknap County House of Corrections, Carter was evaluated by Dr.
Marcosa Santiago on the recommendation of Carter's psychological
counselor. Dr. Santiago diagnosed major depression and
recommended both continued counselling and treatment with a
"tricyclic antidepressant" that would also address Carter's
impulsivity. The antidepressant prescription from Dr. Santiago
2 was filled for Carter and delivered to him.
Carter hoped to participate in the Shock Incarceration
program at NHSP. He had the prescribed antidepressant medication
with him when he was admitted to NHSP, but had not begun the
course of treatment because his attorney warned him that hewould
not be eligible for the Shock program if he were taking
psychotropic medication. He indicated on intake sheets that he
was not taking medications. The intake staff sent Carter's
medication to the prison pharmacy. He underwent a psychological
evaluation for the Shock program on November 25 and December 1,
1992, and was found to be fit for the program. The examining
psychologist noted that Carter's results might be skewed by his
desire to present himself favorably and to minimize his faults,
and he also gualified his evaluation to the factors known at the
time. Carter entered the Shock program on December 7 but left
the next day due to stress.
The medication was never returned to Carter. On January 27,
1993, he reguested a session with defendant Dr. Gressitt
concerning the medication. In the meantime, on February 3,
Carter was seen by a psychologist in the mental health clinic for
trouble sleeping. The psychologist noted Carter's fidgeting and
mild depression, and referred Carter for a psychiatric
3 evaluation.
Carter arrived forty-five minutes late to his psychiatric
appointment with Dr. Gressitt on February 18 because of reported
problems leaving his unit, and the appointment had to be
rescheduled. The next note in Carter's medical record of a
psychiatric consult is on May 27. At that time. Dr. Gressitt
wrote that the appointment was to clarify administration of
Carter's medication, that he would refer Carter to mental health
for an evaluation and would schedule another appointment, and
that Carter "states he is doing o.k. now." Dr. Gressitt's notes
in the record say that Carter missed his appointments on June 4
and July 9.
On July 29, Dr. Gressitt wrote that Carter was guiet during
the interview but responsive to direct guestions and that he
complained of sleeping problems. Carter also asked for
antidepressant medication. Dr. Gressitt referred him to the
mental health clinic and noted that Carter said he would be
alright until then. Carter next saw Dr. Gressitt on August 12.
At that time. Dr. Gressitt wrote that he told Carter that because
he was being counselled by the mental health clinic, he would not
see him again unless he was referred.
4 In late August, the NHSP acting commissioner received a
letter from an attorney on Carter's behalf asking that the prison
consider allowing Carter to participate in an alternative
incarceration program such as the Shock program while he was
taking the antidepressant medication prescribed by Dr. Santiago.
Dr. Sidley responded that the prison staff did not feel that
Carter needed antidepressant medication and that it would not
help him adapt to the Shock program. Carter filed a reguest slip
with Dr. Sidley on September 28 complaining that Dr. Gressitt had
not evaluated him or provided him with his antidepressant
medication. Dr. Sidley responded that he thought Dr. Gressitt
had already evaluated Carter. Carter then explained that his
complaint was lack of treatment for depression. Dr. Sidley
responded that Dr. Gressitt had evaluated Carter and determined
that he did not need medication. No written evaluation by Dr.
Gressitt appears in the record.
On October 1, Carter again asked to speak with Dr. Gressitt
about his antidepressant medication, and Dr. Gressitt responded
that he had asked that an appointment be scheduled. On October
17 and November 1, Carter reguested that Dr. Sidley arrange an
outside psychiatric consultation for him to determine whether he
needed the medication prescribed by Dr. Santiago. Dr. Sidley
5 responded on November 10, "Perhaps if you go to sick call and
request a psychiatric appointment, a time can be set for you to
see [two doctors] both of whom now work in the prison." The same
day Carter filed a grievance concerning the lack of attention to
his treatment for depression. The response two weeks later was
that he would be receiving an appointment. In the meantime. New
Hampshire Legal Assistance wrote to the Attorney General's office
on November 17 detailing Carter's complaint and asking that the
prison either give him his medication or refer him for an outside
psychiatric evaluation.
Carter was seen by Dr. Schopick, a psychiatrist working in
the prison, on November 29. Dr. Schopick found Carter to be
depressed and experiencing sleep problems. He diagnosed a
serious problem with anxiety and a secondary problem with
depression. He prescribed medication for anxiety and weekly
counselling. Dr. Schopick's subsequent notes through June 20,
1994, indicate improvement in anxiety but some recurrent
depression.
Carter filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983
alleging that the defendants' failure to provide him with his
prescribed antidepressant medication and appropriate treatment
violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Defendants
6 have moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Carter's
medical treatment by the defendants did not violate the Eighth
Amendment,2 or in the alternative, that the defendants are
entitled to gualified immunity.
DISCUSSION
NHSP is obligated to provide medical care to its inmate
population, and a failure to do so because of deliberate
indifference to an inmate's serious mental health need violates
the inmate's Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and
unusual punishment. Torraco v. Maloney, 923 F.2d 231, 234 (1st
Cir. 1991); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-06
(1976) .
Deliberate indifference in the Eighth Amendment context
reguires subjective recklessness so that a prison official will
be held liable only if the official "knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
2 A claim by an inmate alleging deprivation of treatment or medical care in prison is properly brought under the Eighth Amendment not the Fourteenth. Jackson v. Fair, 846 F.2d 811, 817 (1st Cir. 1988). Therefore, I consider Carter's claim for inadeguate medical treatment only as an Eighth Amendment claim.
7 substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw
the inference." Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. C t . 1970, 1979 (1994).
Thus, mere negligence or medical malpractice is insufficient to
state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 42 9 U.S. at
106, Watson v. Caton, 984 F.2d 537, 540 (1st Cir. 1993); Figueroa
v. Vose, 874 F. Supp. 500, 507 (D.R.I. 1994). Similarly, inmates
are not entitled under the Eighth Amendment to the treatment of
their choice. Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888, 890-91 (1st Cir.
1980) .
The record establishes that Carter wanted the prison to
provide him with the antidepressant medication that Dr. Santiago
prescribed. Dr. Gressitt, as his notes and affidavit indicate,
believed that Carter's mental health issues were better treated
through counselling, rather than with medication, because of his
history of substance abuse. Although Carter's history taken
while he was at the Belknap County House of Corrections includes
his report of two minor suicide "gestures" prior to his
incarceration, he denied any suicidal ideas at that time. The
psychological evaluation of Carter at NHSP done prior to his
admission into the Shock program in December 1992 did not
identify any serious mental health problems. While Dr.
Gressitt's assessment and treatment of Carter was different from that of Dr. Santiago and later Dr. Schopick, there is no evidence
that defendants were aware of and disregarded a substantial risk
that Carter would suffer serious harm if he did not receive the
treatment he desired. Therefore, I conclude that the defendants'
conduct did not violate Carter's Eighth Amendment rights.3
Because the undisputed facts in the record show no violation of
Carter's civil rights. Carter cannot sustain his suit based on 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983, and defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons defendants' motion for summary
judgment (document 18) is granted.
SO ORDERED.
Paul Barbadoro United States District Judge
August 15, 1995
cc: Scott A. Carter, pro se Daniel J. Mullen, Esg.
3 Having found no violation of Carter's rights, I need not consider the defendants' gualified immunity defense.