Carter v. Connick
This text of 623 So. 2d 670 (Carter v. Connick) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
This case arose on Daniel Carter’s petition for a writ of mandamus directing the Orleans Parish District Attorney to furnish copies of a number of records and reports which are in the prosecutor’s files. After a hearing on the matter, the District Attorney was ordered to furnish Carter with a copy of the file compiled in connection with his prosecution.
The District Attorney appeals the lower court’s decision questioning the constitutionality and application of certain statutes in the Public Records Act. As appellant states the issue, it is “whether the trial court should apply La.R.S. 44:32(0(2), as amended in 1968; or, whether the trial court should apply La.R.S. 44:32(C)(l)(a), as amended in 1989.”
Although appellant speaks of the 1968 amendment,1 there have been two subse[672]*672quent and intervening amendments prior to the 1989 amendment. The 1978 amendment, added by 1978 La. Acts, No. 686 Sec. 1 revised and added new provisions to the existing statute.2 The 1981 amendment is most relevant to appellant’s claims since it rewrote subsection C.3 This revision authorized the commissioner of administration to set uniform fees for copies of records held by state agencies. The two methods for setting fees was the notable distinction between state agencies and other custodians of public records in this statutory scheme. The only relevance of the 1989 amendment is its renumbering of what was formerly section 44:32(C)(l)(a) and adding section 44:32(C)(l)(b).4
[673]*673Subsection C directed custodians of public records to provide records to persons requesting them and authorized them to charge fees in most cases. In appellant’s view, the clause “For all public records, except public records of state agencies” found in 44:32(C)(l)(a), is language which excludes the District Attorney’s office from its purview because that office is a state agency. While that is true, the companion clause, 44:32(C)(2), plainly includes public records custodians of state agencies such as the District Attorney’s Office.
The office of District Attorney is created by the state Constitution in Art. 5, section 26, Constitution of 1974. The test for determining whether an office is a state agency according to Mullins v. State, 387 So.2d 1151 (La.1980) is in its origins. If created by the legislature or initially established by the constitution it is a state office.
In other words, although appellant correctly concludes that the District Attorney’s office is excluded by one section of the statute, we fail to understand the benefit of appellant’s argument since the office is clearly included in the later section. This subsection (C)(2) of the statute has never been amended and is still applicable in its current form.
Appellant also questions whether La. R.S. 44:32 is unconstitutionally contradictory, ambiguous and unenforceable. We find no ambiguity in the statutory scheme. When the 1981 amendment divided subsection C into subparts 1 and 2, there was obviously a distinction made between state agencies and other repositories of public records. In our opinion, the appellant misreads the thrust of the 1989 amendment and its effect on the duty of state agencies to produce records. Nothing changed the duties of the respective custodians to provide copies of public records upon request. The changes involved the provisions for levying fees and determining who was eligible to obtain records at reduced charges.
The 1989 amendment made absolutely no change to the subsection of the statute governing state agencies or in this case, the appellant. The 1989 amendment neither added to nor subtracted from the duty of the District Attorney’s office to produce the records requested by the appellee. The 1989 amendment simply added another category of public records custodians — clerks of court and various Orleans Parish record keepers— to the statutory scheme and gave them the authority to enact uniform procedures for copying records.
There is now an increasing body of opinions illustrating the principle that the Public Records Act is to be liberally construed in favor of broad public access to public records. See Lemmon v. Connick, 590 So.2d 574 (La.1991); Title Research Corp. v. Rausch, 450 So.2d 933 (La.1984); Cormier v. DiGuilio, 553 So.2d 806 (La.1989); Article 12, Section 3 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 grants Louisiana citizens an unequivocal right to examine public records. This right can be denied only when the law specifically and unequivocally provides against access. Harrison v. Norris, 569 So.2d 585 (La.App.2d Cir.1990), writ denied 571 So.2d 657 (La.1990).
Appellant is of the opinion that the legislative intent of the 1989 amendments to R.S. 44:32 was “not to overwhelm state agencies with request (sic) for copies.” Should the statute in its present form fail to state the true intent of the legislature this Court is not the proper forum to correct this alleged deficiency. Clarification of legislative intent or amendment of the law is reserved to the state legislature.
The appellee filed a peremptory exception with this court seeking to dismiss this appeal on the grounds that there is no appealable issue because none of the three issues which the appellant seeks to appeal was raised in [674]*674the lower court. One of the issues raised by the appellant on appeal is the constitutionality of La.R.S. 44:32. Under C.C.P. Art. 2163, “(T)he appellate court may consider the peremptory exception filed for the first time in that court, if pleaded prior to a submission of the ease for a decision, and if proof of the ground of the exception appears of record”. The grounds for the exception would be the failure to join the Attorney General as an indispensable party when alleging the unconstitutionality of a state statute pursuant to C.C.P. 1880.
In Succession of Walker v. Walker, 524 So.2d 907 (La.App. 5th Cir.1988), the court ruled that a peremptory exception could not be considered for the first time on appeal where the record before the appellate court did not contain grounds for the exception. However, failure to join an indispensable party may be noticed by the Court of Appeal on its own motion. Blanchard v. Naquin, 428 So.2d 926, (La.App. 1st Cir.1983), writ denied 433 So.2d 162 (La.1983).
The question of the constitutionality of a statute could not be considered on appeal, where it had not been passed on by the trial court according to Ricks v. Crowell & Spencer Lumber Co., 189 So. 466 (La.App. 1st Cir.1939), particularly when it is raised only by means of argument, in brief and orally. Marchese v. New Orleans Police Dept., 226 La. 982, 77 So.2d 742 (1955).
The only assertion made initially by the appellant in his response to appellee’s application for writ of mandamus was to file a response brief verifying that the District Attorney’s Office was in compliance with the law and had discharged its obligations to the appellee. Attached to the brief was a copy of their letter to the appellee denying his request for the records on the grounds that the District Attorney’s Office is a state agency and is exempted from providing copies through the authority of La.R.S. 44:32(C)(l)(a). Now, in this Court, in brief, he asserts for the first time that La.R.S. 44:32 “in its present form, is unconstitutionally contradictory, ambiguous and unenforceable.”
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
623 So. 2d 670, 1993 La. App. LEXIS 2722, 1993 WL 316503, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carter-v-connick-lactapp-1993.